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The theory of ‘political’ constitutionalism has for many years provided a distinctive 
perspective on the inter-relation between constitutional law and politics in the UK. However, 
recent and growing criticism of this perspective in the academic literature has created a 
crucial space in which to inquire afresh as to its continuing relevance, and indeed its 
continuing utility, specifically as a lens through which to explore key contemporary issues in 
and of the UK constitution. This thesis explores that crucial space; it engages with and thus 
responds to these various criticisms, in particular those which would characterise political 
constitutionalism—and the ‘legal’ paradigm of constitutionalism to which it has primarily 
emerged as a vital corrective—as presenting (no more than) an essentially highly stylised, 
abstract ‘model’ of ideal-type constitutional arrangements, far-removed, that is, from the 
realities and nuances of how the UK constitution, and the balance of power within it, might 
be seen to operate in practice. Indeed, a significant portion of the literature on political (and 
legal) constitutionalism is so normatively charged and ultimately conducted in such abstract 
terms. Yet, the key argument developed in this thesis is that these debates do not, and thus 
should not be seen to, limit the potential for political constitutionalism to generate important 
insights (of broader conceptual significance) in and of itself.  
In order to explore this potential, the thesis considers the constitutional implications of 
four key (controversial) areas of contemporary counter-terrorism law and policy in the UK, 
namely those areas involving measures which operate so as to deprive an individual (or a 
group of individuals) of their liberty, their privacy, their property, and their life. It is argued 
that the utility of political constitutionalism is vindicated when viewed primarily as an 
explanatory lens, in particular one which emphasises, and thus provides key conceptual tools 
with which to critique, the contestability and contingency of constitutional law and legal 
norms in each these areas. Though, crucially, the various legal and political developments in 
these particular areas of counter-terrorism can be seen, in turn, to raise important questions 
for political constitutionalism itself. The interplay of domestic and international law and 
politics in the context of counter-terrorism raises a key question as to how the framework of 
political constitutionalism might accommodate the latter, where, typically, the law/politics 
dynamic is generally conceptualised as taking place entirely on the domestic plane. 
Moreover, counter-terrorism highlights examples of constitutional arrangements which very 
clearly empower state actors, especially in ways which might be considered undesirable from 
a democratic perspective. The question, therefore, is how this might be reconciled with 
political constitutionalism: a distinctive approach to constitutional analysis which typically 
espouses only the virtues of democratic politics, seldom its vices. The key contribution of the 
thesis is thus: it considers the various ways in which the insights of political constitutionalism 
are brought to bear on counter-terrorism law and policy, and, in turn, highlights the ways in 
which contemporary developments in counter-terrorism law and policy might in turn be seen 









































The threat of terrorism, and the many and various controversial measures employed by the 
state in order to diminish that threat (ultimately so to prevent it from materialising), pose very 
great challenges for liberal democracies and their constitutional arrangements. In a well-
known study of the deeply fraught relationship between these two phenomena, Alex Schmid 
notes that, fundamentally, the ‘main dilemma posed when democracies are confronted by 
terrorism is the one between ACCEPTABILITY and EFFECTIVENESS’: 
 
Antiterrorist measures have to be acceptable to a democratic society. On the other hand they have to be 
effective against a particularly unsavoury type of attack. It looks as if we have to make a cruel choice: 
do we want to sacrifice some democratic substance in order to be effective against terrorism or do we 
have to tolerate a certain level of terrorism for the sake of maintaining the civil liberties and political 




Of course, this dilemma has taken on a particular relevance in the last decades, the concerted 
terrorist attacks in New York, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001 
having laid bare to a global audience the immense and unprecedented destructive potential of 
the modern terrorist threat. Thus, ‘[t]he resurgence of international terrorism on a grand scale 
after [‘9/11’] caused democracies and the international community to inquire afresh whether 
the tools at their disposal were suitable to face such a threat’.
2
 A debate of particular and 
ongoing significance in recent years is that of whether, and if so to what extent, the use of 
extraordinary measures to deal with the contemporary terrorist threat can be reconciled with a 
constitutional commitment to democratic politics, to the principle(s) of the rule of law, to the 
protection of the ‘fundamental’ rights of unpopular minorities. The high stakes of counter-
terrorism law and policy establishes a uniquely pertinent context in which to explore the tense 
interplay of constitutional law and politics. After all, it is in this context that political power is 
exercised by the state in especially novel, if often egregious ways. 
In the United Kingdom, the (often competing) theories of so-called ‘legal’ and ‘political’ 
constitutionalism have exerted a great influence over such key debates. Indeed, such is the 
predominance of these approaches to the study of the UK constitution in the academic 
literature, more broadly. ‘It is true, of course,’ Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber wrote in 
                                                          
1 Alex P Schmid, ‘Terrorism and Democracy’ (1992) 4(4) Terrorism and Political Violence 14, 15. 




2010, ‘that the idea of a political constitution—one that is associated with holding those who 
exercise political power to account, for the most part, through political processes and in 
political institutions—has long since melted into the landscape of constitutional thought, at 
least in Britain’.
3
 Classically—if now perhaps somewhat tritely—‘the idea of a political 
constitution [is juxtaposed] with that of a legal constitution, the latter being associated with 
holding those exercising political power to account, to a substantial and increasing extent, 
through judicial review’, while ‘[i]t is also commonplace to suggest that Britain’s constitution 
is slowly evolving away from a political constitution towards something more akin to a legal 
constitution’.
4
 This discourse has spawned an extensive literature, with much attention having 
been paid, in particular, both to the idea(l) of ‘the political constitution’, most famously given 
expression in John Griffith’s 1978 Chorley Lecture,
5
 and the discrete, distinctively normative 
theory of political constitutionalism to which that idea(l) has given rise.
6
 Questions as to, for 
instance, the contemporary relevance of Griffith’s insights, if any, what it might mean to talk 
of the UK constitution as the archetype ‘political constitution’, and what, if anything, can be 
gleaned from adopting this perspective as a means of understanding the inter-relation 
between law and politics in and of the contemporary constitution, all continue to inspire 
debate in the pages of the law journals.
7
  
It suffices to briefly note here that the development of the theory of political 
constitutionalism has primarily emerged as a vital corrective to the theoretical or principled 
claims of the otherwise prevailing ‘legal’ paradigm of constitutionalism, especially as the 
latter might be assumed to have any normative or indeed explanatory force in the specific 
context of the UK’s constitutional arrangements. That is, the former is principally oriented to 
deconstructing the liberal, value-laden conceptions of ‘law’ and ‘constitution’ in which the 
latter has historically been grounded: that in law and legal norms, and in such instruments as 
‘written’ constitutions and legally-entrenched bills of rights, a political community is capable 
both of identifying a discrete set of foundational (liberal) values and principles—including, 
for example, the rule of law, and ‘fundamental’ individual rights and civil liberties—and, in 
turn, of institutionalising their protection by constraining the ostensibly self-serving and 
potentially destructive practice of (democratic-majoritarian) politics.
8
 Rather, political 
constitutionalism emphasises the limits of law and of such legal norms and constitutionally-
enshrined ‘fundamental’ rights in this regard; it challenges the ‘liberal-legal’ conception of 
the relationship between constitutional law and politics, (re-)framing this relationship as one 
in which, fundamentally, both are contingent upon and thus respond to and are conditioned 
                                                          
3 Graham Gee and Grégoire CN Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30(2) OJLS 273. 
4 ibid 273. 
5 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) MLR 1. 
6 See, especially, Adam Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ (2002) 22(1) OJLS 157; Adam Tomkins, Our 
Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005); Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the 
Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP 2007); Thomas Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political 
Constitution’’ (2007) 70(2) MLR 50; Graham Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of JAG Griffith’ (2008) 28(1) LS 20; 
Gee and Webber (n 3). 
7 See, especially, ‘Political Constitutions’ (2013) 14(12) German LJ; ‘The Political Constitution at 40’ (2019) 30(1) KLJ. 
8 See, eg, Martin Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics (Hart 
Publishing 2000) 193 (emphasis added): ‘Constitutionalism … generates a particular conception of the relationship between 
politics and law. It suggests that law must be conceived as a structure of rules and principles which provides the foundation 






 In other words, political constitutionalism builds on several key arguments 
first expressed in Griffith’s Chorley Lecture, including that ‘politics is what happens in the 
continuance or resolution of … conflicts [within a political community] … [a]nd law is one 
means, one process, by which those conflicts are continued or may be temporarily 
resolved’.
10
 And in the subsequent development of the particular normative bent of political 
constitutionalist theory, which embraces a distinctly celebratory account of democratic 
politics, the conditioning of political power via deliberative and representative political fora 
(most obviously that of Parliament)—whether, for instance, as a means of enhancing the 
liberty of the individual in a political community, or valorising the republican and/or 
collectivist potential of political decision-making—is seen as preferable to the distinctive 
characteristics of law and legal norms and the (limitations of the) paradigm, adversarial 
nature of the judicial process.
11
 
Yet, notwithstanding the influence and the level of depth and maturity—orthodoxy, 
even—that the discourse has achieved in recent years (particularly in the UK), there have in 
fact been recent and growing calls to reject it as an essentially polemical, highly stylised and 
altogether futile debate.
12
 Typically underpinning this criticism is the perception that legal 
and political constitutionalism necessarily caricature ‘law’ and ‘politics’, and archetype 
‘legal’ and ‘political’ institutions (courts and Parliament, respectively), as in perpetual 
opposition with one another, vying, it would seem, for ideal-type constitutional arrangements 
in which law trumps politics, or vice versa. Indeed, one key question in particular on which 
the discourse can be seen to have lingered, generally, concerns the most desirable means by 
which constitutional actors may be ‘limited’ in the exercise of political power (be that, for 
instance, most ‘democratic’, most ‘legitimate’, most ‘effective’): whether by ‘law’ or by 
‘politics’; or whether by courts or by Parliament. Thus, however potentially attractive from 
whatever normative perspective, it has often been said that such an approach to understanding 
(especially) the UK constitution is deemed to be far-removed from the realities of actual 
constitutional practice. There is, in other words, very little to learn about the constitution if 
one’s perception of it is unduly skewed to only its ‘legal’ components, or, alternatively, only 
its ‘political’ components: the constitution is of course ‘mixed’, in this respect.
13
 
Criticism of this sort is increasingly manifest, also, in contemporary debates in UK 
counter-terrorism law and policy, particularly those debates on which the conceptual 
framework(s) of legal and political constitutionalism have been brought to bear. For instance, 
one such debate concerns the legitimacy and effectiveness of counter-terrorism judicial 
review, and in particular the question as to whether in fact it is in the court-room (the 
                                                          
9 Gee and Webber (n 3) 278-79. See, also, eg, Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale, ‘Three Waves of Political 
Constitutionalism’ (2019) 30(1) KLJ 74. 
10 Griffith (n 5) 20. 
11 See, especially, Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (n 6); Bellamy (n 6). 
12 See, especially, Martin Loughlin, ‘The Political Constitution Revisited’ (2019) 30(1) KLJ 5; Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Recasting 
the Political Constitution: From Rivals to Relationships’ (2019) 30(1) KLJ 5. See, also, eg, Robert Brett Taylor, ‘The 
Contested Constitution: An Analysis of the Competing Models of British Constitutionalism’ [2018] PL 500. 
13 See, especially, Kavanagh (n 12). See, also, Adam Tomkins, ‘What’s Left of the Political Constitution? (2013) 14(12) 
German LJ 2275, in which Tomkins—indeed, once the standard-bearer of especially the normative defence of political 
constitutionalism—argues that ‘we should move on from what has become a rather outdated contrast between the political 
constitution and the legal constitution’: ‘[T]he British constitution is neither exclusively political nor exclusively legal … 




archetype ‘legal’ constitutionalist institution) or in Parliament (symbolising ‘political’ 
constitutionalism) that the ‘fundamental’ human rights of those unpopular minorities 
invariably targeted by the state in the name of combatting the threat of terrorism might be 
“better” protected.
14
 And yet this, it is said, is to portray these issues raised by the state’s 
response to the contemporary terrorist threat in a most simplified form; this is to say nothing, 
for example, of how the tensions or ‘balance’ between security and liberty—itself a 
potentially over-simplified and thus essentially problematic framing
15
—are significantly 
heightened, perhaps even distorted, in the light of broader debates in which the response to 
terrorism is characterised as a necessarily ‘emergency’ response by the state, requiring 
‘emergency’ (executive) powers and a concomitant departure from otherwise ‘ordinary’ legal 
and political processes.
16
 Ultimately, the key criticism of the dichotomisation of ‘legal’ and 
‘political’ constitutionalist approaches to these debates is that when applied to the context of 
(counter-)terrorism, which itself is often framed by unhelpful dichotomies, in which 
controversy ever abounds, and in which there are seldom any very simple answers to the, in 
reality, myriad legal, political and constitutional issues which are given rise in this context, 
such approaches are liable to be doubly problematic. In other words, the often fraught 
dialectic between courts and Parliament, between judges and politicians, in times of crisis 
(whether real or perceived) inevitably does much to nuance the scrutiny of counter-terrorism 
law and policy in ways which any such sharply drawn, abstract categorisations are unable to 
properly capture. The problem that this thesis seeks to address, therefore, is whether, and if so 
                                                          
14 See, eg, Mark Tushnet, ‘Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism’ (2005) 118 Harv L Rev 2673; Mark 
Tushnet, ‘The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Parliamentary and Separation-of-Powers Regulation (2007) 3(4) 
Int JLC 275; Victor V Ramraj, ‘Between Idealism and Pragmatism: Legal and Political Constraints on State Power in Times 
of Crisis’ in Benjamin J Goold and Liora Lazarus (eds), Security and Human Rights (Hart Publishing 2007); Keith Ewing, 
‘The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: A Comment’ (2008) 3(4) Int JLC 313; Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Judging the 
Judges under the Human Rights Act: Deference, Disillusionment and the “War on Terror”’ [2009] PL 287; Aileen 
Kavanagh, ‘Constitutionalism, Counterterrorism, and the Courts: Changes in the British Constitutional Landscape’ (2011) 
9(1) ICON 172; Fiona de Londras and Fergal F Davis, ‘Controlling the Executive in Times of Terrorism: Competing 
Perspectives on Effective Oversight Mechanisms’ (2010) 30(1) OJLS 19; Fergal F Davis and Fiona de Londras, Critical 
Debates on Counter-Terrorism Judicial Review (CUP 2013); Alexander Horne and Clive Walker, ‘Lessons Learned from 
Political Constitutionalism? Comparing the Enactment of Control Orders and Terrorism Prevention and Investigation 
Measures by the UK Parliament’ [2014] PL 267; Mark Tushnet, ‘Legal and Political Constitutionalism, and the Response to 
Terrorism’ in David Jenkins, Amanda Jacobsen and Anders Henriksen (eds), The Long Decade: How 9/11 Changed the Law 
(OUP 2014). 
15 See, eg, Laura K Donohue, The Cost of Counterterrorism: Power, Politics and Liberty (CUP 2008) 3: ‘[T]he security or 
freedom framework fails to capture the most important characteristic of counterterrorist law: it increases executive power, 
both in absolute and relative terms, and, in so doing, alters the relationships among the branches of government with 
implications well beyond the state’s ability to respond to terrorism. But this is not the framework’s only omission. Missing, 
too, are the broad social, political, and economic effects of counterterrorism. The dichotomy also glosses over the complex 
nature of both security and freedom. The resulting danger is that the true cost of the new powers goes uncalculated – to the 
detriment of the state.’ 
16 See, eg, Ferghal F Davis and Fiona de Londras, ‘Introduction: Counter-Terrorism Judicial Review: Beyond Dichotomies’ 
in Ferghal F Davis and Fiona de Londras (eds), Critical Debates on Counter-Terrorism Judicial Review (CUP 2013). See, 
also, in the same volume, Gavin Phillipson, ‘Deference and Dialogue in the Real-World Counter-Terrorism Context’. On the 
framing of contemporary counter-terrorism responses as ‘emergency’ action by the state, see, eg, Oren Gross, ‘Chaos and 
Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always be Constitutional?’ (2003) 112 Yale LJ 1011; David Dyzenhaus, The 
Constitution of Law: Legality in a Time of Emergency (CUP 2006); Aniceto Masferrer (ed), Post 9/11 and the State of 
Permanent Legal Emergency: Security and Human Rights in Countering Terrorism (Springer 2012); Alan Greene, 




how and to what extent, specifically political constitutionalism can potentially overcome (or 
rather exist in spite of) these criticisms. 
 
Approach to the research 
 
This thesis explores the various ways in which the insights of political constitutionalism, in 
and of itself, are brought to bear on the constitutional issues which arise in four key areas of 
contemporary counter-terrorism law and policy in the UK. These areas encompass a range of 
counter-terrorism measures employed by the state which throughout the thesis are categorised 
in terms of the particular ‘deprivation’ that they entail: deprivation of liberty; deprivation of 
privacy; deprivation of property; and deprivation of life. The thesis engages in doctrinal and 
theoretical analysis of the relevant legal and policy developments in each of these areas, 
utilising a broad range of primary and secondary materials. It seeks in each case to establish 
not only the relevant legal frameworks which relate to the particular counter-terrorism 
measure(s) under consideration, but also the broader constitutional politics of the very thing 
being ‘deprived’ by the state. 
In categorising an otherwise disparate range of counter-terrorism measures and responses 
in this way, a key benefit of this approach is that it highlights potentially important factors 
which are context-specific, and which impact on the inter-relation of constitutional law and 
politics in ways that alternative political constitutionalist perspectives are perhaps liable to 
obscure. For instance, an approach to political constitutionalism which focuses only (or 
primarily) on the capacity of the parliamentary process to protect ‘rights’, per se, is liable to 
overlook the broader constitutional politics of the relevant ‘right’ in question, as 
distinguished from another. The approach taken in this thesis thus provides the means to 
explore potentially revealing differences in the way(s) in which the UK constitution 
conditions, say, the state’s use of lethal force against terrorist suspects (involving deprivation 
of life), as compared with its approach to, for instance, interception of private 
communications (involving deprivation of privacy). 
It ought to be noted here, also, that the four ‘deprivations’ selected for analysis are not 
intended to provide a comprehensive account of the constitutional implications of the UK’s 
contemporary counter-terrorism response(s). Rather, their selection for the purposes of this 
thesis is intended to cover a range of key substantive areas of contemporary counter-terrorism 
law and policy in the UK which is broad enough to draw important overarching conclusions 
as to, in particular, the utility of political constitutionalism as a distinctive lens through which 
to explore these issues. Potential areas for further research, which are not explored in this 
thesis ultimately for reasons of space, include, for instance, deprivation of citizenship. 
Indeed, the use of powers to deprive suspected terrorists of British citizenship is an 
increasingly central strand of the UK’s response to the contemporary terrorist threat. Its 
topicality is further underlined by the recent high-profile UK Supreme Court case of R (on 
the application of Begum) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
17
 In particular, that 
case raises several issues of fundamental constitutional import, not least as to the clash of 
constitutional principles: between the rights of those whose British citizenship has been 
                                                          




deprived by the state to appeal that decision in an effective and fair hearing, and the 




The thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 is a general conceptual chapter which 
analyses the theories of ‘legal’ and ‘political’ constitutionalism. Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 are 
substantive chapters, each exploring a specific ‘deprivation’, and analysing it in light of the 
concepts set out in Chapter 1. The conclusion then brings together the overarching themes of 
the thesis, and reflects on the overall implications of the argument developed throughout.  
 
Outline of argument 
 
The key argument developed in this thesis engages with and thus responds to the 
contemporary critiques of, specifically, political constitutionalism, and the utility of its 
distinctive perspective on the inter-relation between constitutional law and politics. In 
Chapter 1, it is argued that, contrary to the overriding perception (within these critiques) of 
political constitutionalism as a normative theory which is necessarily, singularly focused on 
the capacity of Parliament to “better” protect ‘fundamental’ human rights than judges and 
courts, rather this does not, and thus should not be seen to, limit the potential for political 
constitutionalism to generate important insights of broader conceptual significance in and of 
itself. That chapter highlights two ways in which political constitutionalism can be seen to 
have explanatory value, in particular by providing key conceptual resources with which to 
critique legalistic analyses of the UK constitution. One way is in its application, if classically, 
as a critique of the problematic legalism of ‘legal’ constitutionalism (especially in the context 
of the UK constitution), whilst recognising that the same problems potentially emerge for any 
reading of political constitutionalism which extols the virtues of democracy, or the ordinary 
political process. Secondly, the application of political constitutionalism ought to be 
considered as a means of understanding the inter-relation between law and politics not only, 
or exclusively, in its power-limiting capacity, but rather, crucially, the empowering, enabling, 
and legitimating function of those dynamics, in and of the constitution. Ultimately, the value 
of political constitutionalism as a distinctive, though above all theoretical approach to 
constitutional analysis raises a key methodological point. That is, by giving the theoretical or 
conceptual challenges facing political constitutionalism—or, indeed, legal 
constitutionalism—a firmer footing in actual constitutional practice, this might allow us to 
understand (even more so than without doing so) the true value of the theory. 
These insights are brought to bear on the constitutional implications of four key 
(controversial) areas of contemporary counter-terrorism law and policy in the UK. Chapter 2 
explores the various developments in and of the modern era of ‘executive detention’ in the 
UK, involving intensely controversial measures which deprive individual terrorist suspects of 
their liberty. In particular, that chapter explores the continuing relevance of the ‘democratic 
sceptic’ critique(s) of the role, throughout these developments, particularly of the language 
and legalism of human rights law—as filtered through the operation of the Human Rights Act 
                                                          
18 See, eg, ibid 135 (Lord Reed P): ‘[I]f a vital public interest – in this case, the safety of the public – makes it impossible for 




1998 (HRA) / European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The impact that this has had 
on bringing the various measures of ‘executive detention’ closer to compliance with the right 
to liberty and security, under art. 5 of the ECHR, is undoubted. Yet, it is argued that, when 
viewed from a ‘democratic sceptic’ perspective, the true impact of the HRA / broader human 
rights paradigm can be seen to emerge: that is, far from representing a ‘vindication’ of the 
HRA, rather its centrality throughout these developments has seen the increasingly nebulous, 
legalistic distinction between ‘deprivation’ and mere ‘restriction’ of liberty entrenched as the 
guiding principles by which debates surrounding the constitutional position of ‘liberty’ are to 
be settled. As a consequence, measures involving, for instance, 12-hour curfews and forced 
relocation (up to 200 miles from one’s family and home life), subject only to very low 
procedural thresholds, have in effect been judicially sanctioned under the HRA, and thus 
allowed to take root as a permanent feature of the contemporary counter-terrorism 
framework, all the while purporting to ‘comply’ with core international human rights 
obligations. 
Chapter 3 considers two ‘categories’ (broadly speaking) of measures which involve 
depriving individuals—indeed, potentially a vast number of individuals—of their privacy: 
first, measures of police ‘stop-and-search’ which, crucially, dispense with grounds for 
reasonable suspicion as an essential procedural condition to their use; and secondly, measures 
of ‘state surveillance’, relating to the interception of communications and to the collection of 
and access to communications data. In this chapter, the legal protection of privacy across 
each of these contexts is shown to be contingent, above all, on art. 8 of the ECHR, as 
enforced in the domestic courts under the HRA. Notably absent from the broader 
constitutional ‘picture’ of the protection of privacy, consequently—that is, in any meaningful 
sense—is the influence of the common law, and of the fundamental constitutional principles 
that the domestic courts have, increasingly in recent years, sought to instrumentalise. Indeed, 
a broader theme for which these issues perhaps contribute a compelling evidence base is that 
of the (in)compatibility of common law constitutionalism, as a conceptual grounding for the 
constitutional position of privacy, with the ‘legal’ constitutionalism of (what might be 
described as the inherently ‘legal’ order of) the ECHR.  
Indeed, that a potential vindication of ‘common law constitutionalism’ can be seen, 
however, to emerge in Chapter 4, which explores several measures specifically entailing the 
‘freezing’ of terrorists’ (and suspected terrorists’) assets, is significant. In other words, that 
the values, principles and standards of review of the common law have been brought to bear 
most acutely, in the contemporary framework of counter-terrorism, on the protection of 
property—and not, for instance, the protection of liberty, much less the protection of privacy, 
as discussed in previous chapters—potentially offers key insights as to the legal norms truly 
foremost in ‘common law constitutionalist’ theory. And yet, there are compelling reasons to 
doubt to practical significance of the common law’s apparently particular disdain for asset-
freezing measures, not least given that judicial demands for clear(er) legislative authority for 
the implementation of such measures in domestic law have consistently been met. The 
invariable result: a domestic legal basis which far exceeds, both in nature and scope, that 
which came before. In this context, the tensions which very clearly emerge from the effective 
‘end-point’ of the common law constitution—that is, the reversal of a judicial decision by 




constitution—are situated within the broader context in which a more fundamental tension 
can be seen to play out: that of the interplay of domestic and international law and politics. 
These tensions arise at their point of intersection in the domestic constitution in various, 
significant ways, though which all point, fundamentally, to the incapacity of the rules, 
principles and standards of review developed in the common law to adequately resolve those 
tensions. And so, whatever ‘victory’ might be claimed by or for the common law, here, the 
key point is that any such ‘victory’ ultimately achieves nothing to diminish the basic 
constitutional reality of the UK’s dualist approach to international law: that executive action 
at the international (UN) level extends to the deprivation of ‘fundamental’ rights in ways that 
are untouched, in practice, by domestic legal arrangements. 
This international/domestic dynamic is further explored in Chapter 5, in which it is shown 
to have particular and significant consequences for the (awkward) constitutional position of 
the UK Government’s contemporary counter-terrorism targeted killing ‘policy’. Indeed, the 
Government has consistently publicly denied that it operates a ‘policy’ of targeted killing, per 
se. Not only, though, is this contrary to mounting evidence in practice, involving several 
examples of the targeted use of lethal force overseas, including against suspected terrorists of 
British nationality. Rather, it is argued in this chapter that much flows from the fact that both 
within the prevailing political rhetoric in this area, and indeed the Government’s counter-
terrorism strategy document, ‘CONTEST’, the emphasis is very clearly on the international 
dimensions of any such use of lethal force for counter-terrorism purposes. This, crucially, can 
be seen to establish a potential base from which to negotiate, though crucially without 
resolving, key tensions in the legal and constitutional positions of such an exercise of power. 
In particular, the potential for the Government to engage exclusively in international legal 
argumentation serves as a smokescreen for questions of fundamental domestic legal and 
constitutional import, including whether, for instance, the executive is or could be 
empowered within the UK constitution to target and kill British citizens, albeit for the 
purposes of counter-terrorism. Among several important questions which are raised as a 
result of this is that of whether the constitutional position of targeted killing is at all 
contingent on the international dimension of that action—whether, in other words, the 
international dimension of a targeted killing operation is, of itself, ultimately determinative 
of the extent to which the Government’s targeted killing policy may be legitimately 
implemented as a matter of UK constitutional law. If this is the case—and indeed it does 
appear to be the case—it results in a peculiar state of affairs in which the domestic legal 
basis, plainly an essential factor in establishing the constitutionality of the Government’s 
targeted killing endeavours, has, in effect, been “outsourced” to the international legal 
framework. 
Through exploring the various ways in which the insights of political constitutionalism are 
brought to bear on these discrete areas of counter-terrorism law and policy in the UK, this 
thesis makes three key contributions to constitutional studies. First, the thesis reveals the 
utility of political constitutionalism as an explanatory lens through which to explore the inter-
relation of constitutional law and politics in the UK. In particular, political constitutionalism 
is shown to provide a vital corrective to legalistic analyses which otherwise foreground and 
(over-)emphasise the practical significance of constitutional law and legal norms. Secondly, 




of the UK’s contemporary counter-terrorism response(s) can be seen to emerge, thus 
deepening our understanding of counter-terrorism law and policy in practice. Specifically, 
these themes include the problematic legalism of the human rights paradigm, and the futility 
of the common law as a source of legal protection of ‘fundamental’ rights and constitutional 
principles. And thirdly, the thesis shows how various contemporary developments in these 
areas of counter-terrorism law and policy in turn generate important insights, or perhaps 
challenges, for the potential development of the theory of political constitutionalism. One 
such challenge concerns the conception within political constitutionalism of the status of 
international law in the domestic constitution. Another is that of the constitutional 
empowerment of state actors (especially in the field of counter-terrorism) in ways which 
might be considered undesirable from a democratic perspective. Quite how these issues 
might, if at all, be reconciled by/with political constitutionalism, which typically frames the 
inter-relation of law and politics exclusive in domestic times, and which eulogises the 











An Overview of the Contemporary Discourse 
on ‘Legal’ and ‘Political’ Constitutionalism, 





In the last decades, an extensive body of scholarship has been motivated by the discourse on 
(often competing) theories of so-called ‘legal’ and ‘political’ constitutionalism. The discourse 
has had—indeed, continues to have—particular traction in the UK as a distinctive framework 
through which to explore, especially, the roles of and inter-relation between law and politics 
in and of the constitution, and, by extension, that of archetype ‘legal’ and ‘political’ 
institutions (namely courts and Parliament, respectively).
1
 That this is so owes much, in the 
first instance, to the broad and enduring influence of John Griffith’s seminal 1978 Chorley 
Lecture, ‘The Political Constitution’,
2
 from which the emergence of the discrete theory of 
political constitutionalism can be seen, above all, to have derived.
3
 Among various 
contemporary developments in constitutional practice in the UK which have prompted a 
‘revival’ of Griffith’s idea(l) of ‘the political constitution’ in recent years is that of its having 
come to be seen as ‘something of a bulwark against the rise of legal (or judicial, or common 
law) constitutionalism’.
4
 That is, in light of the apparent and increasing ‘juridification’
5
 of the 
                                                          
1 See, eg, Adam Tomkins, Public Law (OUP 2003) 18-19: ‘A political constitution is one in which those who exercise 
political power (let us say the government) are held to constitutional account through political means, and through political 
institutions (for example, Parliament) . . . A legal constitution, on the other hand, is one which imagines that the principal 
means, and the principal institution, through which the government is held to account is the law and the court-room.’ 
2 JAG Griffith, ‘The Political Constitution’ (1979) 42(1) MLR 1. Indeed, such is the enduring influence of Griffith’s Chorley 
Lecture in contemporary public law scholarship that it has spawned two special-edition collections in recent years: ‘Political 
Constitutions’ (2013) 14(12) German LJ, and ‘The Political Constitution at 40’ (2019) 30(1) KLJ. 
3 See, eg, Thomas Poole, ‘Tilting at Windmills? Truth and Illusion in ‘The Political Constitution’’ (2007) 70(2) MLR 250, in 
which Griffith’s ‘The Political Constitution’ is described as the ‘founding text’ of the theory of political constitutionalism. 
4 Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale, ‘A Note from the Editors: The State of the Political Constitution’ (2013) 
14(12) German LJ 2103, 2103. 
5 The term ‘juridification’, in essence, denotes a process typically characterised by the proliferation of law and legal 
mechanisms of decision-making and thus the concomitant extension of the judicial role in influencing a broad(er) range of 




UK constitution, in particular throughout the period of accelerated constitutional reform 
under the ‘New’ Labour Government,
6
 those who would advocate the necessary priority of 
the ordinary political process over lofty, value-laden conceptualisations of law and legal 
norms—both as a means of understanding the nature of the latter in actually existing 
(constitutional) democracy, and, crucially, their limitations in establishing the conditions, in 
practice, for ‘real and not fictitious’
7
 accountability—found in Griffith’s Chorley Lecture an 
account of the UK constitution which, at once, gave credence to those notions yet ostensibly 
fell short of grounding them in an explicit normative defence of democratic politics (in the 
UK).
8
 For instance, Adam Tomkins, who might fairly be described as one of the standard-
bearers of the contemporary revival of ‘The Political Constitution’, lamented that Griffith’s 
‘entirely descriptive’ approach offered little in the way of establishing the normative case 
against such developments:  
 
[Griffith] may have believed that the political model of accountability was to be preferred over the 
legal. He may have considered it to be both more democratic and more effective. But he did not believe 
the political model of accountability to be constitutionally required … It was, for him, simply what for 




Broadly speaking, Tomkins’ goal—and subsequently that of others, including, for instance, 
Richard Bellamy,
10
 and Graham Gee and Grégoire Webber
11
—was therefore to construct a 
‘normative interpretation’ of ‘the political constitution’ capable ‘of standing as an alternative 
to the liberal-legal paradigm’.
12
 Thus, with insights gleaned from republican political theory, 
imbued with a distinctly celebratory account of deliberative democratic politics and its 
capacity to (better) secure the liberty of the individual (than ‘law’ and the ‘legal reasoning’ of 
judicial institutions),
13
 Tomkins et al built on the foundations of Griffith’s core arguments—
that ‘political decisions should be taken by politicians’;
14
 that ‘law is not and cannot be a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
which ‘juridification’ is defined as above all involving ‘the increasing role of the courts in processes of collective decision 
making’. 
6 See, especially, Human Rights Act 1998; Constitutional Reform Act 2005. On the contemporary legacies of the ‘New’ 
Labour Government’s programme of constitutional reform, see Michael Gordon and Adam Tucker (eds), The New Labour 
Constitution: Twenty Years On (Hart Publishing 2021). 
7 Griffith (n 2) 16. 
8 See, eg, Graham Gee and Grégoire CN Webber, ‘What is a Political Constitution?’ (2010) 30(2) OJLS 273, 275: ‘Griffith 
seemed to deny normative content to the idea of a political constitution…’ 
9 Adam Tomkins, Our Republican Constitution (Hart Publishing 2005) 39. Although, cf Poole (n 3) 253, in which it is 
argued that ‘[Tomkins] underestimates the polemical dimension of Griffith’s work’. 
10 Richard Bellamy, Political Constitutionalism: A Republican Defence of the Constitutionality of Democracy (CUP 2007). 
11 Gee and Webber (n 8); Graham Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of JAG Griffith’ (2008) 28(1) LS 20. 
12 Goldoni and McCorkindale (n 4) 2104. See, also, Martin Loughlin, ‘The Political Constitution Revisited’ (2019) 30(1) 
KLJ 5. 
13 See, eg, Philip Pettit, Republicanism: A Theory of Freedom and Government (OUP 1997); Quentin Skinner, Liberty 
Before Liberalism (CUP 1998). See, also, Gee, ‘The Political Constitutionalism of JAG Griffith’ (n 11), in which the author 
reconstructs the normative grounding of political constitutionalism with reference to the (Conservative) political theory of 
Michael Oakeshott. 










In many ways, this, the normativity of political constitutionalism, has come to define its 
existence as a distinctive approach to the study of the UK constitution (indeed, constitutions 
and constitutional law more generally): the development of the theory in the last years has 
been marked by its invariably dogged emphasis on (and clear normative preference for) 
‘politics’ over ‘law’, or ‘political’ over ‘legal’ mechanisms of constitutional accountability. 
As discussed in this chapter, political constitutionalism deconstructs the conceptions of ‘law’ 
and ‘constitution’ in which the ‘liberal-legal’ paradigm of constitutionalism—or, simply, 
‘legal’ constitutionalism—is fundamentally grounded: that in law and legal principles, and in 
such instruments as ‘written’ constitutions and legally-entrenched bills of rights, a society is 
capable both of identifying universal values and principles—including, for example, 
‘fundamental’ individual rights and liberties—and of institutionalising their protection from 
the ostensibly self-serving and potentially destructive practice of (democratic-majoritarian) 
politics.
17
 It is of particular significance, moreover, as also discussed in this chapter, that 
insofar as the theory of legal constitutionalism conceives of its primary purpose as the 
establishment of ‘limited government’, and thus anticipates an inherently foundational role 
for law and ‘legal’ institutions both in establishing and enforcing these limits, the theoretical 
development of political constitutionalism has, in the main, been oriented to challenging this 
particular supposition—again, from a distinctively normative perspective.
18
  
It is argued in this chapter that the development of the theory of political constitutionalism 
along these lines has done much, regrettably, to narrow the terms of the debate. That is, in 
this way, political constitutionalism presents itself as in perpetual competition with legal 
constitutionalism, fundamentally at odds over the question as to which of the means by which 
constitutional actors may be ‘limited’ in the exercise of political power is the most ideal (be 
that, for instance, most ‘democratic’, most ‘legitimate’, most ‘effective’): whether by ‘law’ or 
by ‘politics’; whether by ‘legal’ institutions or by ‘political’ institutions. Indeed, narrowing 
further the terms of the debate, it has been suggested that  
 
the attention of Bellamy, Waldron and Tomkins is focused much less on the question of power than 
was the case for Griffith … [and so] in response to the claims by legal constitutionalists that rights are 
best protected by means of constitutional adjudication, the defensive crouch of [the development of 
‘normative’ political constitutionalism] is directed towards the most efficient means—political or legal, 




The upshot is that this, in turn, radically suppresses the potential for political 
constitutionalism to be employed as a viable, indeed potentially valuable, analytical 
framework in and of itself; the discourse on legal and political constitutionalism is liable to 
                                                          
15 ibid. 
16 See, also, Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement (OUP 1999) and Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away from 
the Courts (Princeton University Press 1999) which, although not framed as contributions to the theory of political 
constitutionalism, per se, undoubtedly must be considered to be thematically linked to its development. 
17 Marco Goldoni and Christopher McCorkindale, ‘Three Waves of Political Constitutionalism’ (2019) 30(1) KLJ 74. 
18 See, eg, Tomkins, Republican (n 9); Bellamy (n 10). See, also, Adam Tomkins, ‘In Defence of the Political Constitution’ 
(2002) 22(1) OJLS 157. 




be (and often is) caricatured as above all entailing an ideologically-charged contest between 
highly stylised, abstract ‘models’ of ideal-type constitutional arrangements.
20
 And 
notwithstanding the influence and the level of depth and maturity—orthodoxy, even—that the 
discourse has achieved in recent years, to the extent that, however potentially attractive from 
whatever normative point of view, such ‘models’ are ultimately far-removed from the 
realities of actual constitutional practice, there have been recent calls to reject the discourse 
as an altogether futile debate.
21
 
This chapter explores these various developments in (and contemporary critiques of) the 
discourse on legal and political constitutionalism. It begins by outlining, in Section II, the 
emergence of the theory of constitutionalism, per se, focusing in particular on the various 
ways in which it is grounded, fundamentally, in an overtly legalistic (or ‘liberal-legalistic’) 
conceptualisation of the relationship between constitutional law and politics. This underpins a 
distinct emphasis on several key theoretical or principled claims which, as highlighted in that 
section, can be seen to derive from the apparent centrality within ‘traditional’ or 
‘conventional’ understandings of (the term) ‘constitutionalism’ of, firstly, ‘written’ 
constitutions, as embodying ‘higher’ or ‘fundamental’ law and legal principles, and secondly, 
the idea(l) of ‘limited’ (or ‘limiting’) governmental power, as the principal means by which 
the liberty of the individual may be constitutionally protected. Section III then considers the 
development of the theory of political constitutionalism, in particular tracing its evolution, as 
noted above, from a contemporaneous analysis of the UK constitution in the late-1970s to a 
discrete constitutional theory which challenges both the normative appeal of legal 
constitutionalism as well as its (limited) explanatory value in the specific context of the UK’s 
constitutional arrangements. Finally, Section IV explores two key contemporary critiques of 
the discourse on legal and political constitutionalism which highlight the limitations of, 
respectively, the normative dimensions of political constitutionalism, and the oppositional, 
polarising narrative which has characterised the discourse, per se, in the last years. 
Ultimately, the key question considered in this chapter is whether, and if so how and to what 
extent, political constitutionalism can potentially overcome (or rather exist in spite of) these 
criticisms, and in so doing be employed as a viable explanatory lens through which to analyse 
the UK constitution more broadly, and the constitutional implications of the UK’s 




II. THE THEORY OF CONSTITUTIONALISM, AND ITS ‘LIBERAL-LEGALIST’ 
FOUNDATIONS 
 
In the opening paragraph of a book chapter intended to ‘cast a skeptical eye over the political 
theory associated with the term “constitutionalism”’, its author, Jeremy Waldron, concedes 
                                                          
20 See, eg, Loughlin (n 12); Aileen Kavanagh, ‘Recasting the Political Constitution: From Rivals to Relationships’ (2019) 
30(1) KLJ 43. 
21 See, eg, ibid. 
22 See, eg, Michael Gordon, ‘Parliamentary Sovereignty and the Political Constitution(s): From Griffith to Brexit’ (2019) 
30(1) KLJ 125, 130-31: ‘Although these contrasting models [of legal and political constitutionalism] may usefully be used as 
a framing device through which to understand competing constitutional arrangements, or to analyse the change to such 
arrangements, this should not be seen to limit the potential for political constitutionalism to be considered apart from legal 




that such scepticism (in this particular regard) is the exception, not the norm: ‘I know that 
“constitutionalism” is a term of approbation,’ Waldron writes; ‘we are all supposed to be 
constitutionalists now’.
23
 Of course, there is no doubt that this is an intentionally glib remark: 
the fact of the matter, as Waldron proceeds to explain, is that ‘[t]he potential for 
“constitutionalism” to degenerate into an empty slogan is exacerbated by the fact that the 
word is sometimes used in a way that conveys no theoretical content at all’—that is, ‘[o]ften 
the term seems to mean little more than the thoughtful or systematic study of constitutions 
and various constitutional provisions’.
24
 And although accepting that ‘[t]here is nothing 
wrong with this use of “constitutionalism”’—after all, ‘people can use words however they 
like’—Waldron emphasises that ‘the last two syllables – the “ism” – should at least alert us to 
an additional meaning that does denote a theory or set of theoretical claims’.
25
  
This section explores several of these theoretical claims which, as will be discussed, can 
be gleaned from an understanding of the term ‘constitutionalism’ as situated in the context of 
its historical development. 
 
A. Constitutionalism and ‘Written’ Constitutions 
 
While this chapter is primarily concerned with the oft-made comparison between so-called 
legal and political constitutionalism, it is of note for present purposes that this distinction is a 
relatively contemporary (scholarly) innovation—one which departs, that is, from what might 
be called a ‘traditional’ or ‘conventional’ reading of the theory of constitutionalism, per se. 
Rather, such readings of the theory of (or ideas related to) constitutionalism are said to have 
emerged, crucially, alongside the phenomenon of ‘modern constitutions’: at its core, 
constitutionalism represents what Martin Loughlin describes as the ‘political theory’ which 
accompanies the technique employed by the ‘modern concept of the constitution’, namely the 
adoption of a formal constitutional document, the text of which serves to establish and 
regulate institutions of government, their powers and responsibilities.
26
 This connects 
constitutionalism to a specific form of constitutional arrangement, specifically involving the 
adoption of a ‘written’ constitution. This is a significant connection insofar as it reveals the 
underlying ‘logic’ of constitutionalism and the various theoretical or principled claims in 
which this logic is fundamentally grounded. That is, the link between constitutionalism and 
the phenomenon of ‘written’ constitutions speaks, more broadly, to a specific conception of 
the former as principally concerned with the roles of ‘law’ and ‘constitutions’ both in 
                                                          
23 Jeremy Waldron, ‘Constitutionalism – A Skeptical View’ in Thomas Cristiano and John Christman (eds), Contemporary 
Debates in Political Philosophy (John Wiley & Sons 2009) 267. 
24 ibid 267. See, also, TC Grey, ‘Constitutionalism: An Analytical Framework’ in JR Pennock and JW Chapman (eds), 
Constitutionalism: Nomos XX (New York University Press 1979) 189: ‘Constitutionalism is one of those concepts, evocative 
and persuasive in its connotations, yet cloudy in its analytic and descriptive content, which at once enrich and confuse 
political discourse.’ 
25 Waldron (n 23) 267. 
26 Martin Loughlin, ‘What is Constitutionalisation?’ in Petra Dobner and Martin Loughlin (eds), The Twilight of 




generating and sustaining, above all, the source of governmental authority itself—as is 
commonly understood to represent the function of the latter.
27
 
This follows from the historical context in which the phenomenon of ‘written’ 
constitutions can be seen to have proliferated, involving the subjugation or replacement of 
(autocratic) monarchical regimes, chiefly within Continental states in the 18
th
 century, with 
new forms of popular (democratic) self-government. In other words, the phenomenon of 
‘written’—or, as Loughlin refers to, interchangeably, ‘modern’—constitutions is redolent of a 
wave of constitution-making in which centuries of ‘absolute, authoritarian, or arbitrary rule’ 
were brought to an end by the conscious and decisive actions of a people; in their place 
occupied new governance arrangements, deliberately designed to inhibit the capriciousness of 
those who held the reins of political power.
28
  
When read in this light, the ‘-ism’ in ‘constitutionalism’ can perhaps be taken to signify 
the elevation of ‘the constitution’ which, in turn, denotes a distinctively liberal ideal as to the 
proper relationship between law and politics, between the state and the individual: one which, 
as Loughlin notes, promotes and commands respect for a particular form of government 
‘based on contract, the enumeration of powers, institutionalisation of checks over the exercise 
of those powers, and protection of the individual’s basic rights’.
29
 The idea(l) of the 
constitution here—that is, as understood from this particular historical and political 
perspective—becomes a legal construct: a form of ‘contractual’ arrangement drawn up by its 
framers (‘the people’) between rulers and the ruled. Fundamentally, it signifies, as Dieter 
Grimm suggests, the process of the ‘legalization of political rule’.
30
 And it is at the point at 
which the text of a constitutional document is regarded as positive law that, as Loughlin 
suggests, ‘the idea of the constitution undergoes an important shift’,
31
 in which it takes on the 
status of ‘higher’ or ‘fundamental’ law.
32
 As a result, the foundations of the political order are 
ultimately prescribed by this body of (constitutional) law and legal principles and the text of 
the constitutional document by which they enjoy this superior status.
33
  
Thus, in the way that it appeals to the idea(l) of prescribing the necessary conditions for 
political engagement and collective decision-making—desirably, it seems, through ‘written’ 
constitutional arrangements—the theory of constitutionalism provides a distinctive structure 
through which to conceptualise specifically the legal relationship between those who exercise 
political power and those who are subjected to it. Crucially, it carries with it a bespoke set of 
liberal principles around which institutions of government ought to be organised and to which 
they must aspire and give effect. Indeed, it is perhaps in relation to this point that Waldron’s 
                                                          
27 Martin Loughlin, Sword and Scales: An Examination of the Relationship between Law and Politics (Hart Publishing 2000) 
193 (emphasis added): ‘Constitutionalism … generates a particular conception of the relationship between politics and law. 
It suggests that law must be conceived as a structure of rules and principles which provides the foundation of political 
order.’ 
28 Martin Loughlin, The Idea of Public Law (OUP 2003) 48. See, also, CH McIlwain, Constitutionalism: Ancient and 
Modern (Cornell University Press 1940) 5, in which the adoption of a ‘written’ constitution was described as ‘the conscious 
formulation by a people of its fundamental law’ (emphasis added). 
29 Loughlin, Idea (n 28) 48. 
30 Dieter Grimm, Constitutionalism: Past, Present, and Future (OUP 2016) 3. 
31 Loughlin, Idea (n 28) 48. 
32 The attribution of the status of ‘fundamental law’ to ‘written’ constitutions, the idea that a ‘constitution is a thing 
antecedent to government’, is associated with the philosophy of Thomas Paine: Rights of Man (London, 1791). 




remark—‘we are all supposed to be constitutionalists now’—makes most sense. For insofar 
as these principles seek to establish and protect the liberty of the individual, they can be seen, 
ultimately, to represent markers of ‘good’ governance; they underpin the theory of 
constitutionalism which, in turn, is perhaps ‘best seen as a mindset – a tradition and a 
sensibility about how to act in a political world’.
34
 
A key theoretical claim emerges at this juncture, relating to a particular (sceptical) 
conception of politics, namely one in which politics is characterised as an inherently partisan 
discourse—ruled by passion and prejudice and thus ostensibly preoccupied with self-interest 
and personal aggrandisement—which is capable of bringing about the conditions for tyranny 
and oppression in the exercise of power. As such, the constitutionalist project of establishing 
a social order which aspires to a discrete set of liberty-enhancing principles relies on (and 
therefore emphasises) the suppression of the threat posed by politics.
35
 Constitutionalism is 
therefore grounded in a distinctive conception of ‘law’ which is independent of and, more 
importantly, superior to the ostensibly self-serving practice of politics.
36
 In this vein law is 
cast as neither ‘an assortment of customary practices nor as the commands of a sovereign 
power but as a set of foundational principles which exist to constrain and channel the conduct 
of politics’.
37
 And to that end, the role of law and legal norms and institutions in erecting 
obstacles to constrain the (mis)use of political power seeks to ensure that, in a liberal 
democracy, whomever the populace should return as its elected officials will be in no 
position, in such a capacity, to exercise political power for ill. (The point at which the use of 
power is deemed to be the misuse of power is assessed against its compatibility with 
constitutionally-inscribed “goods”.) In its embrace of the ideal of (and ideals related to) 
individual liberty and its guarding against the potential for the rise of despotism, the 
normativity of the theory of constitutionalism is rooted, clearly, in a ‘classical liberalism’ 
worldview. Indeed, that this view has taken on a particular orthodoxy in contemporary 
readings of the theory of constitutionalism is patent: it is considered a truism that ‘[‘liberal’] 
constitutionalism is the belief that constitutions serve principally to constrain state power for 
the benefit of the individual’.
38
 
A second theoretical claim, then, is that in the place of politics and political bargaining, 
law and legal principles are capable of providing an authoritative account as to the rules by 
which a social order ought to be constructed, and are therefore equally capable of identifying 
and instrumentalising universal (liberal) values and principles for the benefit of an entire 
populace, however diverse. In other words, the theory of constitutionalism ‘seeks to provide 
adequate institutional design to cool passions without forfeiting government efficiency’, and 
‘[b]y formalizing these solutions in a legally binding instrument (the constitution), 
constitutionalism provides the necessary limitations of government (sovereign) power and 
                                                          
34 Martti Koskenniemi, ‘Constitutionalism as Mindset: Reflections on Kantian Themes About International Law and 
Globalisation’ (2007) 8(9) Theo Inq L 9. 
35 Waldron (n 23) 271: ‘Constitutionalism seems to assume that the power of the state needs to be restrained or limited or 
controlled, lest it get out of hand.’ 
36 Judith N Shklar, Legalism: Law, Morals, and Political Trials (Harvard University Press 1964) 111. 
37 Loughlin, Sword and Scales (n 27) 179. 
38 MW Dowdle and MA Wilkinson, ‘Introduction and Overview’ in MW Dowdle and MA Wilkinson (eds), 




affirms the legitimate exercise thereof’.
39
 ‘Law’ and its constitutional role, on this reading, is 
thus characterised not only as having a neutralising effect on the exercise of political power, 
but as also possessing the capacity to predetermine the answers to the many fundamental 
questions which provoke political disagreement. Thus, in the light of Waldron’s statement (in 
the beginning of this section), to be a constitutionalist patently involves accepting the 
authority of the (positive law of the) constitution.
40
 The legitimacy of all other claims to 
authority, including that of a democratically elected government, are subject to the overriding 
authority of ‘the constitution’. Indeed, in this sense, constitutionalism (as a distinctive 
theoretical framework) establishes a space in which ‘the constitution’ and ‘democracy’ 
potentially emerge as competing legitimacies.
41
 
Above all, in the light of these various theoretical or principled claims it appears, 
fundamentally, to endorse, the theory of constitutionalism can be seen to rest on a specific 
functional logic:
42
 that institutions of government are constituted—that is, delegated a limited 
authority (by those governed by these institutions) to promote the public good
43
—so as to 
perform specific functions in the activity of governing, that those functions may be 
enumerated, and, as such, their nature and scope conceivably delimited. In turn, 
constitutionalism anticipates that those institutions of government retain the legitimacy and 
legal authority to govern only insofar as their actions remain within the scope of the powers 
conferred upon them by the text of the constitutional document (as a form of ‘higher’ or 
‘fundamental’ law)—or, in other words, to the extent that they act within the boundaries of 
the consent originally granted by ‘the people’ at the point of the constitution’s inception. And 
insofar as constitutionalism involves the elevation of ‘the constitution’ as representing a body 
of ‘higher’ or ‘fundamental’ law which imposes constraints on political power, its 
explanatory value—when applied to specific constitutional arrangements—may in fact 
depend on particular arrangements, for instance involving institutions which are organised in 
such a way as to ensure that these constitutional-legal constraints may be enforced. 
 
B. Constitutionalism as Constraint: Legally ‘Limited’ (or ‘Limiting’) Government 
 
A ‘traditional’ or ‘conventional’ reading of the theory of constitutionalism, as resting 
primarily on the existence of a constitutional text which both enables and constrains (the 
powers of) institutions of government, presents an obvious paradox in the context of the 
UK’s constitutional arrangements. Lacking, as it does, a ‘written’ constitution—in the sense 
that the source of the legitimacy of governmental institutions derives not from the text of a 
singular, fundamental constitutional document, but rather from custom, convention, historical 
practice, and ostensibly well-established legal and political norms—there appears to be little 
evidence to support the idea that the theory of constitutionalism (as classically understood) 
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has any explanatory value in this context.
44
 Indeed, it has been suggested that it is precisely 
the application of the theory of constitutionalism to the British context which has generated 
confusion with the meaning of the term ‘constitution’, itself: 
 
In the 19th century what was meant by the term “constitution” was reasonably definite and clear. 
Paradoxically enough, if the word retained some ambiguity, this was because of the British 
constitution; that is, because the mother country of modern constitutionalism appeared to have an 
obscure constitution, or even – according to some of the standards that seemed very important 




However, there are perhaps two ways in which this conceptual tension might be resolved. 
One way is to accept, simply, that what Colin Turpin and Adam Tomkins call ‘[t]he British 
version of constitutionalism’
46
 clearly rests on different, although by no means radically 
different, foundations. That is, ‘[a]lthough [the UK] lack[s] a general theory of the 
constitution, there has come down to us an idea of constitutionalism – of a constitutional 
order which acknowledges the necessary power of government while placing conditions and 
limits upon its exercise’.
47
 Rather, the main difference is that the nature and form of these 
conditions and limits in the UK has been shaped, primarily, ‘by a number of leading ideas or 
principles [which have] crystallised as rules or doctrines of the constitution’.
48
 And, indeed, 
inasmuch as constitutionalism’s theoretical or principled claims will, at times, appear 
incongruous with those of democracy (as noted above), equally ‘[i]t will appear that, at times, 
there is conflict, or tension, between these ideas: between democracy, for instance, and 
parliamentary sovereignty, or between sovereignty and the rule of law’.
49
 Fundamentally, this 
approach prompts a (re)consideration of the key substantive differences between the ways in 
which ‘written’ and ‘unwritten’ constitutions might constrain the powers of institutions of 
government. Of this, Adam Tucker writes that ‘[w]e might say that there is, in principle at 
least, no limit to the kind of constraints that a written constitution could incorporate’: ‘[a]s 
long as a limit can be written down, it could be included, even if it is irrelevant or even 
contrary to the scheme of government that the document otherwise reflects or constructs’.
50
 
By contrast, an ‘unwritten’ constitution such as the UK’s ‘can only incorporate the kind of 
limits that are capable of emerging as part of a … political decision as to the scheme of 
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government that the constitution embodies’, which means, crucially, that ‘only limits that are 
derived from the scheme of democracy underlying the unwritten British constitution can 
feasibly emerge in British constitutionalism’.
51
 In other words, ‘writtenness’ is relevant to the 
manner in which power is conditioned or limited only insofar as it ‘permits limits that are 
external to the scheme of government generally enacted in a constitution to be appended to its 
provisions whereas unwritten constitutions are limited in the sense that only limits that are 
entailed by the scheme of government they enact are feasible’.
52
 
A potentially significant development in contemporary understandings of the theory of 
constitutionalism offers another way of overcoming the difficulties with its application in the 
context of the UK, namely that of the apparent severing of the link, altogether, between 
constitutionalism and the phenomenon of ‘written’ constitutions. It has been suggested that 
the need to sustain this link is no longer (if it ever was) as pressing as a ‘conventional’ 
account of the theory would appear to imply. That constitutionalism is, as Waldron has 
written, above all concerned with ‘controlling, limiting, and restraining the power of the 
state’
53
 is perhaps, as it seems, all that matters. As Paul Scott puts it, ‘constitutionalism has 
broken free from its moorings within the discrete constitution’.
54
 This, what Scott refers to as 
‘the conceptual inflation’ of constitutionalism—which, in essence, involves the 
disaggregation of the theory of constitutionalism and the phenomenon of ‘written’ 
constitutions, with the resulting emergence of the former as a ‘self-standing ideal’—marks a 
significant shift in the way in which the concept may apply to specific contexts, especially 
that of the UK’s constitutional arrangements.
55
 In line with Waldron’s emphasis of the 
‘controlling, limiting, and restraining’ aspects of constitutionalism, and McIlwain’s 
suggestion that the ‘one essential quality’ of the theory of constitutionalism is its representing 
a ‘legal limitation on government’,
56
 the theory might be repackaged, simply, as the theory of 
‘limited government’.  
What, though, of the centrality within the theory of constitutionalism of the idea(l) of 
‘higher’ law, and of ‘fundamental’ legal principles—if not in the specific form of a ‘written’ 
constitution? A distinctive approach to this question, as it pertains in particular to the UK’s 
constitutional arrangements, has emerged in the last decades, in which, fundamentally, it is 
the common law which is positioned as a body of ‘higher-order law’
57
 to which even the 
otherwise ‘unlimited’ law-making power of Parliament is apparently subject.
58
 The essence 
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of this approach, which is most explicitly developed in the work of Trevor Allan
59
 and Sir 
John Laws,
60
 is thus ‘the reconfiguration of public law [in the UK] as a species of 
constitutional politics centred on the common law court’.
61
 So-called ‘common law 
constitutionalism’ posits that the common law ‘comprise[s] a network of moral principles 
which reflect values considered to be fundamental’.
62
 In turn, the role of the courts in 
reviewing the lawfulness of legislative or administrative action is ‘value-oriented (directed at 




For constitutionalism to exist as a self-standing ideal, then, it appears that it need only 
require that ‘fundamental’ legal principles exist somewhere, albeit not within (the specific 
form of) a ‘written’ constitution. Provided that it represents ‘the product of political 
bargain’—that is, as discussed above, the expression of the contractual arrangement 
sanctioned by the constitution’s framers—the discrete, ‘written’ constitution may be reduced 
to little more than a ‘useful aid to the activity of statecraft’,
64
 albeit one which has clearly 
prevailed as the dominant mode of statecraft in recent history. Yet, more importantly, the 
upshot is that the theory of constitutionalism can be said to derive its normative and/or 
explanatory force merely from its embrace of the idea(l) of ‘limited’, or ‘limiting’ political 
power, which—reflecting the liberal principles with which it is imbued—it regards as a 
precondition for guaranteeing the liberty of the individual.
65
 
Two (related) questions are of note at this point. The first concerns the meaning of the 
term ‘limited government’—or what it means, in practice, that constitutionalism speaks 
specifically to the activity of ‘limiting’ the scope and nature of the power(s) of governmental 
institutions. On this point, Waldron suggests that the term ‘limited government’ refers ‘not 
just to the avoidance of particular abuses, but to a broader sense of what is and what is not the 
government’s proper function’.
66
 The philosophy of John Locke is instructive—indeed, 
perhaps instrumental—in this respect. For in Locke’s Second Treatise of Civil Government, 
the idea of ‘limited government’ is said to derive, in large part, from the notion of original 
grant: the point at which ‘the people’ consents to be governed by those institutions which it 
has itself established. This power-conferring moment—that is, the moment at which political 
power within the constitution is fundamentally constituted—is a crucial aspect of the concept 
of ‘limited government’, for it is claimed that the granting of consent by ‘the people’ involves 
the giving of ‘only a fiduciary duty to act for certain ends’;
67
 rather, ‘the people’ retain a 
‘supreme power’, with which they cannot part, to withdraw consent to be ruled by institutions 
which fall into disrepute, or which no longer serve the salus populi (meaning the ‘health’, 
‘safety’, or ‘security’ of ‘the people’):  
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[A]ll power given with trust for the attaining an end, being limited by that end, whenever that end is 
manifestly neglected, or opposed, the trust must necessarily be forfeited, and the power devolve into 





The notion of trust thus features prominently in this rendition. Those who possess political 
power do so on the condition that it be used for the good of those who benefit from and are 
subjected to its exercise. As Loughlin notes, in the context of Locke’s theory, ‘[g]overnors 




The second question, then, concerns the apparent centrality within the theory of 
constitutionalism that these limitations on government are necessarily legal in nature. The 
notion of ‘limited government’ not only, in this sense, reiterates the significance of the role 
that law plays in the ‘conventional’ understanding of the theory of constitutionalism. Rather, 
the issue here is that the necessarily legal dimension of these limits inevitably speaks to 
specific institutional arrangements, that is, most obviously highlighting the role of the 
judiciary. As Loughlin suggests, where positive law is treated as ‘laying the foundations of 
political order’,
70
 the role of the judiciary, as the principal interpretive body of positive law 
and legal norms, in the context of ‘limited government’, necessarily involves determining the 
nature and scope of institutional power(s) dictated by the ‘fundamental’ or ‘higher’ law of the 
constitution. In other words, the theory of constitutionalism accords to the judiciary a 
significant role in adjudicating not only disputes about the enforcement of ‘ordinary’ law—
for instance, the enforcement of contractual obligations, the righting of tortious wrongs, the 
punishment of criminal activity, and so on—but disputes as to the nature and content of the 
law which itself establishes the authority of ‘ordinary’ law, and, consequently, the rules 
around which a society is ordered. On this basis, as Waldron notes, ‘[s]upport for judicial 




Legal constitutionalism places much emphasis on the need to establish the constitutional-
legal source of authority for the exercise of political power. The power(s) of governmental 
institutions are considered to be enumerated, concrete and often only dispensed with in 
accordance with strict, constitutionally-defined procedures for amendment or repeal. In light 
of this, it is in relation to the question of exceptional, or ‘extra-legal’, power that legal 
constitutionalism becomes somewhat obstructive. The existence of those powers about which 
constitutions are silent presents for legal constitutionalism a significant challenge. Questions 
of executive power are radically obscured, which is perhaps deeply unhelpful as a means of 
understanding the nature and scope of that power in practice, the executive being, in fact, ‘the 
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most powerful of state institutions’;
72
 the conventional understanding of the theory of 
constitutionalism evinces a preoccupation with ‘extra-legal’ or discretionary power as 
representing, in the first instance, a potential abuse of legal authority which must be 
constrained.
73
 And insofar as it is concerned with limiting the exercise of, specifically, the 
arbitrary or exceptional exercise of political power, constitutionalism shares an inherent 
connection with other self-standing ideals such as ‘the rule of law’ and ‘the separation of 
powers’. 
 
III. POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
The discussion of the theory of constitutionalism above, and in particular the (liberal) 
conceptions of ‘law’ and ‘constitution’ in which it is fundamentally grounded, has thus far 
shown that one encounters several fundamental difficulties in seeking to ground an account 
of this theory in the specific context of the UK. Perhaps inevitably: although as Dowdle and 
Wilkinson note, ‘the modern, liberal vision of constitutionalism … has come to dominate the 
‘comparative’ constitutional imagination’, indeed ‘like all regulatory ideas, it is a product of 
particular circumstances: [i]ts foci reflect the concerns of time and place’.
74
 ‘These concerns 
and prescriptions are important,’ it is suggested, ‘but at the same time, they inevitably 




As discussed in this section, the discrete theory of political constitutionalism has emerged 
in recent years as a vital challenge—indeed corrective—to the ‘liberal-legal’ paradigm of 
constitutionalism; political constitutionalism constructs both a distinctive conceptual critique 
of (the normative appeal of) this paradigm, as well as an empirical critique of its (limited) 
explanatory value as a theoretical framework through which to explore the inter-relation 
between law and politics in and of the UK constitution. 
 
A. From Griffith’s ‘The Political Constitution’ to the Theory of ‘Political 
Constitutionalism’: The Normative Challenge to the ‘Liberal-Legal’ Paradigm 
 
Since the term was employed as the title of John Griffith’s 1978 Chorley Lecture, it is a 
truism that the UK constitution is considered to represent the archetype ‘political 
constitution’.
76
 Against the backdrop of the ‘highly combustible’ socio-economic and 
political landscape of the UK in the 1970s, Griffith’s lecture presented an account of the UK 
constitution as one which rests, above all, on the inevitability of such conflict in society. 
Griffith’s view, crucially, was that the means of resolution derived not from the ostensible 
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universality of law, nor in appeals to lofty abstractions such as ‘social solidarity, the 
conscience of mankind or justice or fairness or fundamental legal principles’,
77
 of which 
‘written’ constitutions purport to be the embodiment and judges the ultimate adjudicators and 
guardians. (In other words, liberal aspirations of the kind endorsed within ‘legal’ 
constitutionalism, as outlined in Section II, above, offer little in the way of conceiving how 
conflict in society may realistically be managed, per se—much less, that is, in the context of 
the UK.) Rather, only political judgment—that is, ‘political decisions taken by politicians’—
would, if anything, supply the remedies.
78
  
Gee and Webber helpfully distil the core argument developed by Griffith in ‘The Political 
Constitution’ into four key ideas.
79
 The first is that there is ‘no sharp distinction between law 
and politics’,
80
 a point to which Griffith alludes in suggesting that law merely represents the 
continuation of politics by some other means;
81
 legal constructions, says Griffith, such as 
‘written’ constitutions and bills of rights, ‘merely pass political decisions out of the hands of 
politicians and into the hands of judges or other persons’.
82
 The second idea concerns the 
inter-relation between law and politics: ‘each respond to and are conditioned by’ what 




 Thirdly, Gee and Webber 
highlight Griffith’s profound scepticism of ‘reasoning under the rubric of rights’, once again 
owing, above all, to the fundamental contestability of (the politics of) rights discourse—a 
technical and elite form of discourse, sure, but a political discourse, involving ‘political 
claims by individuals and by groups’,
85
 nonetheless, in which questions as to, for instance, 
“which rights?”, and “whose rights?” ever abound.
86
 ‘One danger of arguing from rights’, 
Griffith wrote, ‘is that the real issues can be evaded’: ‘[w]hat are truly questions of politics 
and economics are presented as questions of law’.
87
 And finally: instead of purporting to 
capture a bespoke set of essential societal rules in such instruments as legally-entrenched bills 
of rights, rather the best that we can do, Griffith argues, is to ‘enlarge the areas for argument 
and discussion in the political process’,
88
 including, that is, argument and discussion about 
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Two overarching themes emerge from these ideas, which, for present purposes, might be 
labelled ‘democratic accountability’ and ‘the limits of law’.
90
 On one hand, these themes 
cohere to form the basis of the challenge that Griffith’s account (of ‘the political 
constitution’) poses to the ‘liberal-legal’ paradigm of constitutionalism (in other words ‘legal’ 
constitutionalism), and in particular to the conceptions of ‘law’ and ‘constitution’ on which 
this paradigm is based.
91
 On the other hand, these themes are among the particular ideals 
which underpin what would, in the decades following Griffith’s lecture, ground a discrete and 
explicitly normative theory of political constitutionalism. 
The first theme can be seen to relate directly to Griffith’s (normative) claim that ‘political 
decisions should be taken by politicians’.
92
 In other words, political power ought to be 
exercised by those who are, in Griffith’s terms, ‘removable’; that those in public office might 
exercise power in the knowledge that they face the threat of removal from that office is key to 
establishing the conditions for ‘real and not fictitious’ accountability.
93
 Inherent to this view, 
then, and to the conceptualisation of ‘the political constitution’ more broadly, is the idea(l) of 
democratic accountability. It has been suggested by Michael Gordon that whilst Griffith does 
not go so far as to lionise the concept of democracy, per se, ‘that Griffith’s conception of the 
political constitution was, ultimately, a democratic one—even if a very thin democratic one—
seems apparent in his emphasis on the removability of those in power’.
94
  
The theoretical development of political constitutionalism, particularly in the work of 
Tomkins and Bellamy, involves an attempt to unpack / build upon the normative appeal of 
this particular aspect of ‘the political constitution’: democratic-political—as opposed to 
‘legal’—accountability.
95
 For instance, Bellamy’s contribution seeks to expose the fallibility 
of law and legal institutions in facilitating democratic decision-making in two key respects: 
 
The first is that we reasonably disagree about the substantive outcomes that a society committed to the 
democratic ideals of equality of concern and respect should achieve. The second is that the democratic 




As to the normativity on which political constitutionalism is ostensibly founded, then, as Gee 
and Webber note, ‘the idea of a political constitution is one that is prescriptive without really 
prescribing’.
97
 In other words, in contrast to the theoretical claims of legal 
constitutionalism—that is, that in law a (liberal) political community can, indeed must, pre-
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determine certain boundaries to collective decision-making crucially as a means of 
suppressing the threat of democratic-majoritarian politics—conceiving a constitution within 
the political constitutionalist paradigm requires political actors to devise suitable 
arrangements for establishing, sustaining and, where necessary, amending prescriptions for 
constitution-making; rather, ‘it is for us all, for the most part acting through representatives in 
political institutions, to do the prescribing’.
98
 Indeed, that democracy supplies the underlying 
rationale for this sort of constitution-making is evident, for a true democracy is arguably one 
which is unbounded in its ability to effect substantive (and ongoing) change—including, 
importantly, as to the nature and form of the relevant process(es) through which such change 
may be implemented, and in turn, the constitution itself. 
The second theme, then, emerges in respect of the perceived ‘limits’ of law. In Griffith’s 
account of ‘the political constitution’, law is regarded as neither capable of sustaining the 
necessary conditions for fruitful and legitimate political decision-making, much less capable 
of providing any truly authoritative statement of the “good” outcome in the resolution of 
political conflict(s). Instead, law is no more than ‘one means, one process, by which those 
conflicts are continued or may be temporarily resolved’.
99
 And it is at this point that the 
theory of political constitutionalism perhaps most strikingly sets itself apart from the 
conventional reading of constitutionalism as the theory of (legally) ‘limited government’. As 
Goldoni and McCorkindale suggest, Griffith’s account is fundamentally at odds with that 
which lies at ‘the heart of the project of legal (or liberal) constitutionalism: the fiction that 
these conflicts ought to be contained – and can be contained – by law’.
100
 Whereas to give 
effect to the theory of legal constitutionalism involves ascribing to the constitution a set of 
universal values which are duly protected by law and legal norms and institutions, political 
constitutionalism recognises, and more importantly embraces, the irreducibility of such 
(‘universal’) values on which stable social orders are purportedly founded. This is captured 
by Griffith’s oft-repeated maxim: 
 
The constitution of the United Kingdom lives on, changing from day to day for the constitution is no 
more and no less than what happens. Everything that happens is constitutional. And if nothing 




Here, Griffith emphasises what legal constitutionalism appears to take for granted: the 
fundamentally contestable nature of constitutions. Rather, a constitution is innately dependent 
on the political forces that both establish and maintain it. The development of the theory of 
political constitutionalism is marked, therefore, by its deconstruction of these conceptions of 
‘law’ and ‘constitution’ (in and of ‘the political constitution’), and, more importantly, its 
emphasis on the question—often overlooked or underdeveloped within the ‘liberal-legal’ 
paradigm of constitutionalism
102
—as to how political power is not only constituted, but 
continuously re-constituted, and sustained by a broader political discourse, within which law 
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operates as one—albeit important—form of political interaction, but is political 
nonetheless.
103
 Rather, ‘constitutional law does not stand above politics: they are two sides of 
one coin’.
104
 If, therefore, democracy represents the yardstick by which the propriety of 
institutional arrangements can or should be determined, then the (continuing) legitimacy of 
constituted power is conditioned by the ebb and flow of the democratic will for the time 
being—as determined not only by substantive and procedural norms as reflected in law and 
legal arrangements, but by the inputs and outputs of the ordinary political process. And so, far 
from seeking to exclude law, as Gordon notes, ‘[t]he political constitution … serves to 
emphasise the limits of law as a social instrument, and—recognising that law and politics are 




B. From the UK’s ‘Political Constitution’ to a ‘Legal Constitution’? 
 
The emergence of the discrete theory of ‘political’ constitutionalism has been presented as a 
distinct challenge in particular to the normative ‘hegemony’ of the ‘liberal-legal’ paradigm of 
constitutionalism.
106
 Among the key debates to which this discourse has given rise, as Gee 
and Webber suggest, is that which involves the juxtaposition of the idea (and ideals) of a 
‘political constitution’ with that of a ‘legal constitution’, the latter of which is principally 
‘associated with holding those exercising political power to account, to a substantial degree 
and increasing extent, through judicial review’.
107
 In turn, this has entailed a tendency to 
conceive of the contemporary British constitution as ‘slowly evolving away from a political 
constitution towards something more akin to a legal constitution’
108
—that is, from a 
constitutional order which broadly reflects and/or embraces the ideals of ‘political’ 
constitutionalism to one which appears to give effect, whether in theory or in practice, to the 
principles underpinning the ‘rival theory’
109
 of ‘legal’ constitutionalism).
110
 
There is scope to question, therefore, whether the discourse on ‘legal’ and ‘political’ 
constitutionalism, especially within the broader context of the UK’s constitutional 
arrangements, primarily involves an exercise in description or prescription: taking stock of 
what actually happens, or postulating what ought to happen.
111
 In other words, whether, as 
Gordon writes, ‘the necessary constitutional priority of politics was, for Griffith, simply an 
empirical truth or also a principled position is open to debate’.
112
 As Goldoni and 
McCorkindale’s recent contribution makes clear, the development of the theory of political 
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constitutionalism has so far happened in three stages, or (as the authors put it) ‘three waves’: 
first, the ‘functionalist wave’, embodied by Griffith’s scholarship (especially Griffith’s 
Chorley Lecture itself), which critiques the conception of law and legal norms and values on 
which ‘legal’ constitutionalism is founded; second, the ‘normative wave’, associated most 
directly with the work of Tomkins and Bellamy, which (as outlined in the introduction to this 
chapter) seeks to mount a distinctively normative defence of the necessary primacy of politics 
over law, and, by extension, political over legal institutions, specifically in the context of 
devising constitutional accountability mechanisms; thirdly, and newly, the ‘reflexive wave’, 
which seeks to retrieve some of the insights of the first ‘wave’ whilst seeking to overcome the 
constraints of the second ‘wave’, ultimately inquiring as to what, exactly, is ‘political’ about 
‘the political constitution’ or ‘political constitutionalism’.
113
 That each ‘wave’ is ‘marked by 
a specific methodological angle’
114
 therefore helps to explain why the theory of political 
constitutionalism can be, and has been, employed as an analytical framework for both 
descriptive and prescriptive purposes. Added to this, however, is the conflict running through 
the debate on the theories of ‘legal’ and ‘political’ constitutionalism, namely whether, and if 
so to what extent, such theorising in and of itself potentially offers anything in the way of 
shedding light on real-word constitutional practice—whether, perhaps, in pitting these 
theories against one another other, there is in fact little more to gain than the opportunity, 
merely, to pontificate about which ideal-type, abstract ‘model’ of constitutionalism is the 
more normatively desirable.  
Though, it is in the reaction to the recent period of significant constitutional reform in the 
UK that one may readily identify the ways in which the juxtaposition of ‘legal’ 
constitutionalism and ‘political’ constitutionalism has been employed as a potentially 
effective framework for assessing, rather from an empirical (primarily descriptive) 
perspective, changes to the form and substance of the constitution. Often during this period, 
as Gee and Webber recognise, were claims made to the effect that a marked shift in the UK’s 
constitutional architecture had occurred: a shift from a ‘political constitution’ to a ‘legal 
constitution’. Tomkins—in whose scholarship this sort of labelling has been readily 
employed,
115
 albeit if no longer
116
—has suggested that this shift (which he in fact describes 
as ‘from a privileging of political constitutionalism in Britain to a privileging of legal 
constitutionalism’) is most explicitly reflected in a series of particular, related 
developments.
117
   
The first development, Tomkins notes, concerns the ostensible decline in both the potency 
of and faith in political accountability in the UK generally, and in the doctrine of ministerial 
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 The essence of the doctrine is that ministers are accountable to 
Parliament—the UK’s foremost ‘political’, democratic institution—for actions taken in the 
conduct of public office. And insofar as political accountability constitutes one of the 
foundational tenets of the theory of political constitutionalism, it is no stretch, therefore, to 
conceive of its compromise as undoing much of the explanatory force, or indeed normative 
attractiveness, of the theory as a whole. Tomkins thus insinuates that the ostensible loss of 
confidence in the ability of political actors to sustain the conditions required to hold power-
wielders to account effectively is consistent with, and perhaps serves as an viable explanation 




A second development, then, pertains to an apparent ‘strengthening of the rule of law and 
a furthering of the constitutional role of the courts’.
120
 Here, Tomkins cites as evidence of this 
the cumulative effect of several contemporary judicial developments, including: the courts’ 
increasing interventionism, including in matters such as the exercise of prerogative 
powers
121
—the legal issue at the heart of R v Home Secretary, ex p Fire Brigades Union;
122
 
the creation of a ‘new species of common law constitutional rights’, as evidenced by R v 
Secretary of State, ex p Simms;
123
 and the introduction of a statutory power to review primary 
legislation for compatibility with European human rights norms following the enactment of 
the Human Rights Act 1998.
124
 Indeed, the third development which Tomkins highlights, 
namely that of the now well-known obiter in Jackson v Attorney General,
125
 ought to be 
included here too. For the significance of these related developments rests on an appreciation 
of the rule of law—which itself embodies the idea(l) of government limited by law—as the 
guiding principle of legal constitutionalism, and especially the ‘common law 
constitutionalist’ variant thereof.
126
 In Jackson, the contemporary propriety of the doctrine of 
Parliament’s ‘unlimited’ legislative power as the fundamental principle of the UK 




 And thus the particular 
relevance of this, in the scheme of ‘legal’ and ‘political’ ‘models’ of constitutionalism, may 
be explained by reference to what Scott has called the ‘thematic linkages’ between (the ideals 
of) ‘political’ constitutionalism and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty.
129
 That is, the 
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contemplation, by senior members of the judiciary, of legal limits sourced in the common law 
which might exist to prescribe the policy choices of democratically elected governments, and 
apparently to ward against complaisant parliamentarians who would legislate contrary to 
‘fundamental’ rights and rule-of-law principles, clearly resonates with the core ideals of legal 
constitutionalism—especially the ideal of (legally) ‘limited’ and ‘limiting’ government. For 
this reason (as is Tomkins’ implication), Jackson, the powers to review primary legislation 
for human rights-compliance under the HRA, and the development of a line of legal 
reasoning which seeks to establish and instrumentalise a repository of ‘common law 
constitutional rights’, may be taken to represent a clear endorsement of these ideals in 
practice, thus marking a consequential shift in attitude amongst important institutional actors 
as to which theory or account of the UK constitution—‘legal’ or ‘political’—is, or might be, 
most consistent with prevailing (if new) constitutional orthodoxy. 
For present purposes, Tomkins’ survey of these (significant) contemporary constitutional 
developments is instructive: it provides a vivid example of the way in which a turn to the 
‘models’ of constitutionalism envisaged by the theories of ‘legal’ constitutionalism and 
political constitutionalism might serve as a viable, indeed valuable explanatory framework 
for understanding the UK constitution, how it works, how it changes, or perhaps might be 
changing. The response prompted by the sorts of developments identified by Tomkins 
primarily concerns the extent to which, empirically, the UK’s traditionally ‘political 
constitution’ (and concomitant reception, traditionally, of those ideals central within the 
broader theory of political constitutionalism) can be seen or said to have withstood the 
adoption of constitutional innovations more readily associated with the idea(ls) of a ‘legal 
constitution’ (and thus the accompanying theory of legal constitutionalism). Above all, this 
demonstrates the way in which the realities of constitutional practice may be tested with such 
‘models’ of constitutionalism, per se: whether, that is, developments in constitutional practice 
can be seen to map onto the blueprint of a constitutional order as conceived within ‘legal’ or 
‘political’ constitutionalist paradigms. The end to which this style of constitutional analysis is 
oriented ultimately leads to the question as to whether the nature of a particular constitutional 
order can be said to rest primarily on either ‘legal’ or ‘political’ foundations. Yet, of course, a 
prominent strand of this scholarship has extrapolated this method, using it as a vehicle to 
inquire, ultimately, as to whether such fundamental change constitutes a normatively 
desirable development.
130
 It is in this respect that the realities of constitutional practice are 
tested against normative ‘models’ of constitutionalism. 
The discourse thus operates on two planes. On one hand, those who would assess real-
world constitutional arrangements against the normative dimensions of legal and/or political 
constitutionalism are ultimately oriented to a specific objective: that is, to draw upon the 
ideals advanced by these abstract ‘models’ of constitutionalism for the purposes of assessing 
whether various trends in constitutional developments are deemed to be normatively positive 
or negative—for example, whether they are conducive or obstructive to the ends of, say, the 
protection of ‘fundamental’ rights. Therefore, as normative ‘models’ of constitutionalism 
which are albeit detached from real-world constitutional practice(s), legal and political 
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constitutionalism may serve as benchmarks of “the good constitution” against which these 
developments can be assessed. In this sense, legal and political constitutionalism are 
employed from a “top-down” perspective: which ‘model’ is the more accurate ‘fit’ with 
current constitutional arrangements, realities, practices? Or, perhaps: which reform(s) ought 
to be implemented to align the UK’s constitutional arrangements with the ideals of, for 
instance, legal constitutionalism, and so give effect to the ideals endorsed by this theory? 
(The answer to which, for instance, might include the enactment of an entrenched Bill of 
Rights, or (further) strengthening the courts’ powers to review primary legislation.)  
On the other hand, those engaged in a “bottom-up” reading of the constitution—in ‘what 
actually happens’—may derive from practice the sorts of markers of constitutional activity 
which might happen to be consonant with the ideals of either legal or political 
constitutionalism. From this angle, constitutional practice may be propped up alongside those 
ideals and justified (or, alternatively, criticised) on the basis of the normative attractiveness of 
the theory with which they correspond (or, alternatively, fail to correspond). An example of 
this can be found in the work of Gordon who, whilst insisting that it is not, in fact, necessary 
to ground the case for establishing the virtue of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty in 
the theoretical framework provided by political constitutionalism, suggests that, nonetheless, 
‘[p]olitical constitutionalism provides the broader framework in which the doctrine of 
parliamentary sovereignty can most convincingly be located’.
131
 Yet, crucially, as Gordon 
intimates, a “bottom-up” reading of constitutional practice does not absolutely necessitate a 
turn to the distinctively normative dimensions of the discourse on legal and political 
constitutionalism. Indeed, where this sort of methodology is adopted—in other words, 
wherever the normative dimensions of either theory are employed as the measure by which 
actual constitutional developments are assessed—the need to justify it, and defend its value as 
a framework for constitutional analysis, is perhaps most pressing. For it begs the question: 
what can a turn to abstract ‘models’ of such as these reveal about the actual constitution? Gee 
and Webber perhaps provide something of an answer to this question, noting that it is 
precisely the lack of agreement as to the precise nature of the UK constitution—which 
principles it truly embodies, how it ‘works’, and so on—which creates the potential for 
meaningful debate as to which abstract ‘model’ most accurately reflects these constitutional 
realities:  
 
Indeed, it is precisely because there is such widespread and whole-hearted disagreement about the 
nature, content and workings of the constitution as a whole, and precisely because that disagreement 
runs so deep, that these two models—the legal and the political—can serve as such effective 




Yet Gee and Webber also acknowledge the potentially self-defeating problem inherent to the 
use of abstract constitutional ‘models’: 
 
If, on the one hand, a political constitution is no more than a predominantly descriptive account of 
constitutional practices, there is an argument that it no longer accurately describes—if it ever did—the 
nature, content and workings of the British constitution. If, on the other hand, a political constitution is 
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a predominantly normative idea, there is an argument that it no longer supplies—if it ever did—an 
attractive account upon which to organize the British constitution.
133 
 
As such, whilst one must acknowledge that the discourse on legal and political 
constitutionalism, and the development of those theories per se, are imperfect, above all 
‘models’ of constitutionalism merely supply ‘an explanatory framework within which to 
make sense of our constitutional self-understandings’.
134
 This is key, for this point is often 
overlooked by those who direct criticism towards those who engage in and have contributed 
to this discourse. 
 
IV. CONTEMPORARY CRITIQUES OF THE DISCOURSE ON LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM 
 
As Marco Goldoni opines, ‘the antagonism between legal and political constitutionalism has 
almost monopolised the discussion on constitutional theory during the last years’.
135
 Such is 
the pervasiveness of this contemporary strand of constitutional(ist) discourse. Though, some 
lament this; the discourse is not without its critics. Martin Loughlin, for instance, has 
suggested that, indeed, its prevalence ‘reveals the impoverishment of public law thought’,
136
 
whereas Aileen Kavanagh considers that the discourse is based, fundamentally, on a ‘false 
dichotomy’, the consequence of which is that it ‘distorts our understanding of the British 
constitution’.
137
 This section explores two key (related) critiques raised by Loughlin and 
Kavanagh in particular, respectively: first, that of the explicit normativity of the discourse, 
which, as outlined in this chapter thus far, has been powered by the emergence of political 
constitutionalism as a vital corrective to the legal constitutionalist paradigm and (especially) 
its ‘classic liberalism’ foundations/precepts; and second, so-called ‘oppositional narrative’, 
that is, concerning the (significant) extent to which legal and political constitutionalism 
appear, fundamentally, to have engendered a distinctively adversarial, polarising debate. 
 
A. The Normative Turn 
 
Often the charges levied at those who engage with and seek to develop the theory of political 
constitutionalism as a distinctive normative challenge to legal constitutionalism fall into one 
of two categories. The first is that the methodology associated with this body of scholarship 
precludes any meaningful engagement with real-world constitutional practice which, as such, 
produces highly stylised, highly selective,
138
 and thus likely misleading accounts of how a 
constitution (generally, and the UK constitution specifically) can be seen to ‘work’, as it 
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were. The second concerns the readiness with which its proponents would associate it with 
Griffith’s scholarship. That is, it has been argued that the ‘normative turn’ in this respect 
fundamentally constitutes a mischaracterisation of Griffith’s scholarship (especially ‘The 
Political Constitution’) which, more broadly, appears to suggest that the theory of political 
constitutionalism, and its precepts, rest on a flawed foundations. 
It is the second category with which this section is principally concerned, for the first—
that is, how normative ‘models’, despite their obvious imperfections, might in fact provide an 
effective framing device for assessing and understanding, say, constitutional change—has 
largely been addressed in Section III. Rather, this (second) type of criticism is issued 
particularly by those who would lambast proponents of political constitutionalism for relying 
on Griffith’s ‘The Political Constitution’ as the source of their intellectual inspiration. In 
particular, critics are keen to highlight Griffith’s self-professed disinterest in theorising about 
‘the constitution’,
139
 which is clearly reflected the style of analysis engendered by the so-
called ‘the normative turn’. Kavanagh’s criticism of those who rely on the discrete theories of 
legal constitutionalism and political constitutionalism as a framework for constitutional 
analysis is a key example, here, for she suggests that the theorising of those such as Tomkins 
and Bellamy ‘departed from Griffith’s deep scepticism about abstract principles and the 
pretensions of ‘grand theorising’’.
140
 Indeed, it appears that, at least in part, the gist of this 
(sort of) critique is that, by cutting them off from a prominent source of their intellectual 
proclivities, those who would espouse an idealistic reading of constitutional practice of the 
kind characterised by ‘the normative turn’ of political constitutionalism ought to be deprived 
of a share in Griffith’s undoubted scholarly influence.
141
  
That scholars such as Tomkins and Bellamy have readily marched under Griffith’s banner, 
as it were, is perhaps seen, more broadly, as a marker of the misapprehensions not only of 
proponents of the theory of political constitutionalism, but of anybody who would engage 
with this scholarship. This critique has been most explicitly developed in a recent article 
entitled ‘The Political Constitution Revisited’ by Martin Loughlin, whose scholarship 
somewhat paradoxically finds support in the work of the political constitutionalists from 
whom he is seemingly keen to distance himself.
142
 Loughlin targets the readiness with which 
proponents of the theory of political constitutionalism would associate it with Griffith’s 
scholarship.
143
 The thrust of Loughlin’s argument is that Tomkins in particular, as the ‘main 
advocate of political constitutionalism’,
144
 erred in his reception of Griffith’s ‘The Political 
Constitution’ as representing something of a call-to-arms against the rise of judicial power, 
                                                          
139 See, eg, JAG Griffith, ‘Judicial Decision-Making in Public Law’ [1984] PL 564: ‘I distrust formulations which begin by 
developing something called “The theory of the constitution” and go on to describe something else called “what actually 
happens”.’ 
140 Kavanagh (n 20) 55. 
141 eg Loughlin, ‘The Political Constitution Revisited’ (n 12). 
142 Goldoni and McCorkindale, ‘Three Waves’ (n 17): ‘The most coherent and developed effort in the direction of a reflexive 
take on political constitutionalism is visible in Martin Loughlin’s ‘political jurisprudence’.’ See, eg, Martin Loughlin, 
Political Jurisprudence (OUP 2017). 
143 Loughlin, ‘The Political Constitution Revisited’ (n 8). 




insofar as it turns Griffith’s account into something that it is not: from an explanation 
grounded in a ‘well-established functionalist public law method’, to a normative model.
145
 
Ultimately, the aim of Loughlin’s critique seems to be to highlight the inherent flaw of the 
‘normative turn’: that, not only did this ‘turn’ cultivate a discrete constitutional theory based 
on a misguided reading of Griffith’s core arguments in ‘The Political Constitution’—
‘political decisions should be taken by politicians’, ‘law is not and cannot be a substitute for 
politics’, ‘the constitution is no more and no less than what happens’, and so on—but that it 
represents something which, although inspired by Griffith’s scholarship, produces a way of 
reading constitutional practice which is wholly incongruous to that which would be procured 
were Griffith’s ‘functionalist’ method more faithfully observed. As Loughlin notes: 
 
In the two decades following Griffith’s Chorley Lecture, it was generally recognised as a critical 
assessment of contemporary constitutional ideas according to the functionalist method … 
Functionalists conceived public law as the law of public institutions. But their descriptive method had 
been shaped by the underlying conviction that social progress could only be sustained through the 




As such, where, for instance, Tomkins lamented that Griffith had refrained from going further 
in his argument, and so opt to explicitly endorse the notion that political mechanisms of 
accountability ought to be ‘constitutionally required’,
147
 Loughlin points out that, rather, the 
‘functionalist’ method was ‘based on a Comtean belief in continuing social progress’, and 
that, ‘given his views on the nature of the constitution, Griffith’s account could never have 
risen to the level of being ‘constitutionally required’’.
148
 Above all, for Loughlin, the 
potential value of Griffith’s Chorley Lecture rests entirely on an appreciation of the 
‘intellectual and political context’ in which that piece ought to be read.
149
 
In addition, Loughlin emphasises that in order for Tomkins to deliver on his ambition 
(which, as Loughlin recalls, is ‘to show that the legal constitutionalist account is not just 
distorted; it is unconstitutional’) he must concede that ‘no republican reading of the 
constitution is possible without embracing some version of the legal constitutionalism he 
criticises’.
150
 In other words, Tomkins is deemed to be guilty of espousing a distorted method 
of constitutional analysis on two counts: first, by constructing an overtly normative reading of 
the core arguments developed in ‘The Political Constitution’ on the flawed assumption that 
Griffith’s methodology was in some way ‘deficient’ as opposed to being largely unconcerned 
by normative, theoretical arguments; and second, by engaging in the same ‘skewed reading of 
modern political developments’ as the legal constitutionalists whom he criticises. Moreover: 
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Griffith recognised only too well that the evolved parliamentary constitution rests on a system of 
government far removed from the republicanism Tomkins promotes. He was suspicious of those who, 
in the course of describing, eulogised parliamentary practices. And his account of politics was more 
sober than the normative conception Tomkins advocates; where Tomkins talks of politics as a practice 
to ‘be celebrated’ and which ‘makes us free’ and ‘makes us human’, Griffith sees a set of practices 
generated as a consequence of the ‘wearisome condition of humanity’. Whatever the virtues of 




The upshot, for present purposes, is this: whilst Loughlin no doubt cogently dissects what 
is commonly thought to represent a natural lineage—from Griffith’s ‘The Political 
Constitution’ to the theory of political constitutionalism—the fact remains that the latter now 
exists, and may continue to exist in and of itself, and that its development may, in turn, 
continue to lend meaning to constitutional analysis, albeit perhaps not necessarily in the way 
that Tomkins et al consider. Indeed, Loughlin appears to concede this point, particularly in 
the last line of the following paragraph: 
 
[‘The Political Constitution’] has been adopted by a new generation of public law scholars as a call-to-
arms against the hegemony of liberal normativism/legal constitutionalism but this has entailed 
significantly distorting [Griffith’s] argument. Griffith might not have been unhappy about that: better to 
be misread for justified political purposes, he could well have said, than ignored because of the 
strictures of an austere juristic method. But if the discipline is to develop, we must acknowledge the 




Of this, it could be said that Loughlin’s critique of the explicit normative bent of the 
(development of the) theory of political constitutionalism is one which even its proponents 
have been forced, recently, to acknowledge. As Goldoni and McCorkindale suggest, ‘[w]hile 
initially refreshing, the view put forward by the second wave has soon appeared as too 
narrow’, proceeding to suggest that the ‘second wave’, like the first (that is, the ‘functionalist 
wave’), was/is ‘reactive’:
153
 its development has suffered from the fact that it above all 
responds to, and is thus tied to, some other theory or phenomenon—in this case, legal 
constitutionalism. As noted above, this has led to a further ‘turn’ in the development of the 
theory of political constitutionalism—what, as noted above, Goldoni and McCorkindale have 
labelled the ‘third wave’ of that development—marked by a new, if still fundamentally 
conceptual inquiry: 
 
Neither a functionalist interrogation of the location and exercise of power, nor a normative exercise 
directed at the legitimacy of political institutions, theirs is an exercise in understanding: understanding 
not only the grammar of public law but in so doing understanding precisely what it is that is political 
about the political constitution.
154 
 
                                                          
151 ibid 14-15. 
152 ibid 20. 
153 Goldoni and McCorkindale, ‘Three Waves’ (n 17). 
154 ibid 74. Examples of the ‘reflexive wave’ might include, eg, Panu Minkkinen, ‘Political Constitutionalism Versus 
Political Constitutional Theory: Law, Power, and Politics’ (2013) 11(3) ICON 585; Goldoni, ‘Two Internal Critiques’ (n 




Perhaps, then, on one hand, the criticism, as expressed by Loughlin, that the ‘normative turn’ 
offers little (if anything) in the way of accentuating the value of ‘the political constitution’ as 
a descriptive lens through which to understand the UK constitution—whether at a particular 
moment in time, or more generally—is one which was recognised some years ago, and thus 
prompted those who are keen to advance the theory to re-evaluate the way in which it might 
be advanced (so as to accommodate or respond to such criticism). And yet, that on the other 
hand the impetus has effectively been towards more theorisation is, of itself, problematic. For 
although such theorising might uncover new and no doubt interesting insights as to, for 
instance, those ‘(sometimes spontaneous and unpredictable) sites of political action’ that exist 
beyond Parliament as the paradigm example,
155
 it inevitably perpetuates analysis of the 
constitution in increasingly abstract terms. Indeed, it might be true that ‘a reflexive 
understanding of the political constitution entails a new research agenda for political 
constitutionalists … [which] should go well beyond a debilitating focus on the functioning of 
courts vis-à-vis parliaments and should confront political constitutionalists with an internal 
examination’, but quite what this sort of introspection might tell us about the actual 
constitution, how it works and how it changes (or might be changed), remains uncertain. 
 
B. The Oppositional Narrative 
 
The second key critique of the discourse on legal and political constitutionalism concerns 
what Aileen Kavanagh has called the ‘oppositional narrative’,
156
 namely the pitting of law 
(and ‘legal’ institutions) against politics (and ‘political’ institutions), and vice versa, in what 
has been characterised as, effectively, a ‘zero sum game’.
157
 Kavanagh has written, recently, 
that ‘casting constitutional issues in terms of an oppositional ‘political versus legal 
constitutionalism’ narrative goes too far’: ‘[i]t creates an unduly polarised, dichotomised and 
reductivist picture of constitutional governance, which threatens to distort our understanding 
of the British constitution’.
158
 Such an approach rests on a ‘false dichotomy’;
159
 rather, ‘[t]he 
UK constitution—like all other developed constitutions—envisages a role for both Parliament 
and the courts, thus relying on a combination of political and legal modes of 
accountability’.
160
 In other words, to the extent that the discourse on legal and political 
constitutionalism is narrowly conceived as cultivating an analytical approach in which law 
and politics are sharply bifurcated, rather it must be recognised that, in fact, law and politics 
cannot be bifurcated; the constitution is of course ‘mixed’, with law and politics (and ‘legal’ 
and ‘political’ institutions) ‘complementing’ one another in the ‘joint enterprise of good 
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 Indeed, claims to this effect are increasingly prominent in contemporary 
critiques of the discourse on legal and political constitutionalism more broadly. For instance, 
one commentator has noted, recently, that ‘it is only when all three models of 
constitutionalism are taken together’—namely, ‘political’, ‘legal’ and ‘common law’ 
constitutionalism—‘that a truer image of the constitution appears, and a path towards a more 
stable constitutional future for Britain emerges’; and only ‘if and until we embrace 




Though, for Kavanagh, ultimately the problem is one of oversimplification:  
 
The lens of either model is too narrow to give us an accurate picture of the institutionally diverse 
constitutional order which combines political and legal elements. It risks blinding us to the complex, 
interactive and heterogeneous reality of the constitutional order. Indeed, it risks distorting our 
perception of those realities, by casting a presumptively bad light on any element which does not 
comply with the one-sided lens. These models are not only partial, but partisan.
163 
 
It is worth noting here, then, that there is also perhaps a sense in which the ‘normative turn’ 
and the ‘oppositional narrative’ are mutually reinforcing. That is, the normative dimensions 
of the discourse tend to involve endorsing or promoting one ‘model’—whether ‘legal’ or 
‘political’—over the other on the basis that one’s preferred model speaks to an idealised view 
of “the good constitution”. As Kavanagh writes: 
 
All told, the dichotomy between political and legal constitutionalism has led to an unfortunate 
polarisation of the academic debate, with so-called ‘political constitutionalists’ in one corner and so-
called ‘legal constitutionalists’ firmly in another. Once the key issues are framed as a stark either/or 
choice about whether we favour democracy on the one hand or ‘juristocracy’ on the other, all 
participants are pressed into one side of a false dichotomy between two extreme positions. It forces 
interlocutors to take sides on the basis of a wholesale orientation towards either Parliament or the 
courts, when in fact the issues should be evaluated retail, one by one, depending on the context. 
Clearly, the polarisation becomes intractable if each side of the dispute compares an idealistic and 




Just as Kavanagh therefore rejects the polarising dimensions of the discourse, indeed the 
point is similarly made by Loughlin (also in ‘The Political Constitution Revisited’, discussed 
above) that ‘[t]he formulation ‘legal v political’ was doomed to lead to an entirely fruitless 
debate’.
165
 Loughlin has in fact long criticised this formulation, noting in 2006 that ‘[t]he 
basic question for constitutional lawyers is not whether we have a legal or political 
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constitution: it is how the idea of law within the political constitution (i.e. the constitution of 
the polity) might best be conceptualized’.
166
 
Beyond the clear sense in which this oppositional, polarising dimension of the discourse 
mischaracterises the roles of both Parliament and the courts (as archetype ‘political’ and 
‘legal’ institutions, respectively)—and thus overlooks the potential complementarity of those 
roles—Kavanagh highlights two further consequences. First: ‘by presenting Parliament and 
the courts as rivals vying for prime position ‘at the heart of the constitutional control room’, 
this deflects our attention away from the most powerful branch of government in the UK 
constitution, namely, the Executive’.
167
 For Kavanagh, this represents a ‘serious blind-spot’: 
not only is this occlusion ‘particularly problematic for a school of thought whose credo is to 
emphasise, prioritise and even celebrate the political dimensions of the British constitutional 
order’, in fact ‘it may be doubly dubious because it may allow political constitutionalists to 
trade on the deliberative and democratic virtues of the legislature, when what is really at stake 
is the power of an overweening Executive’.
168
 Secondly, Kavanagh notes that ‘if the nerve of 
[the dichotomy between legal and political constitutionalism] is a basic disagreement about 
how best to hold the government to account—whether through Parliament or the courts—we 
risk treating these institutions not only as rivals, but also (ironically) as institutional 
equivalents’.
169
 And yet:  
 
[J]ust as it is misguided to assess the legislature against the standards we would expect of courts (such 
as independence, impartiality or proficiency in legal reasoning) it is equally futile to assess courts 
against the standards we expect of legislatures (such as democratic responsiveness to constituent 




Instead, ‘[w]hen judging any institution, we should use standards of assessment which are 
sensitive to the nature, limits and functions of that particular institution’; it is, in other words, 
‘misguided to hold them to the same standards’.
171
 
There is much to agree with in Kavanagh’s critique, especially insofar as it exposes the 
pitfalls of that particular strand of the discourse on legal and political constitutionalism which 
has done much potentially to over-simplify and over-theorise the inter-relation of law and 
politics in and of the constitution. Indeed, as Mark Elliott has also written, the binary 
character of the discourse ultimately begets such oversimplification of otherwise complex 
and multifaceted constitutional issues (such as, in Elliott’s contribution, the question of 
Parliament’s legislative supremacy), and thus the ‘distortion’ of those issues.
172
 Even for 
those who would recognise value in the discourse, this must clearly represent a compelling 
counterargument. Though, it is one thing to accept that these (problematic) developments 
clearly happened in the discourse on legal and political constitutionalism, and, as such, have 
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done much to warrant criticism; it is quite another thing to suggest that the discourse is either 
necessarily or indelibly reduced to little more than an ideologically-charged debate about 
whether archetype ‘legal’ or ‘political’ mechanisms of accountability are “better” than one 
another—whether in deciding difficult constitutional, moral, legal questions, protecting 
‘fundamental’ human rights, and so on. There is scope, also, to question the basis of this 
characterisation of the discourse in the first place. That is, quite whether the development of 
the theory of political constitutionalism in particular—which, in Kavanagh’s critique, appears 
to take much of the blame both for the (pitfalls of the) ‘normative turn’ and the ‘oppositional 
narrative’—is or ever was about excluding law, per se (or the role for the courts in ‘the 
political constitution’ generally), or otherwise separating it from politics, is debatable. 
Rather, as noted in Section III, above, ‘the political constitution’ (whether as a normative or 
empirical phenomenon) specifically conceives law and politics, in effect, as two sides of the 
same coin: as Griffith noted, ‘politics is what happens in the continuance or resolution of 
[conflicts] … [a]nd law is one means, one process, by which those conflicts are continued or 
may be temporarily resolved’.
173
  
That said, the oppositional narrative which has underpinned a significant (and clearly 
influential) portion of the discourse is rightly the target of much criticism insofar as it is 
perceived to bifurcate the UK constitution into two competing ‘models’ of constitutionalism-
as-limits: ‘legal’ and ‘political’. But perhaps the real issue is this: an undue focus on legal 
constitutionalism and political constitutionalism as representing competing ‘models’ which, 
respectively, embrace only legal limits and political limits to the exercise of power in and of 
the constitution evinces a broader preoccupation, within the discourse, with some of the more 
misleading features of constitutionalism, per se, as, historically, the theory of ‘limited’ or 
‘limiting’ government. This is before, even, one considers what “better” could or should 
mean in the context of ‘limiting’ governmental power. More ‘effective’, say, at preventing 
the executive from acting (that is, exercising power) in this or that context, whether at all or 
in certain ways? More ‘democratic’, or more ‘legitimate’—whatever this necessarily entails? 
In other words, focusing exclusively on the power-limiting dimensions of law and politics 
means that the question as to how they interrelate so as to make effective, to democratise 
and/or to legitimise the exercise of power, and in so doing therefore crucially empower and 
enable constitutional actors, is at best significantly underplayed, and at worst entirely 
ignored. The effectiveness, democratic and/or legitimacy credentials of the legislature vis-à-
vis the courts is one (undoubtedly important) thing. Yet crucially, so is that—Kavanagh 
rightly points out—of the executive (whether in and of itself, or vis-à-vis the legislature or the 
courts). Although the theory of political constitutionalism is primarily synonymous with 
(prioritising) the power of Parliament, or legislatures generally, there is nothing inherent in 
the approach that this theory entails which renders it incompatible with analysis of executive 
power—including, for instance, in the UK context, that of the royal prerogative. Indeed, it is 
the normative dimension of the debate—that is, ‘judicial v democratic’—which has perhaps 
made it seem (erroneously) that this is a huge conceptual leap. 
If there is value, therefore, in developing or using a theory of political constitutionalism to 
understand (among other things) the operation, and indeed potential contestation, of 
                                                          




constitutional law and politics, perhaps it can be found in (at least) two ways—both of which 
can be seen to engage with or respond to criticisms of the kind made by Kavanagh. First, the 
value of political constitutionalism might be found in the way in which it critiques, and thus 
corrects, the problematic legalism, and the conceptions of ‘law’ and ‘constitution’, on which 
the theory of legal constitutionalism rests, especially as this might all be applied to the UK’s 
constitutional arrangements. Indeed, it ought to be noted here that Kavanagh appears to 
accept (or concede?) this point: 
 
There is no doubt that [the theory of political constitutionalism as developed by Tomkins, Bellamy, 
etc.] brought valuable insights to bear on constitutional debates. In the post-Human Rights Act era, 
they rightly warned us to be sceptical rather than sanguine about the potential dangers of a creeping 
court-centricism in British constitutional practice and thought. Moreover, by highlighting the strengths 
of the Westminster system of parliamentary government and the achievements of the traditional, 
uncodified British constitution, they provided a valuable corrective to the assumption that we should 
turn to the courts to resolve every constitutional problem. Without doubt, we should all be wary of 
assuming that the courts are—or ever could be—a panacea for all constitutional ills and vigilant against 
the risk of judicial overreach.
174 
 
This critical lens perhaps represents one of the key strengths of ‘the political constitution’ (as 
originally conceived by Griffith) and the theory of political constitutionalism more broadly, 
that is, as an ‘explanatory tool, providing a distinctive perspective on the operation of 




In foregrounding the political aspects and principles of the operation of our constitutional system, 
Griffith’s work provides an increasingly necessary reminder that we must look at more than simply 
legal norms to understand the constitution, while also making it clear that the political dimensions of 
state activity are open to analysis from a perspective which is explicitly constitutional in focus. As 
such, in emphasising the political character of the constitution, and the potentially constitutional 
character of the political, Griffith’s approach enhances our ability to understand the norms and 
institutions of the UK’s constitutional order (and perhaps any other constitutional order).
176 
 
Yet, in critiquing the problematic legalism of legal constitutionalism, one must be wary, 
equally, of a failure to problematise those fundamental precepts of political constitutionalism, 
including, perhaps most obviously, by eulogising the practices of the ordinary political 
process and its notional democratic credentials. 
It follows from this that, secondly, the value of political constitutionalism might be seen to 
lie in the extent to which it confronts the empowering and enabling dynamics of the (UK) 
constitution (in addition to its power-limiting functions), and specifically the roles of and 
inter-relation between law and politics within these dynamics. In other words, it is, as Gordon 
also suggests, ‘through [the] exploration of what a political constitution is, how it functions 
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and is legitimated—what we might see as engaging with the practice of the political 






This chapter has explored the development of the contemporary discourse on theories of legal 
and political constitutionalism. It has considered that the various theoretical or principled 
(‘liberal-legalist’) claims on which former is founded does much to undermine its normative 
or explanatory force when applied to the specific context of the UK’s constitutional 
arrangements, and that the development of the latter emerged, chiefly, as a critical response 
to, and potentially a vital corrective to, those claims. That is, on one hand, the development of 
the theory of political constitutionalism, especially in the work of Adam Tomkins, sustained 
an influential challenge as to the normative desirability of legal constitutionalism (and its key 
precepts), specifically the idea(l) of government which is constitutionally limited by law (and, 
by extension, legal institutions). On the other hand, the theory of political constitutionalism, 
emphasising the contestability and contingency of law and legal values both as an inherent 
aspect of the human condition and as an inevitable consequence of fundamental disagreement 
within a political community, can be seen to have provided a distinctive perspective (as an 
‘explanatory tool’) on the inter-relation of (‘unwritten’) constitutional law and politics in and 
of the UK constitution: one in which, both in theory and crucially in practice, each ‘respond 
to and are conditioned by’ conflict which is ‘at the heart of modern society’.
178
 While much 
(often warranted) criticism of the discourse hangs on the distinctive normative argumentation 
it has cultivated—in particular the over-simplification and over-theorisation which this 
argumentation has tended to beget—this chapter has considered a number of ways in which 
political constitutionalism can be seen to (continue to) have explanatory value above and 
beyond the limitations of the particular normative challenge it has thus far brought to legal 
constitutionalism. This includes its application, if classically, as a critique of the problematic 
legalism of the latter (especially in the context of the UK constitution), whilst recognising 
that the same problems potentially emerge for any reading of political constitutionalism 
which extols the virtues of democracy, or the ordinary political process. It also includes the 
application of political constitutionalism as a means of understanding the inter-relation 
between law and politics not only, or exclusively, in its power-limiting capacity, but rather, 
crucially, the empowering, enabling, and legitimating function of those dynamics, in and of 
the constitution. 
It ought to be noted at this juncture that this chapter has engaged with—and thus sought to 
identify ways of potentially navigating—a broader methodological question, namely that 
which concerns the contemporary relevance, if any, of the ‘turn’ to theory (and theorising 
generally) which has characterised the study of UK public law in the last decades.
179
 Indeed, 
as Paul Scott has written recently, there have been clear and profound benefits to this 
approach: 
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This work has done much to enhance the study of the UK’s constitution, not least by forcing those who 
study it to reflect upon and then articulate their own assumptions as to, most obviously, the role of the 
state, and its appropriate relation to the individual; the question of the extent to which the right can be 
separated from the good, and how that distinction should be reflected in arrangements of governance; 





Yet, as Scott emphasises, ‘there have been costs’, specifically:  
 
[A] portion of that literature is prone to advancing arguments which are broad and sophisticated, 
purporting to shed new light on the UK’s constitution in particular or public law (or 
‘constitutionalism’) in general, but which are only weakly grounded in the legal rules to which they 
ostensibly relate and which do not balance out the indulgence of starting from a point other than the 





This is an important point. For overarching the question(s) as to whether, and if so to what 
extent, specifically the theory of political constitutionalism has any (potential) value as a 
methodological approach to the study of the UK constitution is a broader question as to how 
that theory can be brought to bear, in any event, on an understanding of the actual 
constitution, or actual constitutional practice. The potential pitfalls of over-theorising 
political constitutionalism as a means of responding to, or overcoming, its contemporary 
critics was noted in Section IV, above. To repeat: such theorising might uncover new and no 
doubt interesting insights as to, for instance, those ‘(sometimes spontaneous and 
unpredictable) sites of political action’ that exist beyond Parliament as the paradigm 
example,
182
 but, inevitably, this entails perpetuating analysis of the constitution in 
increasingly abstract terms—increasingly far-removed from actual constitutional practice. 
Surely there is more to be gained, rather, from putting the practice before the theory. That is, 
by giving the theoretical or conceptual challenges with which political constitutionalism—or, 
indeed, legal constitutionalism for that matter—is faced a firmer footing in actual 
constitutional practice, this might allow us to understand (even more so than without doing 
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The system of rights-protection instituted by the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA) at the turn 
of the 21
st
 century has loomed large over every critical stage of the development of a modern 
era of ‘executive detention’ in the UK:
1
 from the establishment of a controversial regime of 
indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects,
2
 to its subsequent demise (that is, following 
what is widely regarded as one of the ‘landmark’
3
 judicial decisions of modern times);
4
 to the 
creation, thereafter, of ‘control orders’,
5
 and the various rights-based challenges to which that 
measure was subjected both in the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords
6
 and, later, in 
the UK Supreme Court;
7
 and, finally, to the introduction, in 2011, of ‘terrorism prevention 
and investigation measures’ (TPIMs), the current means for preventing or ‘pre-empting’ the 
commission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts by which those suspected of 
involvement in terrorism might be (significantly) deprived of their liberty.
8
 Indeed, it is 
perhaps the case that such measures, which have populated the UK’s counter-terrorism 
framework at various points since (and initially in response to) the terrorist attacks in New 
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York, Washington D.C. and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001, have presented the HRA 
with its greatest challenge.
9
 As Mark Elliott notes: 
 
Human rights law is at its most valuable when it stands between the interests of the majority and those 
of unpopular minorities — of which there can be few better examples than foreign nationals suspected 
of involvement in terrorism. Such cases constitute the acid test of the commitment of a state, including 
that of its courts, to fundamental rights.
10 
 
Plainly such measures, involving often egregious deprivation of liberty outwith the ordinary 
processes and protections of the criminal justice system, fly in the face of many of the 
‘fundamental’ rights contained in the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), to 
which the HRA gives domestic legal effect
11
—for instance, by empowering the courts to read 
and give effect to legislation ‘in a way which is compatible with the Convention rights’,
12
 or 
(as the case may be) to declare its incompatibility with those rights.
13
 Not least: the right to 
liberty and security (art. 5); the right to a fair trial (art. 6); the principle of nulla poena sine 
lege (‘no punishment without law’) (art. 7); and the right to respect for private and family 
life, home and correspondence (art. 8). To the extent, therefore, that the HRA ostensibly 
brings ‘rights and rights-based thinking more central to the constitutional agenda’—and does 
much, in turn, to ensure that ‘legislation complies with fundamental constitutional 
principle’
14
—one question of perennial significance in the last years concerns the capacity of 
the Act to make good on these promises, and in so doing rein in some of the worst excesses 
of the post-‘9/11’ counter-terrorist impetus. 
Much has been written as to whether, and if so to what extent, the HRA can be said to 
have succeeded or failed in this particular regard. This chapter takes as its focus a key debate 
within this (now-extensive) literature, which might be described, if crudely, as involving 
those on one side who have argued that the HRA has, in fact, operated as a decisive 
constraining force in this particular area of the UK’s contemporary counter-terrorism 
framework. Broadly speaking, those on this side of the debate have tended to emphasise the 
manner in which several critical interventions by the courts, using the powers conferred on 
them by the HRA, have crucially steered the contemporaneous counter-terrorism law and 
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policy—that is, away from an initial broad acceptance of measures involving egregious 
deprivation of liberty, to measures which, although no doubt continuing to ground, 
themselves, significant deprivation of liberty, are nevertheless (more) rights-compliant (and 
thus ostensibly less onerous for the subject(s) of those measures).
15
 A key example of this 
perspective can be found in the work of Aileen Kavanagh, who, in 2011, wrote: 
 
The courts may not have stopped the British government’s war on terror post 9/11, but they have 
slowed it down, curbed its worse [sic] excesses, and strived to ensure that it is more compliant with 
human rights and the rule of law than might otherwise have been the case. Post-HRA, the courts have 
shown that they can be an important and useful player in the constitutional politics surrounding 
national security in the U.K.
16 
 
More recently, Helen Fenwick has suggested that the evolution of control orders into what is 
now the TPIM regime decidedly represents a ‘vindication of the [HRA]’, noting:  
 
The varying iterations of control order-type measures [from 2005 to present] … are illustrative of the 
post-9/11 struggle in the UK and elsewhere to reconcile international human rights norms with reliance 
on non-trial-based measures. The tension and interaction between security needs and such law partly 
explains … the changing iterations of the control orders model … which exhibit a human rights 




Clearly, on this ‘side’ of the debate the HRA, and human rights norms more generally, are 
considered to have acted as a—perhaps the most—significant barrier within a broader process 
of consolidation of the constitutional position of (counter-terrorism) deprivation of liberty. 
However, those on the other ‘side’ have, from a distinctive ‘democratic sceptic’ perspective 
of human rights law,
18
 presented an alternative account of the role of the HRA in this area—
that is, one which is deeply critical of the ‘success story’ of the HRA, as it were, and its 
purported empowering of the courts to protect the liberty of the individual in the context of 
the contemporary ‘War on Terror’. This account has been developed most clearly within the 
work of Keith Ewing.
19
 For instance, in 2004, Ewing wrote: 
 
It appears that despite the incorporation of Convention rights, there is an extraordinary continuity in the 
approach of the domestic courts in times of crisis. We find as a result that: Convention rights cannot 
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stop the inexorable drive in the direction of more and more state powers, whether it be identity cards, 
police powers of stop and search, or greater emergency powers. In times of crisis, the courts do not and 
will not protect the individual from the state whether the crisis be caused by external or internal threats, 
whether it be world war, cold war or war against terror.
20 
 
This (‘democratic sceptic’) perspective—especially in Ewing’s work—has, at various points 
in the recent years, sustained key challenges to otherwise orthodox, legalistic analyses of, 
most notably, the House of Lords’ ruling in Belmarsh, and the subsequent control order 
litigation. To that end, this perspective has provided an important counterpoint to such 
analyses, in turn providing a critical lens through which to explore constitutional issues of 
broader conceptual significance, not least as to the capacity of the human rights paradigm to 




The purpose of this chapter is not to revisit this debate, per se. Rather, it is to explore, in 
particular, the relevance of the ‘democratic sceptic’ critique(s) of the inter-relation between 
(human rights) law and politics in the specific context of counter-terrorism deprivation of 
liberty, and indeed its potentially continuing relevance in the light of more recent 
developments in this area. The chapter argues that, when considered from this perspective, 
the most compelling questions given rise by contemporary developments in this area are not 
(necessarily) those as to whether the HRA and human rights norms may or may not have 
achieved at least some success in constraining the enactment of such extraordinary 
measures—nor, for that matter, whether it is the courts (the paradigm institution of the ‘legal 
constitution’) or Parliament (the paradigm institution of the ‘political constitution’) which can 
be seen to have ‘better’ performed in this respect.
22
 Of much greater significance, instead, is 
that the HRA can be seen throughout these developments to have inculcated into the process 
of consolidating the constitutional position of counter-terrorism deprivation of liberty the 
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constitutionalism (if only similarly, and again reductively, taken to be embodied by the judicial process) for reasons explored 




language and, ultimately, the legalism of the human rights paradigm.
23
 A critical perspective 
of these aspects of the human rights paradigm thus offers potentially compelling insights as to 
the patent limitations of that paradigm as the appropriate (if prevailing) framework within 
which this process has occurred (and continues to occur) in practice. For, as Michael Gordon 
writes: 
 
The legalism which accompanies the conversion of human rights discourse into human rights law … 
establishes the supremacy of an elite level practice, conducted in a language which is doubly 
problematic, in that it is vague while ostensibly accessible, but this accessibility is actually illusory. 
This leads to engagement through terms of art which can be disorienting when it subverts the meaning 




That the human rights paradigm has done much to narrow the terms of the broader legal and 
political debate in this area is especially clear in the light of current plans to radically expand 
the TPIM regime
25
—beyond, that is, its controversial expansion in 2015 to include previously 
eschewed powers of ‘forced relocation’:
26
 the legal position/protection of ‘liberty’ within the 
UK constitution (in the counter-terrorism context) now appears to hinge on increasingly 
parochial debates—crucially involving such ‘terms of art’—as to whether, for instance, the 
power to compel a person’s relocation some hundreds of miles away from their home and 
family life itself constitutes a ‘deprivation’ of that person’s liberty or but a ‘mere restriction’ 
of it. Surely it is the former. 
The chapter begins by outlining, in Section II, the various key developments which led to 
the creation and subsequent demise of the measures for which Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, 
Crime and Security Act 2001 provided, authorising indefinite detention of foreign terrorist 
suspects. Section III explores the control order regime which followed, including the 
litigation in which the conditions which might give rise to a ‘deprivation of liberty’ within the 
meaning of art. 5 of the ECHR was considered in the senior courts. Turning, finally, to the 
operation of the TPIM regime, which replaced that of control orders in 2011, Section IV 
offers some reflections on current developments involving proposals to expand the scope of 
TPIMs, and, as such, the potential for deprivation of liberty that such expansion would 
inevitably entail.  
 
II. INDEFINITE DETENTION OF FOREIGN TERRORIST SUSPECTS 
 
The 9/11 terrorist attacks laid bare to a global audience the immense and unprecedented 
destructive potential of the modern terrorist threat. And to the extent that, as Fiona de 
Londras suggests, ‘[p]anic, fear and populist impulses can conspire to create an atmosphere 
where the imperative turns towards combating a risk, and where that risk is presented and/or 
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conceived of as being particularly grave or dangerous’,
27
 it is a compelling argument that no 
more acutely in recent decades has such an atmosphere been felt in the UK than in the 
aftermath of those attacks. Indeed, ‘[o]ne of the concerns whipped up by the press and 
others,’ Keith Ewing writes, ‘was that Britain was now harbouring terrorists cut from the 
same cloth as those responsible for the events in New York and Washington’.
28
 The 
provocative claim published in The Times just three days after the attacks, for instance, was 
that the presence of ‘hundreds of extremists’ in the UK had succeeded in turning the country 
into ‘one of the centres for the violent transnational network that inspired and encouraged the 
barbarism’ witnessed in the US.
29
  
That this claim was subsequently cited in Parliament by the Home Secretary, David 
Blunkett,
30
 as just one example of many contemporaneous statements made in the same vein, 
was significant. Above all, it signalled the Government’s endorsement of (while also 
evidencing its crucial role in perpetuating) a key narrative sustained not only by press 
hostility towards non-citizens, but by the spread of a profound ‘moral panic’
31
 which would, 
in turn, prove to have a significant influence upon the design of the powers for which 
Parliament was immediately called upon to legislate. So went this narrative: that the 
problem(s) of and solution(s) to the UK’s (post-9/11) security situation were grounded 
primarily in the issue of immigration control; that, indeed, successive British Governments 
had for too long been a soft touch on immigration, the implications of that fact now having 
manifested in the presence of an indeterminate network of foreign nationals whose 
sympathies lay with the perpetrators of the terrorist attacks in the US, whose intentions were 
to perpetrate, themselves, similarly devastating atrocities on UK soil, and, worse still, whose 





A. Deportation, Immigration Detention and the ECHR 
 
Clearly, it mattered not that this (xenophobic) narrative was entirely unsupported by the 
Government’s own contemporaneous intelligence assessment, which had identified no 
evidence pointing to a specific terrorist threat to the UK in the aftermath of 9/11—much less, 
therefore, one derived specifically from foreign nationals who resided in the UK.
33
 Still, no 
moral obligation was owed, argued the Home Secretary, to those whose leave to remain in 
the UK would or could be exploited as an opportunity to pursue terroristic intentions.
34
 Thus, 
the Government’s approach to such individuals, in effect, would be to embrace what Clive 
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Walker has described as the ‘exit model’ response to foreign suspects of terrorism: 
‘remov[ing] the unwelcome guests by way of deportation or exclusion’.
35
 To that end, the 
Home Secretary confirmed the Government’s plan to operationalise as a key tool in its post-
9/11 counter-terrorism strategy the discretionary powers of immigration control conferred by 
the Immigration Act 1971.
36
 Under s. 3 of the Act, a non-citizen is liable to deportation from 
the UK if ‘the Secretary of State deems his deportation to be conducive to the public good’.
37
 
Notably, the Act gives no definition, stipulates no limitation, nor provides any guidance as to 
the conditions capable of satisfying that test. Rather, the matter is, as noted by Lord Slynn in 
Secretary of State for the Home Department v Rehman,
38
 ‘plainly in the first instance and 
primarily for the discretion of the Secretary of State’.
39
 And while, under s. 15(1)(a), the 1971 
Act confers on the subject of a deportation order a right to appeal the Secretary of State’s 
decision, s. 15(3) curtails the availability of that right in circumstances where the grounds for 
deportation pertain to matters of national security, international relations (between the UK 
and any other country), or ‘other reasons of a political nature’.
40
 As such, this is, 
undoubtedly, a power of exceptional breadth, the absence of key procedural safeguards 
serving only to compound that fact. However, its exercise implicates two significant legal 
obstacles, both of which derive from the UK’s international obligations as a signatory to the 
ECHR, and thus domestic statutory obligations under the HRA. 
First and foremost is art. 3 of the Convention, an ‘absolute’ right (from which, that is, 
derogation is not permitted in any event) which states, simply: ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to 
torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’. The implications of this 
provision for cases involving the deportation of foreign nationals was considered by the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in Chahal v United Kingdom.
41
 That case 
involved a legal challenge concerning the Convention-compatibility of the repatriation of an 
Indian national whose continued presence in the UK was deemed ‘unconducive to the public 
good for reasons of national security and other reasons of a political nature, namely the 
international fight against terrorism’.
42
 The applicant had been detained pending deportation 
in August 1990, pursuant to Paragraph 2(2) of Schedule 3 to the Immigration Act 1971. An 
application for political asylum, for which the applicant cited a ‘well-founded fear of 
persecution within the terms of the United Nations 1951 Convention on the Status of 
Refugees’, was subsequently rejected by the Home Office.
43
  
The applicant’s key substantive argument was that his deportation to India would 
contravene art. 3 of the Convention. It was claimed that the 1995 report of the UN Special 
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Rapporteur on Torture substantiated this contention, it having affirmed the credibility of 
allegations as to the existence in India of a ‘widespread, if not endemic phenomenon’ of 
abuse perpetrated by state officials of the kind prohibited (again, without qualification) by art. 
3.
44
 As held in the previous ECtHR case of Soering v United Kingdom,
45
 the key question to 
be decided by the Court, therefore, was whether there existed substantial grounds for 
believing that an individual, if extradited, ‘faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country’.
46
 Such 
circumstances, the Court had confirmed in Soering, engage art. 3, and so give rise to the 
obligations imposed on High Contracting Parties under that article.  
The UK Government had argued in Chahal that the exigencies of national security 
constituted an implied limitation to art. 3—that is, even where a real risk of ill-treatment 
existed
47
—and that, accordingly, the UK had been availed of its obligations thereunder. 
Given the ‘absolute’ nature of the right protected under art. 3, it is perhaps no surprise that 
this argument was roundly rejected by the Court. This had significant implications for the 
Government’s post-9/11 counter-terrorism response. The effect of the Strasbourg Court’s 
ruling in Chahal, Mark Elliott suggests, was to position the Government ‘between a rock and 
a hard place’;
48
 the problem was that ‘many of the individuals [the Government] suspect[ed] 
of being involving in plotting or carrying out acts of terrorism in the UK originate[d] from 
precisely the sort of countries to which deportation is forbidden under article 3’.
49
 Moreover, 
the elevated status of the obligations imposed by art. 3 meant that there could be no 




The substantive (that is, art. 3) aspect of the ruling in Chahal had ‘gotten in the way’ of 
the Government’s efforts to remove suspected terrorists from the UK.
51
 Though, it ought to 
be noted at this juncture that the Court’s ruling in that case also had significant ramifications 
as to the relevant procedure, in the UK, for challenging deportation on national security 
grounds. As noted above, deportation on such grounds triggers an exception to the 
availability of appeal rights. Of particular relevance to the applicant’s case in Chahal was that 
the Asylum and Immigration Appeals Act 1993 maintains that exception in respect of certain 
rights of appeal granted under the 1993 Act.
52
 The Court expressed concerns particularly as 
to the denial of the applicant’s access to legal representation in appeal proceedings before 
what was then an ‘independent advisory panel’, a non-statutory procedure set out in 
paragraph 157 of the Statement of Changes in Immigration Rules (HC Paper 251, 1990). 
Noting, further, that the panel was possessed of no power of decision, and that advice given 
by the panel to the Home Secretary was neither binding nor disclosed, the Court concluded 
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that ‘the advisory panel could not be considered to offer sufficient procedural safeguards for 
the purposes of Article 13’,
53
 which confers on the victims of (Convention) rights-violations 
the right to an effective remedy before a national authority. On this basis, the Court found 
that the ‘independent advisory panel’ procedure also fell short of art. 5(4) of the 
Convention,
54
 under which those deprived of liberty by means of their arrest or detention 
‘shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of [their] detention shall be 
decided speedily by a court and [their] release ordered if the detention is not lawful’. These 
developments led, ultimately, to key procedural reforms, culminating in the creation of the 
Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC).
55
 A superior court of record, the 
Commission has since operated as an integral independent scrutiny mechanism for cases 
involving deportation of foreign nationals on the grounds of national security. Appeals can be 
heard in ‘closed’ proceedings, given the potential for the inclusion of sensitive (for instance, 
intelligence and security-based) evidence. 
Ultimately unable, therefore, to deport those suspected of involvement in terrorism—such 
that (as in many cases) there existed ‘a real risk of [the person’s] being subjected to torture or 
to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the requesting country’—the 
Government instead proposed to detain them. Indeed, the 1971 Act contains such powers: 
under Schedule 3 of the Act, a person ‘may be detained under the authority of the Secretary 
of State pending the making of a deportation order’.
56
 This course of action would, however, 
give rise to a second legal obstacle, that which stems from art. 5 of the ECHR (and, again, 
implicates the Government’s domestic legal obligations under the HRA). That provision 
entails that ‘[e]veryone has the right to liberty and security of person’, and that ‘[n]o one shall 
be deprived of his liberty save in [certain] cases and in accordance with a procedure 
prescribed by law’.
57
 And although among the various exceptions permitted under art. 5 is 
that of the ‘lawful arrest or detention of … a person against whom action is being taken with 
a view to deportation or extradition’,
58
 the detention of those who could not be deported 
(given the ruling in Chahal) was plainly beyond the scope of this exception. 
Indeed, this key limitation to the exercise of statutory powers of detention contained in 
Schedule 3 of the 1971 Act is in fact reinforced at common law. That is, although the 1971 
Act imposes no express limitation of time on the extent to which an individual may be 
detained, two ‘implied’ limitations were nonetheless established by the High Court in R v 
Governor of Durham Prison, ex p Hardial Singh:
59
 first, that the power conferred upon the 
Secretary of State cannot be used for any purpose other than to authorise detention pending 
either the making of a deportation order or the process removal of an individual; and 
secondly, that those powers are ‘impliedly limited to a period which is reasonably necessary’ 
for the purposes of carrying out the deportation of the detainee (dependent, though that 
question is, upon the particular circumstances of the case).
60
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B. Part 4 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
 
The combined effects of these various legal obstacles presented what the Home Affairs Select 
Committee called ‘an intractable problem’
61
 for the Government. In respect of an individual 
who faced the prospect of suffering torture or inhuman or degrading treatment if repatriated, 
who could not be deported to a third country, and who could not be charged with a criminal 
offence, art. 3 (to the extent articulated in Chahal) prevented their removal from the UK—
crucially, even if they were judged to be a threat to national security.
62
 The use of detention 
powers under the 1971 Act offered no lawful alternative in such cases, given that the 
exception to the right to liberty and security under art. 5(1)(f) permits detention only with a 
view to deportation.   
The Government’s solution to its ‘intractable problem’, therefore, was to seek from 
Parliament ‘more effective powers to exclude and remove suspected terrorists from our 
country’.
63
 The Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), fast-tracked through 
Parliament in just under one month,
64
 provided for such powers—in addition to an extensive 





 and fingerprinting of terrorist suspects.
67
 Under Part 4 of 
the 2001 Act, a ‘suspected international terrorist’—so certified under powers conferred on the 
Secretary of State by s. 21—was liable to be detained, notwithstanding that ‘his removal or 
departure from the United Kingdom was prevented’ either by ‘a point of law which wholly or 
partly relates to an international agreement’
68
 or ‘a practical consideration’.
69
  
Indeed, it is a great irony that only a matter of 12 months into the sunlit ‘culture of respect 
for human rights’
70
 that the HRA was said to have heralded, Parliament had enacted what at 
the time was described as ‘the most draconian legislation [it] has passed in peacetime in over 
a century’.
71
 That said, the presence of the HRA can no doubt be seen to have had (at least) 
some influence on the pre-legislative scrutiny of the 2001 Act. In 2005, Conor Gearty 
suggested that ‘[a]s a result of section 19 [of the HRA]’—that is, by which a Minister of the 
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Crown must issue a statement in Parliament regarding the relevant Bill’s compatibility (or 
not) with the ECHR
72
—‘and also the probability of legal challenge in the future, much of the 
discussion of the [ATCS Bill] was, in fact, conducted in the language of rights’.
73
 Several 
parliamentary select committees—including the then-newly-established Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, embracing its role as ‘parliamentary guardians of the HRA’
74
—published 
reports which were deeply critical of the Part 4 provisions.
75
 Of course, as Gearty also notes:  
 
The criticisms that these bodies and other parliamentarians and commentators made were probably not 
dependant on the Human Rights Act for their existence, in that they would have been made and might 
well have been successful without the existence of the Act. But their arguments undoubtedly drew 
strength and energy from being able to point to a piece of legislation which in theory at least posited an 




A number of liberalising concessions were successfully obtained from the Government, 
notably including the condition that sections 21-23 would expire unless renewed for a period 
not exceeding 12 months (by statutory instrument),
77
 and that of the ‘sunset clause’ according 
to which the Part 4 provisions would cease to have effect altogether (unless renewed by 




 Further, each ‘certification’ 
issued by the Secretary of State would be subject to independent periodic review by the 
SIAC.
79
 The Secretary of State was also required to appoint a person to review the operation 
of sections 21 to 23,
80
 while the entire scheme of the Act would itself be reviewed by a 
committee of Privy Counsellors.
81
 
Though, in any event, the passage of the 2001 Act can scarcely be taken to represent any 
sort of ringing endorsement of the HRA or a broader culture of respect for human rights.
82
 
From the very beginning, the proportionality of the Part 4 measures was questionable at best, 
even on their own terms—in other words, to the extent that they were designed to overcome 
the particular dilemma outlined above. For instance, in 2002, Helen Fenwick noted that ‘the 
detention without trial provision [did] not depend on a finding that persons within section 21 
cannot be deported due to the risk of Article 3 treatment’; it appeared, rather, ‘to represent an 
attempt to provide the government with broad powers which could be used exceptionally to 
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detain persons indefinitely who arguably could be deported’.
83
 The (real) reason for 
introducing such exceptionally broad provisions was perhaps better explained as a means of 
‘prevent[ing] suspected terrorists leaving Britain to go to countries such as Iraq’.
84
 Yet, 
ultimately, as Laraine Hanlon writes, the Part 4 powers ‘proved to be acceptable publicly 
because of the claimed narrow focus of the detention powers’; again, powers authorising the 
indefinite detention of (purported) international terrorist suspects ‘only had to be married to 
the prevailing resentment of the current foreign influx to the UK and the immigration and 
asylum controversy, hysterically whipped up by the British media, to become unbeatable’.
85
  
So ‘coercive and draconian’
86
 were those powers, however, that the Government entered a 
formal derogation from art. 5 of the ECHR, according to the relevant provisions under art. 
15(1), which stipulates: 
 
In time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party 
may take measures derogating from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other 
obligations under international law. 
 
Section 14 of the HRA requires that an order be made by the Secretary of State to the effect 
that a prospective derogation from an Article of the ECHR be ‘designated’ for the purposes 
of the Act. The Human Rights Act 1998 (Designated Derogation) Order 2001 was duly made 
on 11 November 2001, effective from 13 November 2001,
87
 the schedule to which detailed 
the ‘proposed derogation’, and included a statement attesting to the existence of ‘a terrorist 
threat to the United Kingdom from persons suspected of involvement in international 
terrorism’: 
 
In particular, there are foreign nationals present in the United Kingdom who are suspected of being 
concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of international terrorism, of being 
members of organisations or groups which are so concerned or of having links with members of such 
organisations or groups, and who are a threat to the national security of the United Kingdom. As a 




C. The ‘Belmarsh’ Litigation: A and Others v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department 
 
Within three months of the coming into force of the ATCSA, nine foreign nationals had been 
certified by the Home Secretary, under s. 21 of the Act, as ‘suspected international 
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 The individuals were subsequently detained in HMP Belmarsh, south-east 
London, under powers conferred by s. 23. None had been charged, nor even faced the 
prospect of being charged, with a criminal offence. Proceedings were brought by the nine 
detainees before the SIAC in July 2002, in a challenge to the lawfulness of their detention on 
two main grounds.
90
 The first ground was that the threshold conditions for derogation 
stipulated under art. 15(1) of the ECHR had not been met—that, in other words, there did not 
exist a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ within the meaning of that 
provision. As such, it was claimed that the UK’s purported derogation from art. 5 did not 
satisfy the relevant requirements of art. 15(1) and was thus ineffectual to justify the 
individuals’ detention. Secondly, it was argued that neither, therefore, could the measures 
taken in derogation of art. 5 have been ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’, as 
art. 15(1) also stipulates. Alternatively, even in the event that a ‘public emergency’ could be 
said to have existed, the nature of the appellants’ detention, under s. 23 of the ATCSA, 
constituted a disproportionate interference with the right to liberty and security guaranteed by 
art. 5, while the exclusive application to non-citizens of the relevant powers contained in Part 
4 of the 2001 Act amounted to discrimination of the kind prohibited under art. 14 (from 
which the UK Government had not, in fact, derogated). 
The SIAC upheld the appeal, save in respect of the appellants’ submissions as to the 
existence of a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’; although the evidence on 
which the Government relied in relation to that issue was subject to ‘closed’ proceedings, the 
SIAC was satisfied, having considered the closed material, that such an emergency had been 
established.
91
 However, it was held that the measures for which s. 23 of the ATCSA provided 
contravened both art. 5 and art. 14 of the Convention. A declaration of incompatibility was 
issued under s. 4 of the HRA, and the Derogation Order was quashed. 
Yet, with the SIAC’s decision subsequently overturned just three months later, in a 
unanimous decision by the Court of Appeal,
92
 the case was in 2004 brought before the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords; a specially-constituted panel of nine Law Lords 
presided over the appeal.
93
 Incidentally, only five of the nine detainees had been granted 
release before the Law Lords’ ruling: two had exercised their right to leave the UK—one in 
December 2001, the other in March 2002; one had been transferred to Broadmoor Hospital 
on mental health grounds in July 2002; one had been released, albeit with strict bail 
conditions, in April 2004; and the revocation by the Home Secretary of the certification of 
another detainee led to their immediate release without conditions in September 2004.
94
 
Mirroring the original decision of the SIAC, the Law Lords, by the overwhelming majority 
of 8:1, quashed the Derogation Order and issued a declaration of incompatibility to the effect 
that s. 23 of the ATCSA was incompatible with art. 5 and art. 14 of the ECHR. Although the 
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same majority was prepared to follow the conclusions of the SIAC and the Court of Appeal 
as to the existence of a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’,
95
 seven of the 
nine Law Lords held that the Government had gone beyond that which was ‘strictly required 
by the exigencies of the situation’.
96
 Only Lord Walker dissented on this point, having 
concluded that, whilst a ‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’ did exist so as to 
warrant the UK’s derogation from art. 5 of the Convention, the Part 4 measures could 
nevertheless be accepted as ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’.
97
 For Lord 
Walker, the measures were ‘not offensively discriminatory’; rather, there were, in fact, 





(i) Derogation, ‘public emergencies’ and article 15(1) of the ECHR 
 
All but Lord Hoffman, then, found in favour of the Government as to the existence of a 
‘public emergency threatening the life of the nation’. In a now-famous dissenting opinion, 
Lord Hoffmann regarded the case as, above all, ‘call[ing] into question the very existence of 
an ancient liberty of which this country has until now been very proud: freedom from 
arbitrary arrest and detention’; of the power to detain people indefinitely without charge or 
trial, Lord Hoffmann remarked, ‘[n]othing could be more antithetical to the instincts and 
traditions of the people of the United Kingdom’.
99
 Concluding, ultimately, that it required the 
acceptance of too broad an interpretation of the meaning of the phrase ‘the life of the nation’ 
to have been persuaded by the Government’s submissions on this issue, Lord Hoffmann 
noted: ‘I do not underestimate the ability of fanatical groups of terrorists to kill and destroy, 
but they do not threaten the life of the nation’.
100
 Rather, only the threatening of ‘our 
institutions of government or our existence as a civil community’, it appears, would have 
convinced Lord Hoffmann to reach a different conclusion.
101
 And in one of the more 
resounding passages of the ruling, Lord Hoffmann opined that ‘[t]he real threat to the life of 
the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political 
values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these’.
102
 
It ought to be noted at this juncture that Lord Hoffmann’s judgment has, itself, been the 
subject of close(r) analysis, not least given that, as Thomas Poole has written, perhaps the 
most ‘striking feature [of it] lies in the centrality of its appeal to the past’.
103
 Where, 
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primarily, the case was argued on the basis of and with reference to the ECHR jurisprudence 
(‘with international human rights law providing something of an éminence grise by setting 
the normative backdrop to the decision’), rather ‘Lord Hoffmann turned instead to the local’: 
‘[i]nternational human rights law receives no mention; there is no international or 
comparative dimension to the judgment’, and ‘[m]ore striking still, the relevance of the 
[ECHR] jurisprudence is denied not once but twice’.
104
 That is, firstly, Lord Hoffmann 
regarded freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention as ‘a quintessentially British liberty, 
enjoyed by the inhabitants of this country when most of the population of Europe could be 
thrown into prison at the whim of their rulers’; on this reading, the freedom derives not from 
the ECHR, rather it can be found there ‘because [the Convention] set out the rights which 
British subjects enjoyed under the common law’.
105
 In the second instance, Lord Hoffmann 
rejected the utility of ‘the European cases’, noting that ‘[a]ll that can be taken from them is 
that the Strasbourg court allows a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ to the national authorities in 
deciding ‘both on the presence of such an emergency and on the nature and scope of 
derogations necessary to avert it’ [quoting Ireland v United Kingdom (1978) 2 EHRR 25, 
para 207]’.
106
 ‘What this means,’ it was said, ‘is that we, as a United Kingdom court, have to 
decide the matter for ourselves’.
107
 
Among the key issues with the sort of legal reasoning on display here, Poole suggests, is 
that of an obvious, if problematic, conflation of common law constitutional principle and 
Convention jurisprudence, resulting in ‘the intermeshing of a rationalist, rights-dominated 
legal framework with a legal system which operated, while staying largely true to its basic 
anti-rationalist mindset, a venerable but, by contemporary standards, rather flaccid 
jurisprudence of rights’.
108
 Not only does this conflation rest on a deeply contrived reading of 
the history of (the UK’s role and influence in the drafting of) the Convention, in which 
‘Convention rights ought to be understood as originally British exports to a benighted 
Europe’, and the HRA characterised, in turn, as merely ‘the vehicle through which these 
rights are now being repatriated’.
109
 Rather, it highlights a key tension within the human 
rights paradigm more broadly (which is instructive for present purposes), not least as it now 
prevails in the UK under the HRA, as one which potentially compounds (as opposed to 
consolidates) competing constitutional visions, and which presents the paradigm as involving 
a spectrum of (varyingly desirable) alternatives: at one end, the progressive internationalism 
of the ECHR as the source and inspiration of modern conceptions of ‘fundamental’ rights and 
liberties; and at the other, the inward-looking historicism of the ‘common law constitution’, 
and the ‘ancient’ freedoms, values, traditions, principles and norms which purportedly 
underpin the incremental development of the UK’s otherwise unstructured constitution. To 
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the extent, therefore, that Lord Hoffmann’s ruling can be read as emphasising the 
contemporary relevance of the latter, specifically as a means of establishing the constitutional 
position of (counter-terrorism) deprivation of liberty, it is perhaps significant that, on this 




Turning, then, to the position of the majority on the ‘public emergency’ issue: as 
Kavanagh notes, ‘their Lordships made clear that although substantial deference may be 
appropriate in matters of national security, complete deference was not’.
111
 Two key factors 
ultimately persuaded Lord Bingham—whose leading judgment is instructive insofar as the 
position of the majority on this question is concerned—that the ‘public emergency’ threshold 
under art. 15(1) had been met in the circumstances. First, Lord Bingham cited a number of 
examples in the case law of the ECtHR as evidence that the Court accords a wide margin of 
appreciation to national authorities on the determination of such matters.
112
 The case of 
Lawless v Ireland
113
 was of particular note in this respect. For if, in that case, ‘it was open to 
the Irish Government … to conclude that there was a public emergency threatening the life of 
the nation’, it followed for Lord Bingham that ‘the British Government could scarcely be 




If, however, this (first) factor can be seen to represent the ‘very model of the ‘new 
internationalism’’
115
 that the Law Lords (and Lord Bingham in particular) can be seen to have 
embraced under the HRA (and to which Lord Hoffmann, as noted above, was singularly 
opposed), the second factor might be said to reflect a judicial self-awareness which sits more 
broadly within traditional constitutional parameters. That is, the second factor concerned the 
‘relative institutional competence’ of the courts to engage in close scrutiny of ministerial 
decisions made in the name of national security—in other words, the key question was that of 
the (constitutionally) appropriate degree of deference which ought to be given by the courts 
to the executive. On this point, Lord Bingham held: 
 
The more purely political (in a broad or narrow sense) a question is, the more appropriate it will be for 
political resolution and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial decision. The smaller, 
therefore, will be the role of the court. Conversely, the greater the legal content of any issue, the greater 
the potential role of the court, because under our constitution and subject to the sovereign power of 
Parliament it is the function of the courts and not of political bodies to resolve legal questions. The 




Indeed, it is an opinion which echoes—somewhat paradoxically—that of Lord Hoffmann’s in 
Rehman (which, in fact, Lord Bingham had signposted). In that case, Lord Hoffmann had 
noted: 
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What is meant by “national security” is a question of construction and therefore a question of law … 
But there is no difficulty about what “national security” means. It is the security of the United 
Kingdom and its people. On the other hand, the question of whether something is “in the interests” of 
national security is not a question of law. It is a matter of judgment and policy. Under the constitution 
of the United Kingdom and most other countries, decisions as to whether something is or is not in the 





And in a passage subsequently added post-script, three months after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, 
Lord Hoffmann emphasised, in the light of those attacks, that ‘in matters of national security, 
the cost of failure can be high’,
118
 and therefore the jurisdiction of the courts to intervene in 
such matters ought to be determined not only by the question of expertise, but by the question 
of democratic legitimacy:  
 
[S]uch decisions, with serious potential results for the community, require a legitimacy which can be 
conferred only by entrusting them to persons responsible to the community through the democratic 
process. If the people are to accept the consequences of such decisions, they must be made by persons 




Thus, in Belmarsh, Lord Bingham held that, far from potentially undermining the protection 
of Convention rights, to accord a marked degree of deference to the executive on the grounds 
of national security rather ‘reflects the unintrusive approach of the European Court to such a 
question’; the appellants had ‘shown no ground strong enough to warrant displacing the 
Secretary of State’s decision on this important threshold question’.
120
  
Similar conclusions were reached across the various majority judgments. For instance, 
Lord Hope commented that ‘[f]ew would doubt that it is for the executive, with all the 
resources at its disposal, to judge whether the consequences of such events amount to an 
emergency [within the meaning of art. 15 of the Convention].
121
 As such, questions as to 
‘whether there is an emergency or whether it threatens the life of the nation are pre-eminently 




(ii) Proportionality and articles 5 and 14 of the ECHR 
 
The notion of ‘relative institutional competence’, so instrumental to the majority’s ruling on 
the ‘public emergency’ question, ‘cut much less ice in relation to the justification 
question’.
123
 Indeed, it has been suggested that the Law Lords’ ruling on whether the Part 4 
measures were ‘strictly required by the exigencies of the situation’ represents ‘the most 
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persuasive aspect of the House of Lords’ treatment of the [Belmarsh] case’.
124
 As Lord 
Bingham noted, that question—what could or could not be said to be ‘strictly required’ in 
these circumstances—is a matter for which ‘the Convention imposes a test of strict necessity 
or, in Convention terminology, proportionality’.
125
 The elements of the proportionality test 
accepted, at the domestic level, in de Freitas v Permanent Secretary of Ministry of 
Agriculture, Fisheries, Lands and Housing
126
 were considered, namely: 
 
Whether: (i) the legislative objective is sufficiently important to justify limiting a fundamental right; 
(ii) the measures designed to meet the legislative objective are rationally connected to it; and (iii) the 




It was acknowledged that the ‘main thrust’ of the appellants’ argument was directed to the 
second and third elements of the proportionality test: even if, that is, the legislative objective 
of protecting the national security of the UK from (the threat of) Islamist terrorism was 
sufficiently important to justify limiting the right to liberty, the Part 4 measures were neither 
rationally connected to nor the least restrictive means capable of achieving that objective.
128
 
It is at this point that the grounding of the UK’s counter-terrorism strategy in the issue of 
immigration control can be seen, fundamentally, to have been the undoing of that strategy. As 
explored in sub-section A, above, and as Adam Tomkins emphasises, ‘[t]he government 
consistently presented this as a problem of immigration law requiring a solution within 
immigration law’.
129
 The measures for which Part 4 provided were, in the Government’s own 
words, ‘special immigration powers’.
130
 That ‘immigration’ thus provided the foil for 
targeting exclusively non-nationals in the use of extraordinary security measures was clear. 
Yet, even before the lawfulness of that approach was considered (and rejected) by the Law 
Lords, serious concerns had been raised as to its dubious efficacy as a means of countering 
the threat of international terrorism, the Newton Committee having noted in its 2003 report: 
 
Seeking to deport terrorist suspects does not seem to us to be a satisfactory response, given the risk of 
exporting terrorism. If people in the UK are contributing to the terrorist effort here or abroad, they 
should be dealt with here. While deporting such people might free up British police, intelligence, 
security and prison service resources, it would not necessarily reduce the threat to British interests 
abroad, or make the world a safer place more generally. Indeed, there is a risk that the suspects might 
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A similarly critical position was ultimately reflected in several of the majority’s rulings. 
Indeed, for Lord Nicholls, the different treatment accorded to nationals and non-nationals was 
‘[t]he principal weakness in the government’s case’: ‘[i]t is difficult to see,’ Lord Nicholls 
commented, ‘how the extreme circumstances, which alone would justify such detention, can 
exist when lesser protective steps apparently suffice in the case of British citizens suspected 
of being international terrorists’.
132
 So too was Lord Bingham unconvinced:  
 
The choice of an immigration measure to address a security problem had the inevitable result of failing 
adequately to address the problem (by allowing non-United Kingdom suspected terrorists to leave the 
country with impunity and leaving British suspected terrorists at large) while imposing the severe 
penalty of indefinite detention on persons who, even if reasonably suspected of having links with al 




Further, Lord Hope commented that ‘the indefinite detention of foreign nationals had not 
been shown to be strictly required, as the same threat from British nationals whom the 
government is unable or unwilling to prosecute is being met by other measures which do not 
require them to be detained indefinitely’.
134
 It was said that the distinction drawn between 
these two groups ‘raises an issue of discrimination’, but ‘as the distinction is irrational, it 
goes to the heart of the issue about proportionality also’, that is: 
 
It proceeds on the misconception that it is a sufficient answer to the question whether the derogation is 
strictly required that the two groups have different rights in the immigration context. So they do. But 
the derogation is from the right to liberty. The right to liberty is the same for each group. If derogation 
is not strictly required in the case of one group, it cannot be strictly required in the case of the other 




As noted above, Lord Walker, the sole dissenter on this point, considered that there were, 
in fact, ‘sound, rational grounds’ for the different treatment of foreign nationals. One such 
reason, it was suggested, was that, were the power to indefinitely detain terrorist suspects 
without trial framed so as to include British citizens, who, crucially, ‘[have] no option of 
going abroad if they chose to do so’, it would be ‘far more oppressive, and a graver affront to 
their human rights, than a power to detain in “a prison with three walls” a suspected terrorist 
who has no right of abode in the United Kingdom, and whom the government could and 
would deport but for the risk of torture if he were returned to his own country’.
136
 At any rate, 
for Lord Walker, the 2001 Act contained ‘several important safeguards against oppression’—
such as the various and ongoing independent review mechanisms both of the Part 4 measures 
specifically and the 2001 Act more broadly, and that of the apparent ‘temporary’ nature of the 
legislation, per se—all of which, it was found, ‘show[ed] a genuine determination that the 
2001 Act, and especially Part 4, should not be used to encroach on human rights any more 
than is strictly necessary’.
137
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Baroness Hale (also rejecting the rationality of targeting exclusively foreign nationals) 
considered the question, notably, as one involving issues of fundamental democratic 
principle:  
 
Democracy values each person equally. In most respects, this means that the will of the majority must 
prevail. But valuing each person equally also means that the will of the majority cannot prevail if it is 
inconsistent with the equal rights of minorities.
138 
 
The distinction between British and foreign (or ‘international’) terrorist suspects, therefore, 
was ultimately one which purported to (although inevitably failed) to minimise the potential 
for egregious deprivation of liberty, contrary to art. 5 of the Convention, to only that which 
was ‘strictly necessary’ for the relevant purposes. In so concluding, Baroness Hale drew a 
compelling analogy: 
 
No one has the right to be an international terrorist. But substitute “black”, “disabled”, “female”, “gay”, 
or any other similar adjective for “foreign” before “suspected international terrorist” and ask whether it 
would be justifiable to take power to lock up that group but not the “white”, “ablebodied”, “male” or 
“straight” suspected international terrorists. The answer is clear.
139 
 
D. The (Purported) Constitutional Significance of ‘Belmarsh’  
 
Many pages of the law journals have been devoted to analysis of the ruling in Belmarsh. Such 
is its significance, indeed from a broad range of perspectives, including that the Law Lords’ 
speeches contained what has been described as ‘statements which are both unprecedented and 
damning in their criticism of decisions made by government and Parliament’.
140
 Belmarsh 
has been taken to represent a vindication of the constitutional principle of the rule of law over 
the exercise of arbitrary executive power;
141
 the turning point in a long history of judicial 
obsequiousness to the executive on matters of national security;
142
 ‘the beginnings of a much 
belated judicial awakening to the fact that even in the context of national security the courts 
have a responsibility to ensure that the rule of law is respected’;
143
 and ‘perhaps the most 




 In a special issue of the Modern 
Law Review, Martin Loughlin noted ‘the extent to which British constitutional discourse has 
become more nuanced and more complicated’ as a consequence of the HRA’s introduction, 
as evidenced in Belmarsh; indeed, underlying the ‘difficult questions’ given rise by these 
nuances and complications, Loughlin suggests, ‘sits a more basic jurisprudential issue 
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concerned with the meaning that must now be accorded to the terms ‘law’ and ‘constitution’ 
in the British system’.
145 And in a more recent contribution, which considers the legacy of the 
case as a ‘landmark’ public law ruling, Richard Clayton remarks that the Belmarsh judgment 
can be seen to represent ‘a towering decision, from at least four perspectives’: 
 
First, the House of Lords reached an arresting conclusion in a most unpromising terrain, reviewing 
administrative detention of aliens, where traditionally the courts have taken a very deferential 
approach. Second, the political climate in which the decision was made was intense and problematic, as 
the application to recuse Lord Steyn indicated. Third, the structured proportionality analysis undertaken 
by Lord Bingham stands almost alone among HRA 1998 cases in terms of its analytical rigour. Last, 
and, not least, Lord Bingham clearly and unequivocally spelt out the rationale for the [HRA’s] 
constitutional character: under the HRA 1998 the courts are charged by Parliament with delineating the 




Without doubt, the theme which unifies each of these various critiques, if not celebration, 
is certainly one which portrays the ruling in Belmarsh as representing a significant 
(constitutional) moment, signalling a break with the past, and in so doing mapping a 
distinctive and ostensibly desirable (if, vis-à-vis Lord Hoffmann’s ruling, clearly contested) 
vision of the UK constitution—and especially the role of the courts in marshalling the 
protection of ‘liberty’ within it. Yet, for all of the plaudits, in the light of that which followed, 
and thus albeit with the great benefit of hindsight, the case has in recent years come to be 
seen as something of a Pyrrhic victory. ‘[A]fter the excitement following the Belmarsh case,’ 
wrote Keith Ewing and Joo-Cheong Tham in 2008, ‘normal service appears thus to have been 
resumed, in terms of the approach of the courts’.
147
 Similarly—and, incidentally, marking a 
notable climb-down from previous exaltations—Tomkins has since suggested that ‘far from 
establishing itself as a new ‘benchmark’, [Belmarsh] now looks more like a one-off’.
148
  
As Paul Scott suggests, there is potentially a compelling argument that Belmarsh failed 
even to conclude the issue at the heart of the case: from the perspective that the House of 
Lords’ ruling in Belmarsh ‘must be judged not only by its constitutional significance—the 
question of what role it reflects for the court within the national security constitution—but 
also on its own terms’, the issue of derogation, and particularly of the correctness of the 
majority’s decision to quash the Derogation Order, stands out as ‘one point of ongoing 
significance’.
149
 In other words, although it has been suggested that Belmarsh’s key 
contribution to the issue of derogation from the ECHR was to authoritatively establish ‘[t]he 
extent of the judicial resistance to derogation’,
150
 an issue as to jurisdiction remains 
unresolved—which might prove important in future instances involving derogation from the 
ECHR. Lord Scott noted that ‘the Attorney-General was content to argue the case [for the 
Government] on the footing that the [Derogation] Order did have to be justified under article 
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 The question, therefore, is whether this is correct as a matter of domestic law; whether 
a determination as to the validity of the Derogation Order is at all contingent on the correct 
interpretation and application of art. 15(1) of the ECHR—the provision of an international 
treaty. 
Although, as Brice Dickson put it, the decision ‘rode a coach and horses through [the 
Government’s] policy’,
152
 the constitutional significance of Belmarsh is ultimately 
diminished in the light of two key considerations. First, the sum total legal effect of the Law 
Lords’ scathing criticism of the powers contained in Part 4 of the ATCSA, and of the 
declaration of incompatibility issued under s. 4 of the HRA in respect of those powers, was 
nil.
153
 Such is the balance that the HRA carefully preserves, between the protection and 
promotion of human rights on one hand and the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty on the 
other. Thus, far from representing a judicial ‘strike down’ of primary legislation,
154
 the 
finding of incompatibility with the ECHR in no way detracts from the validity of an Act of 
Parliament, and as such does not relieve citizens from the burdens imposed by the relevant 
(offending) provisions for as long as they should remain in force.
155
 It ultimately owes to that 
fact that the Belmarsh ruling failed, secondly, to procure the release of the detainees. Not 
immediately, at least; it was not until March 2005, some three months after the Law Lords’ 
ruling in Belmarsh, that the detainees were, in fact, released (albeit on conditional bail). 
However, by that point Part 4 of the ATCSA had been repealed and replaced the Prevention 
of Terrorism Act 2005 (PTA), which provided for a new counter-terrorism innovation: the 
‘control order’. Indeed, it is in the knowledge of the control order regime which followed the 
decision of Belmarsh that the implications particularly of the House of Lords’ decision in 
relation to the discriminatory dimension of s. 23 of the ATCSA also gives cause for a re-
evaluation of the true constitutional impact of the case. As noted above, the point was 
highlighted in Belmarsh that insofar as it can be accepted that the existence of a ‘public 
emergency’ warranting the UK’s (ostensibly temporary) derogation from the ECHR, there is 
no basis for detaining only foreign terrorist suspects and not those with British nationality.
156
 
Belmarsh was thus a ‘curious kind of success’, insofar as it paved the way for a regime of 
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III. CONTROL ORDERS 
 
A. Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005 
 
The control order was defined under s. 1 of the PTA as ‘an order against an individual that 
imposes obligations on him for purposes connected with protecting members of the public 
from a risk of terrorism’—‘obligations’, that is, that ‘the Secretary of State or (as the case 
may be) the court considered necessary for the purposes connected with preventing or 
restricting involvement by that individual in terrorism-related activity’.
158
 The list of 
obligations licenced by the Act was, by any measure, extraordinary; the Act authorised the 
imposition of prohibitions, restrictions or requirements on an individual, which might have 
related to: ‘his possession or use of specified articles or substances’;
159
 ‘his use of specified 
services or specified facilities, or … his carrying on specified activities’;
160
 ‘his work or other 
occupation, or … his business’;
161
 ‘his association or communications with specified persons 
or with other persons generally’;
162
 ‘his place of residence or … the persons to whom he 
gives access to his place of residence’;
163
 ‘his being at specified places or within a specified 
area at specified times or on specified days’;
164
 ‘his movements to, from or within the United 
Kingdom, a specified part of the United Kingdom or a specified place or area within the 
United Kingdom’;
165
 ‘his movements as may be imposed, for a period not exceeding 24 
hours, by directions given to him in the specified manner, by a specified person and for the 
purpose of securing compliance with other obligations imposed by or under the order’;
166
 
‘[surrendering] his passport, or anything in his possession to which a prohibition or restriction 
imposed by the order relates, to a specified person for a period not exceeding the period for 
which the order remains in force’;
167
 ‘[giving] access to specified persons to his place of 
residence or to other premises to which he has power to grant access’;
168
 [allowing] specified 
persons to search that place or any such premises for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
obligations imposed by or under the order have been, are being or are about to be 
contravened’;
169
 ‘[allowing] specified persons, either for that purpose or for the purpose of 
securing that the order is complied with, to remove anything found in that place or on any 
such premises and to subject it to tests or to retain it for a period not exceeding the period for 
which the order remains in force’;
170
 ‘[allowing] himself to be photographed’;
171
 ‘[co-
operating with] specified arrangements for enabling his movements, communications or other 
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activities to be monitored by electronic or other means’;
172
 ‘[complying with] a demand made 
in the specified manner to provide information to a specified person in accordance with the 
demand’;
173
 ‘[his reporting] to a specified person at specified times and places’.
174
 Each of 
these burdens had a maximum duration of 12 months
175
 (but were renewable ‘on one or more 
occasions’)
176




As noted above, unlike the regime of indefinite detention under Part 4 of the ATCSA, 
control orders would apply to British and non-British citizens alike. Though managing, 
therefore, to avoid a situation such as that which arose in Belmarsh, involving the 
discriminatory targeting of foreign nationals contrary to art. 14 of the ECHR, the control 
order legislation nevertheless continued to raise issues concerning compatibility with the 
right to liberty and security under art. 5.
178
 The PTA sought to address this issue by drawing a 
distinction between so-called ‘derogating’ and ‘non-derogating’ control orders.
179
 The former 
would involve the imposition of obligations ‘that are or include derogating obligations’,
180
 
and, as such, in recognition of that fact, would necessitate the UK’s entering a formal 
derogation under art. 15 of the ECHR (as in the case of the previous Part 4 provisions). 
Further, in what Ewing describes as ‘a brilliant manoeuvre (intended or otherwise)’ by the 
Government, which ‘succeeded in giving this remarkable provision an enhanced 
respectability’, the High Court had ‘been offered a central—but limited—part in the 
drama’.
181
 That is, the making of a derogating order required an application by the Secretary 
of State to the court which would, in turn, determine whether the order should be confirmed 
(with or without modification). In so deciding, the court would have regard to whether it was 
‘satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that the controlled person is an individual who is or 
has been involved in terrorism-related activity’, that ‘the imposition of obligations … [was] 
necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of 
terrorism’—that is, one arising, or associated with, ‘a public emergency in respect of which 
there [was] a designated derogation from the whole or a part of [art. 5 of the ECHR]’—and 
that the relevant obligations were ‘derogating obligations of a description set out for the 
purposes of the designated derogation in the designation order’.
182
  
The creation of derogating control orders had the effect, crucially, of building into the new 
regime the expectation that some (or perhaps a certain combination of) obligations would in 
fact amount to an interference with a person’s liberty beyond that which is permitted by art. 5. 
By contrast, a non-derogating order was one which purported to impose obligations entirely 
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within the parameters of that provision. This (assumption) was reflected in a significant 
relaxing of the procedural conditions for the making of such an order, as compared, that is, 
with those relating to derogating orders. Thus, the procedural threshold for the making of a 
non-derogating order was that of reasonable suspicion,
183
 marking a significant reduction 
both from that of ‘reasonable belief’ under the previous Part 4 provisions, and, in respect of 
derogating orders, the ‘balance of probabilities’ (as noted above). Indeed, this lowering of the 
threshold was rendered all the more significant given the extraordinary range of obligations 
to which an individual might be made subject, even under a purported non-derogating order. 
Further, the courts played a notably lesser supervisory role in these circumstances: a control 
order could be made by the Secretary of State provided s/he had ‘applied to the court for 
permission to make the order and ha[d] been granted that permission’.
184
 In the case of 
urgency, and, notably, in the specific cases of those previously certified and detained under 
Part 4 of the ATCSA (including those involved in the Belmarsh litigation), the making of a 
non-derogating order was open to the Secretary of State before approval was given by the 
High Court.
185
 The function of the court, either way, was merely to assess ‘whether the 
decision of the Secretary of State to make the order he did was obviously flawed’
186
—‘a 
diluted standard that falls some way below the normal standard for judicial review’.
187
 
Yet, crucially, nowhere in the PTA was the ‘cut-off between restriction of liberty and its 
deprivation under Article 5’ articulated, nor any ‘precise line’ between non-derogating and 
derogating control orders specified.
188
 The Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation 
considered that the imposition upon an individual of restrictions and/or prohibitions the 
cumulative effect of which amounted to practical ‘house arrest’
189
 would cross the threshold, 
in particular those concerning the individual’s association or communication with others, and 
his confinement to a ‘specified area’ or place of residence in the UK. Indeed, as Ben 
Middleton writes, the derogating order was conceived as the appropriate mechanism for 
imposing obligations of such severity as to ‘represent significant interference with the right to 
liberty of the controlee’.
190
 Plainly, though, such (significant) interference could nevertheless 
be achieved by the supposed non-derogating order, for which the procedural burdens were 
much easier to overcome. In any event, throughout the lifetime of the control order regime, 
no derogating order was ever made.  
 
B. ‘Deprivation of Liberty’ and the Control Order Litigation 
 
The question as to whether, and if so to what extent, the imposition of a non-derogating order 
could thus be achieved within the scope of art. 5 was raised in several legal challenges heard 
by the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords. The meaning of ‘deprivation of liberty’ 
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(within the meaning of art. 5) was first considered by the Law Lords in Secretary of State for 
the Home Department v JJ,
191
 a case concerning the complaints of six ‘controlled persons’ 
(known only by the initials ‘JJ’, ‘GG’, ‘KK’, ‘HH’, ‘NN’, and ‘LL’) previously upheld both 
at first instance
192
 and in the Court of Appeal.
193
 The appellants argued (successfully in the 
lower courts) that the terms of the non-derogating control orders to which they had been 
made subject in fact amounted to a ‘deprivation of liberty’ (thus contravening art. 5), and 
that, accordingly, those orders ought to be quashed. Among other things, the relevant orders 
imposed restrictions including: a requirement to remain within a designated ‘residence’ for 18 
hours a day (save between 10am and 4pm), which, in the cases of each of the appellants, 
meant confinement to a one-bedroom flat (provided either by the local authority or the 
National Asylum Support Service); a requirement that visitors be authorised by the Home 
Office; spot searches by the police; locational constraints, including confinement to restricted 
urban areas (that is, during the six hours in which the appellants would be permitted to leave 
their residences); a requirement to wear an electronic tag and to report to a monitoring 
company both pre- and post-curfew hours; and prohibitions on ‘using or possessing 
communications equipment of any kind save for one fixed telephone line in their flat 
maintained by the monitoring company’.
194
 
The decision of the ECtHR in Guzzardi v Italy
195
 had much bearing on the Law Lords’ 
approach to question of whether the various restrictions constituted a ‘deprivation of liberty’. 
In Guzzardi, the Strasbourg Court had reiterated its earlier finding in Engel and Others v The 
Netherlands
196
 that the substance of art. 5 ‘is contemplating the physical liberty of the person; 
its aim is to ensure that no one should be dispossessed of this liberty in an arbitrary 
fashion’.
197
 Thus, as previously in Engel, the Court in Guzzardi held that in order to 
determine whether an individual has been ‘deprived’ of his liberty contrary to art. 5, ‘account 
must be taken of a whole range of criteria such as the type, duration, effects and manner of 
implementation of the measure in question’.
198
 That is, whether a ‘deprivation’ of liberty in 
fact amounts only to a mere ‘restriction’ upon liberty is therefore a matter ‘of degree or 
intensity, and not one of nature or substance’.
199
 The Court noted, however, that the former 
may take numerous forms other than ‘classic detention in prison’, and that whilst it may not 
be found on the strength of any one factor in isolation, multiple factors considered 
‘cumulatively and in combination’ may ‘certainly raise an issue of categorisation from the 
viewpoint of Article 5’.
200
 
Bringing these principles to bear on the appellants’ case, the Law Lords (sitting as a panel 
of five) upheld the complaints, dismissing the Secretary of State’s appeal, by a 3:2 majority 
(Lord Hoffmann and Lord Carswell dissenting). Lord Bingham, Baroness Hale and Lord 
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Brown each held that the cumulative effect of the obligations imposed upon the six controlled 
persons amounted to a deprivation of—that is, as opposed to a ‘mere restriction’ upon—the 
liberty of those persons. Lord Bingham found that ‘[t]he effect of the 18-hour curfew, 
coupled with the effective exclusion of social visitors, meant that the controlled persons were 
in practice in solitary confinement for this lengthy period every day for an indefinite 
duration’.
201
 Baroness Hale concurred: ‘[t]he requirement to remain in the “residence” for 18 
hours each day’ constituted ‘classic detention or confinement’.
202
 ‘Undoubtedly,’ Baroness 
Hale suggested, ‘these people were deprived of their liberty during the curfew hours’; the fact 
of their being allowed out for up to six hours a day was considered to have made very little 
difference given that ‘that freedom was also severely curtailed’ by, for instance, the various 




Lord Carswell rejected the notion that the relevant control orders contravened art. 5, 
noting that ‘on balance even that very long curfew does not take the cases of JJ and others 
over the line of deprivation of liberty’.
204
 Lord Hoffmann’s position signalled a somewhat 
extraordinary, paradoxical departure from that previously adopted (only a couple of years 
previously) in Belmarsh. As noted above, in that case, Lord Hoffmann characterised the 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention as a ‘quintessential British liberty’; indeed, the 
significance of such a freedom was emphasised once again in JJ, wherein Lord Hoffmann 
suggested that the reason why ‘deprivation of liberty [is] regarded as so quintessential a 
human right that it trumps even the interests of national security [was] … because it amounts 
to a complete deprivation of human autonomy and dignity’.
205
 And yet, insisting on the 
‘paradigm case of deprivation of liberty’ being that of imprisonment, ‘in the custody of a 
gaoler’,
206
 Lord Hoffmann held that the various restrictions imposed on each of the six 
controlled persons, notwithstanding their cumulative effects, did not contravene art. 5 of the 
Convention. 
In particular, Lord Brown’s ruling (for the majority) would prove especially consequential. 
In it, it was considered that, ‘[p]lainly there must come a point at which a daily curfew (itself 
clearly a restriction upon liberty of movement) shades into a regime akin to house arrest, 
where so little genuine freedom is left that the line is crossed into deprivation of liberty’.
207
 
Noting that the Secretary of State had in fact contended that a curfew of up to 18 hours a day 
did not breach the threshold into ‘deprivation of liberty’, Lord Brown commented that ‘there 
is no particular logic in this’, adding: ‘[w]hy not 20 hours, or 22?’
208
 At any rate, ‘[n]o useful 
comparison can be made with actual imprisonment,’ it was suggested, given that ‘conditions 
of imprisonment vary hugely’.
209
 Ultimately, Lord Brown held that ‘[t]aking account of all 
the other conditions and circumstances of these control orders … and not least the length of 
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time for which they are imposed … 18 hour curfews are simply too long to be consistent with 
the retention of physical liberty’; such restrictions thus breach art. 5. Though, crucially, Lord 
Brown endorsed ‘the acceptable limit to be 16 hours, leaving the suspect with 8 hours 
(admittedly in various respects controlled) liberty a day’ as a regime which ‘can and should 
properly be characterised as one which restricts the suspect’s liberty of movement rather than 
actually deprives him of his liberty’.
210
 And although noting that the distinction could not be 
said to turn solely on the existence or length of a curfew, per se, Lord Brown concluded that 
any such curfew beyond this ‘absolute limit’ ought not to be imposed unless the relevant (and 
more stringent) conditions for the making of a derogating control order had been met’.
211
 
It suffices for present purposes to note only briefly that the subsequent control order 
litigation can be seen, ultimately (and importantly), to have largely embraced the approach to 
the ‘deprivation’/‘restriction’ distinction set out in JJ.
212
 Control orders involving 14-hour 
curfews, and other (severe) restrictions such as electronic tagging, locational constraints, 
reporting obligations and police searches of the premises were found not to have constituted a 
‘deprivation of liberty’ in Secretary of State for Home Department v MB and AF.
213
 
Moreover, in Secretary of State for the Home Department v E,
214
 the Law Lords rejected the 
claim that there had been a ‘deprivation of liberty’ resulting from restrictions including, 
notably, a curfew of (only) 12 hours. Thus, as Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson note: 
‘[t]he finding, particularly in MB & AF, coupled with the rejection of the eighteen-hour 
curfew in JJ, appeared to imply that the Lords were giving some—albeit, reluctant and 




The last in this key cluster of cases concerning the compatibility with art. 5 of the control-
order regime was that which was considered in 2010 by the (then newly formed) UK 
Supreme Court in Secretary of State for the Home Department v AP.
216
 In that case, Lord 
Brown, with whom each of the six other Justices agreed, considered that ‘for a control order 
with a 16-hour curfew (a fortiori one with a 14-hour curfew) to be struck down as involving a 
deprivation of liberty, the other conditions imposed would have to be unusually destructive of 
the life the controlee might otherwise have been living’.
217
 The controlee was subjected to a 
16-hour curfew, electronic tagging and (by this point usual) additional restrictions on 
association and communication with others.
218
 Of particular relevance, however, was the 
Secretary of State’s subsequent modification of the control order to include a requirement 
that the controlee relocate to an address ‘some 150 miles away’ from the London area in 
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which he, his family, friends and associates had always lived.
219
 This, it was held, constituted 
a particularly severe combination of restrictions, resulting in the controlee’s effective social 
isolation; the interference with the controlee’s right to private and family life under art. 8 of 
the ECHR was held to have been ‘capable of tipping the balance’ between a ‘restriction’ and 
a ‘deprivation’ of liberty under art. 5—that is, decisively towards the latter. 
On one hand, the decision in AP provided some welcome clarification as to the nebulous 
art. 5 jurisprudence, and further clarification, in particular, regarding the upper limits (within 
the context of that jurisprudence) of restrictions imposed under non-derogating control 
orders. Fenwick and Phillipson have commented that the ruling represents a ‘narrowly 
focused decision’ in which ‘the UK Supreme Court gave support to most of the core aspects 
of the control order scheme as implemented by the government, while making clear that if 
sixteen-hour house detentions are to be imposed, the Home Secretary would have to take full 
account of the impact of other significant restrictions’.
220
 Thus, this signalled ‘a more holistic 
approach towards the adverse impacts of control orders, in particular taking account of their 
destructive effect upon family life and friendship’.
221
 Yet, on the other hand, the ‘net result’ 
of the various control order litigation had been such that ‘art. 5 [was] interpreted in domestic 
law to mean that sixteen, but not eighteen, hours’ house detention can be imposed and may 
well not breach art. 5, even when combined with other restrictions on liberty and movement, 
so long as such restrictions do not have the stringent effect on the controlee described in 
AP’.
222
 And as a result: 
 
[W]hile the majority of their Lordships in JJ and the UK Supreme Court in AP rejected the explicit 
executive argument that the ambit of article 5(1) should be narrowed by reference to the needs of 
national security, the combined effect of these decisions was … to redefine and minimize that ambit by 
implication, in the domestic context. The obligations imposed could only be viewed as not amounting 
to a “deprivation of liberty” by relying implicitly on a narrow interpretation of that concept. 
 
Fenwick and Phillipson argue that, crucially, such a narrow interpretation ‘is not fully 
supported by the jurisprudence of the ECtHR’,
223
 whereby, for instance, ‘too much emphasis 
has been placed on the idea of restriction of physical liberty analogous to arrest’, contrary to 
the subjective, case-specific approach endorsed in Guzzardi.
224
 Thus, ‘while the non-
derogating orders scheme—as originally envisaged by the executive—relied on presupposing 
a heavily attenuated version of article 5 that the judges did not accept, the judges [had] 
nevertheless been partially drawn into the redefining process by accepting an overly 
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IV. TERRORISM PREVENTION AND INVESTIGATION MEASURES 
 
Though, ultimately, the control order regime managed to come through these various legal 
challenges largely intact, upon entering office in May 2010 the Conservative-Liberal 
Democrat Coalition Government pledged to ‘urgently review’ the regime, as part of a ‘wider 
review of counter-terrorist legislation, measures and programmes’.
226
 The Review of Counter-
Terrorism and Security Powers, subsequently published in January 2011, recommended that 
the regime be repealed, and replaced by ‘a system which will protect the public but will be 
less intrusive, more clearly and tightly defined and more comparable to restrictions imposed 
under other powers in the civil justice system’.
227
 The Review specifically promised ‘an end 
to the use of forced relocation and lengthy curfews that prevent individuals leading a normal 
life’.
228
 And whereas ‘[u]nder control orders the Government could implement any measure 
deemed necessary provided it was not struck down by a court’, the new regime would require 
the Government to ‘specify in greater detail the measures that will and will not be 
available’.
229
 It is notable, also, that whatever would replace the control order regime was 
described as ‘neither a long term nor adequate alternative to prosecution, which remains the 
priority’;
230
 the Review was clear that the raison d’être of counter-terrorism restrictions on 
liberty ought, and would be, to ‘facilitate further investigation [leading, ultimately, to 




A. Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 
 
The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, which entered into force in 
December 2011, implemented this new approach. The Act abolishes control orders,
232
 and 
makes what have been widely regarded as several significant improvements upon its 
predecessor. For example, in the first report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism 
Legislation (IRTL) on the operation of the (at that point nascent) TPIM regime, it was noted 
that ‘TPIMs [are] more rights-compliant than control orders, and less likely to be a focus for 
community grievance’.
233
 Indeed, the Act confers on the Secretary of State a broad power to 
impose, by notice (that is, a ‘TPIM notice’), a range of coercive measures, many of which are 
plainly analogous in substance to those previously permitted under the PTA. But only 14 
such measures are listed under Schedule 1 to the TPIM Act, above all marking a significant 
reduction in the remarkably long list of restrictions for which the PTA provided (as outlined 
in Section III, above). The TPIM Act permits the imposition of restrictions relating to, among 
other things, the place of residence of the individual in question, such as a requirement to 
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reside in a specified residence, to remain at, or within, that residence overnight (that is, 
‘between such hours as are specified’), and to notify the Secretary of State of the identity of 
any cohabitants.
234
 Moreover, restrictions might (also) be imposed upon a person’s freedom 
to enter or leave a specified area or place,
235
 to access financial services,
236
 and to associate 
and/or communicate with others.
237
 And while initially the power to enforce a person’s 
relocation to some other area in the UK was omitted (as promised), that power was 
subsequently reintroduced under the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA)
238
—
very clearly doing much to undermine not only initial impressions of the TPIM regime as 
‘more rights-compliant than control orders’, but one of the key bases on which reform of 
control orders was sold by the Coalition Government from the outset. 
The power to impose such restrictions is subject to several key conditions (A to E). 
Condition A, originally that the Secretary of State need reasonably believe that the individual 
in question ‘is or has been, involved in terrorism-related activity’,
239
 was also later amended 
by the CTSA, which elevated the relevant threshold to that of ‘the balance of probabilities’.
240
 
Further: Condition B is ‘that some or all of the relevant activity is new terrorism-related 
activity’;
241
 Condition C is ‘that the Secretary of State reasonably considers that it is 
necessary, for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from a risk of 
terrorism, for [TPIMs] to be imposed on the individual’;
242
 Condition D is ‘that the Secretary 
of State reasonably considers that it is necessary, for purposes connected with preventing or 
restricting the individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity, for the specified 
[TPIMs] to be imposed on the individual’;
243
 and Condition E is that ‘the court gives the 
Secretary of State permission under section 6, or the Secretary of State reasonably considers 




The Act thus provides for judicial oversight similar to that previously incorporated into the 
non-derogating control order regime. The Secretary of State may impose a TPIM notice only 
having obtained the prior permission of the court,
245
 once again save, however, in cases of 
urgency,
246
 in which, among other things, the Secretary of State must refer to the court the 
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imposition of the relevant measures ‘[i]mmediately after serving the TPIM notice’.
247
 
Though, as with non-derogating control orders, the court’s role is to determine both ‘whether 
the relevant decisions of the Secretary of State are obviously flawed’ and ‘whether to give 
permission to impose measures on the individual’ (with or without exercising the power to 
direct the Secretary of State as to the relevant measures).
248
 The court may consider the 
application—to be determined on the basis of judicial review principles
249
—‘in the absence 
of the individual’, ‘without the individual having been notified of the application’, and 
‘without the individual having been given an opportunity (if the individual was aware of the 
application) of making any representations to the court’.
250
 Though, once permission is given 
by the court, the court must conduct a ‘directions hearing’ and thereafter a ‘review hearing’ 
which the subject of the relevant TPIM notice may attend.
251
 In regards to the latter, it is ‘the 
function of the court … to review decisions of the Secretary of State that the relevant 
conditions [for the imposition of restrictions] were met and continue to be met’—again, to be 
decided by reference to judicial review principles.
252
 The individual in question is entitled to 
make representations,
253
 while the court is empowered to quash the TPIM notice in full or in 
part, and to give directions to the Secretary of State for, or in relation to, ‘the revocation of 
the TPIM notice’ or ‘the variation of measures specified in [it]’.
254
 
Further safeguards included within the TPIM Act include the maximum time limit of two 
years on the validity of a TPIM notice. That is, a TPIM notice remains in force for a period of 
one year following its service on the individual in question (‘or, if later, at the time specified 
for this purpose in the notice’).
255
 The Secretary of State may by notice extend the effects of 
the original TPIM notice ‘for a period of one year beginning when [it] would otherwise 
expire’, though only if Conditions A, C and D (outlined above) are met, and only on one 
occasion.
256
 In any event, during the period that a TPIM notice is in force, the Secretary of 
State ‘must keep under review whether conditions C and D are met’
257
—albeit that the Act 
fails to specify the precise nature or form of this review. This is in addition to the Secretary of 
State’s duty to provide quarterly reports on the exercise of powers under the Act, as well as 
ongoing (annual) review of the Act by the IRTL.
258
 And finally, the Act stipulated that the 
Secretary of State’s TPIM powers would ‘expire at the end of 5 years beginning with the day 
on which [the] Act is passed’, unless postponed by statutory instrument, following 
consultation with the IRTL, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner, and the Director-
General of the Security Service’. One such postponement was effected in 2016, which 
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stipulated that the provisions would expire—unless extended further, as seems highly 
probable at the time of writing—on 31 December 2021.
259
  
Two issues of ongoing significance ought to be noted at this point. Firstly, in-keeping with 
the ‘investigative’ rationale of TPIMs—and the priority ostensibly accorded, in turn, to 
securing criminal convictions of those suspected of involvement in terrorism—the Act 
requires the Secretary of State, before seeking the court’s permission to impose restrictions, 
to consult ‘the chief officer of the appropriate police force’ specifically as to ‘whether there is 
evidence available that could realistically be used for prosecuting the individual for an 
offence relating to terrorism’.
260
 Thereafter, the chief officer must ‘secure that the 
investigation of the individual’s conduct, with a view to a prosecution of the individual for 
[such an offence], is kept under review throughout the period the TPIM notice is in force’.
261
 
And yet, TPIMs can scarcely be said to have had any real impact in this respect. In 2014, the 
IRTL reported that ‘TPIMs appear to be no more successful as investigative measures than 
were control orders’.
262
 An inquiry by the JCHR in 2013-14 notably ‘failed to find any 
evidence that TPIMs have led in practice to any more criminal prosecutions of terrorist 
suspects’; the Committee considered that this in fact confirmed its previous concerns that ‘the 
replacement for control orders were not “investigative” in any meaningful sense’.
263
 Indeed, 
similar criticisms have since been made more recently by the current IRTL, Jonathan Hall, 
who, in 2020, noted that ‘[the title ‘terrorism prevention and investigation measures’] is 
something of a misnomer: no measures are imposed specifically for the purpose of 
investigation’.
264
 One reason for this, Helen Fenwick has suggested, is that the dual purposes 
of ‘prevention’ and ‘investigation’ are fundamentally at odds, and so have the effect of 
‘obscur[ing] the basis for deploying measures such as TPIMs’.
265
 In any event, that TPIMs 
are seemingly incapable of fulfilling (one of) their core functions undermines another of the 
key bases on which reform of the control order regime was originally sold by the Coalition 
Government—that is, in addition to the (equally broken) promise on ending ‘forced 
relocation’, as noted above—giving yet further cause for concern as to whether TPIMs can in 
reality be seen to have improved upon its predecessor. 
The second issue—which perhaps is directly related to, or indeed a possible explanation 
for, the first—is that of the very limited use of TPIMs generally in the several years that they 
have been available within the domestic counter-terrorism framework. On one hand, this 
might in fact give credence to the perception, fundamentally, that TPIMs are ‘more rights-
compliant than control orders’, it appearing to suggest that, in practice, restrictions have 
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generally been imposed more sparingly, as a measure of last resort, than under the previous 
regime. The number of TPIM notices in force at any one time has been consistently few—
only occasionally reaching double figures. For instance, in 2015, the IRTL reported that up 
until the previous year a total of 10 TPIM notices had been imposed by the Secretary of State, 
nine of which in fact related to those (British citizens) transferred from control orders in early 
2012, the other relating to (at that point) ‘the only foreign national to have been subject to the 
regime’, served in October 2012.
266
 Although at one stage it appeared that ‘TPIMs may be 
withering on the vine as a counter-terrorism tool of practical utility’,
267
 more recently there 
has been a reasonably consistent number of TPIM notices in force (as reported by the IRTL) 
at any one time: six, as of 31 August 2016;
268
 six, again, as of 31 August 2017;
269
 and five, as 
of 30 November 2018.
270
  
On the other hand, the paucity of TPIMs can perhaps be explained by the relative and 
increasing prominence within the contemporary counter-terrorism framework of other 





 and indeed prosecution itself—albeit prosecution which does 
not result from the use of TPIMs, per se. It is in this sense that the use of liberty-depriving, 
control-order-type preventive measures appears, somewhat ironically, to have come full 
circle: the contemporary counter-terrorism impetus is seemingly one in which deportation 
and expulsion of suspected terrorists (once again) take centre stage, as in the early months 
and years of the UK’s post-9/11 response. And this is notwithstanding, crucially, the various 
questions and issues which, in any event, continue to surround the efficacy of (merely) 
‘exporting’ or ‘displacing’ the terrorist threat as a primary means of diminishing it.
273
 Of 
particular significance, moreover, is what this perhaps says of the role of the HRA and human 
rights norms more generally, particularly at this (third) stage of the development of a modern 
era of ‘executive detention’ in the UK. For, as Paul Scott notes:  
 
Alongside the tense dialectical interplay of domestic and international legal regimes at the point of 
intersection in the Human Rights Act, which has influenced both the emergence of TPIMs as the most 
flagship counter-terrorism measure and the location of the line which TPIMs must walk in trading off 
the needs of security and those of liberty, the UK’s response to the threat of terrorism is therefore 
subject to a second evolutionary force. The changing foreign policy environment in part precipitated by 
the UK’s foreign misadventures—the invasions of Afghanistan [in 2001] and, more importantly, Iraq 
[in 2003]—has in that way doubled back upon itself, coming now to influence the domestic aspect of 
the state’s response to threats to its security.
274
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In other words, the operation of the HRA was very clearly brought to bear on the rise of the 
TPIM regime, but there is little evidence to suggest that it has, of itself, done very much to 
bring about that regime’s apparent fall. 
 
B. Reform of TPIMs: The Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2020 
 
Indeed, recent proposals to radically expand the TPIMs regime perhaps suggest that there is 
now a further stage to the development of the story explored in this chapter, so to speak, in 
which the role of the HRA—and the continuing imperative of rights-protection more 
generally—can also be further examined (if only briefly for present purposes). It ought to be 
noted at this point that these proposals have emerged in the light of the ‘substantial’ threat of 
terrorism faced by the UK in recent years, and indeed currently (meaning an attack is 
‘likely’);
275
 there have been a number of terrorist attacks resulting in death and serious injury 
to members of the British public, including, for instance, at Fishmongers’ Hall, near London 
Bridge, in November 2019, and in Streatham, Greater London, in February 2020. The 
Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 2020—which at the time of writing is currently 
pending Royal Assent—contains several significant reforms to the TPIMs regime, both 
substantive and procedural in nature. Notably, the Bill proposes to reduce the threshold 
condition as to determining ‘involvement in terrorism-related activity’ (Condition A), that is, 
from ‘the balance of probabilities’ (to which the threshold was in fact raised in 2015) to the 
much lower standard of ‘reasonable suspicion’.
276
 Moreover, the Bill proposes to remove the 
(maximum) 2-year time limit on the duration of TPIMs, rather permitting the Secretary of 
State, effectively, to impose indefinite restrictions on liberty.
277
 ‘Overnight’ residence 




Without doubt, the effect of these reforms would be to bring TPIMs closer to the previous 
(non-derogating) control order regime,
279
 including, it appears, by embracing even the more 
contentious elements of that regime (especially in regards to the impact on the liberty of the 
affected individual).
280
 Notably, the view of the former IRTL, Lord Carlile, is that it is 
‘sensible’ that ‘the bill proposes that TPIMs follow the example of control orders’, for 
reasons including (that is, in respect of plans to extend the maximum duration of a TPIM 
notice) that ‘[t]he focus will shift from arbitrary time limits to necessity’.
281
 In Parliament, 
Lord Carlile noted that, in fact, control orders ‘worked well; they were supported by the 
courts; the standard of proof was adequate; they were justiciable’, and so their effective 
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return (albeit that the ‘TPIMs’ moniker is retained) ‘is correct’.
282
 And while, interestingly, 
Lord Carlile’s successor as IRTL, (now) Lord Anderson, also intimated his support for 
TPIMs generally—accepting, for instance, that ‘they are unfortunate necessities for a small 
number of dangerous individuals who cannot be detained for long periods under criminal 
investigation … and who cannot be placed on trial or convicted’—this came with a pointed 
comment as to whether, in fact, ‘there is a better balance to be struck consistent with the 
enhanced public protection that the Bill aims to provide’.
283
 Lord Anderson noted that the 
suggestions of the current IRTL, Jonathan Hall, might achieve this, including ‘an upper limit 
in excess of two years and the retention of the current [‘balance of probabilities’] standard of 
proof, if not in all cases then at least beyond the initial period, which would take care of any 
valid concerns there may be about urgent cases’.
284
 Indeed, as Lord Anderson also 
suggested,
285
 it is of particular note that, consistent with evidence submitted to the House of 
Commons Public Bill Committee by Assistant Chief Constable Tim Jacques (Deputy Senior 
National Co-ordinator for Counter-Terrorism Policing), the Government concedes that ‘there 
has not been an occasion on which the security services wanted to give a TPIM but could not 
do so because of the [current] burden of proof’.
286
 
The fact of the matter is that, although replicating the very excesses of the control order 
regime which TPIMs were fundamentally designed to redress, at the heart of this manoeuvre 
is the fact that these excesses were found by the courts, in the various control order litigation 
discussed in Section III, above, to be compatible with the ECHR. The joint Ministry of 
Justice / Home Office ECHR Memorandum on the Counter-Terrorism and Sentencing Bill 
emphasises this point (and reiterates the Government’s endorsement of the Convention-
compatibility of the new TPIMs regime): it is noted that ‘[t]he enabling powers in the 
[control order] legislation were not found to be incompatible with ECHR rights – although, in 
a number of cases, obligations imposed in individual cases were found to be incompatible’, 
and so ‘[t]he case law in this context provides guidance as to the limits of the measures that 
may be imposed and the factors the Secretary of State must take into account’.
287
 For 
instance, on the extension of ‘overnight residence’ measures, the Memorandum also notes 
that ‘[t]he principle of imposing a curfew on an individual under civil preventative measures 
does not therefore breach Article 5 and there are protections in place to ensure that measures 
do not individually or cumulatively amount to a deprivation of liberty’.
288
 It is striking, 
however, that these “protections” are said to entail ‘[the] duty on the Secretary of State (under 
section 6 of the [HRA]) to act compatibly with the Convention rights in determining the 
length of the curfew and any other measures to be imposed under a TPIM notice – taking into 
account the relevant case law’, as well as the Secretary of State’s obligation (under the TPIM 
Act) ‘not to impose measures unless they are “necessary”, and … to keep the necessity of the 
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TPIM notice and each measure in it under review’.
289
 Indeed, it is one thing that the Secretary 
of State must act compatibly with the Convention rights, taking into account the relevant 
(control order) case law, and in doing so remain cognisant of the ongoing need to justify the 
necessity of the relevant measures; it is quite another that the ‘compatibility’ of such 
measures, especially in regards to the right to liberty and security under art. 5 of the ECHR, 
depends entirely on the increasingly nebulous and legalistic distinction between the 
‘deprivation’ and the mere ‘restriction’ of that right. For if the lessons of the control order 
litigation are to be remembered, so ‘overly restrained’ was the interpretation of the former 
which the courts were eventually drawn into accepting that the Government was effectively 
permitted to orchestrate a scheme of purportedly ‘non-derogating’ preventive measures on 
the basis of ‘a heavily attenuated version of article 5’.
290
 The new TPIMs regime will no 
doubt reopen the debate as to the upper legal limits, within the HRA/ECHR system, of 




There are a number of (compelling) reasons to be sceptical about whether the various stages 
of the development of a modern era of ‘executive detention’ in the UK can be seen to 
represent a ‘vindication’ of the HRA, and of the contemporary human rights paradigm more 
generally.
291
 Of course, the system of human rights-protection under the HRA did much, 
ultimately, to provide the courts with the necessary tools to wrest the UK Government’s 
scheme of indefinite detention of foreign terrorist suspects from its immigration law footing 
in Belmarsh. Rightly so: that footing was always a dubious one, purporting to ground an 
emergency counter-terrorism strategy which ‘sought to distinguish sharply between neighbor 
[sic] and foreigner, denoting them naively as friend and foe’.
292
 And clearly, at least on the 
face of things, the evolution of control orders into the analogous TPIMs was the product of a 
desire on the part of the then Coalition Government to cultivate a distinctly rights-compliant 
approach to counter-terrorism deprivation of liberty—albeit that the courts had by this point 
endorsed the Convention-compatibility of effective house arrest under the ostensibly ‘non-
derogating’ control order regime. Yet, perhaps the most convincing aspect of contemporary 
developments in this area is that which shows the human rights paradigm as having, in fact, 
operated as an obscuring (as opposed to consolidating) force in marshalling the constitutional 
position of (counter-terrorism) deprivation of liberty, radically narrowing the terms of the 
debate, and cultivating, above all, a law-of-diminishing-returns dynamic. That is, each 
iteration of the various measures explored in this chapter purports to improve upon the human 
rights situation of that which came before, all the while managing, fundamentally, to continue 
to ground egregious deprivations of liberty outwith the ordinary processes and procedural 
safeguards of the criminal justice system.  
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Recently, and notably, there appears to have been some reflection—indeed resistance—
amongst the senior judiciary specifically as to the extent to which the common law should be 
aligned with the concept of ‘deprivation of liberty’. For instance, in the recent case of R (on 
the application of Jalloh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department,
293
 then President of 
the Supreme Court Lady Hale noted that, in fact, ‘[t]he right to physical liberty was highly 
prized and protected by the common law long before the United Kingdom became party to 
the [ECHR]’.
294
 It was said that the ECtHR’s ‘multi-factorial approach’ in distinguishing 
between ‘deprivation’ and ‘restriction’ of liberty ‘is very different from the approach of the 
common law to imprisonment’,
295
 and that there is, in light of this, ‘no need for the common 
law to draw such a distinction and every reason for the common law to continue to protect 
those whom it has protected for centuries against unlawful imprisonment, whether by the 
State or private persons’.
296
 Whilst clearly this can be seen to bring renewed relevance to 
debates of the kind demonstrated in Belmarsh, that is, involving potentially competing 
visions for the position and protection of ‘liberty’ within the constitution, over a not 
insignificant period of two decades the centrality of the HRA/ECHR paradigm has 
nevertheless seen the increasingly nebulous concept of ‘deprivation of liberty’ entrenched as 
the guiding principle by which those debates are to be settled. As a consequence, measures 
involving, for instance, 12-hour curfews and forced relocation (up to 200 miles from one’s 
family and home life), soon to be subject only to the existence of ‘reasonable grounds for 
suspecting’ an individual’s involvement in ‘terrorism-related activity’ (widely defined), have 
been judicially sanctioned under the HRA, and thus allowed to take root as a permanent 
feature of the contemporary counter-terrorism framework. The key argument of this chapter, 
however, is not that the HRA is to be, or must be, blamed for all the ills of the UK’s post-
9/11 counter-terrorism response, whose mark the contemporary framework can be seen, 
clearly, to continue to bear. Rather, it is to highlight the enduring relevance of the 
‘democratic sceptic’ scholarship which did so much at key points within the various 
developments explored in this chapter to provide a necessary reminder that, in the case of the 
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The UK’s contemporary response to the threat of terrorism has been described as having 
above all involved ‘a very significant ratcheting up of the state’s coercive powers in terms of 
the criminal law, police powers, and extraordinary ‘pre-emptive’ measures’.
1
 Among the 
measures at the forefront of this expansion of the state’s coercive powers are those whose 
effect is to deprive an individual (or, indeed, potentially a vast number of individuals) of their 
privacy. This chapter explores two ‘categories’ (broadly speaking) of such measures, such 
that, it is submitted, the broader constitutional implications of counter-terrorism deprivation 
of privacy can be convincingly located within the various contemporary legal developments 
manifest in those contexts. 
The first category comprises those measures of police ‘stop-and-search’ which, crucially, 
dispense with grounds for reasonable suspicion as an essential procedural condition to their 
use. The chapter explores two sets of powers within this category, which, as an addition to 
the broad range of existing police powers of stop-and-search,
2
 have long been regarded in the 
UK as a necessary tool for the prevention of terrorist acts.
3
 They are: first, s. 44 (now s. 47A)
4
 
of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT), which permits suspicionless stop-and-search within the 
boundaries of so-called ‘specified areas’—including, for instance, the whole or part of the 
Metropolitan Police District, the City of London, and Northern Ireland;
5
 and secondly, 
Schedule 7 to the 2000 Act, which makes available a range of suspicionless stop-and-search 
powers at ‘a [UK] port or in the border area’.
6
 The co-existence of these measures within the 
                                                          
1 Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson, ‘UK Counter-Terror Law Post-9/11: Initial Acceptance of Extraordinary Measures 
and the Partial Return of Human Rights Norms’ in Victor V Ramraj, Michael Hor, Kent Roach and George Williams (eds), 
Global Anti-Terrorism Law and Policy (2nd edn, CUP 2012) 481. 
2 The main police powers of stop-and-search derive from the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE), s 1. Further 
powers of stop-and-search available to the police are listed in PACE Code A, and include (but are not limited to): Firearms 
Act 1968, s 47; Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, s 23; Criminal Justice Act 1988, s 139B. 
3 See, eg, Lord Lloyd, Inquiry into Legislation Against Terrorism (Cm 3420, 1996) ch 10. 
4 Protection of Freedoms Act 2012, s 58. 
5 TACT, s 44(4) (as originally enacted); TACT, sch 6B. 
6 TACT, sch 7, para (2)(2)(a). ‘Port’ is defined under TACT, sch 7, para 1(2) as including ‘an airport and a hoverport’, 
whereas ‘in the border area’ is defined under TACT, sch 7, para 4 as including both ‘[a] place in Northern Ireland … no 




UK’s contemporary counter-terrorism framework ultimately provides a crucial point of 
comparison. Section 44/47A and Schedule 7 share several key characteristics, not least the 
wide discretion that they each confer on executive actors—again, unconstrained by the 
requirement of reasonable suspicion. Although, it forms a key part of that comparison that 
Schedule 7 in particular has been described as ‘amongst the strongest of all police powers’,
7
 
and, as such, of the two measures, is considered to go much further both in terms of the 
nature and scope of intrusions of privacy for which it provides legal authority. Schedule 7 




 of persons for the (by any measure 
vague and ill-defined) purpose of determining whether they ‘appear’ to be concerned in the 
commission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts,
10





 of those persons, their property and/or their vehicles.  
Within the second category of measures, two further sets of powers are considered, 
namely those relating to the interception of communications and to the collection of and 
access to communications data. These powers, in their modern form, are made available 
under the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA) both in so-called ‘targeted’ and, crucially, 
‘bulk’ form. As such, it is in this context, that of state surveillance of communications, that 
there is great potential for invasions of privacy, especially in the case of the latter: ‘the 
defining feature of a bulk power,’ it has been written, ‘is that it allows public authorities (in 
particular, law enforcement and intelligence) to have access for specified purposes to large 
quantities of data, a significant portion of which is not associated with current targets’.
13
 The 
key question, therefore, is whether, and if so to what extent, the relevant legal framework is 
capable of properly safeguarding against these incidental or collateral invasions of privacy. 
The chapter unfolds as follows. Section II outlines the legal and constitutional 
arrangements relevant to the protection of privacy in the UK, noting, in particular, the 
(significant) extent to which the indeterminacy of the nature and scope of the freedoms 
necessarily captured by the concept of privacy is brought to bear on (the complexity of) those 
arrangements. Indeed, as argued in that section, many of the legal and constitutional 
implications of the protection of privacy flow fundamentally from this issue. Turning, then, to 
the first category of counter-terrorism measures noted above, Section III outlines the 
provisions of s. 44/47A and Schedule 7 before exploring two key legal challenges to those 
provisions: respectively, R (on the application of Gillan and another) v Commissioner of 
Police for the Metropolis and another,
14
 and the more recent case of Beghal v DPP.
15
 In 
particular, as discussed in that section, it speaks to a number of issues of broader 
constitutional significance that the outcomes of both cases, brought within the domestic 
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courts, were subsequently overturned by the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). 
Indeed, a similar dynamic can be seen to have prevailed in the context of the contemporary 
legal framework of state surveillance of communications, which is explored in Section IV. 
That section outlines the various ways in which the enactment of the IPA, and the various 
mechanisms of oversight with which that new legislative framework is now populated, 
reflects the impetus of the last years increasingly towards greater protection of privacy 
specifically in the context of ‘bulk’ or ‘mass’ surveillance practices. It then considers the 
impact of recent key developments in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence on the right to private and 
family life (under art. 8 of the European Convention), culminating in the ruling in Big 
Brother Watch v United Kingdom,
16
 in which the UK’s contemporary ‘bulk’ surveillance 
practices were found to have violated that right. 
Among the key themes that are shown to emerge in this chapter is that of the apparent 
contingency of the broader constitutional position of privacy along two prominent lines. 
Firstly, the legal protection of privacy is shown to be contingent, above all, on art. 8 of the 
ECHR, that provision being directly enforceable in the domestic courts by virtue of the 
Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA). Notably absent from the broader constitutional ‘picture’ of 
the protection of privacy, consequently—that is, in any meaningful sense—is the influence of 
the common law, and of the fundamental constitutional principles that the domestic courts 
have, increasingly in recent years, sought to instrumentalise. It thus raises a number of 
questions of fundamental constitutional import that the application and enforcement by the 
domestic courts particularly of the test of ‘lawfulness’ under art. 8(2) of the ECHR has been 
found in the contexts of each of the specific counter-terrorism measures explored in this 
chapter to be inconsistent with the Strasbourg Court’s jurisprudence. That the incorporation 
of art. 8 by virtue of the HRA has done much to leverage the protection of privacy at the 
domestic level is clear (as the discussion in Section II shows). Indeed, as has been noted 
recently in the UK Supreme Court, reception of a right to privacy in the domestic legal 
system ‘has been relatively recent and almost entirely due to the incorporation into domestic 
law of the [ECHR]’.
17
 Not only, therefore, does the centrality of the ECHR (and, by 
extension, the ECtHR) in the broader constitutional ‘picture’ of the protection of privacy in 
the UK highlight an ever-increasing chasm between the common law’s capacity to protect 
‘fundamental’ rights and that of the ECHR: it also brings into sharp focus precisely what is at 
stake in the light of contemporary and ongoing debates about the future of the HRA and the 
UK’s membership of the Council of Europe.
18
 
Secondly, the constitutional position of privacy appears to be contingent on the 
conceptualisation of privacy, increasingly both at the domestic and supranational levels, in 
overwhelmingly formal or procedural (as opposed to substantive) terms. The decisions of the 
domestic courts in Gillan and Beghal typify this approach, such that they elide any real 
consideration of the substantive dimensions of the deprivation of privacy resulting from 
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suspicionless stop-and-search, focusing instead on the requirement that interferences with art. 
8 be ‘in accordance with the law’. Moreover, the ECtHR’s developing art. 8 jurisprudence 
can to seen to hang increasingly on the existence and adequacy of procedural safeguards 
(again, under the ‘in accordance with the law’ limb of art. 8), of which the ruling in Big 
Brother Watch stands as an important, and for present purposes supremely relevant, recent 
example. Contingency along this axis in particular speaks to a broader theme for which these 
issues perhaps contribute a compelling evidence base, concerning the (in)compatibility of 
common law constitutionalism, as a conceptual grounding for constitutional position of 
privacy, and the ‘legal’ constitutionalism of (what might be described as the inherently 
‘legal’ order of) the ECHR. 
 
II. THE LEGAL PROTECTION OF (THE RIGHT TO) PRIVACY IN THE U.K. 
 
Privacy is a deeply contested concept. Much flows fundamentally from what may only be 
described as a paradox at the heart of privacy: that although privacy is ‘a concept rich in 
meanings, and it is often highly valued, particularly in its absence’, it is nevertheless 
‘famously difficult to define’.
19
 In other words, the concept of privacy invariably generates 
consensus that the values it embodies are, in fact, essential values which speak more broadly 
to the essential conditions of the political freedom of the individual—for instance, securing to 
the individual ‘the right of determining, ordinarily, to what extent his thoughts, sentiments, 
and emotions shall be communicated to others’.
20
 And yet, the indeterminacy of the nature 
and scope of the freedom(s) necessarily captured by the concept of privacy has the effect of 
obfuscating its essential characteristics in ways that are brought to bear, crucially, on the 
capacity of the law and legal norms to protect those characteristics.  
These issues are certainly reflected in the legal protection of the right to privacy, which is 
enshrined in several international human rights frameworks.
21
 The right to privacy has been 
described as ‘essential to autonomy and the protection of human dignity’ and, indeed, ‘the 
foundation upon which many other human rights are built’.
22
 Moreover, it is said that ‘[t]he 
rules that protect privacy give us the ability to assert our rights in the face of significant 
power imbalances’, and as such, ‘privacy is an essential way we seek to protect ourselves and 
society against arbitrary and unjustified use of power, by reducing what can be known about 
us and done to us, while protecting us from others who may wish to exert control’.
23
 Yet, in-
keeping with the theme of paradox sketched out above, it has also been suggested that ‘the 
most striking thing about the right to privacy is that nobody seems to have any very clear idea 
what it is’.
24
 It stands to reason, also, that modern ideas as to the precise content of any such 
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right to privacy prove even more elusive. For significant advances in technology have 
expanded exponentially the fora in which the right to privacy is increasingly, and necessarily, 
regarded as a matter of utmost concern. And thus one of the key questions as to the protection 
of the right to privacy in the modern day concerns the extent to which the increasingly 
sophisticated means by which privacy is deprived by the state can realistically be captured by 
the provisions of human rights instruments drafted long before those means could ever have 
been imagined. For, what does it mean to enjoy a right to privacy in an age where so much of 
one’s private life is recorded ‘on-line’, and is reduced to modicums such as ‘data’ and ‘meta-




A. The Protection of Privacy at Common Law 
 
One of the key issues surrounding the legal protection of privacy in the UK is that of the 
marked (and historic) absence from the common law of a general right to privacy.
26
 The 
protection of privacy in this context has instead relied, above all, on the ad hoc development 
of discrete areas of private law, most notably those involving equitable action of ‘breach of 
confidence’,
27
 and action grounded in torts relating to public disclosure of information held 
by the police,
28 
‘misuse of private information’
29
 and, more recently, ‘invasion of privacy’.
30
 
Although, much of this development has in recent years been powered by the increasing 
‘convergence between public law concepts and reasoning, and private law remedial 
mechanisms’.
31
 In particular, the courts’ enforcement of the right to privacy under art. 8 of 
the ECHR in disputes between private parties can be seen to have had a marked influence on 
the development of common-law protection of privacy. For instance, in A v B & C
32
 Lord 
Woolf CJ opined that the courts can be seen to have ‘absorbed’ the right protected by art. 8 
into the common law, given that, as a ‘public authority’ under s. 6 of the HRA, which 
explicitly includes a court or a tribunal within the meaning of that that term,
33
 the courts are 
prohibited from ‘act[ing] in a way which is incompatible with a Convention right’.
34
 The 
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result, it was said, had been to give ‘a new strength and breadth’ to action grounded in those 
aforementioned causes in private law so as to ‘accommodate the requirements of [art. 8]’.
35
 
Yet, notwithstanding the domestic courts’ apparent embrace of the values captured by art. 
8
36
—the so-called ‘horizontal’ enforcement of the Convention rights—significant gaps in the 
protection of privacy in the contemporary common law constitution can be seen, ultimately, 
to have prevailed. That is, those gaps have endured the further, recent development of an 
explicit body of legal reasoning in the domestic courts that recognises (and, more 
importantly, seeks to instrumentalise) a repository of ‘common law constitutional rights’,
37
 
widely considered to represent something of a contemporary ‘renaissance’ or ‘resurgence’ in 
common law constitutionalism.
38
 Whilst in recent years the courts have demonstrably made 
clear strides in this area, not least with regards to the ‘constitutional right of access to the 
courts’,
39
 the development of the common law has been far less forthcoming on the issue of 
privacy, per se.
40
 As Kirsty Hughes notes, not only does this reflect the common law’s 
‘historic rejection’ of a right to privacy, rather the courts continue, presently, to show a 
‘continuing disregard for a right to privacy’.
41
 A key problem, it seems, is that simply 
because art. 8 of the ECHR has done much to leverage the protection of privacy in the 
domestic courts, where, plainly, that protection had previously been inadequate, litigants are 
invariably disinclined to look beyond art. 8 as the most effective grounds for challenging the 
lawfulness of invasions of privacy. It is, as Hughes suggests, ‘far easier for counsel to turn to 
Article 8 ECHR and the courts do not appear to be encouraging them to do otherwise’.
42
 And 
as such, ‘[t]he lack of clarity as to the capacity and direction of the common law means that 
we may well be waiting for Godot in looking for a case in which non-informational aspects of 
privacy are litigated using both the common law and Article 8 ECHR’.
43
  
A key theme in understanding the courts’ historic, and indeed ongoing, resistance to the 
development of a comprehensive right to privacy, per se, is that of the ‘quite remarkable, and 
rather uncomfortable, flexibility’ of that concept, and the difficulties that follow, therefore, in 
isolating precisely ‘what values or interests an ethical right of privacy would seek to protect 
and, consequently, what form the right should take’.
44
 This is evidenced in the recent Court of 
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Appeal case of ZXC v Bloomberg L.P.,
45
 in which Simon LJ suggested that the nebulousness 
of the concept of privacy owes, fundamentally, to the variability of ‘the circumstances in 
which there may be interference with a right to personal autonomy’, as well as the challenges 
posed by ‘changes in societal attitudes and developments in technology’ for articulating such 
a right.
46
 The opinion of Sir Robert Megarry VC in Malone v Metropolitan Police 
Commissioner
47
 epitomises the courts’ more general and long-standing reluctance to move 
beyond simply reiterating the conceptual ambiguity of privacy as the primary reason for its 
non-existence in the common law, it having been noted in that case that ‘[t]he extension of 
existing laws and principles is one thing, the creation of an altogether new right is another’; 
fundamentally, ‘[n]o new right in law, fully-fledged with all the appropriate safeguards, can 
spring from the head of a judge deciding a particular case: only Parliament can create such a 
right’.
48
 Subsequently, in Wainwright v Home Office
49
, Lord Hoffmann reiterated that the 
protection of privacy ‘is an area which requires a detailed approach which can be achieved 
only by legislation rather than the broad brush of common law principle’.
50
 
Though, of course, aspects of privacy and ‘private life’—including, importantly, those 
which are implicated in the contexts of the measures explored in this chapter—are 
nevertheless captured within the ambit of common law constitutional principle(s). In 
particular, the common law’s broader and historic commitment to the principle of the rule of 
law—of which the decision in Entick v Carrington
51
 is widely and historically considered to 
represent the epitome
52
—grounds a number of attendant principles which are brought to bear 
on the protection of privacy in a number of important ways. This includes, for instance, the 
principle of legality articulated by Lord Hoffmann in R v Secretary of State for the Home 
Department, ex parte Simms,
53
 which recognises that a constitutional arrangement in which 
unlimited legislative power is ascribed to Parliament means ‘that Parliament can, if it 
chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights’.
54
 The principle of 
legality is thus a tool of (strict or robust) statutory interpretation that is sensitive to the 
apparent threat posed by Parliament’s legislative supremacy over rule-of-law values and 
principles, and thus requires that ‘[f]undamental rights cannot be overridden by general or 
ambiguous words’. Plainly, this means that whatever power Parliament might confer on the 
executive to intrude upon a person’s privacy (or ‘private life’) must be clearly defined in 
statute so as to militate against lawless and arbitrary infringements of such a ‘fundamental’ 
right. 
The problem, however, is that the courts can scarcely be said to recognise as 
‘fundamental’ a negative right against interference by public authorities. As such, the 
question of the practical influence in this area, if any, of common law values and principles, 
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including the principle of legality, gives rise to a broader point as to the position of the 
common law vis-à-vis the protection of privacy. That is, the extension of discrete areas of 
private law, particularly owing to the courts’ embrace of the ‘horizontal’ effect of art. 8, has 
done much to accommodate the protection of privacy within the common law in the absence 
of a general right to privacy. And yet, it makes for an unusual state of affairs, which are 
shown to manifest perhaps most acutely in the context of ‘state surveillance’ practices 
(discussed in Section IV, below), whereby domestic courts can be seen to be ‘more 
comfortable to recognise the horizontal effect of the right to privacy and to apply it in the 
cases only marginally related to its original content, than to use it in its primary context – 
namely, as a negative right meant to safeguard individuals against oppressive privacy 
intrusions by the state’.
55
 Fundamentally, any such ‘right’ to privacy recognised at common 
law simply does not apply in any meaningful sense to the measures at the forefront of the 
UK’s contemporary counter-terrorism response, which often involve the deprivation of 
privacy on a potentially industrial scale. Indeed, this maps neatly onto a theme which is 
perhaps true of the UK’s counter-terrorism framework more broadly. For, as Paul Scott notes, 
it is a central theme of (certainly the evolution of) that framework that ‘[w]hen resistance 
emerges to this or that initiative of the state, that resistance is (far) more likely to be grounded 
in the [ECHR] than it is in the common law, with its values and principles and standards of 
review’.
56
  In the last years, the fulcrum of that resistance in the case of privacy has been art. 
8 of the ECHR. As a right to privacy actionable at a level of much greater generality than that 
which, if at all, is available at common law, art. 8 thus represents a—perhaps the—critical 
legal source of protection of privacy in the contemporary constitution. 
 
B. The Protection of Privacy under Article 8 of the ECHR 
 
Although central to the broader constitutional position of (counter-terrorism deprivation of) 
privacy, it is not altogether clear, however, that art. 8 of the ECHR is itself capable of 
providing clarity as to the nature and scope of the freedom(s) captured within the meaning of 
privacy or ‘private life’. That article, which provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to respect 
for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence’, has been regarded in the 
academic literature as ‘ill-defined and amorphous’,
57
 and ‘one of the most open-ended 
provisions of the Convention’.
58
 It was suggested by Lord Sumption in the recent UK 
Supreme Court case of R (Catt) v Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis that the right to 
privacy under art. 8 has in fact ‘proved to be the most elastic of the rights protected by the 
Convention and … has for many years extended well beyond the protection of privacy in its 
narrower sense’.
59
 Indeed, the potential for conceptual clarity is further compounded such 
that the ECtHR has itself on more than one occasion been given cause to remark that ‘the 
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concept of “private life” is a broad term not susceptible to exhaustive definition’.
60
 However, 
Nicole Moreham’s study of the Court’s case law on art. 8 is particularly instructive in 
delineating the boundaries of art. 8, having demonstrated that, although extending ‘well 
beyond traditional private law conceptions of privacy’, a clear(er) understanding of the 
freedoms captured by the term ‘private life’ can be identified as falling broadly within ‘five 
categories of right’.
61
 They are: firstly, ‘freedom from interference with physical integrity and 
psychological integrity’;
62
 secondly, ‘freedom from unwanted access to and collection of 
information’;
63
 thirdly, ‘freedom from serious environmental pollution’;
64
 fourthly, ‘the right 
to be free to develop one’s identity’;
65
 and fifthly, ‘the right to live one’s life in the manner of 
one’s choosing’. 
It suffices for present purposes to note simply that the measures of ‘suspicionless stop-
and-search’ and ‘state surveillance’ explored in this chapter can be seen to implicate art. 8 at 
least insofar as the first and second categories of Moreham’s exegesis are concerned. The 
ways in which the content of art. 8 is brought to bear on the compatibility of those measures 
is explored more fully in Sections III and IV of this chapter, respectively. Although, the key 
issue of note at this point is that, as one of the Convention’s several ‘qualified rights’, an 
interference with the right to private and family life may be justified according to the test set 
out in art. 8(2). That test has two elements: that is, the relevant interference must be both ‘in 
accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. In respect of the latter, a 
test of proportionality is applied; the ECtHR considers the extent to which, if at all, the 
impugned measure strikes an appropriate balance between the relevant interference that it 
purports to ground and the legitimate objective to which that interference is ostensibly 
directed. Under art. 8(2), a legitimate objective expressly includes (but is not limited to) ‘the 
interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country’. And 
as the ultimate arbiter of the propriety of the balance struck in these instances, it is the 




The test of whether an interference is ‘in accordance with the law’ under art. 8(2) concerns 
not only the question of whether the impugned measure purporting to ground the interference 
has some basis in domestic law, but also that which has been referred to in the case law of the 
Strasbourg Court as the ‘quality of the law’. The classic formulation of the test was given in 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom,
67
 in which the Court stipulated two fundamental 
characteristics that the relevant legal basis need possess. The first is that ‘the law must be 
adequately accessible’, meaning that ‘the citizen must be able to have an indication that is 
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adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case’.
68
 Secondly, the 
relevant law must be ‘formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his 
conduct’—in other words, the citizen ‘must be able – if need be with appropriate advice – to 




However, it is a key theme of the Court’s approach to determining the question of 
‘lawfulness’ in the last decades that the test applied is one which radically expands the 
meaning of the term ‘in accordance with the law’ as articulated in Sunday Times. As much is 
illustrated in the contexts of the various measures discussed in this chapter. For, as discussed 
in this chapter, the Court’s approach in the main has been to emphasise the need for domestic 
law to ‘afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention’, which, above all, requires that 
‘the law must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion conferred on the 
competent authorities and the manner of its exercise’.
70
 Only on this basis, then, can the 




III. ‘SUSPICIONLESS’ STOP-AND-SEARCH 
 
A. Suspicionless Stop-and-Search in ‘Specified Areas’: Section 44 (and Section 47A) 
of the Terrorism Act 2000 
 
Along with powers of arrest without warrant
72
 and search of premises,
73
 Part V of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 provides for police powers relating to, in effect, two “types” of stop-and-
search. The exercise of powers relating to the first “type” is conditional upon the existence of 
reasonable grounds for suspicion, and, as such, is relatively orthodox, comparing in many 
respects to powers also available to the police under s. 1 of the Police and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1984 and s. 23 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971, for instance. Thus, under s. 43 of the 
2000 Act, where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a person is a terrorist, a 
police constable may stop and search that person for the purpose of discovering ‘whether he 
has in his possession anything which may constitute evidence’ to that effect
74
—that is, 
evidence to suggest either that the person has committed a terrorism-related offence or is 
‘concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of terrorist acts’.
75
 Section 43A, 
inserted into the 2000 Act in 2012,
76
 applies to the stop-and-search of vehicles, and permits 
searches both of their contents and occupants for ‘anything which may constitute evidence 
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that the vehicle is being used for the purposes of terrorism’.
77
 Equally, the constable is 
required by the Act to have formed reasonable grounds for suspecting that the vehicle is 
being so used.
78
 So too, moreover, does the procedural requirement of reasonable suspicion 
apply to powers relating to the seizure and retention of material discovered in the course of 
(either of) those searches: only that which the constable ‘reasonably suspects may constitute 
evidence that the person is a terrorist’,
79
 or that which he ‘reasonably suspects may constitute 
evidence that the vehicle is being used for the purposes of terrorism’
80
 may, in accordance 
with the Part V powers, be seized and retained for further investigation.  
Until its eventual reform in 2012,
81
 s. 44 provided for the second “type” of counter-
terrorism stop-and-search, said to reflect an ‘all-risks’
82
 approach to the policing of terrorism. 
That section empowered a senior police officer, insofar as it was considered by him 
‘expedient for the prevention of acts of terrorism’,
83
 to authorise the stop-and-search of 
pedestrians and vehicles in a ‘specified area’ for the purpose of ascertaining the presence of 
‘articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism’. The power to stop-and-
search authorised under s. 44 was available to a police constable, crucially, ‘whether or not 
the constable ha[d] reasonable grounds for suspecting the presence of articles of that kind’.
84
 
Once given, an authorisation was valid for a maximum period of 28 days,
85
 although 
provision was made for its renewal at the end of that period.
86
 It also required the 
confirmation of the Home Secretary—who was to be informed ‘as soon as [was] reasonably 
practicable’, and in whom the power was vested to reduce the duration of, or to cancel 
altogether, the authorisation
87
—within 48 hours, after which time it ceased to have effect.
88
 
Its ceasing to have effect did not, however, ‘affect the lawfulness of anything done in reliance 
on it before the end of that period’.
89
 And although in the exercise of the power conferred by 
an authorisation a police constable was prohibited from requiring a person to ‘remove any 
clothing in public except for headgear, footwear, an outer coat, a jacket or gloves’,
90
 
detention of a person or vehicle was expressly permitted ‘for such time as is reasonably 
required to permit the search to be carried out at or near the place where the person or vehicle 
is stopped’.
91
 Section 47 made it an (imprisonable) offence to fail to comply with a stop-and-
search authorised under s. 44. 
Section 44 was used extensively throughout England and Wales for over a decade; 
suspicionless stop-and-search authorised under the provision produced tens of thousands of 
searches each year between 2000 and 2007, before ‘balloon[ing] to 126,500 in 2007/08 and 
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 This serves to emphasise a broader point about what s. 44 exemplifies: 
that although, as Keith Ewing noted in 2010, there had been ‘serious concerns’ about stop-
and-search powers for a number of decades,
93
 not least as to the manner of their exercise, the 
broader impetus (particularly in the face of the contemporary terrorist threat) was to 
nevertheless extend those powers, while, crucially, ‘beginning to dilute the statutory 
safeguards which must accompany their use’.
94
  
The safeguards built into the framework of s. 44 operated on two levels—pertaining, that 
is, to what John Ip characterises as the conferral on executive actors of ‘two broad 
discretions’: 
 
a ‘front-end discretion’ of a senior police officer and the Secretary of State as to whether to make an 
authorisation and confirm the authorisation, and a ‘back-end discretion’ of an individual officer as to 




However, so widely drawn were the provisions of s. 44 that each safeguard relevant to the 
exercise of the ‘front-end discretion’ proved notional at best. Throughout the lifetime of the s. 
44 framework, there was no recorded instance of the Home Secretary’s refusing to grant an 
authorisation. So-called ‘specified areas’ in fact included the whole of the City of London 
and the Metropolitan Police District,
96
 while, in practice, authorisations relating to those 
(extensive) geographical areas were perennially renewed on a rolling 28-day basis. The 
cumulative effect of these failures of the safeguards built into the s. 44 framework was 
highlighted by the human rights advocacy group Liberty, in that ‘for almost 10 years all of 




The failure of the frontloading of the statutory safeguards in ss. 44-47 to counterbalance 
the absence of the usual requirement of reasonable suspicion at the ‘back-end’ discretion is 
particularly critical given the obvious breadth of that discretion. Although s. 45(1)(a) 
confined the exercise of that discretion to a specific purpose—that of searches only in respect 
of ‘articles of a kind which could be used in connection with terrorism’
98
—it is a convincing 
argument that the breadth of that formulation nonetheless ‘undermines its ability to provide 
any meaningful limitation on the power’s use’.
99
 Rather, as Bowling and Marks suggest, ‘the 
wording of s. 44 [did] not preclude the possibility of conducting searches at random’.
100
 A 
statutory obligation to abide by the guidance set out in PACE Code A
101
 also impressed upon 
those exercising powers of stop-and-search the need to ‘take particular care not to 
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discriminate against members of minority ethnic groups’.
102
 And yet, statistics published 
annually by the Ministry of Justice consistently evidenced the disproportionate use of s. 44 
against those of BAME backgrounds, the consequences of which have been found to include, 
particularly amongst Asian males, the feeling ‘as though the perception of them as inherently 
suspicious has become normalised’.
103
 
Once an authorisation was in place, and suspicionless stop-and-search permitted in a 
‘specified area’, any safeguard provided either by the statutory purpose articulated in s. 
45(1)(a) or by the guidance set out in PACE Code A was rendered futile; police constables 
effectively enjoyed ‘an almost limitless discretion as to who to search within the authorised 
area’.
104
 The availability of such widely drawn and widely used powers of stop-and-search 
often (perhaps inevitably) resulted in their use in contexts far-removed from that of counter-
terrorism, including peaceful protests,
105
 and in one particularly infamous episode, at a fringe 
event of the 2005 Labour Party Conference.
106
 And so, by 2006, the IRTL, Lord Carlile, 
reported that ‘[i]f there is a single issue that can be identified as giving rise to most assertions 
of excessive and disproportionate police action, it is the use of section 44’.
107
 
The statistics also stacked up against s. 44’s apparent effectiveness as a counter-terrorism 
measure. Lord Carlile was of the view that the power to authorise so-called ‘suspicionless’ 
stop-and-search in specified areas represented a ‘necessary and proportionate’ response to the 
contemporary terrorist threat.
108
 Yet, whilst the broader purposes of counter-terrorism often 
justify more onerous, intrusive powers than are available to police officers for the purposes of 
dealing with “ordinary” criminal activity, it begs the question, not least in the light of s. 44’s 
extensive use in England and Wales although not in Scotland, as to why the terrorist threat in 
other parts of the UK was capable of being dealt with by other means.
109
 In several annual 
reports as IRTL, Lord Carlile noted that there was ‘little or no evidence that the use of section 
44 ha[d] the potential to prevent an act of terrorism as compared with other statutory powers 
of stop and search’.
110
 Quite how, therefore, it could in any event be considered to be 
‘proportionate’ is unclear. Lord Carlile’s successor as IRTL, David Anderson, recorded the 
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remarkable fact that ‘during its currency, none of the more than 600,000 stops in Great 




B. Judicial Scrutiny of Section 44: The Gillan Litigation 
 
The main legal challenge to the s. 44 framework, R (on the application of Gillan and another) 
v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis, reached the Appellate Committee of the House 
of Lords in 2006. The case stemmed from the use of s. 44 to authorise suspicionless stop-and-
search at a peaceful protest in Battersea, London, in 2003. Mr Gillan, a student, and Ms 
Quinton, a freelance journalist, both of whom had attended the protest, were stopped and 
questioned by police, and searched for ‘articles concerned in terrorism’. In both instances, the 




In what has been described as ‘one of the most disappointing UK judgments of the post-
9/11 era’,
113
 the appeal, having previously failed at first instance
114
 and dismissed in the 
Court of Appeal,
115
 was unanimously rejected by the Law Lords (sitting as a panel of five). 
The appellants had argued, firstly, that the threshold stipulated in s. 44(3)—that of 
‘expediency’ in the prevention of terrorist acts—insufficiently safeguarded against the 
arbitrary, excessive or discriminatory exercise of powers previously acknowledged by the 





 Rather, the correct interpretation of s. 44(3), it was submitted, was that which 
gave effect to the principle of legality, which (as outlined in Section II, above) requires that 
‘[f]undamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous words’;
118
 it was 
incumbent upon the Law Lords, consistent with that principle, to rein in the expansive 
meaning of the term ‘expedient’, such that the making of an authorisation ought only have 
been permitted ‘if the decision-maker ha[d] reasonable grounds for considering that the 
powers [were] necessary and suitable, in all the circumstances, for the prevention of 
terrorism’.
119
 It was also argued that the authorisation granted by the Assistant Commissioner 
of the Metropolitan Police on 13 August 2003 and confirmed by the Secretary of State on 14 
August 2003, under which the appellants had been stopped, was excessive and thus unlawful, 
to the extent that it (a) applied (unnecessarily) to the whole of the Metropolitan Police 




Delivering the leading judgment, Lord Bingham gave short shrift to the exceptional nature 
and scope of the powers available under s. 44, albeit having recognised the departure effected 
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by those powers ‘from the normal rule applicable where a constable exercises a power to stop 
and search’.
121
 Notably, the relevance of the principle of legality in interpreting the scope of 
the powers available upon authorisation under s. 44 was roundly dismissed, which is perhaps 
all the more striking given the Law Lords’ contemporaneous recognition of the fundamental 
constitutional status of that principle.
122
 ‘[E]ven if these sections are accepted as infringing 
fundamental human rights, itself a debatable proposition,’ Lord Bingham noted, ‘they do not 
do so by general words but by provisions of a detailed, specific and unambiguous 
character.’
123
 Moreover, it was held that the same (narrow) meaning could not be ascribed to 
the terms ‘expedient’ and ‘necessary’, as the appellants had claimed, there being above all 
‘no warrant for treating Parliament as having meant something which it did not say’.
124
 And 
among other reasons for rejecting the appellants’ argument as to the overbroad nature of s. 44 
was that examination of the broader statutory context showed both the procedure for 
authorisation and the exercise of the power to stop-and-search to have been ‘very closely 
regulated’; Parliament had legislated for a ‘series of [effective] constraints’, including that 
‘the authorisation may [have been] given only by a very senior police officer’, that ‘the 
authorisation [could not] extend beyond the boundary of a police force area’, and that ‘the 
authorisation [was] limited to a period of 28 days, and need not [have been] for so long’.
125
 
Yet, perhaps the most disappointing aspect of the judgment in Gillan is that of the Law 
Lords’ treatment of the human rights issues evidently given rise in the context of 
‘suspicionless’ stop-and-search. Widespread allegations of misuse and abuse of s. 44 had 
provided an opportunity, as Ewing writes, ‘to test the mettle of the Human Rights Act’, (at 
the time in its infancy,) particularly given ‘the challenge which stop and search presents 
potentially to a number of Convention rights … [and] its use in non-terrorist contexts’.
126
 
Indeed, it formed the basis of the appellants’ second key argument that the s. 44 framework 
contravened several provisions of the ECHR, namely art. 5 (the right to liberty and security), 
art. 8 (the right to respect for private and family life), art. 10 (freedom of expression), and art. 
11 (freedom of assembly and association). It was claimed, for instance, that the compulsory 
nature of searches authorised under s. 44 amounted to a ‘deprivation of liberty’ within the 
meaning of art. 5, not least insofar as provision had been made for a person’s detention at the 
discretion of the police constable,
127
 and that it was open to constables to use reasonable force 
for the purpose of enforcing compliance.
128
 But whilst it was accepted by Lord Bingham that 
a stop-and-search procedure has ‘features’ of the kind central to the appellants’ complaint, 
that argument was ultimately rejected on the basis of the test established by the ECtHR in 
Guzzardi v Italy,
129
 in which the term ‘deprivation of liberty’ was distinguished from ‘mere 
restrictions on liberty of movement’ (the latter falling short of engaging the provisions of art. 
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 To that end, it was held that detention of the kind typically associated with a stop-and-
search procedure does not amount to ‘being detained in the sense of confined or kept in 
custody’, but rather ‘of being detained in the sense of kept from proceeding or kept 
waiting’.
131
 And where it could be said that art. 5 of the Convention had been engaged in the 
course of a stop-and-search authorised under s. 44, it was found that in any event ‘the public 
[were] … subject to a clear obligation not to obstruct a constable exercising a lawful power 
stop and search for articles which could be used for terrorism’.
132
 Any such detention was 
considered to have properly fallen within the scope of the exceptions permitted under art. 5, 
for its purpose, above all, is ‘to secure effective fulfilment of that obligation’.
133
  
The Law Lords’ unanimous dismissal of the challenge grounded in art. 8 is of particular 
relevance to the broader issues explored in this chapter. The basis of the challenge was thus: 
stop-and-search authorised under s. 44 necessarily engages art. 8(1), and as such must 
therefore be justified in relation to the conditions set out in art. 8(2)—that is, that the 
interference be both ‘in accordance with the law’ and ‘necessary in a democratic society’. 
Lord Bingham found it doubtful that ‘an ordinary superficial search of the person can be said 
to show a lack of respect for private life’, notwithstanding the broad construction of art. 8(1) 
‘to embrace wide rights to personal autonomy’.
134
 Such that the Convention jurisprudence 
indicates that ‘intrusions must reach a certain level of seriousness to engage [its] operation’, it 
was held that ‘an ordinary superficial search of the person and an opening of bags, of the kind 
to which passengers uncomplainingly submit at airports, for example, can scarcely be said to 
reach that level’.
135
 Lord Scott added that a stop-and-search procedure ‘will often be very 
annoying to the person concerned, and may sometimes produce a feeling of humiliation or a 
perception of victimisation or discrimination [for that person]’, but ‘any invasion of privacy 
will be shortlived’.
136
 Lord Brown was equally unpersuaded, noting that 
 
[u]nwelcome and inconvenient though most people may be expected to regard such a stop and search 
procedure, and radically though it departs from our traditional understanding of the limits of police 





It did not (for the Law Lords) follow, therefore, that an ordinary stop-and-search inevitably 
involves an interference with art. 8. Nor, at any rate, had any interference been established on 
the facts. What is clear, though, throughout the Law Lords’ rejection of the art. 8 claims in 
Gillan is the perception that a stop-and-search procedure in any event amounts to little more 
than a trivial interaction between state and citizen. Beyond only a cursory acknowledgement 
that the powers conferred by that framework might fall foul of the substantive dimensions of 
art. 8—specifically, ‘as where (for instance) an officer in the course of a search perused an 
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address book, or diary, or correspondence’
138
—the judgment in Gillan elides any real 
consideration of those dimensions, and instead can be seen to approach the question of 
deprivation of privacy (resulting from suspicionless stop-and-search) from a wholly formal or 
procedural angle. 
That is, the appellants’ challenge having fell, ultimately, at the first hurdle, the Law Lords 
were nonetheless invited to consider the compatibility of the s. 44 framework with the 
conditions set out in art. 8(2), given the respondents’ concession that an interference could 
well be thought to have arisen (again, ‘as where (for instance) an officer in the course of a 
search perused an address book, or diary, or correspondence’).
139
 Lord Bingham outlined the 
test of whether an interference with art. 8 is ‘in accordance with the law’ as implicating 
‘supremely important features of the rule of law’,
140
 above all requiring that ‘[t]he exercise of 
power by public officials, as it affects members of the public, must be governed by clearly 
and publicly-accessible rules of law’; ‘interference by public officials acting on any personal 
whim, caprice, malice, predilection or purpose other than that for which the power was 
conferred’ otherwise denotes arbitrariness, ‘which is the antithesis of legality’.
141
 The 
appellants argued that the s. 44 framework fell foul of the test, there being a critical lack of 
transparency as to the process by which both an authorisation and ministerial confirmation 
could be given: that is, ‘a member of the public would know that the section 44 power to stop 
and search could be conferred on the police, but would not know at any given time or in any 
given place whether it had been’.
142
 Coupled with the ‘broad and ill-defined’ discretion 
conferred on a police constable, the potential for arbitrary stop-and-search authorised under s. 
44 was, for the appellants, clear.
143
 Still, alongside the suggestion that ‘the fact or the details 
of any authorisation’ cannot properly be regarded as “law”, but rather ‘as a procedure for 
bringing the law into potential effect’, Lord Bingham gave a litany of reasons as to why the 
appellants’ claim ought to fail, including: that both the 2000 Act and PACE Code A 
adequately informed the public as to the availability of the powers and the procedure 
involved in their exercise; that it would, in any event, ‘stultify a potentially valuable source of 
public protection to require notice of an authorisation or confirmation to be publicised 
prospectively’; and that in exercising the power, a police constable was ‘not free to act 
arbitrarily’, but would nevertheless be amenable to civil suit if he did.
144
 In short, there 
existed, as Lord Hope elsewhere articulated, ‘a structure of law within which the [s. 44 
power] must be exercised’.
145
 
Finally, thought was given only briefly to the question of whether suspicionless stop-and-
search is a measure ‘necessary in a democratic society’—although perhaps, as it appears, for 
the sake of completeness. Lord Bingham held that it would be ‘impossible to regard a proper 
exercise of the power, in accordance with [PACE] Code A, as other than proportionate when 
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seeking to counter the great danger of terrorism’,
146
 noting, also, that any challenge grounded 
in art. 10 and/or art. 11 would likely fail for the same reason. 
Following the Law Lords’ ruling, an application was made to the ECtHR, whose 
consideration of the human rights issues raised in Gillan ultimately represents a key turning 
point in the story, so to speak, of the contemporary legal landscape of suspicionless stop-and-
search. The decision of the Strasbourg Court is in stark contrast to that of the Law Lords. The 
Court held, firstly, that the exercise of coercive powers to ‘require an individual to submit to 
a detailed search of his person, his clothing and his personal belongings amounts to a clear 
interference with the right to respect for private life’.
147
 Resisting the analogy drawn by Lord 
Bingham with searches to which passengers ‘uncomplainingly’ submit at airports, the Court 
found, rather, that ‘[a]n air traveller may be seen as consenting to such a search by choosing 
to travel’—that, in other words, those who would travel through airports can reasonably 
expect to be searched in that environment and thus enjoy a ‘freedom of choice, since [they] 
can leave personal items behind and walk away without being subjected to a search’.
148
 On 
this basis, the power to stop-and-search under s. 44 was regarded by the Court as 
‘qualitatively different’ than the search powers at ports and borders to which they had been 
compared by Lord Bingham; it was noted that, unlike those powers, s. 44 permitted the 
stopping of an individual ‘anywhere and at any time, without notice and without any choice 
as to whether or not to submit to a search’.
149
 
Having therefore established an interference with the right to private and family life 
guaranteed under art. 8 in the applicants’ case, the Court went on to hold that, in fact, the 
interference constituted a violation of that right. ‘[B]ut what is striking,’ Fenwick and 
Phillipson suggest, ‘is [the Court’s] reason for doing so: that ss. 44-7 did not satisfy the ‘in 
accordance with the law’ test … [which represents] an unprecedented move in relation to a 
modern British statute – the first time it had happened in the course of the history of the UK’s 
engagement with the ECHR.’
150
 Whereas, in other words, the bulk of the Court’s art. 8 
jurisprudence can be seen to hang on the question of proportionality—that is, whether the 
interference is ‘necessary in a democratic society’—s. 44 failed, remarkably, to overcome the 
anterior threshold of lawfulness under art. 8(2). The Court reiterated the requirements of 
lawfulness as including ‘the impugned measure both to have some basis in domestic law and 
to be compatible with the rule of law’, the latter being ‘expressly mentioned in the preamble 
to the Convention and inherent in the object and purpose of Article 8’;
151
 that the domestic 
legal basis ‘must afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences by public 
authorities with the rights safeguarded by the Convention’; and that it would ‘be contrary to 
the rule of law … for a legal discretion granted to the executive to be expressed in terms of an 
unfettered power’.
152
 And by application of these principles, the Court found that the ‘powers 
of authorisation and confirmation as well as those of stop and search under sections 44 and 45 
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The Court’s reasoning speaks to a number of issues raised by the appellants (and 
subsequently dismissed) in the domestic courts. It was noted, for instance, that the power to 
authorise suspicionless stop-and-search under s. 44 was unduly broad, having been couched 
in terms of ‘expediency’. Yet, ‘“expedient means no more than “advantageous” or “helpful”’, 
the Court noted, there being ‘no requirement at the authorisation stage that the stop and 
search power be considered “necessary” and therefore no requirement of any assessment of 
the proportionality of the measure’.
154
 It was also considered that any constraint on the 
exercise of the broad discretion enjoyed by the Secretary of State to refuse confirmation or to 
reduce the time limit of an authorisation proved equally dubious, such that ‘in practice this 
ha[d] never been done’.
155
 Temporal and geographical limitations had failed to ‘act as any 
real check on the issuing of authorisations by the executive’, a s. 44 authorisation covering an 
area as large as the entirety of the Metropolitan Police Force Area having been ‘continuously 
renewed in a “rolling programme” since the powers were first granted’.
156
 Moreover, the 
Court was ‘struck’ by the number of searches recorded annually by the Ministry of Justice, 




The Court dismissed the Government’s claims that ‘safeguards against abuse [were] 
provided by the right of an individual to challenge a stop and search by way of judicial 
review or an action in damages’.
158
 Although recognising the availability of judicial review as 
an avenue of challenge to the exercise of the powers of authorisation and confirmation, the 
Court once again emphasised the deleterious effects of the breadth with which the statutory 
basis of those powers had been drafted—that applicants seeking to prove that they had been 
exercised unlawfully thus faced ‘formidable obstacles’.
159
 In any event, the limitations of the 
ostensible safeguards identified by the Government were ‘clearly demonstrated by the present 
case’; in particular, the Court noted that, owing to the absence of reasonable suspicion as a 
procedural requirement to the exercise of stop-and-search powers by an individual officer, ‘it 
is likely to be difficult if not impossible to prove that the power was improperly exercised’.
160
 
Finally, the Court chose not to make a determination as to arts. 5, 10 and 11, given its 
finding in relation to art. 8. Although, the element of coercion associated with a stop-and-
search procedure authorised under s. 44 was nonetheless regarded as ‘indicative of a 
deprivation of liberty within the meaning of [art. 5]’.
161
 It is also arguable that the Court was 
more keenly attuned than the Law Lords to the ‘risk that such a widely framed power could 
be misused against demonstrators and protestors in breach of Article 10 and/or 11 of the 
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 Indeed, that the Court highlighted these points is, of itself, indicative of the 
extent to which its decision upended that of the Law Lords. 
 
C. Reform of Suspicionless Stop-and-Search in ‘Specified Areas’ 
 
Perhaps somewhat ironically, the IRTL, Lord Carlile, noted that the decision of the ECtHR in 
Gillan v UK had ‘illustrated the excessive nature and use of section 44’.
163
 A remedial order 
was issued under s. 10 of the HRA,
164
 with formal amendments to the s. 44 framework 
subsequently introduced by the Protection of Freedoms Act 2012.
165
 The 2012 Act inserted a 
new provision—s. 47A—into the Terrorism Act 2000, under which a senior-ranking police 
officer is similarly empowered to ‘give an authorisation … in relation to a specified area’, but 
only if the officer ‘reasonably suspects that an act of terrorism will take place’.
166
 The officer 
need also ‘reasonably consider’ that, first, ‘the authorisation is necessary to prevent such an 
act’, second, ‘the specified area or place is no greater than is necessary to prevent such an 
act’, and thirdly, ‘the duration of the authorisation is no longer than is necessary to prevent 
such an act’.
167
 Thus, imbued with the requirement of reasonable suspicion (albeit only as to 
the exercise of the ‘front-end’ discretion) and now couched in the language of necessity, s. 
47A bears the essential procedural safeguards whose absence from the s. 44 framework 
ultimately led to that framework’s demise. 
A key question, however, is whether inserting a requirement of reasonable suspicion at the 
‘front-end’ discretion is enough to moderate the challenges posed by stop-and-search, more 
broadly, to those ‘fundamental’ principles, norms and values reflected in the common law (as 
outlined in Section II, above). This question was broached in 2015 in the UK Supreme Court 
case of R (on the application of Roberts) v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis,
168
 
albeit involving a challenge to the use of powers derived from s. 60 of the Criminal Justice 
and Public Order Act 1994. It suffices, here, to simply note that the provisions of that section 
are comparable in many respects to counter-terrorism stop-and-search under s. 44/47A. For 
instance, s. 60 of the 1994 Act confers on ‘a police officer of or above the rank of inspector’, 
who reasonably believes ‘that incidents involving serious violence may take place in any 
locality in his police area, and that it is expedient to give an authorisation under this section to 
prevent their occurrence’, the power to authorise suspicionless stop-and-search within that 
locality for a period ‘not exceeding 24 hours’.
169
 Among the key outcomes of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Roberts is that of the explicit (re)positioning of the common law as the 
‘starting point’ for police powers to stop and search a person or vehicle.
170
 The joint opinion 
of Lady Hale and Lord Reed (with whom Lord Clarke, Lord Toulson and Lord Hodge 
agreed) foregrounds the courts’ particular suspicion of ‘giving too much power to the police’, 
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with ‘police powers to stop and search without having reasonable grounds to suspect that we 
are committing or going to commit a crime’ singled out as a particular cause for concern.
171
 It 
was thus reiterated that two ‘fundamental’ principles of the common law are given rise in this 
context. First, that the police have no power to stop and search, per se—given the levels of 
coercion and intrusion that this entails—save for that which is explicitly authorised by 
statute.
172
 And secondly, that whilst it is recognised at common law that a police constable is 
entitled to arrest, without a warrant, any person reasonably suspected of having committed 
(or of proceeding to commit) a criminal offence, and that that person is then liable to be 
searched, it is both ‘contrary to constitutional principle and illegal to search someone to 
establish whether there are grounds for arrest’.
173
 
On one hand, this signifies a much clearer statement of the (common law) constitutional 
position of stop-and-search powers than that which had previously been endorsed in Gillan. 
In that case, Lord Bingham had claimed that the freedom to go about one’s business in the 
streets of the land ‘confident that they will be not be stopped and searched by the police 
unless reasonably suspected of having committed a criminal offence’ had been ‘so jealously 
guarded’ that it had ‘almost become a constitutional principle’.
174
 However, in Roberts, there 
was no such caveat; the Supreme Court Justices were unequivocal that, indeed, this was a 
matter of constitutional principle. And yet, on the other hand, there is a compelling argument 
to be made that, in fact, the position of the Supreme Court flatters to deceive. For although 
accepting that ‘[a]ny random “suspicionless” power of stop and search carries with it the risk 
that it will be used in an arbitrary or discriminatory manner in individuals cases’—and so, 
one must assume, risks compromising the fundamental importance of establishing reasonable 
grounds for suspecting that a stop-and-search is objectively justified in any such case—the 
Justices nevertheless went on to find that the common law, its values and principles, could in 
fact accommodate a power of this sort. The basis for the legal challenge to s. 60 in Roberts 
concerned the risk that suspicionless stop-and-search carried in permitting, specifically, 
arbitrary and disproportionate searches of young people from BAME groups. And yet, the 
Court noted: 
 
While there is a concern that members of these groups should not be disproportionately targeted, it is 
members of these groups who will benefit most from the reduction in violence, serious injury and death 
that may result from the use of such powers. Put bluntly, it is mostly young black lives that will be 




The key point is this. There are reasons to doubt the practical effect of an alignment of 
exceptional police powers and ‘fundamental’ common law constitutional principle—
especially given the apparent background sentiment in the senior judiciary that the particular 
risks of misuse and abuse of power against BAME communities are offset by such uses of 
power being, ultimately (if perversely), for the particular ‘benefit’ of those communities. 
Still, this is the direction of travel: within the conception of the constitutional position of 
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stop-and-search powers that the Supreme Court here seeks to advance, the requirement that 
reasonable suspicion serves to condition the exercise of powers which deprive a person of 
their privacy is clearly of the utmost importance. Indeed, that requirement serves at least 
some notion of the rule of law. Reasonable suspicion, at least in principle, ‘acts as a check 
upon an individual officer’s suspicion – which might be based on flimsy, instinctive or 
prejudiced grounds’; to the extent that it ensures, in other words, that ‘invasions of liberty 
only occur at the point at which objectively justifiable grounds for such intervention arise’, 
the requirement of reasonable suspicion militates against the arbitrary exercise of coercive 
power(s) by an individual (executive) officer, which is ‘normally perceived as a desirable 
attribute of the rule of law’.
176
  
To that end, the reform of s. 44 has generally been welcomed. ‘[I]n large part because of 
the tightened front-end discretion,’ Ip has suggested, ‘[s. 47A] represents a considerable 
improvement over its predecessor’.
177
 David Anderson, as IRTL, described the repeal of s. 44 
as a ‘correction in favour of liberty’.
178
 And as Ben Middleton notes, although in many ways 
appearing to represent ‘simply a diluted descendent of s. 44’, the powers under s. 47A ‘are no 
doubt Convention compliant in the wake of Gillan and represent a nuanced compromise 
between operational requirements and civil liberties concerns’.
179
 For the time being, 
suspicionless stop-and-search in ‘specified areas’ under TACT thus retains its position within 
the UK’s contemporary counter-terrorism framework. Clearly, that it is now drafted in similar 
terms to s. 60 of the CJPOA 1994, to which the Supreme Court effectively gave a clean bill 
of health in Roberts, speaks to its likely longevity within that framework.  
One point of increasing significance in recent years, however, is that of the 
implementation of s. 47A having coincided with a significant reduction in the number of 
searches resulting from the use of such powers.
180
 Writing in early 2017, at which point the 
powers under s. 47A had in fact never been used,
181
 Bowling and Marks suggested that ‘[the] 
20-year experiment with suspicionless searches in England and Wales seems to have come to 
a conclusive end’.
182
 Section 47A was, however, used for the first time in Great Britain in 
September 2017, following the terrorist attacks in Parsons Green, London; a s. 47A 
authorisation was issued by four separate police forces, including the British Transport 
Police, though none of these authorisations lasted longer than 48 hours, with one 
authorisation subsequently revoked after just a matter of 23 minutes.
183
 The reason for this, 
the IRTL noted, was that ‘[i]n each case the authorisation was based on the raising of the 
general United Kingdom threat level to Critical, rather than any intelligence of a particular 
threat in a particular geographical area (or in the case of the British Transport Police, to the 
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rail network)’, although it was ‘not clear why no other Forces granted authorisations, since 
the basis of the authorisations could have been applied equally to many other, if not all, 
Forces’.
184
 Ultimately, in the year ending 31 March 2018, 149 stops and searches under s. 
47A were recorded, 145 of which were conducted by the British Transport Police alone, and 
a total of only five arrests having been made.
185
 The measure was not used at any point in the 
years ending 31 March 2019 and 31 March 2020.
186
 Indeed, the apparent dormancy of the 
revised regime might in part be explained by the concurrent exponential rise, in recent years, 
of stop-and-search under s. 60 of the 1994 Act, it appearing to highlight the relative ease of 
use of that section to ground suspicionless stop-and-search in large geographical areas.
187
 
Whatever, despite some activity in late-2018, Bowling and Marks’ inclination to call time on 
the post-9/11 suspicionless stop-and-search ‘experiment’ appears, for now, to have been 
vindicated. 
 
D. Suspicionless Stop-and-Search at UK Ports and Borders: Schedule 7 to the 
Terrorism Act 2000 
 
The co-existence within the UK’s contemporary counter-terrorism framework of 
suspicionless stop-and-search powers under s. 44/47A of TACT and those contained in 
Schedule 7 to the Act provides a crucial point of comparison. Indeed, it forms a key part of 
that comparison that the nature and scope of the instrusions into a person’s privacy for which 
the latter provides legal authority far exceed those of the former. Given effect by s. 53 of the 
2000 Act, Schedule 7 confers on ‘examining officers’—which includes police constables, 
immigration officers and designated customs officers
188
—an extensive range of coercive 
powers exercisable ‘at a [UK] port or in the border area’.
189
 A person whose presence the 
examining officer believes is ‘connected with his entering or leaving Great Britain or 
Northern Ireland or his travelling by air within Great Britain or Northern Ireland’ may be 
stopped, searched, questioned and detained for the purpose of determining whether ‘he 
appears to be a person falling within section 40(1)(b)’—that is, a ‘terrorist’ within the (wide) 
meaning of that provision
190
—crucially ‘whether or not’ the examining officer has formed 
reasonable grounds for suspecting a person’s involvement in terrorism-related activity.
191
 The 
threshold to the exercise of powers under Schedule 7 is thus appreciably lower than that of s. 
44/47A. To use the analogy employed by Ip in relation to the s. 44/47A framework 
(discussed above), there is no ‘front-end’ safeguard (for example, the need to obtain prior 
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authorisation to exercise suspicionless stop-and-search powers) capable of counterbalancing 
the risk of arbitrariness in the individual officer’s decision-making.  
This issue goes to the heart of the (breadth of) discretion available under Schedule 7, and 
renders all the more striking the panopoly of coercive measures to which a person stopped 
under Schedule 7 is potentially exposed, including: detention for up to a maximum period of 
six hours (reduced in 2014 from nine hours), where questioning may exceed one hour;
192
 
searches of that person (including the performance of strip-searches)
193
 and ‘anything which 
he has with him, or which belongs to him’;
194
 a statutory obligation to ‘give the examining 
officer any information in his possession which the examining officer requests’, including 
travel and identity documents;
195
 detention, for a period of up to seven days, of property 
given to or found by an examining officer in the course of a Schedule 7 examination.
196
 
‘Wilful’ failure to comply with any duty imposed under or in relation to Schedule 7, as well 
as ‘wilfully’ obstructing or seeking to frustrate a search or examination, constitutes a criminal 
offence carrying a custodial sentence of up to three months.
197
 
Given its wide use in recent years, Schedule 7 has generated a considerable degree of 
controversy, attracting criticism not least from human rights advocacy groups such as 
Liberty, by whom the measure has been labelled ‘ripe for overuse and abuse’ and ‘invariably 
used in a discriminatory fashion … based on stereotype rather than genuine suspicion’.
198
 
Concerns were also notably articulated by the Supreme Court in 2013, where, in R v Gul,
199
 it 
was considered that Schedule 7 is ‘not subject to any controls’, and thus gives rise to the risk 
of ‘serious invasions of personal liberty’.
200
 Against this backdrop, a number of legal 
challenges involving the use of Schedule 7 powers have prompted the courts to clarify 
somewhat the outer limits of those powers. For instance, in CC v The Commissioner of Police 
of the Metropolis and another,
201
 the High Court emphasised that the scope of Schedule 7 is 
anchored to the purpose stipulated in para 2(1)—the same vague and problematic purpose, 
that is, of determining ‘whether a person appears to be [a terrorist]’. Although, whilst it was 
held, therefore, that Schedule 7 cannot be construed as permitting questioning for the purpose 
of gathering evidence in pursuit of criminal proceedings—the basis of the challenge in CC—
the High Court nevertheless noted that para 2(1) is to be ‘properly given a wide 
construction’,
202
 owing, among other things, to the expansive definition of ‘terrorist’ under s. 
40(1)(b) of TACT to which it corresponds.  
The extraordinary reach of Schedule 7 subsequently formed the basis of the high-profile 
legal challenge in R (Miranda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department.
203
 The case 
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concerned the use of Schedule 7 powers to stop, search, question and detain at Heathrow 
Airport, in August 2013, the spouse of a Guardian journalist complicit in the publication of 
classified documents obtained by the former (US) National Security Agency intelligence 
analyst-turned-whistleblower Edward Snowden. The appellant argued, firstly, that his 
questioning and the confiscation of items found in his possession, which included encrypted 
storage devices,
204
 was done without legal authority, there being no basis to rely on Schedule 
7, a tool of counter-terrorism, for the confiscation of journalistic material. It was also 
submitted that if the purpose to which the powers conferred under Schedule 7 are oriented (as 
noted above) was properly adhered to in the circumstances, the measure nevertheless 
represents a disproportionate interference with the freedom of expression protected by art. 10 
of the ECHR (that is, on the grounds of national security). In 2016, the Court of Appeal held 
that although the use of Schedule 7 was in the circumstances lawful, the measure was 
incompatible with art. 10 of the ECHR to the extent that legal safeguards against its arbitrary 
use in relation to journalistic material were inadequate.
205
 
There has, as yet, been no specific legislative response to the Court of Appeal’s decision in 
Miranda. Nor, in fact, does any such response now seem likely in the near future, certainly 
given that the furore surrounding the Miranda litigation has long since passed. The Home 
Office issued a press release in the immediate aftermath of the Court of Appeal judgment, to 
the effect that the updated Schedule 7 Code of Practice sufficiently safeguards against 
examination of journalistic material.
206
 Although, the Miranda litigation has done much to 
generate a level of scrutiny of Schedule 7 the likes of which had not been achieved for over a 
decade. At any rate, in between the decisions of the High Court and the Court of Appeal, 
several reforms to the Schedule 7 regime were introduced by Parliament in the Anti-Social 
Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. This included: the reduction of the maximum 
period of detention permitted under Schedule 7, as noted above (that is, from nine hours to 
six);
207
 the introduction of a ban on ‘intimate searches’;
208
 and the imposition on senior 
officers of a duty to periodically review a person’s detention.
209
 The Act also conferred on 
those detained and questioned under Schedule 7 the right ‘to have someone informed and to 
consult a solicitor’,
210
 in response to the decision in R (Elosta) v Commissioner of Police for 
the Metropolis,
211
 in which the refusal by examining officers to delay a Schedule 7 interview 
pending the arrival of a solicitor requested by the individual concerned was held by the High 
Court to be unlawful. Although, these changes can scarcely be said to amount to very 
much—not least by way of curtailing the more severe coercive powers made available under 
Schedule 7. And, indeed, among the changes implemented by the 2014 Act was, in fact, an 
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extension of those coercive powers, namely in respect of the making and retention of copies 
of anything confiscated by an examining officer (albeit only where the officer is a police 





E. Judicial Scrutiny of Schedule 7: The Beghal Litigation 
 
Of the various legal developments involving Schedule 7 in recent years, certainly the most 
significant, not least for present purposes, is that of the UK Supreme Court case of Beghal v 
DPP.
213
 In January 2011, Beghal, a British national, was stopped, searched and detained for 
interview under Schedule 7 at East Midlands Airport for the purpose of establishing whether 
or not she was a person concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of 
terrorism. Beghal had returned to the UK from Paris, where she had visited her spouse, a 
French national, who was in custody for offences relating to terrorism. The ordeal was 
reported to have lasted almost two hours in total, the interview having been concluded in 
around 30 minutes. Beghal refused to answer most of the questions put to her, for which she 
was subsequently charged and later convicted of the offence, under para 18 of Schedule 7, of 
wilfully failing to comply. The appeal against her conviction reached the Supreme Court in 
2015, and raised several issues concerning the compatibility of Schedule 7 with the ECHR—
specifically art. 5, art. 6 (right to a fair trial) and, crucially, art. 8.  
A panel of five Justices of the Supreme Court presided over the appeal. The Court’s 
dismissal of the appeal by a 4:1 majority (Lord Kerr dissenting) signalled its retreat from the 
concerns about Schedule 7 it had previously expressed in R v Gul (noted above).
214
 
Delivering the leading judgment for the majority, Lord Hughes (with whom Lord Hodge 
agreed) decided that ‘[t]he question of the compatibility of the power of detention with article 
5 only barely arises in the present case’. Thus, following a ‘rather perfunctory’
215
 discussion 
of the art. 5 dimensions of the appeal, it was held: ‘[t]o the extent that there was any 
deprivation of liberty in the present case, it seems clear that it was no longer than was 
necessary for the completion of the process’.
216
 Equally, the majority rejected the appellant’s 
claim that the requirement to answer questions put to those interviewed under Schedule 7 was 
incompatible with the right to a fair trial guaranteed by art. 6 of the Convention, because 
‘[t]he appellant was at no stage a defendant to a criminal charge and no question of a breach 
of a right to a fair trial arises’.
217
 
In relation to the issues surrounding art. 8, it was ‘right’, Lord Hughes noted, that there 
was ‘no dispute before [the Court] that Schedule 7 questioning and search under compulsion 
constitutes an interference with the private life of a person questioned’.
218
 This point, of 
itself, is significant, for in so finding the Supreme Court in Beghal departs from the Law 
Lords’ rather narrow interpretation in Gillan as to what constitutes an interference with the 
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right to privacy protected under art. 8. It ought to be reiterated at this point that stop-and-
search under compulsion under s. 44 was described in that case as ‘unwelcome and 
inconvenient’, although above all scarcely ‘any very substantial invasion of our fundamental 
civil liberties’.
219
 As such, in Beghal, the question of compatibility with art. 8 turned on 
whether the interference arising from the use of Schedule 7 satisfied the two-pronged test 
stipulated in art. 8(2)—again, whether the measure is both ‘in accordance with the law’ and 
proportionate to the legitimate objectives of national security.
220
 The former required the 
relevant legislative provision ‘to contain sufficient safeguards to avoid the risk that power 
will be arbitrarily exercised and thus that unjustified interference with a fundamental right 
will occur’.
221
 Whether the impugned measure meets the test of proportionality, on the other 
hand, was said to depend ‘on the balance between the level of intrusion for the individual and 
the value of the power in community purpose served’.
222
  
It is at this point that the comparison between stop-and-search authorised under s. 44/47A 
of TACT and that of Schedule 7 crystallises. For the majority in Beghal held that Schedule 7 
fulfils both of the conditions set out in art. 8(2), crucially distinguishing the judgment of the 
ECtHR in Gillan and Quinton v UK. As to the Strasbourg Court’s finding that, albeit 
notionally confined to a ‘specific area’, suspicionless stop-and-search of the kind permitted 
under s. 44 was ‘neither sufficiently circumscribed nor subject to adequate legal safeguards 
against abuse’,
223
 in Beghal Lord Hughes noted that among the reasons for the Court’s 
conclusion in that case was ‘[t]he fact that the power was exercisable without depending on 
any prior suspicion, subjective or objective’.
224
 Yet, whilst acknowledging that the absence of 
the procedural requirement of reasonable suspicion is common both to s. 44 and Schedule 7, 
the conclusion reached in Beghal was that ‘there are otherwise very significant differences’ 
between those provisions. In what presents as a direct parallel to the decision of the Law 
Lords in Gillan, it was held that the safeguards applicable to the exercise of Schedule 7 
powers sufficiently militate against the risk of arbitrary misuse of those powers, thus 
satisfying the requirement that the interference with art. 8 be ‘in accordance with the law’. It 
was also, on this basis, held that ‘the principle of legality is satisfied’.
225
 
In a remarkably strong dissenting opinion, Lord Kerr would have held both that the use of 
Schedule 7 powers in the present case, and indeed the nature and scope of the measures 
themselves, contravened each of the impugned Convention articles. Lord Kerr suggested that 
‘[t]he opportunity to exercise a coercive power in an arbitrary or discriminatory fashion is 
antithetical to its legality’,
226
 and that, crucially, powers capable of being used in such a way 
‘are not transformed to a condition of legality simply because they are of proven utility’.
227
 
Quite how, though, such an opportunity would be prevented in the case of any coercive 
power is perhaps unclear. 
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The most recent development of the Beghal litigation is that of the decision of the ECtHR 
in May 2019,
228
 which speaks directly to a key theme highlighted in this chapter. The 
Strasbourg Court held that the absence of a ‘reasonable suspicion’ requirement did not, of 
itself, render the provisions under Schedule 7 incompatible with the ECHR; rather, the power 
to examine an individual without reasonable grounds for suspecting their involvement in 
terrorism-related activity, in combination with other factors—including the maximum 
duration of examination (which, at the time of the applicant’s detention was 9 hours), the 
statutory obligation to answer questions without the right to have a lawyer present, and the 
limited possibility of judicial review of the exercise of the power—meant that ‘the Schedule 7 
powers were not “in accordance with the law”’.
229
 In a marked departure from the decision of 
the Supreme Court, the ECtHR held that there had, as such, been a violation of art. 8 of the 
Convention. Notably, the Court went on to imply that the powers under Schedule 7 could also 
be challenged, successfully, on the grounds that they violate art. 5 of the Convention: 
 
In reaching this conclusion the Court has only had regard to the Schedule 7 power to examine as it was 
at the time the applicant was stopped. It has not considered the amendments which flowed from the 
Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 and the updated Code of Practice; nor has it 
considered the power to detain under Schedule 7, which has the potential to result in a much more 




Ultimately, it is clear is that the increasing number of legal challenges to Schedule 7 has 
succeeded in generating a broader awareness of the measure, and indeed has to some extent 
stimulated a broader impetus for reform (so far culminating in the amendments implemented 
under the Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014). Moreover, Home Office 
statistics indicate that there has, in fact, been an appreciable reduction in their use in recent 
years.
231
 Yet, it nevertheless seems that Schedule 7 is, at least for the foreseeable future, here 
to stay. That its provisions have in effect been taken as a blueprint for Schedule 3 to the 
recently enacted Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 suggests that the key legal 
obstacles have, again, if only for the time being, been overcome. The powers contained in 
Schedule 3 of the 2019 Act are drafted in similarly (strikingly) broad terms, and target those 
who are or have been engaged in so-called ‘hostile activity’—activity, that is, which (a) 
threatens national security, (b) threatens the economic well-being of the UK in a way relevant 
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IV. STATE SURVEILLANCE OF COMMUNICATIONS 
 
A. An Overview of the Contemporary (Post-‘Snowden’) Legal Framework of 
Surveillance Powers 
 
This section explores the privacy-implications of state surveillance of communications—an 
increasingly common, indeed increasingly integral, aspect of modern investigations 
conducted by the security and intelligence agencies (SIAs), law enforcement and other public 
authorities into terrorism-related activity.
233
 The section focusses, in particular, on the 
implications for (the protection of) privacy of powers involving the interception of 
communications and the collection of and access to communications data. These powers are 
derived from an area of law which has been described as having ‘grown exponentially in 
recent years, in terms of its volume, complexity and sophistication’;
234
 they sit alongside the 
many and various other forms of surveillance in which the state also engages for the purposes 
of (although not limited to) counter-terrorism, which are now provided for, in the main, by 
the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 (IPA).
235
 This includes, for instance, measures involving 
so-called ‘equipment interference’
236
—a term which can be understood, essentially, to refer 
to a legalised form of computer ‘hacking’—and the use of ‘bulk personal datasets’,
237
 which 
contain personal information—relating to, among other things, medical records, banking, 
driving and vehicle licences—about large numbers of people. Space precludes discussion of 
these measures, albeit that they, too, are inevitably implicated in the broader constitutional 
position of (counter-terrorism deprivation of) privacy with which this chapter is concerned; 
nor, for reasons of space, is this section able to account for the (long) history and 
development of the broader legal framework of investigatory powers from which these 
measures derive. Rather, this section explores the interception of communications and the 
acquisition of communications data given their place as two of the most widely used—and 
arguably most controversial—measures of surveillance in and of the contemporary legal 
framework, far and away the most comprehensive analysis of which in the literature is given 
by Paul Scott (whose work greatly informs the key issues considered herein).
238
 
It suffices for present purposes to begin by noting that the contemporary legal framework 
is the product of recent and significant reform, the impetus for which can be seen to derive 
from several key developments in the UK relating to the Snowden disclosures in 2013. Those 
disclosures, involving the leaking of highly classified documents held by the US National 
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Security Agency, exposed a secret global network of surveillance programmes in which, 
notably, the UK’s SIAs were revealed to be complicit. For instance, it was reported by The 
Guardian—one of the select few media outlets to whom the documents had been leaked by 
Snowden—that one programme in particular, codenamed ‘Tempora’, had been carried out by 
the UK’s Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) for almost two years ‘without 
any form of public acknowledgement or debate’; the programme involved GCHQ’s gaining 
access to private telephone communications and Internet traffic by ‘tap[ping] into and 
stor[ing] huge volumes of data drawn from fibre-optic cables for up to 30 days so that it can 
be sifted and analysed’.
239
  
Among the key controversies given rise by the Snowden disclosures—and, indeed, the 
now well-known existence of GCHQ surveillance programmes of the kind exemplified by 
‘Tempora’—is that of the sheer scale of the SIAs’ surveillance activities, which, crucially, 
were shown to far exceed anything that the relevant legislative framework at the time 
appeared to sanction.
240
 Only in litigation brought before the Investigatory Powers Tribunal 
(IPT)—that is, the independent, specialist statutory body established with limited jurisdiction 
to hear complaints about the SIAs’ surveillance activities
241
—was it made apparent that 
GCHQ purported to ground the ‘Tempora’ programme of ‘bulk’ interception of 
communications and acquisition of communications data in s. 8(4) of the Regulation of 
Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). That provision dispensed with rules to the effect that 
a warrant authorising interception of communications need name or describe either ‘one 
person as the interception subject’ or ‘a single set of premises as the premises in relation to 
which the interception to which the warrant relates is to take place’ in circumstances 
involving, among other things, although crucially, the ‘interception of external 
communications’.
242
 Although subsequently held by the IPT to have been within the scope of 
that provision, as well as compliant with art. 8 of the ECHR,
243
 s. 8(4) of RIPA can be seen to 
typify a fundamental flaw of the legal framework of investigatory powers which was 
rendered explicit in 2013, whereby, as Scott writes: 
 
[I]n certain cases investigatory powers were derived from statutory provisions sufficiently ambiguous 
or obscure that the practices allegedly authorised by them were effectively secret, with no possibility of 
legal or political accountability for their use.
244
    
 
The post-‘Snowden’ legal framework of surveillance powers (with which this section is 
concerned) is one, therefore, which confronts and thus seeks to rationalise the vast and ever-
increasing capabilities of the state, in an age of significant technological advancement, to 
intrude upon the private lives of its citizens. The IPA updates and consolidates the legal 
framework of surveillance powers which hitherto had developed ‘piecemeal’, and thus 
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rendered the law in this area both ‘difficult to understand’ and ‘unnecessarily secretive’.
245
 In 
David Anderson’s comprehensive and influential report on the review of investigatory 
powers in 2015, many of the recommendations of which went on to be implemented in the 
new legal framework, RIPA—the principal statutory basis for much of the SIA’s surveillance 
practices which the IPA has since replaced—was the subject of particularly searching 
criticism; the Act was described as having been ‘obscure since its inception’, ‘patched up so 
many times as to make it incomprehensible to all but a tiny band of initiatives’, and, as such, 
produced an ‘undemocratic, unnecessary and – in the long run – intolerable state of 
affairs’.
246
 Thus, among the various key innovations of the IPA is that it secures to a more 
explicit legal basis the availability and oversight of powers (including those relating to 
interception of communications and acquisition of communications data) in so-called ‘bulk’ 
form—powers which, in essence, allow public authorities ‘to have access for specified 
purposes to large quantities of data, a significant portion of which is not associated with 
current targets’.
247
 This is in stark contrast to the relevant legal provisions in which the SIAs 
had previously purported to ground ‘bulk’ surveillance. Whilst, as Scott notes, in this respect 
the IPA constitutes ‘a significant expansion of the statutory powers available to the 
executive’, with self-evident and far-reaching implications for privacy, rather the key impact 
of the new legislative framework is that it ‘in part codifies and in part makes manifest 
practices which were already taking place’.
248
 Where previously, for example, the SIAs 
sought to ground an extensive regime of ‘equipment interference’ in several general 
provisions of the Secret Service Act 1989 and the Intelligence Services Act 1994
249
—
contrary, it was only recently found, to the common law principle of legality
250
—crucially the 
IPA is now transparent as to the availability of such powers.
251
 To that end, it has been noted 
that ‘[t]he IPA can be seen as an improvement on the previous situation’, for ‘[i]n 
consolidating the basis for surveillance powers … the IPA makes the system arguably more 




Moreover, to existing statutory bodies of oversight in the form of the Investigatory Powers 
Tribunal (IPT)
253
 and the Intelligence and Security Committee of Parliament (ISC),
254
 the 
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IPA adds a further, and crucial, oversight mechanism: the Investigatory Powers 
Commissioner (IPC), a role which combines the functions previously split, under RIPA, 
between three separate bodies—namely, the Interception of Communications Commissioner, 
the Intelligence Services Commissioner, and the Chief Surveillance Commissioner.
255
 The 
occupant of the new IPC role is to be appointed by the Prime Minister,
256
 who, in turn, is also 
to appoint ‘such number of other Judicial Commissioners as the Prime Minister considers 
necessary for the carrying out of the functions of the Judicial Commissioners’.
257
 Both the 
IPC and the JCs ought to hold or have held ‘high judicial office’.
258
 The role of the JCs is 
central to what is referred to as the ‘double-lock’
259
 feature of the new regime, for it involves 
their reviewing the relevant conclusions of the Secretary of State that a decision to issue a 
warrant authorising, for instance, targeted interception of communications is ‘necessary on 
relevant grounds’ and that ‘the conduct that would be authorised by the warrant is 
proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that conduct’.
260
 And although, as discussed 
in more detail in sub-section D, below, there are several compelling reasons to suspect that 
the effectiveness of the ‘double-lock’ in practice may, in fact, be somewhat limited, the 
oversight provided by quasi-judicial bodies in the forms of the IPC and the JCs performs an 
important function in terms, more broadly, of ensuring the new regime’s compatibility with 
the ECHR. That is, the ‘double-lock’ does much to align the current regime with the 
Strasbourg Court’s apparent recent endorsement in the art. 8 case law of a line of reasoning 
which highlights (sufficient) independent oversight of executive/ministerial authorisation of 
surveillance powers—perhaps, specifically, and crucially, by a judicial actor—as an essential 
precondition of ‘lawfulness’ under art. 8(2).
261
 
It is against the backdrop of this new legal framework—and the various new (extensive) 
measures and oversight mechanisms with which it is populated—that powers relating to 
(‘targeted’ and ‘bulk’) interception of communications and acquisition of communications 
data are to be considered in this section. Four key issues concerning the legal protection of 
privacy, which are brought to bear on the exercise of these substantial powers, are then 
explored: firstly, the ‘general duties in relation to privacy’ now imposed upon public 
authorities under Part 1 of the IPA,
262
 and in particular the way in which those duties might 
operate at the level of application, with the oversight role of the JCs given as a key example; 
secondly, that of art. 8 of the ECHR, and the (increasingly onerous) requirements of 
‘lawfulness’ developing within the Strasbourg Court’s case law, as evidenced most recently 
in the ECtHR case of Big Brother Watch v United Kingdom; thirdly, the position of the 
common law, and specifically the oversight role of the ‘ordinary’ courts in relation to, or as 
distinguished from, that of the IPT; and fourthly, the continuing relevance of the key legal 
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categories of ‘content’ and ‘metadata’, which are distinguished within the IPA for reasons 
which can be traced ultimately to the objective of protecting privacy. 
 
B. Interception of Communications under the IPA 
 
Powers relating to the interception of communications are among the most intrusive available 
under the IPA, authorising access to the contents of the relevant communication as well as the 
collection of data relating to it. The significance of the distinction between ‘content’ and 
‘communications data’—especially in the context of the protection of privacy—is discussed 
in more detail in sub-section D, below. Rather, it suffices to note here that interception of 
communications implicates both (‘content’ and ‘communications data’), and thus can be 
described as revealing not only what was said in a communication, but also by whom and to 
whom the communication was sent, where from and where to, when, and by which means. 
The use of intercept powers has increased in recent years; figures published by the newly 
established Investigatory Powers Commissioner’s Office (IPCO), including totals for law 
enforcement agencies, the UK intelligence community and the Ministry of Defence, confirm 
that 2,795 targeted interception authorisations were given in 2014, rising to 3,576 
authorisations in 2018,
263
 although reducing somewhat, to 3,329, in 2019.
264
 30 ‘bulk’ 
interception warrants, issued under the new IPA powers which came into effect in 2018 (as 
outlined below), were authorised in 2019.
265
 
The IPA carries over from the previous legal framework the basic rule that, beyond certain 
exceptions,
266
 it is unlawful for a person to intercept a communication in the course of its 
transmission in the UK—that is, ‘by means of (i) a public telecommunication system, (ii) a 
private telecommunication system, or (iii) a public postal service’—where that person ‘does 
not have lawful authority to carry out the interception’.
267
 A person has lawful authority, 
under s. 6 of the Act, if the interception is carried out in accordance with any one of several 
warrants for which the IPA provides: a targeted interception warrant or mutual assistance 
warrant (the latter relating, essentially, to circumstances involving intelligence-exchange 
between UK SIAs and foreign agencies);
268
 a bulk interception warrant;
269
 or, ‘in the case of 
communication stored in or by a telecommunication system’, a targeted equipment 
interference warrant or a bulk equipment interference warrant.
270
  
As noted in sub-section A, above, the IPA explicitly distinguishes between ‘targeted’ and 
‘bulk’ powers. The former ostensibly by their nature entail a level of specificity as to the 
individual/s whose privacy is/are to be invaded as a result of their use—including, for 
instance, that the individual/s be named in the relevant warrant authorising the interception of 
communications or acquisition of communications data. As such, in these circumstances, the 
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invasion of privacy is notionally limited, if only in the sense that it is properly directed to 
those ‘who are suspected of being a threat to the UK’.
271
 By contrast, ‘bulk’ powers are those 
which are said to ‘involve the Agencies casting their nets wider and analysing large volumes 
of information, [and so] enable the Agencies also to find linkages, patterns, associations or 
behaviours which might demonstrate a serious threat requiring investigation’.
272
 The 
implications for the protection of privacy in the case of ‘bulk’ powers are thus self-evident, 
and, indeed, are manifestly more severe than those derived from ‘targeted’ powers: ‘bulk’ 
powers effectively maximise the capacity of the SIAs and law enforcement, say, to identify a 
credible terrorist threat, but crucially at the expense of those—in any case likely very many—
whose communications or personal data are of no concern whatsoever to investigators of 
terrorism-related activity. Not only, therefore, is the distinction between ‘targeted’ and ‘bulk’ 
powers straightforwardly predicated on the bare fact that the latter entails the potential for 
intrusions of privacy on a much broader scale than the former: ‘bulk’ powers are to be 
distinguished, also, by their speculative nature as an intelligence-gathering tool, such that the 
decision to authorise their use may be vindicated (if at all) only at the point at which subjects 
of interest are identified and thus require further investigation. For this reason, it has been 
noted that ‘bulk’ capabilities ‘nevertheless require some degree of targeting in order to ensure 
that a human eye only looks at that which is most likely to be of intelligence evidence’.
273
 
The corollary of this, therefore, is that procedural conditions as to the exercise of powers 
which are ‘bulk’ in nature are more restrictive than those which apply in the context of 
‘targeted’ powers. Those conditions apply both at the stage of authorisation and, crucially, at 
the stage of selection for examination of ‘bulk’ communications or communications data. For 
example, under the 2016 Act only ‘on an application made by or on behalf of the head of an 
intelligence service’ may the Secretary of State issue a warrant authorising bulk interception 
of communications or bulk acquisition of communications data—again subject, that is, to the 
approval of a JC.
274
 Rather, in the contexts of the ‘targeted’ variants of those powers, the list 
of those who may apply for issue of the relevant warrant is much broader, extending not only 
to the heads of the intelligence services, but to, among others, the Director General of the 
National Crime Agency, the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and chief constables 
of the respective Police Services of Scotland and Northern Ireland, and the Commissioners 




(i) ‘Targeted’ interception of communications 
 
The IPA provides for the issuing of warrants relating specifically to ‘targeted’ interception of 
communications in two forms. One form, a ‘targeted examination warrant’, applies to 
circumstances involving the selection for examination of ‘any content of communications 
intercepted by an interception authorised or required by a bulk interception warrant under 
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Chapter 1 of Part 6 [of the Act]’
276
 (considered in more detail below). The other, as noted 
above, is a ‘targeted interception warrant’, which authorises ‘the interception, in the course of 
their transmission by means of a postal service or telecommunication system, of 
communications described in the warrant’, ‘the obtaining of secondary data’ (in the course of 
their transmission by the same means), and ‘the disclosure, in a manner described in the 
warrant, of anything obtained under the warrant to the person to whom the warrant is 
addressed or to any person acting on that person’s behalf’.
277
 A targeted interception warrant 
may be issued by the Secretary of State on an application of any of the relevant ‘intercepting 
authorities’ listed in s. 18. The list includes (but is not limited to) the head of the Security 
Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), or GHCQ; the Director General of the 
National Crime Agency; the Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis and chief constables 
of the respective Police Services of Scotland and Northern Ireland; and the Commissioners 
for Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs. The relevant grounds on which it may be 
considered by the Secretary of State necessary to issue a targeted interception warrant include 
‘in the interests of national security’
278
 and ‘for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious 
crime’.
279
 A warrant may also be considered necessary ‘in the interests of the economic well-
being of the United Kingdom’, but only insofar as ‘those interests are also relevant to the 
interests of national security’
280
 and, crucially, ‘only if the information which it is considered 
necessary to obtain … relat[es] to the acts or intentions of persons outside the British 
Islands’.
281
 The Secretary of State’s decision to issue a targeted interception warrant is 
subject to the approval of a JC,
282
 there being provision, however, in urgent cases, for a 
warrant to take effect without such approval.
283
 In those circumstances, statutory obligations 
are imposed such that ‘[t]he person who decided to issue the warrant must inform a [JC] that 
it has been issued’,
284
 and that before ‘the period ending with the third working day after the 
day on which the warrant was issued’, the JC must ‘decide whether to approve the decision to 
issue the warrant’ and ‘notify the person of [the outcome of that] decision’.
285
 Where a JC 
refuses to approve the relevant decision, the warrant both ‘ceases to have effect (unless 
already cancelled) and ‘may not be renewed’.
286
 The person to whom the refusal is addressed 
must ‘so far as reasonably practicable, secure that anything in the process of being done 
under the warrant stops as soon as possible’,
287
 while the JC may thereafter ‘direct that any of 
the material obtained under the warrant is destroyed’ or ‘impose conditions as to the use or 
retention of any of that material’.
288
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One key issue which it suffices to highlight here is that the IPA can be seen to have 
innovated as to the substance of targeted interception powers in a number of ways which 
distinguishes those powers from the corresponding provisions in the previous legislative 
framework (under RIPA).
289
 Among the effects of this, crucially, is an evident expansion of 
the scope of intercept powers within the new regime and, as such, the potential for intrusions 
of privacy. One key example relates to the range of potential subject-matter to which a 
targeted interception warrant may apply. The relevant provision, s. 17 of the IPA, provides 
that a warrant may apply not only to ‘a particular person or organisation’ or ‘a single set of 
premises’, but also to ‘a group of persons who share a common purpose or who carry on, or 
may carry on, a particular activity’, or ‘more than one person or organisation, or more than 
one set of premises, where the conduct authorised or required by the warrant is for the 
purposes of a single investigation or operation’.
290
 In so providing, that section renders 
explicit the availability of what is described in the relevant Code of Practice as a ‘targeted 
“thematic” warrant’.
291
 So-called ‘thematic warrants’, although given no formal definition 
within the Act, can be understood, essentially, as ‘warrants which identify the persons and 
property to whom they apply by virtue of a theme which connects them, rather than their 
specific identity’.
292
 It is in this sense that ‘thematic’ warrants are an important illustration of 
the way in which, in practice, intercept powers are exercisable at a level of much greater 
generality than the term ‘targeted’ would appear to imply. Indeed, the level of obfuscation 
surrounding that fact within RIPA was widely considered among the most compelling 
arguments for the need to reform that framework. For provisions concerning the content of 
targeted interception warrants under RIPA read, simply, that either ‘one person’ or ‘a single 
set of premises’ ought to have been named in the authorisation;
293
 only in the general 
interpretation provision of the 2000 Act, s. 81, was it made apparent ‘person’ was given the 





(ii) ‘Bulk’ interception of communications 
 
Whatever the potential scope for intrusions of privacy under ‘targeted’ interception warrants, 
even in the form of ‘thematic’ warrants, it pales in comparison to so-called ‘bulk’ 
interception warrants, the relevant provisions for which are found in Part 6, Chapter 1 of the 
IPA. A bulk interception warrant—the only means, within the Act, by which interception of 
communications on this scale may be authorised—is defined thereunder as a warrant which 
satisfies two key conditions (A and B).
295
 Condition A is that ‘the main purpose of the 
warrant’ is ‘the interception of overseas-related communications’ and/or ‘the obtaining of 
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secondary data from such communications’.
296
 Condition B is that the warrant ‘authorises or 
requires the person to whom it is addressed to secure, by any conduct described in the 
warrant, any one or more of the following activities’: 
 
(a) the interception, in the course of their transmission by means of a telecommunication system, of 
communications described in the warrant; 
 
(b) the obtaining of secondary data from communications transmitted by means of such a system and 
described in the warrant; 
 
(c) the selection for examination, in any manner described in the warrant, of intercepted content or 
secondary data obtained under the warrant; 
 
(d) the disclosure, in any manner described in the warrant, of anything obtained under the warrant to 
the person to whom the warrant is addressed or to any person acting on that person’s behalf. 
 
So great is the potential scope for intrusions of privacy associated with bulk interception of 
communications that the conditions imposed upon the power to issue a warrant authorising 
those measures are among the most restrictive on the face of the 2016 Act. As noted above, 
only ‘on an application made by or on behalf of the head of an intelligence service’—again, 
meaning the Security Service (MI5), the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), or GCHQ
297
—
may the Secretary of State issue a bulk interception warrant.
298
 The decision of the Secretary 
of State to issue a warrant must be approved by a JC,
299
 and may be justified on the grounds 
that the Secretary of State considers the warrant both necessary ‘in the interests of national 
security’
300
 and ‘proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by [the conduct authorised in 
the warrant]’.
301
 A warrant may be considered necessary also (that is, in addition to, but not 
exclusive of, ‘in the interests of national security’)
302
 ‘for the purpose of preventing or 
detecting serious crime’,
303
 or ‘in the interests of the economic well-being of the United 
Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national security’,
304
 
although (in respect of the latter) ‘only if the information which it is considered necessary to 




Another important condition is imposed upon the exercise of bulk interception powers in 
the form of the so-called ‘operational purposes’ for which material intercepted pursuant to a 
bulk interception warrant might subsequently be examined. That is, a warrant ‘must specify 
the operational purposes for which any intercepted content or secondary data obtained under 
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the warrant may be selected for examination’,
306
 the Secretary of State having, therefore, to 
satisfy herself that each of the operational purposes so specified ‘is a purpose for which the 
examination of intercepted content or secondary data obtained under the warrant is or may be 
necessary’
307
 (on any of the grounds on which the warrant itself is considered by her to be 
necessary).
308
 A list of operational purposes is to be maintained by the heads of the 
intelligence services,
309
 overseen by the ISC ‘at the end of each relevant three-month 
period’,
310
 and reviewed annually by the Prime Minister.
311
 Statutory arrangements for 
additions or modifications to the list include that ‘[a]n operational purpose may be specified 
in the list … only with the approval Secretary of State’,
312
 who, crucially, ‘may give such 
approval only if satisfied that the operational purpose is specified in a greater level of detail 
than the descriptions contained in section 138(1)(b) or (2)’
313
—that is, ‘in the interests of 
national security’, and so on.  
A potential limitation of the ‘operational purposes’ requirement, however, is that very 
little detail is made available as to what those purposes might include. Indeed, the lack of 
clarity in this regard was considered by the ISC in its report on the Draft Investigatory 
Powers Bill to be ‘completely unsatisfactory’, for it ‘contradicts the primary purpose of the 
[IPA], to provide some much-needed transparency in this area’.
314
 Examples are given in the 
UK Government’s ‘Operational Case for Bulk Powers’ published in 2016, which includes 
(but is not limited to): ‘[t]o detect and disrupt direct threats to the UK and allied interests 
overseas from Daesh and its affiliates’; ‘[t]o understand the scale and nature of the cyber 
threat to the UK and allied interests’; and ‘[t]o detect and disrupt child sexual exploitation 
and abuse’.
315
 Yet, even assuming that the operational purposes are in practice outlined in 
more detail than the examples given here, the requirement itself that they be specified by the 
Secretary of State ‘at a greater level of detail than the descriptions contained in section 
138(1)(b) or (2)’ can scarcely be said to impose any meaningful obstacle to the Secretary of 
State’s ability to add to or modify the list of operational purposes. Descriptions such as ‘in 
the interests of national security’ and ‘for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious 
crime’ are themselves, by any measure, vague and invariably all-encompassing, and thus it is 
perhaps no tall order to improve upon their specificity whilst continuing to undermine 
transparency in the SIAs’ surveillance activities. And in any event, that the Secretary of State 
is in a key position to influence the process of establishing the relevant operational purposes 
raises questions as to the effectiveness of that condition as an essential limit on the Secretary 
of State’s power to authorise ‘bulk’ interception of communications. 
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One final point which also ought to be noted here is that the exercise of ‘bulk’ powers is 
subject to the general principle that they may only be used in respect of ‘overseas-related 
communications’.
316
 And while exceptions to that rule include, notably, bulk acquisition of 
communications data—an arrangement which can be traced, ultimately, to the (increasingly 
contested) content/metadata distinction discussed below—that that requirement applies to 
‘bulk’ powers at all reflects the assumption adopted by the IPA that powers authorising the 
interception of communications or the acquisition of communications data by the state on a 
massive scale are tolerable in the UK only to the extent that they may not be used against the 
domestic population at large. One question of perennial importance as to the scrutiny of the 
operation of ‘bulk’ surveillance regimes, therefore, is that of whether the relevant legal 
framework sufficiently circumscribes the instances in which (if at all) such territorial 
restrictions might be compromised. 
 
C. Acquisition of Communications Data under the IPA 
 
The collection of and access to communications data, a form of so-called ‘metadata’ which 
can be understood to mean ‘data about use made of a telecommunications or postal service 
but not the contents of the communications themselves’,
317
 has been described as ‘a basic tool 
in the investigator’s armoury’, it having played ‘a significant role in every counter-terrorist 
operation MI5 has run in the past decade’.
318
 Indeed, so integral are communications data to 
the work of the SIAs—a 2013 report by the ISC suggesting, for instance, that ‘it is used in 
practically all investigations conducted by the Security Service’
319
—it is perhaps unsurprising 
that powers relating to its acquisition are used widely. In the IPCO’s annual report for 2018, 
published in March 2020, statistics show that some 210,755 requests for (‘targeted’) 
communications data acquisition were approved, issued or given in 2018;
320
 in total, 808,214 
items of communications data were applied for and obtained in the same year.
321
 The IPCO’s 
annual report for 2019, published in December 2020, notes that ‘[c]ommunications data 
requests continue to be the most voluminous of the authorisations for covert powers’; the 




(i) ‘Targeted’ acquisition of communications data 
 
The relevant powers need only be considered briefly for present purposes. It suffices to note, 
simply, that of the various measures considered in this section of the chapter, the procedural 
conditions that apply to targeted acquisition of communications data under the IPA can be 
seen to be the least imposing. As noted above, the IPA makes available the power to obtain 
communications data to a wide range of public authorities; a ‘designated senior officer’ of the 
relevant public authority may ‘authorise any officer of the authority to engage in any 
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conduct’ which is ‘for the purpose of obtaining data from any person’, and relates to ‘a 
telecommunication system’ or ‘data derived from a telecommunication system’.
323
 There is a 
requirement that an authorisation be necessary for any one of a relatively long list of 
purposes
324
—as compared, that is, with the list of purposes for which targeted interception of 
communications might be considered necessary, reflecting, in turn, the many and various 
contexts (beyond that of ‘national security’) in which acquisition powers are routinely used. 
Of course, featured within that list are the purposes of ‘in the interests of national security’, 
‘preventing or detecting crime or of preventing disorder’ and ‘in the interests of public 
safety’.
325
 So too is there an additional requirement that an authorisation be necessary to 
obtain the data ‘for the purposes of a specific investigation or a specific operation’, or ‘for the 
purposes of testing, maintaining or developing equipment, systems or other capabilities 
relating to the availability or obtaining of communications data’.
326
 In any case, the conduct 




(ii) ‘Bulk’ acquisition of communications data 
 
The strategic importance of bulk acquisition of communications data to the UK’s 
contemporary counter-terrorism response is highlighted in the 2016 Report of the Bulk 
Powers Review, in which GCHQ is quoted as stating that ‘[t]ogether with communications 
obtained through bulk interception, this power is the primary way in which [it] discovers new 
threats to the UK’.
328
 Statistics as to the use of the relevant IPA provisions on bulk 
acquisition are only recently made publicly available in the IPCO’s annual reports, those 
provisions having only come into force in February 2019.  Previous reports reveal that, in 
2017, 15 ‘directions’ had been made pursuant to s. 94 of the Telecommunications Act 1984—
the previous legislative basis for bulk acquisition powers—with over 20,500 applications to 
access communications data obtained pursuant to those directions were made, relating to 
98,798 items of communications data.
329
 And in 2017, nearly 10% of GCHQ’s ‘end product 
reports’ included material acquired bulk provisions.
330
 In the IPCO’s most recent annual 
report, which covers the year 2019, it is confirmed that 18 bulk acquisition warrants were 
approved in that year.
331
 
It suffices for present purposes to simply note that, analogous to the difference in 
approach, generally, to the regulation of ‘targeted’ and ‘bulk’ interception of 
communications, bulk acquisition of communications under the IPA is subject to greater 
restrictions than the ‘targeted’ equivalent of those powers. Indeed, the conditions applicable 
to the power to issue a bulk acquisition warrant in many ways replicate the relevant 
provisions (outlined above) on bulk interception of communications. Thus, similarly only ‘on 
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an application made by or on behalf of the head of an intelligence service’ may the Secretary 
of State issue a warrant authorising bulk acquisition of communications data;
332
 the Secretary 
of State’s decision may be justified on national security grounds,
333
 or on those grounds and 
for the purposes of ‘preventing or detecting serious crime’ or ‘the economic well-being of the 
United Kingdom so far as those interests are also relevant to the interests of national 
security’;
334
 and the decision ought to be approved by a JC (on which, see the discussion in 
sub-section D, below).
335
 Arrangements concerning the ‘operational purposes’ for which 
communications intercepted under a bulk warrant may be examined also apply in the context 
of acquisition of communications data—so too therefore, do the same issues as to the 
potential dubiousness of those arrangements arise here. 
 
D. The Protection of Privacy in the Contemporary Legal Framework of Surveillance 
Powers 
 
(i) ‘General duties in relation to privacy’ and the role of the Judicial Commissioners 
 
Alongside the various reforms aimed at improving transparency and oversight of the use of 
surveillance powers, the IPA can be seen to demonstrate a (renewed) commitment to the 
protection of privacy. That Part 1 of the IPA provides for ‘general privacy protections’ is the 
clearest example of that commitment. Specifically, under that Part the Act imposes upon 
public authorities a range of ‘general duties in relation to privacy’ which apply to the myriad 
circumstances in which decisions concerning the use of invasive powers of surveillance are 
made—decisions that relate, for example, to the issue, renewal, or cancellation of a warrant 
authorising the use of those powers.
336
 Duties include the need, in those circumstances, to 
have regard to ‘whether what is sought to be achieved by [a] warrant, authorisation or notice 
could reasonably be achieved by other less intrusive means’;
337
 ‘whether the level of 
protection to be applied in relation to any obtaining of information by virtue of [a] warrant, 
authorisation or notice is higher because of the particular sensitivity of that information’ 
(with items covered by legal privilege,
338
 information relating to journalistic sources,
339
 and 
correspondence between MPs and their constituents
340
 given as relevant examples of 
‘sensitive information’);
341
 ‘the public interest in the integrity and security of 
telecommunication systems and postal services’;
342
 and ‘any other aspects of the public 
interest in the protection of privacy’.
343
 These duties are ‘subject to the need to have regard to 
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other considerations that are also relevant in [the particular] context’,
344
 which, besides the 
familiar requirements of ‘the interests of national security or of the economic well-being of 
the United Kingdom’
345
 and ‘the public interest in preventing or detecting serious crime’,
346
 
also include ‘whether the conduct authorised or required by the warrant, authorisation or 
notice is proportionate’, ‘whether it is necessary to act for a purpose provided for by [the] 
Act’,
347
 ‘the requirements of the [HRA]’,
348
 and ‘other requirements of public law’.
349
  
Notwithstanding that by grounding the protection of privacy as a key objective across the 
contemporary legal framework of surveillance powers the IPA has been commended for 
‘proffer[ing] a welcome human rights approach from the UK Government’,
350
 among the key 
questions given rise in this context is that of the effect, if any, that ‘general duties in relation 
to privacy’ per se will have on the operation of that regime at the level of application. 
Perhaps, in other words, the inclusion of the ‘general duties’ in the IPA is, in fact, 
tokenistic—statutory recognition, simply, of the broader heightening of sensitivities about the 
privacy-implications of state surveillance powers and practices post-‘Snowden’. One point 
which does emerge from the various ‘general duties’ outlined above, however, is that the key 
standards to be applied in their stead—proportionality, necessity—are evidently those derived 
from the ECHR, once again reflecting the extent to which the domestic protection of privacy 
hangs, ultimately, upon the legal norms and values developed in the Convention 
jurisprudence. By contrast, the practical significance, if any, of those principles developed 
and protected in the common law (to the extent that they can be separated from Convention 
norms)—which the term ‘other requirements of public law’ probably encompasses—appears 
much less clear-cut.  
Although, one area in which principles of the common law are, in fact, brought to bear is 
that of the role of the JCs in deciding whether to approve a person’s decision to issue a 
warrant authorising, for instance, targeted interception of communications. (In the specific 
context of those powers,) s. 23 of the Act stipulates that in reviewing the relevant person’s 
conclusions that ‘the warrant is necessary on relevant grounds’ and that ‘the conduct that 
would be authorised by the warrant is proportionate to what is sought to be achieved by that 
conduct’, the JC must ‘apply the same principles as would be applied by a court on an 
application for judicial review’, as well as having to consider the matter ‘with a sufficient 
degree of care’ so as to ensure compliance with the Part 1 ‘general duties’.
351
 (Incidentally, 
quite what constitutes ‘a sufficient degree of care’ in respect of the obligation owed by the 
JCs under the Act’s ‘general duties in relation to privacy’, and how, if at all, that standard 
might be enforced, are among the key questions surrounding the issue noted above, 
concerning the (un)likely effectiveness of those duties in practice.)   
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Much hangs on the requirement that ‘principles of judicial review’ be applied, it having 
been noted that the ‘practical significance’ of the JCs’ role—especially in terms of ensuring 
the effectiveness of the ‘double-lock’ feature of the new regime—‘depends in large part upon 
the approach taken to review and, in particular, how the 2016 Act’s reference to [those 
principles] is interpreted’.
352
 Broader implications concerning the independence of the JCs in 





 operating somewhere in-between a legal-judicial and political-
parliamentary oversight function—and the contingency of that factor upon, again, the 
interpretation of the term ‘principles of judicial review’, include those which are to be read in 
the light of the Strasbourg Court’s developing jurisprudence on the requirements of 
‘lawfulness’ under art. 8(2). The nature and significance of those requirements are considered 
in more detail below, although for present purposes it suffices to note that insofar as chief 
among them is the existence of ‘adequate safeguards’ capable of allaying the risk of abuse of 
surveillance measures—not least where those measures are used covertly—the ECtHR has 
noted that a process of authorisation involving ‘a non-judicial authority may be compatible 




For these reasons, the level of uncertainty that surrounds the meaning intended for the 
reference to ‘principles of judicial review’ produces an unsatisfactory state of affairs, 
particularly given that the Act fails to clarify even the basic issue of exactly which principles 
are to be applied. On one reading, the relevant principle would be that of ‘reasonableness’, on 
which basis the JC would be tasked with assessing whether the Secretary of State’s 
conclusions (as to the necessity and proportionality of a warrant) fell within the range of 
reasonable conclusions open to her in the relevant circumstances. However, were 
‘reasonableness’ the requisite standard to be applied, bound as it is to the extraordinarily 
stringent threshold first established in Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v 
Wednesbury Corporation,
356
 that would result in oversight by the JCs which, in effect, was 
‘weaker than that carried out by [the previous] Surveillance Commissioners’, for whom the 
key question was not ‘whether a decision was outwith the range of reasonable conclusions 
open to the decision-maker’, but rather ‘whether there [were] reasonable grounds for it’.
357
 
Review of the kind associated with ‘Wednesbury reasonableness’ being, in reality, of the 
lightest touch in the vast majority of circumstances, it follows, therefore, that this approach 
would risk ‘collapsing [the ‘double-lock’] into a purely cosmetic exercise’ and, as such, fall 
foul of the increasingly stringent requirements of ‘lawfulness’ under the ECHR.
358
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In an ‘Advisory Notice’ published by the IPCO on ‘Approval of Warrants, Authorisations 
and Notices by the Judicial Commissioners’, the relevant approached was stated as follows: 
 
The purpose of the so-called “double lock” provisions of the Act are to provide an independent, 
judicial, safeguard as to the legality of warrants, in particular to their necessity and proportionality. In 
cases engaging fundamental rights, the Judicial Commissioners will not therefore approach their task 
by asking whether a Secretary of State’s decision that a warrant is necessary and proportionate is 
Wednesbury reasonable, as this would not provide the requisite independent safeguard.  
 
This is the approach that is taken by domestic courts in judicial review cases when reviewing measures 
and decisions that interfere with fundamental rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 and when 
applying EU law, and a similar approach is adopted when considering interferences with common law 
rights. Since the Judicial Commissioners are required to adopt the same approach as would be applied 




Thus, ‘Wednesbury reasonableness’ was explicitly rejected as the appropriate standard of 
review ‘[i]n cases engaging fundamental rights’. Of course, on one hand, this decision is to be 
welcomed, such that it clearly avoids the pitfalls outlined above. Yet, there are several 
reasons to be doubtful about the IPCO’s interpretation of the ‘principles of judicial review’ 
requirement—that is, not only as to whether it is the correct one, but also as to whether, in 
fact, it is desirable as far as the protection of privacy is concerned.  
The key problem is one of the likelihood of practice aligning (or not, more to the point) 
with asserted principle. In other words, an interpretation of the ‘principles of judicial review’ 
requirement which is in any way aligned with the common law’s approach to proportionality-
style review is liable not to bode well for the protection of privacy. Indeed, that approach is 
one which can be described as at best tentative, so heavily dependent is the availability of 
proportionality as a standalone ground of review at common law (that is, outwith the scope of 
the HRA/ECHR and EU law) upon contextual factors—indeed, contextual factors about 
which there is no clarity in the development of the common law on this issue.
360
 For reasons 
outlined in Section II, above, the common law can scarcely be said to recognise as 
‘fundamental’ a negative right against interference by public authorities of the kind 
warranting the (increased) intensity of scrutiny that comes with the test of proportionality (as 
compared, that is, with the test relating to the ‘Wednesbury reasonableness’ standard of 
review). It is not at all convincing, therefore, that an invasion of privacy of the kind 
associated with state surveillance of communications is, on the IPCO’s interpretation, 
sufficient to ground (what the common law would recognise as) the relevant conditions for 
proportionality-review. Neither, for similar reasons, may any encouragement be gleaned from 
the suggestion that the IPCO’s approach is justified insofar as ‘a similar approach is adopted 
[by the domestic courts] when considering interferences with common law rights’. There is, 
in fact, a certain irony in that the Advisory Notice cites as relevant authority for that 
proposition, among others, the case of R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex 
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 For that case is in many ways emblematic of the domestic courts’ inadequate 
approach to the protection of privacy; as Scott writes, that case ‘which might have been 
conceptualised as relating to individual privacy … [was] determined on the basis that the 
policy governing the search of prisoners’ cells was a violation of the fundamental right of 
access to the courts’.
362
 
In any event, the effectiveness of the JCs’ oversight may be hamstrung by another, 
perhaps more glaring issue. As Scott notes: 
 
[The IPCO’s approach] interprets the double-lock requirement in a strong form, though falls short of an 
approach in which the JCs decide for themselves whether the issue of the warrant is necessary and 
proportionate, as evidenced by the assertion that ‘in deciding whether to approve a decision to issue a 
warrant, the Judicial Commissioners will ask themselves whether the Secretary of State’s decision to 




On this basis, that proportionality is the requisite standard of review appears altogether 





(ii) Compatibility with the right to private and family life under art. 8 of the ECHR 
 
The second key issue as to the legal protection of privacy considered to be considered in this 
section is that of the compatibility of contemporary state surveillance practices with art. 8 of 
the ECHR. Interception of communications and the collection of and access to 
communications data are among the various forms of state surveillance which have been 
recognised by the ECtHR as engaging the right to respect for private and family life under 
art. 8.
365
 As noted in Section II, above, the compatibility of such measures ultimately falls to 
be assessed on two grounds (stipulated under art. 8(2)): first, whether the interference with 
art. 8 is ‘in accordance with the law’; and secondly, whether the interference is ‘necessary in 
a democratic society’, in pursuit of some broader objective—including (but not limited to) 
‘the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country’. 
The availability of powers authorising ‘bulk’ interception of communications and acquisition 
of communications data speaks, in many ways, to the question of ‘necessity’, and, in turn, to 
the Court’s role in mediating—by application of the test of proportionality—the ‘inevitable 
tension between individual privacy and state security’ which powers of such incredibly 
extensive scope and application undoubtedly agitate.
366
 Moreover, the question of necessity is 
rendered all the more pressing by the secrecy in which state surveillance practices are 
customarily enshrouded; the Court has noted that ‘[p]owers of secret surveillance of citizens, 
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characterising as they do the police state, are tolerable under the Convention only in so far as 
strictly necessary for safeguarding the democratic institutions’.
367
 Still, as with measures of 
suspicionless stop-and-search (discussed in Section III, above), it is the question of 
‘lawfulness’ which is brought to bear most acutely on the Court’s approach to assessing the 
Convention-compatibility of surveillance powers, including those made available in ‘bulk’ 
form. It is also in relation to the particular legal test attached to the question of ‘lawfulness’, 
as opposed to that of ‘necessity’, that the covert nature of surveillance by the state is uniquely 
problematic: the absence of transparency—not least in respect of the intelligence/evidence-
basis on which key decisions as to the exercise of intrusive powers are made—is anathema to 
the fundamental requirements of ‘accessibility’ and ‘foreseeability’ outlined in the case of 
Sunday Times v United Kingdom.
368
 
As much was recognised by the ECtHR in Weber and Savaria v Germany,
369
 that case 
having involved an assessment as to the compatibility with art. 8 of a regime of covert 
interception of communications, in which it was noted: 
 
foreseeability in the special context of secret measures of surveillance, such as the interception of 
communications, cannot mean that an individual should be able to foresee when the authorities are 




Given, though, that ‘the implementation in practice of measures of secret surveillance of 
communications is not open to scrutiny by the individuals concerned or the public at large’, 
in Weber the Court reiterated that ‘it would be contrary to the rule of law for the legal 
discretion granted to the executive or to a judge to be expressed in terms of an unfettered 
power’.
371
 As such, it was held that ‘lawfulness’ in this context above all requires that the 
relevant legal basis (purporting to ground the interference) ‘must indicate the scope of any 
such discretion conferred on the competent authorities and the manner of its exercise with 
sufficient clarity to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference’.
372
 
Accordingly, the Court has developed ‘minimum safeguards that should be set out in statute 
law in order to avoid abuses of power’, which includes: 
 
the nature of the offences which may give rise to an interception order; a definition of the categories of 
people liable to have their telephones tapped; a limit on the duration of telephone tapping; the 
procedure to be followed for examining, using and storing the data obtained; the precautions to be 
taken when communicating the data to other parties; and the circumstances in which recordings may or 




Three key issues are of note, here. The first issue concerns the question as to whether the 
Weber principles, developed in the specific context of interception of communications, apply 
also (and equally) to measures involving acquisition of communications data. Notably, the 
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Court has typically prevaricated somewhat on this issue, leaving open to interpretation the 
position of the ECHR as to the content/metadata distinction. Although, in Uzun v 
Germany,
374
 a case in which the applicant complained of an infringement of art. 8 arising 
from state surveillance in the form tracking via Global Positioning System (GPS), the Court 
held:  
 
While the Court is not barred from gaining inspiration from [the Weber] principles, it finds that these 
rather strict standards, set up and applied in the specific context of surveillance of telecommunications 
… are not applicable as such to cases such as the present one, concerning surveillance via GPS of 
movements in public places and thus a measure which must be considered to interfere less with the 




As such, the Court appeared in Uzun to have implied that the applicability of the Weber 
principles depends, at least in part, on the substance of the relevant interference—the 
paradigm case being interception of communications. The Court proceeded to assess the 
alleged interference in Uzun by reference to ‘the more general principles on adequate 
protection against arbitrary interference with Article 8 rights’
376
—that is, ‘accessibility’ and 
‘foreseeability’ as understood in the context of Sunday Times v United Kingdom. It would 
seem, in light of the Court’s approach in Uzun, that the compatibility with art. 8 of the 
acquisition by the state of what is properly described as metadata need only be assessed in 
this way, too. In which case the position of the Court (and, by extension, art. 8 of the ECHR) 
as to the content/metadata distinction is one which manages only to perpetuate the 
increasingly unconvincing assumption that communications data is intrinsically incapable of 
betraying one’s privacy any more (or, at the very least, equally as) severely than the contents 
of one’s communications.  
Yet, it ought to also be noted that an area in which the Court has been more assertive as to 
the application of the Weber principles is that of ‘bulk’ surveillance measures. The Court has 
remarked that it ‘does not consider that there is any ground to apply different principles 
concerning the accessibility and clarity of the rules governing the interception of individual 
communications, on the one hand, and more general programmes of surveillance, on the 
other’.
377
 It follows that such measures may, in principle, be compatible with art. 8, and 
specifically the requirements of necessity, proportionality, and ‘lawfulness’ upon which that 
question is to be decided. 
The second issue relevant to the applicability of the Weber principles is that of their 
reach—whether, in other words, the ‘minimum safeguards’ apply to circumstances involving 
surveillance of those located (at the material time) outside of the territory of the UK.
378
 That 
issue goes more broadly to the question of ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of art. 1 of the 
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 and in particular the Court’s developing jurisprudence as to the extraterritorial 
application of Convention obligations.
380
 That question is particularly pertinent in the context 
of ‘bulk’ surveillance given that the exercise of those powers is generally limited to 
‘overseas-related communications’—those which are sent or received by ‘individuals who are 
outside the British Islands’.
381
 Although having not (yet) been considered by the ECtHR, in a 
legal challenge brought by several human rights campaigners in the light of the Snowden 
revelations, the IPT determined that ‘a contracting state owes no obligation under Article 8 to 
persons both of whom are situated outside its terroritory in respect of electronic 
communications between them which pass through that state’.
382
 While, in fact, broadly 
consistent with the Strasbourg Court’s interpretation of ‘jurisdiction’, the decision has been 
criticised as one which demonstrates ‘a lack of proper engagement with the underlying 
principles at stake’
383
—including, above all, that of the protection of privacy. 
And finally, the third issue of note for present purposes relates to the Court’s recent 
expansion of the Weber principles, including, especially, an apparent requirement of judicial 
oversight of surveillance regimes. In Szabó v Hungary—one of several cases in recent years 
in which the Court has been tasked with assessing the compatibility with art. 8 of a ‘bulk’ 
surveillance regime—the Court held that ‘an interference by the executive authorities with an 
individual’s rights should be subject to an effective control which should normally be assured 
by the judiciary, at in least in the last resort, judicial control offering the best guarantees of 
independence, impartiality and a proper procedure’.
384
 The question, therefore, is whether 
further developments to this effect in the Convention jurisprudence on secret surveillance 
measures will see the Court’s insisting upon judicial authorisation as an essential requirement 
of the art. 8-compatibility of those measures. 
The ruling of the ECtHR, in 2018, in Big Brother Watch v United Kingdom
385
 represents a 
major development in the art. 8 jurisprudence generally, but also specifically in regards to the 
application of the Weber principles to ‘bulk’ surveillance practices. In that case, which 
crucially marks the first intervention of the ECtHR in relation to the UK’s ‘bulk’ surveillance 
practices post-‘Snowden’, several aspects of the UK’s ‘bulk’ surveillance practices—
including bulk interception of communications and acquisition of communications data—
were found to have violated arts. 8 and 10 of the ECHR. Although relating primarily to those 
practices grounded in the previous legal framework (RIPA), the decision has obvious and 
significant ramifications for the operation of the current surveillance regime now provided 
for, chiefly, by the IPA. In its assessment of the many and various issues raised by such 
practices, the Court began by accepting that ‘the decision to operate a bulk interception 
regime in order to identify hitherto unknown threats to national security is one which 
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continues to fall within States’ margin of appreciation’.
386
 The Court also reiterated, however, 
the potential for abuse of those regimes, especially ‘where the true breadth of the authorities’ 
discretion to intercept cannot be discerned from the relevant legislation’.
387
 In light of that 
issue, the Court firstly addressed the question of the adequacy of the Weber requirements. 
Notably, the Court considered that judicial authorisation ‘is not inherently incompatible with 
the effective functioning of bulk interception’,
388
 and that ‘while [it] considers judicial 
authorisation to be an important safeguard, and perhaps even “best practice”, by itself it can 
neither be necessary nor sufficient to ensure compliance with Article 8 of the Convention’.
389
 
‘Rather,’ it was said, ‘regard must be had to the actual operation of the system of 
interception, including the checks and balances on the exercise of power, and the existence or 
absence of any evidence of actual abuse’.
390
 Yet, as Hughes suggests, this perhaps represents 
a ‘weaker’ position than that adopted by the Court in the recent cases of Szabó and Zakharov; 
appearing to rein in its apparent endorsement, in those cases, of the virtues of judicial 
involvement in authorising secret surveillance practices, rather the Court in Big Brother 
Watch ‘reasoned that judicial authorisation is not necessary, and that states can operate 
without it provided that there is an adequate system of independent oversight’.
391
 
Nevertheless, the Court found several of the ‘minimum safeguards’ to have been 
‘adequately’, ‘sufficiently clearly’ or ‘effectively’ provided for, including those concerning 
(in the Court’s phrasing): the ‘duration of the secret surveillance measure’;
392
 the ‘procedure 
to be followed for storing, accessing, examining and using the intercepted data’;
393
 the 
‘procedure to be followed for communicating the intercepted data to other parties’;
394
 and 
‘the circumstances in which intercepted material must be erased or destroyed’.
395
 However, a 
number of issues were identified as to ‘the scope of application’ of the bulk interception 
regime (under RIPA) considered in that case. Specifically, three questions were raised in this 
respect, which the Court identified as relating, broadly, to the first two Weber ‘minimum 
safeguards’ (namely, ‘the nature of the offences which might give rise to an interception’ and 
the ‘definition of the categories of people liable to have their telephones tapped’).
396
 The first 
question was ‘whether the grounds upon which a warrant can be issued are sufficiently clear’; 
the second, ‘whether domestic law gives citizens an adequate indication of the circumstances 
in which their communications might be intercepted’; and thirdly, ‘whether domestic law 
gives citizens an adequate indication of the circumstances in which their communications 
might be selected for examination’.
397
 Although the Court was satisfied that ‘the 
circumstances in which and the conditions on which a section 8(4) warrant might be issued’ 
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were ‘sufficiently clear[ly]’ outlined under s. 5(3) of RIPA
398
—and thus the first question 
having been adequately resolved—the bulk interception regime was found lacking, crucially, 
with regards to the second and third questions.  
In addressing those questions, the Court recognised the ‘wide’ category of people ‘liable 
to have their communications intercepted’.
399
 The key issue was that of the limit (generally) 
imposed upon the bulk interception of communications as to the targeting (as far as possible) 
of ‘external’ communications. For although, as the Court noted, there was some ‘confusion 
about the application of the terms “external communications” and “internal communications” 
to modern forms of communications’, the relevant legal framework was clear: that is, ‘[i]n 
practice, one of the grounds set out in s. 5(3) of RIPA must be satisfied, bulk interception 
must be proportionate to the aim sought to be achieved, and – at least at the macro level of 
selecting the bearers for interception – only external communications can be targeted’.
400
 
Given, however, the sheer volume of communications intercepted pursuant to a bulk warrant, 
that it is in many ways impractical to ensure the interception of only ‘external’ 
communications at the stage of authorisation of a bulk interception warrant was recognised 
by the Court: 
 
[E]ven where it is clear that a communication is “internal”, as it is between two people in the British 
Islands, in practice, some or all of its parts might be routed through one or more other countries, and 




And given that, at any rate, s. 5(6) of RIPA expressly permitted the interception of 
communications ‘not identified in the warrant’, the risk that the ‘external’/‘internal’ divide 
might be rendered nugatory was clear. Clearly, therefore, of the utmost importance to regimes 
of ‘bulk’ interception of communications—indeed, including that now provided for by the 
IPA—are procedures relating to the selection for examination of material acquired pursuant 
to a bulk warrant, it having been noted by the Court that ‘the exclusion [from selection] of 
communications of individuals known to be in the British Islands is … an important 
safeguard’.
402
 Reflecting a—if perhaps the—fundamental norm of the ‘targeted’/‘bulk’ 
powers distinction (as noted sub-section A, above), this, the Court suggested, was because 
‘[t]he intelligence services should not be permitted to obtain via a bulk warrant what they 
could obtain via a targeted warrant’.
403
 
Crucially, several flaws in the relevant procedures (under the RIPA) were identified, chief 
among which was the Court’s finding that ‘the list from which analysts [were] selecting 
material [was] itself generated by the application of selectors and selection criteria which 
were not subject to any independent oversight’.
404
 And although the Court found ‘no 
evidence to suggest that the intelligence services [were] abusing their powers’, ultimately it 
was ‘not persuaded that the safeguards governing the selection of bearers for interception and 
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the selection of intercepted material for examination [were] sufficiently robust to provide 
adequate guarantees against abuse’;
405
 of ‘greatest concern’, it was noted, was the absence 
from the regime of bulk interception (under RIPA) of ‘robust independent oversight of the 
selectors and search criteria used to filter intercepted communications’.  
 
(iii) The Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the position of the common law 
 
The ECtHR’s recent decision in Big Brother Watch can be seen also to have broader 
implications for the role of the IPT within the contemporary legal framework of investigatory 
powers in the UK. The question as to, in particular, the effectiveness of the Tribunal as a 
mechanism of oversight and accountability within that framework arose in Big Brother Watch 
given that only one of the three joined applications had previously been the subject of 
proceedings before it—the outcome of which, incidentally, was that there had been no 
violation of the Convention in respect of GCHQ’s ‘bulk’ surveillance practices.
406
 One of the 
key arguments proposed by the UK Government, therefore, was that the two remaining 
applications ought to have been dismissed as inadmissible, the relevant applicants having 
failed to exhaust all available domestic remedies (contrary to the criteria stipulated under art. 
35(1) of the Convention)—including, that is, lodging a complaint with the IPT.
407
 The 
applicants sought, rather, to rely on the Court’s previous decision in Kennedy v United 
Kingdom.
408
 In that case, it was held that the relevant Convention jurisprudence at the 
material time did not require that an effective remedy be provided ‘where the alleged 
violation arise[d] from primary legislation’;
409
 in other words, it was not incumbent upon 
applicants to bring proceedings before the IPT in cases involving general (as opposed to 
individual) complaints as to the compatibility with art. 8 of the relevant framework. 
In Big Brother Watch, the Court reiterated that ‘[t]he obligation to exhaust domestic 
remedies … requires an applicant to make normal use of remedies which are available and 
sufficient in respect of his or her Convention grievances’,
410
 there being, however, ‘no 
obligation to recourse to remedies which are inadequate or ineffective’.
411
 Further, it was 
noted that where an applicant seeks to challenge the general legal framework for secret 
surveillance measures—as in the present case—the Court had more recently identified (in the 
case of Zakharov v Russia) ‘the availability of an effective domestic remedy as a relevant 
factor in determining whether that applicant was a “victim” of the alleged violation’, the 
reason being that ‘widespread suspicion and concern among the general public that [such 
powers] were being abused’ is, in the absence of such a remedy, likely to arise.
412
 Noting 
both ‘the manner in which the IPT has exercised its powers in the fifteen years that have 
elapsed since [the Tribunal’s ruling in the Kennedy litigation], and the very real impact its 
judgments have had on domestic law and practice’, the Court considered that its previous 
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concerns as to the effectiveness of the IPT ‘as a remedy for complaints about the general 
compliance of a secret surveillance regime’ no longer hold.
413
 Consequently, the present 
position is such that applicants ought firstly to exhaust domestic remedies, which now ‘as a 
general rule’ includes the IPT—save, that is, where ‘special circumstances’ absolve an 
applicant of that obligation.
414
 Although, in the case of the present applicants, the Court 
accepted that ‘special circumstances’ did, in fact, exist to that effect: ‘[the applicants] could 
not be faulted for relying on Kennedy as authority for the proposition that the IPT was not an 




Beyond simply providing an insight as to how and why two of the three joined 
applications in Big Brother Watch came to be accepted as admissible by the Court (in the face 
of some ambiguity deriving from the Convention case law), the Court’s decision in this 
respect is particularly consequential from the perspective that it gives what might only be 
described as a glowing reference as to the work of the IPT. The Court noted the IPT’s 
‘extensive post-Kennedy case-law’ as ‘demonstrat[ing] the important role that [the Tribunal] 
can and does play in analysing and elucidating the general operation of surveillance 
regimes’
416
—a role which the Court considers of ‘invaluable assistance’ to it ‘when 
considering the compliance of a secret surveillance regime with the Convention’, such that it 
involves determining questions of fact or the proper interpretation of domestic law (both of 
which, the Court reiterated, are outwith its supervisory role).
417
 The effectiveness of the IPT 
was said to be ‘further underlined by the fact that it can, as a matter of EU law, make an order 
for reference to the CJEU where an issue arises that is relevant to the dispute before it’, the 
Court having noted that ‘the protection of fundamental rights by Community law can be 
considered “equivalent” to that of the Convention system’.
418
 And of the applicants’ 
complaint that the IPT cannot issue a declaration of incompatibility (DOI) under s. 4 of the 
HRA—an issue which, it was argued, goes to the (in)effectiveness of the IPT as a mechanism 
of redress in cases involving alleged violations of art. 8 arising from primary legislation—the 
Court merely emphasised that the non-binding nature of the DOI mechanism rendered 
uncertain the practice of giving effect to the national courts’ use of that mechanism; rather, 
the Court suggested, ‘the relevant question is not whether the IPT can issue a [DOI], but 
whether the practice of giving effect to its findings is sufficiently certain’.
419
 Indeed, the 
Court concluded that it was. The upshot of the Court’s treatment of the ‘IPT as an effective 
remedy’ issue is this: the Court expressed an esteem for the IPT which, as Kirsty Hughes 
writes, ‘suggests that it is likely [in future] to be deferential to [the Tribunal’s] decisions’.
420
 
Clearly, the effect of this is that of entrenching the IPT’s position as the principal legal 
mechanism of accountability in the contemporary framework of surveillance powers. 
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At this juncture, the position of the common law ought to be considered, specifically the 
way in which oversight by the “ordinary” courts is, in light of the above, brought to bear on 
the contemporary legal framework of surveillance powers. Although, for reasons outlined 
here, in fact the key theme of the oversight provided in this context—indeed, one of the key 
themes of this chapter, more broadly—is that of its general inadequacy, especially as far as 
the protection of privacy is concerned. This has so far been shown, in this chapter, to stem 
from the domestic courts’ historic reluctance (if perhaps inability) to recognise the 
availability at common law of, much less enforce, a negative right against interference by 
public authorities. As discussed in Section II, above, reasons for this include the conceptual 
ambiguity in which the content of that right is enshrouded, and thus the difficulty inherent to 
the task of establishing its proper scope and application without proper democratic 
deliberation or input. And to the extent that key common law principles, values and standards 
of review are, in fact, inculcated within statutory mechanisms of oversight of surveillance 
powers, the role of the JCs in the IPA’s ‘double-lock’ system stands as one (important) 
example in which the effect of this imposition has been shown to potentially obfuscate rather 
than enhance those mechanisms. 
The key factor as to the futility of the common law in this area, however, is that of the 
marginalisation of the “ordinary” courts from the institutional structures of that framework. 
Not least, that is, given the centrality within those structures of the IPT, the decisions of 
which the relevant legal framework seeks generally to immunise from oversight by the 
‘ordinary’ courts. Given the typically sensitive nature of evidence relevant to complaints 
heard by the IPT—which might include, for example, information concerning specific 
intelligence-gathering operations carried out by the SIAs—the Tribunal’s proceedings are 
invariably required to be conducted in private.
421
 That undoubtedly raises several issues of 
fundamental constitutional import regarding, for instance, the extent to which, if at all, so-




Although, the most significant contemporary constitutional development concerning the 
immunisation of the IPT’s activities is that of the UK Supreme Court’s decision in R (on the 
application of Privacy International) v Investigatory Powers Tribunal & Others.
423
 That case, 
which reached the UK Supreme Court in May 2019, concerned the effect of s. 67(8) of RIPA, 
which purported to “oust” the jurisdiction of the High Court to hear challenges or appeals in 
respect of ‘determinations, awards, orders and other decisions of the Tribunal (including 
decisions as to whether they have jurisdiction)’.
424
 Overturning the decisions of both the High 
Court
425
 and the Court of Appeal,
426
 in which it was held that s. 67(8) effectively precluded 
judicial review of the IPT, a 4:3 majority of the Supreme Court found that the provision had 
no such effect. In the leading majority judgment delivered by Lord Carnwath (with whom 
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Lady Hale and Lord Kerr agreed), it was noted that ‘[t]here is an obvious parallel with the 
“ouster clause” considered by the House of Lords in the seminal case of Anisminic Ltd v 
Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147’; in that case, the House of Lords held 
that s. 4(4) of the Foreign Compensation Act 1950—which provided, ‘[t]he determination by 
the commission of any application made to them under this Act shall not be called in question 
in any court of law’—was ineffective to exclude review by the courts of the legal basis of the 
Commission’s decision. Famously, the Law Lords interpreted the word ‘determination’ in 
such a way as to find that it could not be taken to include any such ‘determination’ made 
beyond the Commission’s jurisdiction; as Lord Carnwath noted, the courts were found in that 
case not to have been precluded ‘from inquiring whether or not the order of the commission 
was a nullity’.
427
 And so the ‘central issue’ for the Supreme Court in Privacy International 
was thus: ‘what if any material difference to the court’s approach is made by any differences 
in context or wording, and more particularly the inclusion, in the parenthesis to section 67(8), 
of a specific reference to decisions relating to “jurisdiction”?’ 
It would be ‘odd’, Lord Carnwath claimed, if specifically the reference (in s. 67(8)) to 
‘decisions as to whether they [the IPT] have jurisdiction’ in fact made any difference in this 
regard. Noting the decision of the IPT which Privacy International sought ultimately to 
challenge, namely the lawfulness of the issue of ‘thematic’ warrants under s. 5 of the 
Intelligence Services Act 1994 authorising extensive computer ‘hacking’, Lord Carnwath 
held that this ‘raised a short point of law, turning principally on the reading of the word 
“specified” in section 5’.
428
 It followed, therefore, that ‘[o]n no ordinary view could [this] be 
regarded as a decision “as to whether [the IPT] had jurisdiction”; indeed, ‘the present 
wording [of s. 67(8)] seems designed if anything to emphasise that the exclusion is directed 
specifically at decisions about jurisdiction made by the IPT itself’.
429
 Lord Carnwath also 
commented: 
 
I am unimpressed by arguments based on the security issues involved in many (though not all) of the 
IPT’s cases. As this case shows, the tribunal itself is able to organise its procedures to ensure that a 
material point of law can be considered separately without threatening any security interests. The 
Administrative Court can also ensure that the grant of permission is limited to cases raising points of 
general significance, and that its proceedings are conducted without risk to security concerns. Further, 
in the case of the IPT, the potential for overlap with legal issues which may be considered by the 
ordinary courts … makes it all the more important that it is not able to develop its own “local” law 
without scope for further review.
430 
 
This latter point fed into Lord Carnwath’s discussion of the secondary dispute, namely ‘as 
to the power of the legislature, consistently with the rule of law, to entrust [the task of 
independent legal interpretation] to a judicial body such as the IPT, free from any possibility 
of review by the ordinary courts (including the appellate courts).
431
 That is, of ‘the need to 
ensure that the law applied by the specialist tribunal is not developed in isolation (“a local 
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law”), but conforms to the general law of the law’, Lord Carnwath reiterated that this has 
long been ‘a central part of the function of the High Court as constitutional guardian of the 
rule of law’.
432
 Indeed, that point ‘applies with particular force in the present context where 
there is a significant overlap between jurisdictions of the IPT and of the ordinary courts’:  
 
The legal issue decided by the IPT is not only one of general public importance, but also has possible 
implications for legal rights and remedies going beyond the scope of the IPT’s remit. Consistent 




In what will no doubt go down as a memorable passage of Lord Carnwath’s ruling, it was 
thus held: 
 
[There is] a strong case for holding that, consistently with the rule of law, binding effect cannot be 
given to a clause which purports wholly to exclude the supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court to 





Indeed, as much is echoed by Lord Lloyd-Jones (also for the majority), who notes:  
 
the exclusion of the review jurisdiction of the High Court in cases of error of law, if achievable at all, 
would require a provision of much greater clarity [than that apparently achieved by s. 67(8)] making 




Two key points, specifically concerning the protection of privacy, are raised by these 
developments. On one hand, in ultimately preserving the supervisory jurisdiction of the 
“ordinary” courts in relation to the IPT—contrary, it would certainly appear on the face of 
things, to Parliament’s intention—the decision in Privacy International clearly does much to 
erect a key obstacle to the common law’s increasing marginalisation from the contemporary 
legal framework of surveillance powers. Indeed, Lord Carnwath highlights one particularly 
important issue (above) that this might serve to address: it prevents the IPT from arrogating 
to itself too much, if perhaps all of the responsibility of ensuring the effective legal oversight 
of the executive in this area, and in so doing carving out of the common law a developing 
jurisprudence which the latter is unable to retrieve and, if necessary, correct. And in the 
context of protecting privacy, there are clear benefits, at the very least, that the IPT, with its 
(albeit to a large extent necessarily) secretive processes, is not further immunised from 
transparency and accountability for its own decision-making. On the other hand, though, is 
the question as to whether this might have any bearing at all on the protection of privacy in 
practice. After all, there are reasons to be sceptical that oversight of the IPT by the “ordinary” 
courts will ensure anything other than lightest-touch review of the Tribunal’s decisions—
including, crucially, decisions which nevertheless involve scrutinising the SIAs’ compliance 
with art. 8 of the ECHR. Not least: among the key insights to have emerged from Privacy 
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International is that of the apparent equivalent constitutional status of the IPT and the High 
Court: the IPT engages in the same kind of review of the conduct of public authorities—
being required, that is, to ‘apply the same principles for making their determination in those 
proceedings as would be applied by a court on an application for judicial review’
436
—and is 
populated by the same judicial personnel who preside over such applications in the High 
Court.
437
 Indeed: ‘[w]hether this will offer any substantial additional accountability for the 
activities of the intelligence services scrutinised in the Tribunal, or will simply elongate the 
standard avenues of legal challenge, remain to be seen’.
438
 
Though, of course, the legal challenge in Privacy International was not about the 
protection of privacy, per se. It is no surprise, therefore, that this appears to have had no 
bearing whatsoever on the Supreme Court’s approach to the question as to whether the IPT’s 
activities are or ought to be amenable to judicial review. The rationale of the majority 
decision was steeped, rather, in the overriding imperative(s) of the principles of the rule of 
law. For instance, Lord Carnwath emphasised that ‘[t]o deny the effectiveness of an ouster 
clause is … a straightforward application of principles of the rule of law’: ‘[c]onsistently with 
those principles, Parliament cannot entrust a statutory decision-making process to a particular 
body, but then leave it free to disregard essential requirements laid down by the rule of law 
for such a process to be effective’.
439
 Indeed, the broader significance of this aspect of the 
Supreme Court’s decision is perhaps that it can be seen to reflect the common law’s approach 
to the regulation of surveillance and investigatory powers more generally. For as Scott notes, 
the regulation of these powers in the UK has ‘always been heavily influenced by the common 
law’s approach to the rule of law, whereby the executive must have authority for any of its 
actions which interfere with the legal rights … of the individual’.
440
 Beyond that bare 
principle, for which ‘[u]sually identified as authority … is Entick v Carrington’, Scott 
highlights several other key themes of the modern constitutional position of these powers 
which are equally manifest in the decision in Entick. Among these themes is, firstly, that of 
the courts’ insistence upon the clarity of the relevant legal basis which purports to ground an 
interference by the state as to one’s privacy
441
—a theme which, in the contemporary 
constitution, is reflected in the principle of legality (outlined in Section II, above), which 
looks to ensure that ‘[f]undamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous 
words’.
442
 A second theme—which Scott describes as a ‘partly subsidiary but also more 
wide-reaching … example of the common law’s commitment to the rule of law’—is that of 
the suspicion with which the courts are (or ought to be) inclined to treat claims to the effect 
that the law must vary with the needs of the state.
443
 Thirdly, and finally, is that of the rule-
of-law implications of ‘general’ warrants, the key problem with which is that ‘they require 
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those executing the warrant—rather than the person issuing it—to decide for themselves 




Though, Privacy International perhaps points to a fourth (key) theme: that the common 
law provides substantive protection within the context of state surveillance powers, albeit in 
narrowly defined circumstances, namely those in which the relevant legal framework 
purports to “oust” the oversight of the “ordinary” courts from it. Clearly, any sense in which 
the protection of privacy at common law can be seen to derive from this is, however, 
incidental. After all, the courts have been explicit, and consistent, in the self-image that they 
have long projected in the context of protection of privacy: that this ‘is an area which requires 
a detailed approach which can be achieved only by legislation rather than the broad brush of 
common law principle’.
445
 Still, a principled, rule-of-law-based resistance to the 
marginalisation of the common law from the contemporary framework of surveillance 
powers is one significant way in which this ‘broad brush’ approach is nonetheless brought to 
bear on this area. 
 
(iv) The ‘content’/‘metadata’ distinction in the contemporary framework of surveillance 
powers 
 
As discussed throughout this section so far, underpinning the contemporary legal framework 
of surveillance powers are several key distinctions which together look to ensure as a basic 
rule that the greater the (perceived) potential for the invasion of privacy associated with the 
relevant powers, the more imposing the procedural conditions to their exercise. One such 
distinction has been highlighted already (in sub-section A, above): that which distinguishes 
between ‘targeted’ and ‘bulk’ powers. Though, the distinction between ‘interception’ and 
‘communications data’—in other words, between ‘content’ and ‘metadata’—has been 
described as, in fact, ‘[t]he basic distinction that governs the operation of the law in this 
area’.
446
 That distinction (which, as also discussed in sub-section A, above, the IPA carries 
over from the previous legal framework) grounds a fundamental, and longstanding, although 
increasingly tenuous, normative position: that gaining access to the contents of a 
communication—what was said—denotes a greater level of intrusion of privacy than 
obtaining information from which (only) the details about a particular communication can be 
derived—by whom it was sent and received, where, when, and by which means. Powers 
relating to interception of communications, which operate in the realm of ‘content’, 
ostensibly continue, therefore, under the 2016 Act, to be more tightly controlled than those 
which relate (merely) to the collection of and access to communications data, a form of so-
called ‘metadata’, which can be understood to mean ‘data about use made of a 




                                                          
444 ibid 63. See, also, Privacy International v Investigatory Powers Tribunal (n 250).  
445 Wainwright (n 49) [33] (emphasis added). 
446 Anderson, A Question of Trust (n 246) [6.2] (emphasis added). 




The conceptual distinction between ‘content’ and ‘metadata’ can be seen as the basis of 
arrangements concerning the relatively limited availability of intercept powers, generally, as 
compared with powers which apply in the context of communications data. Again, whereas 
the decision to issue a warrant authorising targeted interception of communications is a 
matter for the Secretary of State alone
448
 (albeit subject to the subsequent approval of a 
JC),
449
 the power to grant an authorisation for the targeted acquisition of communications 
data is extended, rather, to a wide range of public authorities; the decision of the relevant 
official—‘a designated senior officer’—need not, in fact, be approved by a JC.
450
 It ought to 
also be noted, moreover, that implied within each of the distinct legal categories of ‘content’ 
and ‘metadata’ themselves is a sliding scale of intrusiveness, whereby certain types of 
communications and related data are measured to be more sensitive (as a matter of privacy) 
than others. As such, within the provisions relating to authorisation of interception of 
communications, additional safeguards apply in respect of the communications of Members 
of Parliament,
451
 items subject to legal privilege,
452
 confidential journalistic material,
453
 and 
sources of journalistic information.
454
 For example, in the case of a warrant authorising 
interception of MPs’ communications, the Secretary of State is required to obtain the 
approval of the Prime Minister.
455
 Equally, that some forms of ‘metadata’ are considered 
more sensitive than others is reflected in the imposition of (greater) restrictions to access of, 
for example, ‘internet connection records’.
456
 
There are a number of reasons to be sceptical, however, that the content/metadata 
distinction is one which can be sustained, and, as such, one that continues to justify a 
significant relaxing of procedural safeguards, generally, in regards to the collection of and 
access to communications data. This is especially the case insofar as the level of intrusion 
considered to be associated with measures relating to communications data is—especially 
when compared with interception of ‘content’—practically nominal. One example concerns 
the way in which the IPA appears to expand the meaning of the term ‘secondary data’ as it 
applies in the context of intercept powers available under s. 16 (outlined above). For, as Scott 
writes, ‘[w]here RIPA had employed in this context the concept of ‘related communications 
data’, defined in such a way that only metadata was included within it, the definition of 
‘secondary data’ in the IPA shifts the boundary into the domain of content’.
457
 The reason for 
this is that s. 16 of the IPA defines ‘secondary data’ as such to include two forms of data. The 
first is ‘systems data which is comprised in, included as part of, attached to or logically 
associated with the communication (whether by the sender or otherwise)’.
458
 Though, 
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‘systems data’ is of no real consequence to the content/metadata distinction, being broadly 
consistent with the meaning of metadata as generally understood: it encompasses no element 
of ‘content’, referring only to ‘any data that enables or facilitates, or identifies or describes 
anything with enabling or facilitating, the functioning of’, among other things, ‘a postal 
service’ or ‘a telecommunication system’.
459
  
Rather more problematic is the inclusion within the meaning of ‘secondary data’ of 
‘identifying data which is comprised in, included as part of, attached to or logically 
associated with the communication’, ‘is capable of being logically separated from the 
remainder of the communication’, ‘and if it were so separated, would not reveal anything of 
what might reasonably be considered to be the meaning (if any) of the communication, 
disregarding any meaning arising from the fact of the communication or from any data 
relating to the transmission of the communication’.
460
 This is because ‘identifying data’ is 
defined in the Act as including data which may be used to identify, or assist in identifying, 
among other things, ‘any person, apparatus, system or service’, ‘any event’, or ‘the location 
of any person, event or thing’.
461
 The key issue, therefore, is that although the relevant 
provisions on the collection of ‘identifying data’, as a form of ‘secondary data’, clearly 
extend only to that which ‘would not reveal anything of what might reasonably be considered 
to be the meaning (if any) of the communication’, this would perhaps imply that, in fact, 
there are circumstances in which the contents of the relevant communication may (whether 
intentionally or not) be discerned. Of course, the exception is there to prevent this. But such 
data which reveals the meaning of the communication might be acquired, and crucially it is 
impossible to know whether, in fact, that meaning is revealed without the intercepting 
authority having looked at that data in the first place. This, Scott notes, ‘makes it difficult to 
know where exactly the boundary will be drawn in practice’.
462
 
It ought to be noted here, also, that in Big Brother Watch the ECtHR addressed the 
exemption of ‘related communications data’—that is, the term applied throughout RIPA in 
reference to what would now more widely be understood as ‘metadata’—from the safeguards 
applicable to the searching and examining of ‘content’ (under s. 16 of that Act). This issue 
goes to the heart of the content/metadata distinction, and as such presented a key opportunity 
for the Court to (further) clarify the relevant position of the Convention which hitherto—
typified by the Court’s decision in Uzun (discussed above)—has generally been characterised 
by ambiguity. In particular, it presented an opportunity for the Court to decide whether the 
Weber requirements applied also (and equally) to the acquisition of metadata as with the 
interception of communications. The Court made several important points in this respect, 
noting, firstly, that ‘communications data is a valuable resource for the intelligence services’, 
and one which ‘can be analysed quickly to find patterns that reflect particular online 
behaviours associated with activities such as a terrorist attack’.
463
 It was also suggested that 
‘related communications data’, although ‘not to be confused with the much broader category 
of “communications data”’, nevertheless ‘represents a significant quantity of data’. Most 
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importantly, however, are the Court’s remarks to the effect that it was ‘not persuaded that the 
acquisition of related communications data is necessarily less intrusive than the acquisition of 
content’, metadata being capable, that is, of ‘reveal[ing] the identities and geographic 




In the face of clear indications that the Court ‘might be willing to finally overturn the 
content/communications data distinction’,
465
 it is disappointing that the Court found it 
ultimately unnecessary to decide that issue, having explained, rather, that ‘save for the section 
16 safeguards, the section 8(4) regime treats intercepted content and related communications 
data in the same way’.
466
 It was suggested in Big Brother Watch that the key question for the 
Court was thus ‘whether the justification provided by the Government for exempting related 
communications data from [the s. 16 safeguards] is proportionate to the legitimate aim 
pursued’.
467
 The Court found against the Government in this respect, noting that ‘it does not 
consider that the authorities have struck a fair balance between the competing public and 
private interests by exempting [‘related communications data’] in its entirety from the 
safeguards applicable to the searching and examining of content’.
468
 Although, the key point 
that ought to be taken from the Court’s approach in this regard is that it is one which can be 
seen to be paradigmatic of a more general and apparently deeply entrenched reluctance to 
engage with the deprivation of privacy in substantive terms. In other words, despite offering 
several compelling reasons as to why the content/metadata distinction no longer—if it ever 
did—accurately reflects the privacy-implications of acquisition of communications data as 
compared with the interception of content, the Court’s decision in Big Brother Watch simply 
(further) entrenches the procedural (‘in accordance with the law’) angle as the one that 




Two key themes have been shown to overarch the constitutional implications of the various 
counter-terrorism measures explored in this chapter. The first theme is that of the marked and 
perennial inadequacy of the common law as a key legal source of protection of privacy in the 
UK. Any such ‘right’ to privacy which the common law can be seen to have developed over 
the years simply does not apply in any meaningful sense in the contexts of those legal 
frameworks which empower the state to intrude upon the private lives of its citizens for the 
purposes of investigating potential (threats of) terrorist activity. Though, in fact, it might be 
said that the common law’s abject record in this area merely reflects a deeper, more 
fundamental point: that the common law has neither the conceptual tools for developing, 
much less enforcing, a negative right against interference by public bodies. Indeed, this is a 
limitation of the domestic courts’ self-proclaimed ‘broad brush’
469
 approach to the protection 
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of privacy, which relies primarily on the application of first principles of the rule of law. And 
while in the Privacy International litigation, and thus the specific context of “ouster clauses”, 
such an approach has nevertheless carved out a key area of substantive protection in the legal 
framework of surveillance powers, it fails to convince that this might properly be regarded as 
a victory for the protection of privacy, per se, whether in principle or, more importantly, in 
practice. This is to say nothing, moreover, of those cases involving extraordinarily wide 
powers of (suspicionless) stop-and-search, in which the rule of law, or the derivative 
principle of legality, had no bearing on the lawfulness of those measures in any substantive 
sense. Rather, the general truth of the common law’s failure to protect privacy in and of itself 
holds true, which is, in turn, no doubt a lasting consequence of its ‘historic rejection’ and 
‘continuing disregard for a right to privacy’.
470
 
The second key theme can be seen to follow from the first: it is because of this general 
truth that the constitutional position and protection of privacy is to all intents and purposes 
contingent on the operation of the HRA/ECHR. The right to private and family life under art. 
8 of the Convention has done much—indeed, more than anything else—to leverage a 
significant level of protection of (the right to) privacy in the UK which, plainly, without it 
would not exist. It is, as a result, incredibly difficult to envisage the removal of art. 8—if, that 
is, the long-threatened repeal of the HRA is ever carried out—as doing anything other than to 
radically diminish that level of protection. Moreover, the importance of art. 8 in this regard is 
rendered all the more striking in light of the gaping difference in approach between the 
domestic courts and the ECtHR to its application and enforcement. The decisions of both the 
Appellate Committee of the House of Lords and the UK Supreme Court in Gillan and 
Beghal, respectively, are key examples of this. As discussed in this chapter, in both instances 
the domestic courts were subsequently found by the ECtHR to have erred in their approach to 
the question of the ‘lawfulness’, under art. 8(2), of the relevant stop-and-search powers 
contained in the Terrorism Act 2000. Indeed, that it fell, once again, to the Strasbourg Court 
in Big Brother Watch to remedy the violation of art. 8 in respect of the UK’s ‘bulk’ 
surveillance regime ultimately highlights a damning pattern: clearly, this is a difference in 
approach which, it has been said, ‘would doubtless be important if we ever had to rely 
exclusively upon the common law for protection’.
471
 But what it also reveals is that even with 
the benefit of art. 8, which has been instrumental in guiding the development of an otherwise 
non-existent public law jurisprudence on the protection of privacy, the domestic courts have 
consistently undersold the protection that it ought to provide. 
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The UK has been a key player in the so-called ‘Financial War on Terrorism’ of the last 
decades—that (core) strand of the contemporary global response to the threat of terrorism 
which has been powered, in the main, by the proliferation of coercive measures designed to 
stem the flow of funding to terrorists and terrorist groups.
1
 This chapter explores the domestic 
constitutional implications of several such measures, namely those which specifically entail 
the ‘freezing’ of terrorists’ (and suspected terrorists’) assets. In sharp contrast to the extensive 
criminal regime in the UK for which Part III of the Terrorism Act 2000 provides, relating to 
‘terrorist property’ offences,
2
 asset-freezing involves the imposition by the state (often, as 
discussed in this chapter, at the behest of international institutions) of severe financial 
sanctions upon individuals and entities which, crucially, are not dependent upon criminal 
conviction. Rather, these sanctions—including, for example, ‘limit[ing] the provision of 
certain financial services’ and ‘restrict[ing] access to financial markets, funds and economic 
resources’—are ‘preventive’, or ‘pre-emptive’, in nature; they work, among other things, to 
‘constrain a target by denying them access to key resources needed to continue their 
offending behaviour, including the financing of terrorism’.
3
 And although in this sense 
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(s 21A).  
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comparable to the (since abolished) ‘control order’,
4
 for it effectively ‘places unending 
restrictions on individual liberty based on suspicion rather than proof’,
5
 asset-freezing is in 
many ways revealed to be uniquely egregious. Indeed, it has been suggested that sanctions of 
the kind associated with asset-freezing ‘entail the worst effects of pre-emptive action on the 
individual’: not only do they involve subjecting targets to ‘a system that seriously infringes 




Two key themes of the contemporary counter-terrorism asset-freezing regime are explored 
in this chapter. The first theme, which, it is argued, reflects both a symptom and a cause of 
much legal and constitutional complexity in this area, is that of the interplay of domestic and 
international law and politics. Indeed, the contemporary counter-terrorism asset-freezing 
‘regime’ in reality comprises several, invariably overlapping regimes, simultaneously 
implicating legal and political arrangements at the domestic, supranational (European Union) 
and international (United Nations) levels. And whilst, as discussed in this chapter, a range of 
key features are replicated across each of those regimes—not least including that they each 
confer broad discretionary powers on executive actors to unilaterally ‘designate’ or ‘list’ 
persons and organisations as the subjects of financial sanctions—it is in the various ways that 
they differ which has a particular, and crucial, distorting effect on the domestic constitutional 
position of asset-freezing. The potential for independent oversight of or challenge to key 
decision-making—whether by legal or political means—varies radically between regimes, as 
do, for instance, the relevant conditions as to the exercise of asset-freezing powers, and the 
regularity with which use is made of those discrete sets powers in practice. Of particular 
(constitutional) significance, in this respect, is the distinction between those asset-freezing 
regimes which are derived from and governed by international legal arrangements (though 
are given legal effect in the UK via enabling powers both in primary or secondary 
legislation), and those which are, by contrast, purely the creation of domestic law. For 
although themselves in many ways imperfect (for reasons outlined in Section IV of this 
chapter), accountability mechanisms and procedural safeguards are nonetheless (relatively) 
more robust in the case of the latter than in that of the former. In other words: it matters, 
therefore, that, as Clive Walker writes, ‘[i]n grave doubt are the accountability and the 
constitutional governance of international listings’, for it is in the context of those 
circumstances that ‘[t]hose affected are left beyond democratic governance and are subject 
primarily to political spheres of influence at international level’.
7
  
The second key theme explored in this chapter is that of the particularly vehement liberal-
legal(ist) response which has been provoked by the flagrant undermining of legal protections 
of human rights and of core rule-of-law principles in this area of counter-terrorism. The 
judicial response is of particular import, in this respect. For in order to overcome the 
constitutional constraints and legitimacy deficits at the domestic and supranational levels, vis-
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à-vis the international legal processes of UN Security Council counter-terrorism sanctions, 
the domestic and European courts have instead exacted especially robust scrutiny of the 
various legislative instruments by which those sanctions have been translated into the 
relevant municipal legal orders. Some key examples are discussed in this chapter,
8
 in which, 
notably, judicial resistance to the counter-terrorism sanctions regime(s) to which these 
various instruments give effect has above all been grounded both in ‘fundamental’ 
constitutional principle(s) and human rights—and, specifically in the UK context, in the 
protection of ‘fundamental’ common law constitutional principle(s) and rights. Indeed, that it 
should be so that a potential vindication of ‘common law constitutionalism’ has resulted from 
the courts’ intervention in disputes involving the protection of property—and not, for 
instance, the protection of liberty, much less the protection of privacy, as discussed in 
previous chapters—is, of itself, significant. For this potentially offers key insights as to the 
norms and values truly foremost in ‘common law constitutionalist’ theory, and how that 
theory is brought to bear on the UK constitution in particular, which also clearly have 
important consequences, therefore, for the constitutional position of asset-freezing—and of 
the UK constitution more broadly—as understood from that perspective. 
The chapter begins by outlining, in Section II, the international counter-terrorism sanctions 
regime which has grown exponentially since (and primarily in response to) the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. It then considers the various means by which that regime has been and is currently 
given domestic legal effect in the UK—that is, both via primary and secondary legislation. A 
key focus of that section is the UK Supreme Court’s ruling in HM Treasury v Ahmed,
9
 which, 
in addition to representing one important example of the much broader liberal-legal(ist) 
critique of counter-terrorism asset-freezing mentioned above, can also be seen to represent a 
critical turning point in the contemporary legal landscape of asset-freezing. In particular, 
Parliament’s response to Ahmed led to significant fragmentation of this legal landscape 
which, itself, is the source of much ongoing legal and constitutional complexity in this area. 
Section III then outlines those asset-freezing measures contained in Part 2 of the Anti-
terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 and Schedule 7 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, 
which exist alongside, though are entirely independent of, the international regime (and 
indeed the relevant legal instruments which incorporate the international regime into 
domestic law). That section concludes with some brief reflections on the recent introduction 
of a third discrete domestic legal basis for asset-freezing, the Sanctions and Anti-Money 
Laundering Act 2018, following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020. 
Indeed, to the extent that the 2018 Act now dovetails (if only part) of the international 
sanctions regime and that which is otherwise “purely” domestic, several key questions are 
raised. Not least, for instance, as to what impact this will have, if any, in potentially resolving 
much of the fragmentation which has been perpetuated in the development of the 
contemporary legal framework of asset-freezing. 
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II. THE INTERNATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM SANCTIONS REGIME(S) 
 
The escalation of terrorist violence perpetrated by Al-Qaida and affiliated networks at the 
turn of the 21
st
 century prompted an international legal response focused to an unprecedented 
degree on combatting the financing of terrorism.
10
 The UN General Assembly’s adoption, in 
1999, of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
11
 
signals the extent to which the issue had risen (exponentially) on the international agenda 
during that period.
12
 Described as ‘unique amongst its 12 sister international conventions 
tackling terrorism in that it is the first to address the root causes and lifeblood of the 
phenomenon’,
13
 the Terrorist Financing Convention obliges signatories to, among other 
things, ‘adopt such measures as may be necessary’ so as to give effect to, and thus make 
punishable, ‘terrorist financing offences in domestic law’.
14
 Moreover, it mandates the taking 
of ‘appropriate measures … for the identification, detection and freezing or seizure of any 
funds used or allocated for the purposes of committing [these] offences’.
15
 Although initially 
(infamously) having failed to attract a sufficient number of signatures for ratification,
16
 the 
9/11 terrorist attacks triggered a significant upturn in this respect. As of August 2019, 189 
states are now party to the Terrorist Financing Convention, making it one of the most 
successful international anti-terrorism treaties in terms of its breadth and uptake. 
Of particular significance for present purposes are the various counter-terrorism-financing 
measures adopted and enforced under the auspices of the UN collective security framework. 
As the institution on which the Member States of the UN have conferred ‘primary 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security’,
17
 the UN Security 
Council enjoys extensive powers in this regard, under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. Upon 
determining ‘the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of 
aggression’
18
—for which, again, the Security Council is both solely responsible and afforded 
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Force?’ (2007) 29 Dublin ULJ 397, 397-98. 
14 Terrorist Financing Convention, art 4. 
15 ibid art 8. 
16 Of the requisite 22 ratifications required under art 26 of the Terrorist Financing Convention, only four—which, as of 7 
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17 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations (1945) 1 UNTS XVI (UN Charter) art 24(1). 
18 ibid art 39. See, eg, Jeremy Matam Farrall, United Nations Sanctions and the Rule of Law (CUP 2007) 82: ‘The text of 
Article 39 suggests that, prior to applying sanctions, the Council should first determine the existence of a threat to the peace, 
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—it falls to the Security Council to also ‘decide what measures shall be 
taken … to maintain or restore international peace and security’.
20
 Article 41 of the UN 
Charter empowers the Security Council to ‘decide what measures not involving the use of 
armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions’, and to ‘call upon the Members 
of the United Nations to apply such measures’, which include (but are not limited to) 
‘complete or partial interruption of economic relations’.
21
  
One key point which ought to be noted at this juncture is that the international counter-
terrorism sanctions regime established pursuant to the UN Security Council’s Chapter VII 
powers (discussed below) follow, and indeed perpetuate, what has been described as a ‘sea 
change’ in the Council’s practice in the last decades, involving ‘significantly advanc[ing] the 
sophistication of the sanctions instrument’.
22
 That is, where historically art. 41 had 
established a legal basis for (non-military) enforcement action primarily targeting recalcitrant 
states, the shift in focus ‘from comprehensive to more selective measures’
23
 of the kind 
typified by the increasing imposition of so-called ‘individualised’ counter-terrorism sanctions 
had been prompted by several factors, including an increased awareness of the broader 
(severe) humanitarian and economic implications of such a state-centric approach—for 
example, the imposition of general trade sanctions, wide restrictions on travel and aviation, 
and expansive embargoes on the sale and transport of arms. This shift in the UN Security 
Council’s practice in the last decades thus represents a significant international (legal and 
constitutional) development, per se, about which much has been written.
24
 As Ben Murphy 
notes, ‘[t]he contemporary importance of this practice is demonstrated by the fact that … 
‘sanctions’ sit at the top of two important lists: by some distance, they simultaneously 
constitute the most commonly invoked and the most controversial aspect of the Council’s 
recent practice’.
25
 It is against the backdrop of the controversies of this particular 
development, therefore, that the counter-terrorism sanctions regime ought to be considered; a 
number of questions of fundamental legal and constitutional import are given rise as to 
whether, and if so to what extent, the UN Security Council can itself be held accountable—
whether legally or politically—for the far-reaching human rights implications of its use of 
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A. UN Security Council Resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1373 (2001) 
 
Building on several such measures adopted in response to the terrorist attacks carried out by 
Al-Qaida on US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998,
26
 the Security Council 
established under UNSCR 1267 (1999)
27
 a regime of economic sanctions uniquely targeting 
individuals and entities from whom Al-Qaida terrorist networks derived financial support. In 
particular, this included the then-ruling Taliban regime in Afghanistan, which was roundly 
condemned by the Security Council for ‘continu[ing] to provide safe haven to [the leader of 
Al-Qaida] Usama bin Laden and … [for] allow[ing] him and others associated with him to 
operate a network of terrorist training camps from Taliban-controlled territory’.
28
 Thus, in 
addition to prohibitions on, for instance, aircraft taking off or landing in Taliban-controlled 
territory,
29
 UNSCR 1267 required all states to 
 
Freeze funds and other financial resources, including funds derived or generated from property owned 
or controlled directly or indirectly by the Taliban, or by any undertaking owned or controlled by the 
Taliban … and ensure that neither they nor any other funds or financial resources so designated are 
made available, by their nationals or by any persons within their territory, to or for the benefit of the 
Taliban or any undertaking owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by the Taliban, except as may be 




Moreover, following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the UN sanctions regime was significantly 
expanded under UNSCR 1373 (2001),
31
 which constitutes a general international mandate 
(existing alongside that of UNSCR 1267) for the freezing of terrorists’ (and suspected 
terrorists’) assets. The provisions of UNSCR 1373 are equally wide-ranging, and impose on 
all states a range of obligations, including, for instance, to ‘[f]reeze without delay funds and 
other financial assets or economic resources of persons who commit, or attempt to commit, 
terrorist acts or participate in or facilitate the commission of terrorist acts’,
32
 and to ‘[b]ecome 
parties … to the relevant international conventions and protocols relating to terrorism, 
including the [Terrorist Financing Convention].
33
 
The counter-terrorism asset-freezing regime established by UNSCR 1267 ought to be 
considered here, for, of the two, that regime is arguably the more controversial, and certainly 
the more far-reaching in terms of its implications for (the protection of) international human 
rights norms. UNSCR 1267 established the Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee (‘the 
1267 Committee’), charged with overseeing the effective implementation of asset-freezing 
measures. The Committee, comprising all 15 members of the Security Council, enjoys broad 
powers to ‘designate’ funds or other financial resources meeting the relevant criteria (noted 
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 Since 2004, the Committee has been supported by the Analytical Support and 
Sanctions Monitoring Team.
35
 The mandate of the Committee has been renewed annually 
since its inception, whilst its remit has been expanded significantly on several occasions so as 
to encompass further categories of persons and organisations with links to Al-Qaida.
36
 In 
particular, UNSCR 1333 (2000) specified that asset-freezing measures be implemented 
against ‘Usama bin Laden and individuals and entities associated with him as designated by 
the Committee, including those in the Al-Qaida organization’.
37
 More recently, in 2011, the 
adoption of UNSCRs 1988 (2011)
38
 and 1989 (2011)
39
 effectively split the UNSCR 1267 
regime in two: pursuant to the former, the Security Council established a Committee 
mandated to oversee the implementation of the various asset-freezing measures against 
individuals and entities associated specifically with the Taliban;
40
 the latter established the 
‘Al-Qaida Sanctions List’, with the relevant Sanctions Committee charged with overseeing 
the implementation of the various sanctions specifically against individuals and entities 
associated with Al-Qaida.
41
 Yet, with the rapid rise of the ISIL/Da’esh terrorist 
organisation—a splinter group of Al-Qaida—in the last years, the remit of the ‘Al-Qaida 
Sanctions Committee’ was further extended in 2015 so as to encompass those individuals and 
entities with links to that organisation also, leading to its renaming, once again, as the ‘ISIL 
(Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee’.
42
  
A detailed examination of the procedure by which individuals come to be ‘listed’ as the 
subjects of UN Security Council-mandated financial sanctions is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. It suffices, for present purposes, to note two key points. The first point concerns the 
general absence of transparency in and of the decision-making process at the Sanctions 
Committee level. For instance, meetings of the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions 
Committee are generally held in closed sessions, with members of the Monitoring Team 
invited to attend at the discretion of the Chair.
43
 Names of individuals and/or entities are 
proposed for inclusion on the Sanctions List by Member States, in whose power it is to 
specify that their status as designating State(s) is not to be made known.
44
 Decisions are 
deemed adopted—and thus the relevant name(s) included in the Sanctions List—unless a 
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It follows, secondly, that the lack of transparency is exacerbated by ‘the difficulty that 
individuals and entities face in challenging a decision [to impose sanctions upon them]’.
46
 
Indeed, for some several years the imposition of financial sanctions was effectively done in 
secret, there being no way for the relevant individual or entity—who were not informed—to 
know that a decision had even been made. And although this eventually changed in 2008, 
with the introduction of mandatory notification (of the relevant decision) of those 
concerned,
47
 ‘this did little to quell criticisms’, as Murphy notes, ‘for it was not coupled with 
an obligation to give reasons.
48
 For instance, the addition of a name to the ISIL (Da’esh) and 
Al-Qaida Sanctions List requires the Committee, ‘with the assistance of the Monitoring Team 
and in coordination with the relevant designating State(s), [to] make accessible on the 




The position of a ‘listed’ person is thus an incredibly onerous one. Above all, ‘[t]o seek a 
justification to explain their listing, or ultimately to seek delisting, those targeted have no 
direct access to the Sanctions Committee’.
50
 Certain developments have improved the 
situation somewhat. In particular, the establishment of an Office of the Ombudsperson, in 
2009,
51
 which would ‘receive requests from individuals and entities seeking to be removed 
from the Consolidated List’,
52
 is said to represent ‘by far the most important change’ to the 
‘listing’ procedure in this regard.
53
 As ‘an office independent of the Security Council with the 
mandate to receive listing appeals and promote dialogue between the various parties involved 
in it, including the individual, listed person’, this development clearly did much to enhance 
the (otherwise abysmal) transparency of the ‘listing’ procedure, whilst providing a crucial 
point of contact for the affected individual or entity to, at the very least, establish the relevant 
basis for the decision to impose sanctions upon them.
54
 
The ‘listing’ procedure is certainly an intensely controversial feature of the UN sanctions 
regime, though represents just one aspect of the much wider criticism of that regime in the 
last decades. As Larissa van den Herik writes, ‘[o]ver the years, a great variety of actors have 
voiced their concerns or outright condemnation of the accountability deficit that exists for 
UN sanctions regimes which target individuals’.
55
 Notably, this includes a range of judicial 
actors who have denounced the UN sanctions regime for (among other things) its denial of 
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basic principles of procedural fairness,
56
 and for its far-reaching human rights implications—
not only, that is, for the subjects of financial sanctions themselves, but also for members of 
their families.
57
 Indeed, several key issues are raised from this perspective, not least including 
the compatibility of the UN sanctions regime with the legal norms reflected in the ECHR and 
the fundamental rights, freedoms and principles integral to the EU’s legal order.
58
  
The latter were brought to bear on the lawfulness of Council Regulation (EC) No 
881/2002—the relevant EU legal basis which gave effect to UNSCR 1267—in the long-
running Kadi litigation. In what has been described as a ‘landmark’
59
 decision, the European 
Court of Justice considered that  
 
the obligations imposed by an international agreement cannot have the effect of prejudicing the 
constitutional principles of the [Treaty on European Union], which include the principle that all 
Community acts must respect fundamental rights, that respect constituting a condition of their 
lawfulness which it is for the Court to review in the framework of the complete system of legal 




Regulation 881 was thus annulled on the basis that its provisions could not be taken ‘to 
authorise any derogation from the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human 
rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in Article 6(1) [of the Treaty on European Union] 
as a foundation of the Union’.
61
 Moreover, the Court noted: 
 
[I]n light of the actual circumstances surrounding the inclusion of the appellants’ names in the list of 
persons and entities covered by the restrictive measures contained in Annex 1 to [Regulation 881], it 
must be held that the rights of the defence, in particular the right to be heard, and the right to effective 




The decision was subsequently upheld by the General Court of the (renamed) Court of Justice 
of the European Union (CJEU), in 2010,
63
 and the Grand Chamber of the CJEU, in 2013.
64
 
The interventionism of the ECJ/CJEU is mirrored by that, increasingly in recent years, of 
the ECtHR. The Court has found a number of violations of the Convention rights concerning 
the use of asset-freezing measures, in particular art. 6 (‘right to a fair trial’),
65
 art. 8 (‘right to 
respect for private and family life’),
66
 art. 13 (‘right to an effective remedy’),
67
 and art. 1 of 
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Protocol 1 (‘protection of property’).
68
 For example, in what has been described as signalling 
the Court’s ‘broad affirmation of the Kadi judgment’,
69
 in Nada v Switzerland,
70
 the Court 
held that the imposition of asset-freezing measures upon the applicant in that case had 
violated art. 8: the relevant measures ‘did not strike a fair balance between [the applicant’s] 
right to the protection of his private and family life, on the one hand, and the legitimate aims 
of the prevention of crime and the protection of Switzerland’s national security and public 
safety, on the other’.
71
 Indeed, as Erika de Wet notes, ‘the Nada decision … has indicated 
that even where the language of a UNSC resolution leaves no apparent scope for 
reinterpretation, States remain under an obligation to find some way to give effect to 




B. Domestic implementation of UN sanctions: the Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Orders and the Al-Qaida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Orders 
 
In the UK, domestic legal effect was given to UNSCRs 1267 and 1373 via s. 1 of the United 
Nations Act 1946, which provides:  
 
If, under [art. 41 of the UN Charter] … the Security Council of the United Nations call upon His 
Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to give effect to any decision of that Council, His 
Majesty may by Order in Council make such provision as appears to Him necessary and expedient for 
enabling those measures to be effectively applied, including (without prejudice to the generality of the 
preceding words) provision for the apprehension, trial and punishment of persons offending against the 
Order. 
 
Enacted on 10 October 2001, the Terrorism (United Nations Measures) Order 2001 enforced, 
in the UK, the general (international) legal mandate for the imposition of counter-terrorism 
asset-freezing measures under UNSCR 1373.
73
 Though initially regulations made pursuant to 
s. 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 provided the domestic legal basis for the 
UNSCR 1373 sanctions regime enforced separately under EU law,
74
 both strands of that 
regime—domestic and EU—were consolidated under the Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Order 2006 (hereinafter ‘TO 2006’), and the later Terrorism (United Nations 
Measures) Order 2009.
75
 Once again, both Orders in Council were made via the enabling 
power in the 1946 Act. Thus, a person was deemed to be the subject of UN sanctions—that 
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is, a ‘designated person’—if identified in either the Council Decision 2006/379/EC, 




As under the previous TO 2001, art. 4 of the TO 2006 empowered the Treasury to 
designate persons where there existed ‘reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person is or 
may be’ (one or more of the following): ‘a person who commits, attempts to commit, 
participates in or facilitates the commission of acts of terrorism’; ‘a person identified in the 
Council Decision’; ‘a person owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by a designated 
person’; or ‘a person acting on behalf of or at the direction of a designated person’.
77
 The 
effects of designation upon the individual(s) concerned were onerous. For instance, once 
given, a direction prohibited a person (‘including the designated person’) from ‘deal[ing] 
with funds or economic resources belonging to, owned or held by’ the designated person, 
unless done ‘under the authority of a licence granted under article 11 [of the TO 2006]’.
78
 So 
too was it an offence to contravene prohibitions on ‘mak[ing] funds, economic resources or 
financial services available, directly or indirectly, to or for the benefit’ of designated persons 
and those involved in terrorism-related activity.
79
 
UNSCR 1267 was similarly incorporated into domestic law via secondary legislation 
enacted under the authority of the 1946 Act.
80
 Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the Al-
Qa’ida and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2002,
81
 and subsequently the Al-Qaida 
and Taliban (United Nations Measures) Order 2006 (hereinafter ‘AQO 2006’),
82
 were 
enacted so as to enforce, in the UK, the various sanctions to which those named in the 
Consolidated List of the 1267 Sanctions Committee were made subject. Thus, for the 
purposes of the AQO 2006, ‘designated persons’ included then-leader of the Al-Qaida 
terrorist organisation Usama bin Laden, as well as ‘any person designated by the Sanctions 
Committee’.
83
 Notably, the regime implemented by the AQO 2006 came to be regarded as 
‘even more draconian’
84
 than that of the TO 2006. Such was the particular severity of the 
consequences of designation under the former for those concerned. Indeed, both the TO 2006 
and the AQO 2006 provided that those identified in or affected by a direction given by the 
Treasury were able, upon application to the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session, 
to have the direction set aside (on traditional common law grounds of judicial review).
85
 And 
yet, where, as noted above, designation pursuant to the TO 2006 required the Treasury to 
establish reasonable grounds for suspecting that the individual in question ‘is or may be … a 
person who commits, attempts to commit, participates in or facilitates the commission of acts 
of terrorism’, the effect of the AQO 2006, by contrast, was that it ‘transposed the UN list on 
to the domestic level automatically, without reference to individual designation by Treasury 
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 In other words, those captured by the provisions of the AQO 2006 became 
‘designated persons’—both as matter of domestic and international law—without the (need 
for) involvement of the Treasury, meaning that, crucially, no such direction had been given, 
and therefore no such relief was available; the only means of challenging one’s designation in 
such circumstances were those provided for by the UN Security Council (noted above). And 
although, with the introduction of ‘financial restrictions proceedings’ under Part 6 of the 
Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, persons affected by ‘any decision of the Treasury in connection 
with the exercise of any of their functions under [‘the UN orders’]’ may apply to the courts 
under s. 63 of the Act to have the decision set aside, the same (aforementioned) reasons 
precluded the availability of judicial review: once again, where the Treasury had played no 
role in bringing about a person’s addition to the 1267 Sanctions List, there was no domestic 
act on which a legal challenge could possibly hang. 
 
C. HM Treasury v Ahmed & Ors 
 
The validity of both the TO 2006 and the AQO 2006 was the subject of litigation which 
reached the UK Supreme Court on appeal in October 2009.
87
 The case, HM Treasury v 
Ahmed & Ors, was brought by five appellants. Four of the appellants—referred to, 
throughout proceedings, as ‘G’, ‘A’, ‘K’, and ‘M’—had been designated under art. 4 of the 
TO 2006 (and later re-designated under the terms of the TO 2009) on the basis that the 
Treasury had reasonable grounds for suspecting that they were, or might be, persons who 
facilitated the commission of acts of terrorism.
88
 They were each informed by the Treasury 
that ‘the effect of the direction was to prohibit [them] from dealing with [their] funds and 
economic resources and to prevent anyone notified of the freeze from making funds, 
economic resources or financial services available to [them] or for [their] benefit’.
89
 The 
circumstances of the appellant known as ‘G’ are particularly revealing of the issues 
concerning the absence of transparency, of legal clarity and of basic due process in the 
automatic ‘listing’ regime under UNSCR 1267 / AQO 2006. That is, having initially been the 
subject of a direction given by the Treasury under the provisions of the TO 2006, ‘G’ was 
subsequently informed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that his name had been 
added to the consolidated list maintained by the 1267 Committee, and as such was deemed, 
also, to be a designated person pursuant to the AQO 2006. Of this, the Supreme Court noted 
that ‘[n]o mention was made at that stage of the domestic measure under which the 




[‘G’] was told that he could petition the Committee to seek de-listing. He was not told until later that 
his listing had been at the request of the United Kingdom. It was not until March 2007 that he was told 
that his listing meant that he was a designated person under the AQO … It appears to have been 
assumed on his behalf that a direction was made against him under article 4(1) of the AQO. But there is 
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no evidence that this ever happened, and it would have been unnecessary as he was a designated person 




Finally, having also previously been ‘listed’ by the 1267 Committee (in September 2005), the 
fifth appellant, ‘HAY’, whose interest in the proceedings was described as ‘virtually identical 
to those of G and A, K and M’, was also a designated person pursuant to the AQO 2006.
92
  
The issue central to the appeal in Ahmed was ‘whether the Treasury was empowered by 
section 1 of the 1946 Act to introduce an asset freezing regime by means of an Order in 
Council’.
93
 Several arguments were submitted in this respect. The appellants ‘A’, ‘K’ and 
‘M’ contended that the TO 2006 was beyond the scope of the enabling power conferred by 
the 1946 Act on multiple grounds at common law: that the Order had been passed 
(unlawfully) without parliamentary approval; that it ‘lacked legal certainty and 
proportionality’; and that it failed to establish procedures that ‘enabled designated persons to 
challenge their designation’.
94
 It was argued by the appellant ‘G’ that the AQO 2006 was 
likewise ultra vires the 1946 Act, and that the incompatibility of that Order, and the TO 2006, 
with the ECHR—specifically art. 8 (‘right to respect for private and family life) and art. 1 of 
Protocol 1 (‘protection of property’)—contravened the obligation imposed upon public 
authorities under s. 6 of the HRA.
95
 The appellant ‘HAY’’s complaint also concerned the 
AQO 2006; it was submitted that the Order was outwith the 1946 Act on the grounds that it 
violated the fundamental common law right of access to a court for an effective remedy.
96
 
The Supreme Court (sitting as a panel of seven) unanimously held that the TO 2006 was 
ultra vires s. 1 of the 1946 Act, and ordered that it be quashed in full. Lord Hope (with whom 
Lord Walker and Lady Hale agreed) gave the leading judgment, in which it was decided that 
‘[t]he crucial question is whether the section confers power on the executive, without any 
Parliamentary scrutiny, to give effect in this country to decisions of the Security Council 
which are targeted against individuals’.
97
 It was considered that judicial scrutiny of the extent 
to which the relevant measures ought to be considered ‘necessary’ and ‘expedient’ within the 
meaning of s. 1 of the 1946 Act was above all guided by the (common law) principle of 
legality. As outlined by Lord Hoffmann in R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, 
ex parte Simms,
98
 whilst recognising that ‘[p]arliamentary sovereignty means that Parliament 
can, if it chooses, legislate contrary to fundamental principles of human rights’, that principle 
demands that ‘Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and accept the political 
cost’, and, as such, that ‘[f]undamental rights cannot be overridden by general or ambiguous 
words’.
99
 Thus, for Lord Hope, ‘[t]he closer [the relevant measures] come to affecting what 
[in Simms] Lord Hoffmann described as the basic rights of the individual, the more exacting 
this scrutiny must become’.
100
 ‘If the rule of law is to mean anything,’ it was suggested, 
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‘decisions as to what is necessary or expedient in this context cannot be left to the 
uncontrolled judgment of the executive’.
101
 And although ‘[t]he words “necessary” and 
“expedient” both call for the exercise of judgment’, ‘this does not mean that its exercise is 
unlimited’; rather, ‘[t]he wording of the [TO 2006] must be tested precisely against the words 
used by the Security Council’s resolution and in the light of the obligation to give effect to it 
that article 25 [of the UN Charter] lays down’.
102
 
On this basis, Lord Hope examined the implications, in particular, of the ‘reasonable 
suspicion’ test as a key condition to the exercise of powers to designate persons under the TO 
2006. Noting that ‘[UNSCR 1373] is not phrased in terms of reasonable suspicion’, but 
instead refers, simply, to persons ‘who commit, or attempt to commit, terrorist acts’,
103
 Lord 
Hope suggested that the introduction of this test could not be taken to be ‘necessary’ (within 
the meaning of s. 1 of the 1946 Act), though ‘[i]t may well have been expedient to do so, to 
ease the process of identifying those who should be restricted in their access to funds or 
economic resources’.
104
 Yet, extending the scope of the Order in this way raised several 
‘fundamental questions’, as to, for instance: ‘the standard of proof that should be required’; 
‘whether the directions should be capable of being challenged by an effective form of judicial 
review’; and ‘whether they should last indefinitely or be time limited’.
105
 The key question in 
this respect, therefore, was whether it is ‘acceptable that the exercise of judgment in matters 




Ultimately, Lord Hope concluded that ‘by introducing the reasonable suspicion test as a 
means of giving effect to [UNSCR 1373], the Treasury exceeded their powers under section 
1(1) of the 1946 Act’.
107
 Of particular concern was that the restrictions resulting from the use 
of those (wide) powers ‘strike at the very heart of the individual’s basic right to live his own 
life as he chooses’.
108
 This was ‘a clear example of an attempt to adversely affect the basic 
rights of the citizen without the clear authority of Parliament’,
109
 in contravention, that is, to 
the principle of legality as articulated both in Simms and in the earlier case of R v Secretary of 
State for the Home Department, ex p Pierson.
110
 Indeed, applying that principle to the present 
facts, it was held that ‘[t]he absence of any indication that Parliament had the imposition of 
restrictions on the freedom of individuals in mind when the provisions of the 1946 Act were 
being debated makes it impossible to say that it squarely confronted those effects and was 
willing to accept the political cost when that measure was enacted’.
111
 
By a 6:1 majority (Lord Brown dissenting), the Supreme Court ordered that the AQO 2006 
also be quashed in part, specifically on the basis that art. 3(1)(b)—under which, as noted 
above, ‘any person designated by the [1267] Sanctions Committee’ was automatically liable 
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to asset-freezing measures as a matter of domestic law—was also ultra vires the 1946 Act. As 
noted above, the complaints raised in this respect related to the legal protection of 
fundamental rights, both within the scheme of the HRA and at common law. Those 
complaints grounded in the HRA were dismissed; the Supreme Court found that the operation 
of the HRA/ECHR had no bearing on the validity of the Orders. In so deciding, the Court 
distinguished the approach adopted by the ECJ in Kadi (as discussed above). For instance, 
Lord Hope accepted that, in that case, the ECJ held that 
 
it did not follow from the principles governing the international legal order under the United Nations 
that any judicial review of the internal lawfulness of the contested regulation in the light of 
fundamental freedoms was excluded by virtue of the fact that that measure is intended to give effect to 
a resolution of the Security Council adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.
112  
 
However, the point was noted that ‘[t]he ECJ was not faced in [Kadi] with the problem that 
article 103 of the UN Charter gives rise to in member states in international law, as the 
institutions of the European Community are not party to the UN Charter’, and so it was not 
(at that point in time) appropriate to presume the stance of the Strasbourg Court on the 
question of the hierarchy of UN Charter obligations.
113
 Rather, the proper approach as a 
matter of domestic law, it was held, was that previously adopted by the Appellate Committee 
of the House of Lords in R (Al-Jedda) v Secretary of State for Defence,
114
 in which 
obligations derived from the UN Charter were taken to have prevailed over those derived 
from any other international treaty, including the ECHR.
115
  
Yet, no such limitation applied to the protection of fundamental rights as derived from the 
common law: it was said that ‘[t]wo fundamental rights were in issue in G’s case, and as they 
were to be found in domestic law his right to invoke them was not affected by article 103 of 
the UN Charter’: first, ‘the right to peaceful enjoyment of [one’s] property, which could only 
be interfered with by clear legislative words’; and second, the ‘right of unimpeded access to a 
court’.
116
 ‘There must come a point,’ Lord Hope remarked, ‘when the intrusion upon the right 
to enjoyment of one’s property is so great, so overwhelming and so timeless that the absence 
of any effective means of challenging it means that this can only be brought about under the 
express authority of Parliament’.
117
 And so, once again, the principle of legality was in play, 
directing that the interference with these fundamental rights could ‘only be done by express 
language or by necessary implication’, and that ‘it was not open to the Treasury to use its 
powers under the general wording of section 1(1) of the 1946 Act to subject individuals to a 
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regime which had these effects’.
118
 Lord Hope noted that, in part the complaint raised by the 
appellant concerned not only ‘the inability of the 1267 Committee’s procedures to provide an 
effective remedy … [but also] the means that had been used in domestic law to subject G to 
the AQO’s regime’.
119
 As such, the ‘essential point’ raised by counsel for the appellant G 
‘[was] that G ought not to have been subjected to this by an Order made under section 1 of 
the 1946 Act which avoids Parliamentary scrutiny’; the ‘fundamental objection’, therefore, 
which Lord Hope ultimately accepted, ‘[was] directed to the dangers that lie in the 
uncontrolled power of the executive’.
120
 As a ‘designated person’ under the UNSCR 1267 / 
AQO regime, G, and equally the appellant HAY, had been denied an effective remedy within 
that regime to challenge the basis on which they came to be so designated.
121
 The point was 
reiterated by Lord Rodger (with whom Lady Hale agreed): 
 
[B]y enacting the general words of section 1(1) of the 1946 Act, Parliament could not have intended to 
authorise the making of AQO 2006 which so gravely and directly affected the legal right of individuals 
to use their property and which did so in a way which deprived them of any real possibility of 




And in the view of Lord Mance, so ‘radical’ are the consequences for personal and family life 
of ‘designation as an “associate” of a rogue state or non-state organisation’ that ‘one would 
expect [it] to be subject to judicial control, before or after the designation’.
123
 Thus:  
 
[S]ection 1(1) was and is an inappropriate basis for the Al-Qaida Order, freezing indefinitely the 
ordinary rights of individuals to deal with or dispose of property on the basis that they were associated 
with Al-Qaida or the Taliban, without providing any means by which they could challenge the 




   
One key question which ought to be considered here is that of the extent to which the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Ahmed can properly be understood to represent a vindication of 
the common law constitution, in and of itself. That that might be so in any event clearly 
follows from the foregrounding, throughout the decision, of the common law principle of 
legality, and thus the judicial role, more broadly, in protecting the rule of law. Indeed, the 
Court reiterated the demands of the rule of law in several instances, including in relation to 
(warding against) ‘the uncontrolled judgment of the executive’;
125
 the requirement that ‘the 
actions of the Treasury in this context be subjected to judicial scrutiny’;
126
 the perception that 
exceptional measures (such as asset-freezing) ‘trea[d] the boundaries of what is compatible 
with respect for fundamental rights and the rule of law’;
127
 and the foundational principle (of 
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the rule of law) of ‘[a]ccess to a court to protect one’s rights’.
128
 And of the fact that it was 
the common law which ultimately established the crucial source of protection of fundamental 
rights, especially in the absence of the HRA/ECHR, it has been written: 
 
Ahmed thus exemplifies that, in post-HRA cases where reliance on the HRA has been impossible due 
to external exigencies but where English common law could be relied on, the Supreme Court has been 





However, there are a number of compelling reasons to doubt that Ahmed might best, or 
otherwise primarily be seen as an example of the common law constitution’s (and/or the rule 
of law’s) triumph over ‘uncontrolled’ executive power. One such reason is that this would 
perhaps be to overlook, rather, the balance that the Supreme Court can be seen to have 
attempted to strike in its invocation of the principle of legality, namely that of the power(s) 
and accountability functions of the courts and those of Parliament. In other words, the 
principle of legality was deployed in Ahmed above all as a means to buttress Parliament’s 
scrutiny role, whereby interference (by the executive) with fundamental rights—including the 
right to protection of one’s property, and the right to access to a court—ought to be clearly 
and unambiguously authorised by Parliament in full knowledge of the ‘political cost’ it might 
be required to pay as a result.
130
 This follows, also, from the majority’s criticism of the 
apparent undermining of Parliament: that the asset-freezing regime implemented via 
secondary legislation lay ‘wholly outside the scope of Parliamentary scrutiny’ meant that it 
was ‘far more draconian’ than the scheme for the freezing of assets established under Part 2 
of the ATCSA (outlined in Section III of this chapter, below).
131
 And, indeed, the point was 
unequivocally stated by Lord Phillips:  
 
Nobody should conclude that the result of these appeals constitutes judicial interference with the will of 
Parliament. On the contrary it upholds the supremacy of Parliament in deciding whether or not 




This, Walker suggests, demonstrates that ‘[t]he Court was conscious of its overt challenge to 
government policy and, as in the Belmarsh judgment in 2004, raised the constitutional shield 
of the protection of democracy rather than asserting judicial superiority, per se’.
133
  
Yet, there is another, if less edifying, comparison to be drawn with the earlier ruling in 
Belmarsh: as in that case, grand statements of common law constitutional principle 
notwithstanding, the plight of those subjected to severe counter-terrorism measures ultimately 
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remained unchanged. That is, just as the Law Lords’ ruling did nothing to bring about the 
immediate release of those indefinitely detained in Belmarsh prison, the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Ahmed did nothing to alleviate the undermining of the fundamental rights of those 
such as G and HAY, whose status as ‘designated persons’ nonetheless continued to flow from 
the (unaffected) fact of their ‘listing’ as a matter of international law. 
Indeed, it is the question of the common law’s (in)capacity to resolve key tensions in and 
of the intersection of international and domestic law and politics—not least, that is, in the 
case of the UNSCR 1267 / AQO regime—which emerges, in Ahmed, as perhaps the most 
constitutionally significant. Whether or not the principle of legality can be seen to do much to 
reconcile the democratically appropriate balance of power between the courts and Parliament, 
the key point, after all, is that it is the executive which can be seen to hold all the cards, here. 
That underpinning the Supreme Court’s principled stance is the fact that Parliament—the 
foremost democratic constitutional actor in the UK—had not confronted the ‘political cost’ in 
authorising the domestic implementation of those sanctions therefore crucially 
misapprehends the constitutional position of the executive in domestic law vis-à-vis its 
position in international law. There is, in other words, in the latter context an effective 
inversion of the (legal and political) hierarchy between Parliament and the executive which 
the principle of legality—a common law rule of domestic constitutional arrangements—is 
liable to obscure. It is the executive which ‘speaks’ for the UK on the international stage, not 
Parliament. It is the executive which, as a permanent, veto-wielding member of the UN 
Security Council, was and is uniquely and centrally involved in the development and 
implementation of financial sanctions under UNSCR 1267 specifically, and under the 
auspices of the UN collective security framework more broadly. It is the executive, therefore, 
which is in fact the foremost democratic constitutional actor at the international level. And it 
follows from that fact that it was international politics which compelled the executive to 
implement the UN sanctions regime(s). So too does it follow from that fact that there is also 
the parallel, and equally constitutionally distorting dynamic between domestic and 
international law. As Lord Brown (dissenting) noted, alongside the principle of legality, there 
is also ‘an important countervailing principle also in play here’, namely the principle that the 
UK abide by its legal obligations under the UN Charter.
134
 Of this, Lord Brown said: 
 
When one considers the ravages of terrorism and war and the gross invasions of human rights which 
they inevitably entail, it is difficult to think of any greater imperative than that member states should 
fully honour their international law obligation to implement Security Council decisions under article 
41. The existence of such an obligation could not be plainer. Article 25 of the Charter mandates it and 




Indeed, this ‘clash of conflicting principles’
136
 meant that, crucially, ‘[n]ot merely was the 
UK entitled to introduce this asset-freezing scheme in respect of those designated by the 
Sanctions Committee; it was (under international law) bound to do so’.
137
 And so: 
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The Simms principle is intended to ensure that human rights are not interfered with to a greater extent 
than Parliament has already unambiguously sanctioned. The loss of such rights is not to be allowed to 
“[pass] unnoticed in the democratic process”. “Parliament must squarely confront what it is doing and 
accept the political cost.” But in this case the Security Council by Resolution 1267 unambiguously 
stated what was required of the UK and the 1946 Act equally unambiguously provided that that 
measure could be implemented by Order in Council. There could surely be no political cost in doing 




These issues are undoubtedly brought to bear on the question of Ahmed’s contemporary 
constitutional significance, especially as regards what it says, or might say, about the role and 
impact of those common law principles, values and norms in the broader context of the UK’s 
contemporary counter-terrorism framework. The key point for present purposes is that these 
issues can in fact be seen to reveal a more complex set of questions than the otherwise narrow 
focus on that, simply, of the (appropriate) balance between legal and political mechanisms of 
accountability in and of the UK constitution alone. And, indeed, in the context of what 
followed, outlined in the next section, it is primarily these questions—concerning, for 
instance, the inter-relation of domestic and international law and politics—which continue to 
reveal important insights as to the constitutional significance of Ahmed. 
 
D. Domestic implementation of UN sanctions after Ahmed  
 
On 4 February 2010, one week after judgment was handed down in Ahmed, a majority of the 
Supreme Court (Lord Hope dissenting) refused a petition by the UK Government to suspend 
the effects of the decision to quash the TO 2006 (in whole) and the AQO 2006 (in part).
139
 
Parliament responded by enacting—via emergency, ‘fast-track’ legislation procedures—the 
Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010, retrospectively validating the 
making of the TO regime(s). (The continuation of the AQO regime was achieved via 
different means, discussed below). Thus, in a direct rebuke of the Supreme Court’s ruling, the 
Act deemed ‘every provision of those Orders’ to be within the power conferred under s. 1 of 
the United Nations Act 1946 for the period beginning 4 February 2010 (the date of the Act’s 
coming into force) and ending 31 December 2010.
140
 Things ‘done or omitted’ during that 
period were equally deemed to be ‘valid, lawful and effectual’ as if the Orders had been 
validly made under the enabling power in the 1946 Act, and ‘every provision of them had 
been within that power’.
141
 Legal effect was also given to directions made and licences 
granted pursuant to the Orders—including the making and granting of further such directions 
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(i) The Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 
 
The Terrorist Asset-Freezing (Temporary Provisions) Act 2010 was subsequently replaced in 
December of that year by the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (TAFA). It ought to be 
noted here that, following the UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020, Part 1 of 
the 2010 Act was subsequently repealed on 31 December 2020, though remained in force 
throughout the (‘transition’) period between these dates pursuant to regulations made under 
the authority of the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018 (discussed in Section 
III, below).
143
 It suffices to outline the Part 1 provisions briefly here. 
Once again mirroring the provisions of the abolished TO regime(s), the TAFA provided 
that ‘designated persons’ include either ‘a person designated by the Treasury’ or ‘a natural or 
legal person, group or entity including in the list provided for by Article 2(3) of Council 
Regulation (EC) No 2580/2001’.
144
 Prohibitions resulting from designation imposed under 
the TAFA, as well as provisions concerning exceptions and the granting of licences by the 
Treasury,
145
 are also analogous to those of the previous Temporary Provisions Act, and of the 
TO and AQO regimes. They included, for instance, restrictions in relation to ‘deal[ing] with 
funds or economic resources owned, held or controlled by a designated person’,
146
 as well as 
to making funds, financial services or economic resources available to a designated person or 
for the benefit of that person.
147
  
However, one area in which the TAFA innovated is in relation to the conditions imposed 
upon the Treasury’s power to designate persons, which was made available in two forms: 
‘interim designation’ and ‘final designation’. Whilst in either circumstances the Treasury was 
required to ‘consider that it is necessary for purposes connected with protecting members of 
the public from terrorism that financial restrictions should be applied in relation to the 
[relevant] person’,
148
 the relevant threshold for designation differed. ‘Interim’ designation 
required the Treasury to establish reasonable grounds for suspecting that the person ‘is or has 
been involved in terrorist activity’, that s/he ‘is owned or controlled directly or indirectly by a 
person [involved in terrorist activity]’, or that s/he ‘is acting on behalf of or at the direction of 
a person [involved in terrorist activity]’.
149
 The same criteria as to a person’s involvement in 
terrorist activity were relevant to ‘final’ designation, though, notably, the Act elevated the 
threshold by which those criteria were to be met in such circumstances to that of ‘reasonable 
belief’.
150
 Indeed, this reflects the relative severity of ‘final’ designation as compared with 
‘interim’ designation. For instance, the latter, once made, expired ‘at the end of the period of 
30 days beginning with the date on which it was made’ or ‘on the making of a final 
designation in relation to the same person’—‘whichever is the earlier’.
151
 By contrast, ‘final’ 
designation was renewable at ‘the end of the period of one year beginning with the date on 
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which it was made’,
152
 and, as such, potentially imposed financial restrictions for an 
indefinite period.  
The question as to the appropriate threshold for the use of asset-freezing powers is, of 
itself, an important one—and one which, as discussed in Section III, below, can be seen to 
resurface in relation to the new regime under the 2018 Act. For as the Independent Reviewer 
of Terrorism Legislation highlighted in a 2011 report, no matter how efficient the system for 
‘designating’ the subjects of asset-freezing measures, ‘[it] is likely to be experienced, by 
anyone at liberty in the United Kingdom who is subject to it, as intrusive, demoralising and 
humiliating’.
153
 And yet, it is a matter of some dispute as to whether in fact the raising of the 
threshold to reasonable belief can be said to establish any real procedural safeguard vis-à-vis 
the Treasury’s power to make a designation. Indeed, the question of the appropriate threshold 
for designation was considered in pre-legislative scrutiny of the TAFA by the Joint 
Committee on Human Rights, in which it was recommended that ‘the balance of 
probabilities’ replace ‘reasonable belief’ as the requisite standard of proof.
154
 Moreover, 
Adam Tomkins, Helen Fenwick and Liora Lazarus questioned the effect that the distinction 
between thresholds (for ‘interim’ and ‘final’ designation), if any, would have in practice. In 
2011, they argued that ‘something more than reasonable suspicion should have been required 
before the powers could be exercised [in relation to interim designation]’, and that ‘[t]he 
same may be said of the ‘reasonable belief’ threshold, which appears to denote only a 
marginally higher standard’.
155
 ‘The lower the threshold for triggering the use of the power in 




Elsewhere, however, the 2010 Act can be seen to have improved upon the regime(s) that it 
replaced, specifically in terms of procedural safeguards and (legal and political) oversight. 
Designated persons are permitted under the Act to appeal against Treasury decisions—
including as to the making, varying, renewal or revocation of the relevant designation—to the 
High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session (though, without that affecting the validity of 
the decision to which the appeal relates).
157
 The court is empowered to set aside the decision 
on the traditional grounds of judicial review, and thereafter ‘make any such order, or give any 
such relief, as may be made or given in proceedings for judicial review’.
158
 In addition, when 
in force, the Treasury was required to produce a quarterly report on the operation of Part 1 of 
the TAFA,
159
 whilst ongoing review of the regime fell within the remit of the IRTL.
160
 
Indeed, in this sense, the TAFA has been highlighted as a key example of the ways in which 
the international sanctions regime can be reformed, more broadly, with increasingly 
progressive results. For instance, it has been suggested that there are particular advantages to 
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 in the UNSCR 1373 sanctions regime—as reflected in the 2010 
Act—which render it preferable to the alternative UNSCR 1267 regime: the former ‘allows 
states to set evidential standards and review processes which are superior to the UNSCR 1267 
standards or the EU Council Regulation (EC) 2580/2001 requirements’.
162
 Thus:  
 
the benefit of resort to the UNSCR 1373 regime is that any decision to list at national level can secure a 
form of judicial review accessible directly by the listed individual in their own local court system and 
not a remote UN committee or Ombudsperson.
163  
 
Though, one point which stands out in particular from the various reports of the oversight 
mechanisms noted above is that of the consistently limited use of the TAFA powers in 
practice. For example, the IRTL reported that in the first three review periods of the new 
Act—December 2010 to September 2013—‘no new entities and only six new individuals 
were designated under TAFA 2010 by the Treasury’.
164
 The IRTL noted that ‘the number of 
Treasury designations under TAFA 2010 and its predecessors declined steeply, from 162 at 
the start of 2008 to 38 by September 2011’.
165
 The ‘major cause of this decline’, however, 
‘was the implementation of a policy whereby persons who were already subject to UN or EU 
asset freezes were no longer subject to duplicate Treasury designations, save where this was 
necessary to support an EU asset freeze’.
166
 So too did ‘pruning on grounds of lack of 
‘necessity’’ have an impact, particularly ‘where there were no apparent UK-based assets, 
save where the UK Government’s proposal was the basis for the EU listing’.
167
 By September 
2013, the number of in-force Treasury designations ‘barely changed’, totalling 39, whilst that 
number in fact decreased to 33 exactly a year later.
168
  
Yet, over the last years there has been a further, significant decrease in these numbers. For 
instance, in the January-March 2017 reporting period, the Treasury confirmed that the total 
number of individuals designated under the TAFA was 14; in the same period, the total 
number of those designated under Council Regulations (EC) 2580/2001 and 881/2002 was 13 
and 263, respectively.
169
 Since then, only one new public designation has been made under 
the TAFA (in the January-March 2020 reporting period).
170
 And so, following the changes 
implemented under the 2018 Act, which now consolidates both the domestic (TAFA) and EU 
sanctions regimes, it remains to be seen what impact, if any, this will have on these numbers. 
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(ii) UN sanctions through the (EU) back door: the Al-Qaida and Taliban (Asset-
Freezing) Regulations 2010 
 
As noted above, the continuation of the UNSCR 1267 / AQO asset-freezing regime following 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Ahmed was achieved via different means. That is, 
Parliament’s response to the quashing of the AQO 2006 (in part) was to effectively reproduce 
the Order via further secondary legislation, this time establishing a legal basis in s. 2(2) of the 
European Communities Act 1972. Thus, the Al-Qaida and Taliban (Asset-Freezing) 
Regulations 2010,
171
 later superseded by the ISIL (Da’esh) and Al-Qaida (Asset-Freezing) 
Regulations 2011,
172
 maintained in domestic law the various financial sanctions to which 
those named in the consolidated list of the 1267 Committee were subject, as enforced under 
Council Regulation (EC) No 881/2002. Crucially, this included those individuals who were in 
fact successful in their appeal in the Supreme Court, once again calling into question the 
extent to which Ahmed may properly be understood as a victory for the common law 
constitution, if indeed a ‘victory’ in any ordinary sense of the word. 
The key point to note for present purposes is that the new regulations were implicated in 
further litigation, involving one such individual, which reached the Supreme Court on appeal 
in November 2015.
173
 The individual in question challenged the lawfulness of the Secretary 
of State’s decision in 2005 to lift a ‘hold’ which the UK, as a member of the 1267 Sanctions 
Committee, had earlier placed on his designation by that Committee. Indeed, as a result of 
this, the individual’s status as a ‘designated person’ under the UNSCR 1267 / AQO regime 
automatically followed. This was despite evidence earlier disclosed in the Ahmed proceedings 
which revealed not only that the Government had in fact decided the appellant ‘no longer met 
the criteria for designation’, but that between 2009 and 2012 ‘the Secretary of State actively 
supported [the individual’s] removal from the Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List, and 
attempted to persuade other members to agree, but without success’.
174
 Ultimately, the 
question to be decided by the Supreme Court was whether the individual’s status as a 
‘designated person’—and the severe deprivation of property that this entails—had been 
effected by the exercise of royal prerogative powers for the conduct of foreign relations. If so, 
this, the appellant argued, would constitute a violation of the common law principle—‘the 
Entick principle’
175
—that ‘interference by the state with individual property rights cannot be 
justified by the exercise of prerogative powers, unsupported by specific statutory 
authority’.
176
 Previously in the Court of Appeal, it was held that ‘if the Foreign Secretary’s 
release of the hold on the claimant’s designation rested solely on the Prerogative power, then 
it would appear to have been done without legal authority’; the position, however, was that 
‘[a]s a matter of domestic law the Foreign Secretary was obliged to apply the Consolidated 
List regime to its proper subjects by force of … Regulation 881/2002’.
177
 In this sense, legal 
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authority derived ultimately from the relevant EU legal instrument by which the 1267 
Sanctions List was incorporated in the UK. As such, because Regulation 881/2002 grounded 
sufficient legal authority for the relevant action, it was held that the principle of legality 
provided ‘no added force to the appellant’s case’.
178
 Notably, counsel for the Government 
opted against this approach in the Supreme Court: it was argued that the royal prerogative did 
provide sufficient legal authority for the Secretary of State to approve the designation, though 
in fact ‘[i]t was not that decision which resulted in interference with the appellant’s rights, but 




The Supreme Court (sitting as a panel of five) was unanimous in holding that ‘[t]he 
respective submissions, and indeed the reasoning of the Court of Appeal, pay insufficient 
regard to the legal means by which the listing took effect in this country’.
180
 After all: ‘[i]t is 
here that the interference with the appellant’s rights, like the intrusion on Mr Entick’s 
property, took place’.
181
 The Court held that the interference was ‘directly and specifically 
authorised by regulation 881, which was given legislative effect in this country by the 
European Communities Act 1972’.
182
 Moreover, it was held that ‘[n]o issue had been raised 
as to the effectiveness of the Act for that purpose’; rather, ‘[Regulation 881], taken with the 
1972 Act, provides ample statutory authority to satisfy the Entick principle’.
183
 It was 
reiterated that for the purpose of domestic law, Regulation 881 was ‘given effect by a United 
Kingdom statute [and so] stands on its own feet’.
184
 This, in turn, meant that the Secretary of 
State’s action at the UN Committee level was done (properly) under the authority of the 
relevant royal prerogative power; this had no bearing on the deprivation of the appellant’s 
property rights and thus ‘involved no breach of any common law principle’.
185
 
The significance of this decision ought, clearly, to be considered in light of that previously 
made by the Supreme Court in Ahmed. Two key points are of note here. The first is patent: 
Youssef very clearly marks an about-turn by the Court, and does much, as a result, to entirely 
undermine whatever advances may previously have been made (in Ahmed) for the common 
law constitution—that is, both in and of itself, and specifically its potential role in the UK’s 
contemporary counter-terrorism framework. Indeed, so similar are the facts of Ahmed and 
Youssef that the difference in approach by the Supreme Court, not least as to the relevance of 
the principle of legality, is rendered all the more striking. For instance, it is not clear that, 
consistent with that principle, the general words of the ECA 1972 authorise the Secretary of 
State to deprive a person of their property rights any more plainly than the UN Act 1946.
186
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The second point is that, in Youssef, the Supreme Court can perhaps be seen to have in fact 
done more to confront the awkward constitutional reality of the competing legal frameworks 
at play here. As noted in sub-section C, above, one of the key constitutional implications of 
the contemporary legal landscape of asset-freezing is that it renders explicit the effective 
inversion, at the international level, of the (legal and political) hierarchy between Parliament 
and the executive which the principle of legality—a common law rule which bites only on 
domestic constitutional arrangements—is liable to misconstrue. That is, its application may 
have compelled Parliament to provide unambiguous legal authority for the freezing of assets 
in domestic law—which of course it later did, under the TAFA—but it did nothing to change 
the legal status of the relevant ‘designated persons’ in international law. In other words, it did 
nothing to diminish the fundamental point of the UK’s dualist approach to international law 
that executive action at the international (UN) level extends to the deprivation of 
‘fundamental’ rights in ways that are untouched, in practice, by domestic legal arrangements. 
And whereas this point was perhaps largely overlooked in Ahmed, it is, however, more 
clearly reflected in the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Youssef, wherein it is suggested: 
 
From the victim’s point of view it may seem strange that a process which, as applied under domestic 
legislation, was found to involve an unacceptable interference with his property rights, should be 
capable of automatic and immediate reinstatement by the indirect route of a European regulation. 
Indeed, it is unclear from the substantive judgments in Ahmed to what extent the court was made aware 




III. THE DOMESTIC LEGAL FRAMEWORK(S) OF COUNTER-TERRORISM  
ASSET-FREEZING  
 
A. Part 2 of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 
 
Alongside those various legal frameworks in the UK discussed in Section II, above, whose 
purpose is to give domestic legal effect to the international counter-terrorism sanctions 
regime(s) of the UN Security Council, there has also developed a “purely” domestic legal 
framework from which broad, discretionary powers to unilaterally impose targeted financial 
sanctions are derived. The first set of such powers to be considered are those which were 
incorporated in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 (ATCSA), as part of the raft 
of emergency measures for which that legislation provided in response to the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks. As well as (significantly) expanding several aspects of the ‘terrorist property’ regime 
contained in the Terrorism Act 2000,
188
 the ATCSA provides for asset-freezing powers which 
had their basis, originally, in legislation re-enacting wartime measures.
189
 That is, Part 2 of 
the 2001 Act confers on HM Treasury the power to impose a ‘freezing order’,
190
 which 
‘prohibits persons from making funds available to or for the benefit of a person or persons 
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specified in the order’,
191
 subject to two conditions: the Treasury need reasonably believe, 
firstly, that ‘action to the detriment of the United Kingdom’s economy (or part of it)’ or 
‘action constituting a threat to the life or property of one or more nationals … or residents of 
the United Kingdom’ either has been or is likely to be taken by a person or persons,
192
 and 
secondly, that the ‘person’ is a foreign government or ‘a resident of a country or territory 
outside the [UK]’.
193
 Notably, parliamentary scrutiny is built into the procedural requirements 
for making a freezing order under the 2001 Act: the power to make a freezing order is 
exercisable by statutory instrument, which must be laid before Parliament within 28 days of 
having been made; an order ceases to have effect unless approved by a resolution of each 
House of Parliament (‘but without that affecting anything done under the order or the power 
to make a new order’).
194
 Once made, it is an offence, among other things, to fail to comply 
with a prohibition imposed by the order;
195
 to engage in an activity in the knowledge or with 
the intention that it will ‘enable or facilitate’ the contravention by another person of a 
provision of the order;
196
 and to fail (without reasonable excuse) to disclose information, or to 
knowingly or recklessly provide false information, when required to do so under the terms of 
the freezing order.
197
 The Act requires that amendments to and revocations of existing orders 
also be made via statutory instrument.
198
 In any event, a freezing order expires ‘at the end of 
the period of 2 years starting with the day on which it is made’,
199
 it being incumbent on the 
Treasury, moreover, that they be kept under review
200
—though, it is not made clear quite 
what the terms of this review might include. 
These are, by any measure, remarkably broad provisions. Indeed, all the more so in light 
of the fact that, as Keith Ewing notes, the power to impose a freezing order under s. 4 of the 
2001 Act ‘can be exercised without any prior judicial authority or approval to justify the 
deprivation of property on what could be a grand scale, and no need for a warrant before [it] 
can be invoked’.
201
 It speaks, also, to what has been described as ‘the danger of ambiguous, 
or in this case, deliberately overbroad, definitions in “emergency” legislation’
202
 that the 
purposes for which s. 4 establishes a legal basis for asset-freezing measures far exceed that of 
combatting (the financing of) terrorism.
203
 As much was rendered explicit in the 
circumstances in which the power was invoked for the first time, in 2008, which related not 
to terrorist activity, but rather to the collapse of the Icelandic national bank, Landsbanki. The 
relevant freezing order prohibited persons from making funds available to the bank—as well 
as to ‘the [Icelandic] Authorities’ or to the Government of Iceland—after the bank had 
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 In a voluntary memorandum subsequently given by the Treasury to 
the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments, the point was emphasised that ‘the manner in 
which section 4 is worded and the legislative and Parliamentary history of Part 2 of the Act 
[show] that it is not a power limited to terrorism’.
205
 Thus, in this case, ‘the power to make a 
freezing order was used in circumstances where the primary concern was to prohibit the flow 




The episode highlighted several controversial features of the Part 2 regime which further 
compound its breadth and coerciveness. This includes the absence from the 2001 Act of a 
right to appeal the Treasury’s decision to impose a freezing order. Rather, the best for which 
the Act itself provides is that where a person specified in a s. 4 freezing order as ‘a person to 
whom or for whose benefit funds are not to be made available’ makes ‘a written request to 
the Treasury to give him the reason why he is so specified’, the Treasury is obliged to 
comply—giving that person the relevant reason(s) in writing—as soon as is practicable.
207
 
This, as Genevieve Lennon and Clive Walker have noted, rendered the Landsbanki Order 
vulnerable to challenge on the grounds that the Part 2 provisions fell foul of the rights 
contained in the ECHR, including, art. 6, which confers the right to ‘a fair and public hearing 
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law’, and 
art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, which provides that ‘[n]o one shall be deprived of 
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law 
and by the general principles of international law’.
208
 Though, ultimately, no such challenge 
was forthcoming, the situation was improved somewhat, albeit belatedly, with a range of 
reforms contemporaneously introduced by the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. Part 6 of the 
2008 Act provided for ‘financial restrictions proceedings’, expressly allowing for those 
affected by ‘any decision of the Treasury’ concerning the exercise of any of their functions 
under Part 2 of the ATCSA to apply to the High Court or, in Scotland, the Court of Session to 
have the order set aside on the traditional (common law) grounds of judicial review.
209
 
Incidentally, general provisions about rules of court in the context of such proceedings 
include ‘the need to secure that the decisions that are the subject of the proceedings are 
properly reviewed’ and ‘the need to secure that disclosures of information are not made 
where they would be contrary to the public interest’.
210
  
Another factor which contributes to the particular severity of the Part 2 regime is that of 
the failure of the Act, more broadly, to establish a permanent mechanism of independent 
review of freezing orders imposed by the Treasury. This is in sharp contrast, in particular, 
with the regime established under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010 (discussed in 
Section II, above). Although, the absence of a bespoke independent review mechanism of the 
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Part 2 regime can be explained, at least in part, by the particular circumstances of the 
ATCSA’s enactment. That is, given its conception as an ‘emergency’ legislative response to 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks, s. 122 of the ATCSA required that a committee of Privy 
Counsellors (appointed by the Secretary of State) conduct a review of the Act within two 
years of it having been passed. The ‘Newton Report’ was subsequently published in 2003, 
and notably recommended that ‘freezing orders for specific use against terrorism should be 
addressed again in primary terrorism legislation, based on the well tested provisions of the 
[TO regime]’.
211
 The recommendations of the Newton Report having been passed over, 
however, the effect of the absence of independent oversight was rendered particularly acute 
for a number of years, given that, curiously, it was not until 2015 that the ATCSA was 
brought within the remit of the IRTL.
212
 Section 44 of the Counter-Terrorism and Security 
Act 2015 authorised the IRTL to report on the operation of the Part 2 regime, albeit to the 
extent that it ‘applies in cases where a use or threat of the action referred to in section 4(2) of 
[the ATCSA] would constitute terrorism’.
213
 This reform, in addition to those implemented 
by the CTA 2008, undoubtedly improves oversight of and broader accountability 
arrangements for the ATCSA, Part 2 asset-freezing framework. Though, one point of ongoing 
significance is that that framework has been routinely overlooked in practice as a necessary, 
if appropriate, domestic legal basis for the freezing of terrorists’ assets. Notwithstanding their 
contemporaneous entry into force, the asset-freezing provisions contained in Part 2 of the 
ATCSA played no part in the domestic implementation of the UN Security Council’s 
counter-terrorism-financing initiatives after 9/11. And in the two decades since its enactment 
only a handful of s. 4 freezing orders have been imposed.
214
 Indeed, the Part 2 regime appears 
at present to have fallen into something approaching obsolescence; as of January 2020, only 
two persons were listed as the subjects of freezing orders under the 2001 Act.
215
  
Two key issues can be gleaned from the relative dormancy of the Part 2 regime. The first 
is that, fundamentally, it exemplifies (once again) the centrality of international legal and 
political co-ordination of counter-financing measures designed to meet the contemporary 
terrorist threat. As Clive Walker suggests, the Part 2 regime was enacted as ‘a bridging 
measure between the domestic measures and internationally imposed measures’, allowing for 
‘unilateral and summary action by domestic authorities where there is a foreign element’.
216
 
This, Walker notes, is consistent with the former Government’s view of the regime around 
the time of its enactment, as expressed by Lord McIntosh of Haringey (then Government 
Deputy Chief Whip in the House of Lords) during parliamentary debate: ‘The power is just 
one part of the sanctions regime,’ Lord McIntosh stated; thus, ‘[i]f a decision to impose 
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sanctions is taken at European Community level or under a United Nations Security Council 
resolution, it would not be appropriate to use the power [under s. 4 of the 2001 Act]’.
217
 This 
reading was also subsequently endorsed in the Newton Committee report, it having been 
noted that financial sanctions of the kind permitted under the Part 2 regime ‘have more 
impact where they can be implemented internationally on the basis of multilateral 
agreement’.
218
 As such, the Committee recognised that ‘[Part 2] is geared to those other 
occasions where action has not yet been agreed internationally, or where it is appropriate for 
the United Kingdom to impose sanctions unilaterally’.
219
 And yet, now that a range of 
discrete regimes have evolved from the intermeshing of international and domestic legal 
frameworks, plainly there is no part for the ATCSA to play, if ever there was, in establishing 
a relevant legal basis for the imposition of asset-freezing measures for the purposes of 
counter-terrorism. 
Indeed, this point is reflected in the second key issue, here. As Ewing writes, ‘[t]he powers 
of the 2001 Act … raise important questions about constitutional propriety and human 
rights’, though far from being ‘embarrassed about such powers’, the reason why they have 
not been used is that the Government has simply ‘found other vehicles to get to the same 
destination more quickly’.
220
 It ought to be noted at this juncture, however, that the Newton 
Report regarded these “other vehicles” as in fact having ‘a number of advantages which 
distinguish [them] from [Part 2]’. For instance, the TO regime was said to have ‘give[n] a 
clear and narrowly limited definition of terrorism, drawn directly from the Terrorism Act 
2000’, ‘[was] not limited in application to foreign nationals’, and ‘explicitly permit[ted] an 
appeal by individuals and affected firms through the High Court’.
221
 And yet, none of the 
alternative domestic legal bases involve processes of parliamentary scrutiny of the making of 
freezing orders of the kind built into the 2001 Act. It is therefore a great irony of the ATCSA, 
Part 2 regime that although constituting, by any measure, a draconian and apparently 
increasingly obsolete legal framework for combatting the financing of terrorism, still it 
manages to inculcate key procedural safeguards which are notably, and crucially, absent in 
the alternative regimes with which it has co-existed. 
 
B. Schedule 7 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 
 
Schedule 7 to the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 (given effect under Part V of that Act)
222
 
establishes an alternative (“purely”) domestic legal basis for the unilateral imposition of 
counter-terrorism asset-freezing measures. It confers on HM Treasury the power to give 
directions not only to ‘a particular person’ or to ‘any description of persons’ operating in the 
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financial sector, but also, crucially, to ‘all persons operating in that sector’.
223
 As such, 
directions may impose restrictions of incredibly expansive coverage, specifically relating to 
‘transactions or business relationships’ with persons or companies (including subsidiaries) 
resident or incorporated in a particular country, or, indeed, the government of that country. 
Such requirements as may result from the imposition of these restrictions expressly include 
‘enhanced customer due diligence measures’;
224
 ‘enhanced ongoing monitoring of any 
business relationship with [the subject(s) of a Treasury direction]’;
225
 systematic reporting, 
such as ‘provid[ing] such information and documents … relating to transactions and business 
relationships with designated persons’;
226




The Schedule 7 regime is comparable to that of ATCSA, Part 2 in a number of ways, not 
least in the manner of its creation.
228
 Though, one of the key differences of Schedule 7, it has 
been suggested, is that it does not allow for ‘the same degree of freedom of action [as under 
Part 2] … since legal action is made dependent on initial advice from the [Financial Action 
Task Force]’.
229
 Indeed, that it is a core aim of the Schedule 7 regime to give effect to the 
recommendations of the FATF is certainly reflected in the conditions to the exercise of the 
power to issue a direction; it is one of three conditions that ‘the [FATF] has advised that 
measures should be taken in relation to the country because of the risk of terrorist financing 
or money laundering being carried on in the country, by the government of the country, or by 
persons resident or incorporated in the country’.
230
 The second condition is that the Treasury 
reasonable believe both that such a risk exists, and ‘that this poses a significant risk to the 
national interests of the United Kingdom’.
231
 Finally, the third condition is that the Treasury 
reasonably believe that ‘the development or production of nuclear, radiological, biological or 
chemical weapons in the country’, or, alternatively, that ‘the doing in the country of anything 
that facilitates the development or production of any such weapons’ poses, once again, ‘a 
significant risk’ to the UK’s national interests.
232
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There is, in any event, a requirement that a direction must be proportionate—that is, 
having regard to the advice of the FATF or, as the case may be, to the relevant risk perceived 
by the Treasury.
233
 Moreover, the power to issue a direction is not exercisable in relation to 
an EEA state.
234
 Any direction which purports to impose restrictions in relation to business 
done either by or with a designated person ‘must be contained in an order made by the 
Treasury’; as under the ATCSA, Part 2 regime, the order must be laid before Parliament after 
being made and ceases to have effect if not approved by a resolution of each House of 
Parliament within 28 days.
235
 The Treasury is required to ‘take such steps as they consider 
appropriate to publicise the making of the order’, as well as any changes to the order or its 
ceasing to have effect.
236
 ‘[I]f not previously revoked and whether or not varied’, the relevant 
order expires a year after having been made.
237
 Directions can be challenged in ‘financial 
restrictions proceedings’, for which the 2008 Act also provides.
238
 And the operation of the 
regime is subject to review by the IRTL, under s. 44(2)(c) of the CTSA 2015. 
Like the ATCSA, Part 2 powers, Schedule 7 has scarcely been used in over a decade; to 
date, only three directions have been issued by the Treasury under Schedule 7. One such 
direction, issued in 2009,
239
 prohibited transactions and business relationships with two 
Iranian financial institutions (including any of their branches): the Islamic Republic of Iran 
Shipping Lines and Bank Mellat.
240
 A statement issued by the Treasury read:  
 
The Treasury is satisfied, as required by the Act, that activity in Iran that facilitates the development or 
production of nuclear weapons poses a significant risk to the national interests of the UK. Iran 




It was also claimed that ‘vessels of the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines (IRISL) have 
transported goods for both Iran’s ballistic missile and nuclear programmes’, while ‘Bank 
Mellat had provided banking services to a UN listed organisation connected to Iran’s 
proliferation sensitive activities, and has been involved in transactions related to financing 
Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programme’.
242
 
The order was subject to a legal challenge which reached the UK Supreme Court in early 
2013, implicating questions both of procedure and substance.
243
 In regards to the latter, it was 
alleged by the appellant, Bank Mellat, that it had been denied by the Treasury the opportunity 
to make representations before the order was made, that the CTA 2008 failed to confer a 
statutory right to such an opportunity, and that this was, in any event, ‘required at common 
law and by article 6 and article 1, Protocol 1 of the [ECHR]’.
244
 As to the substantive ground 
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of appeal, the appellant argued that the decision to make the order was ‘irrational, 
disproportionate and discriminatory, that the Treasury failed to give adequate reasons for 




The Supreme Court allowed the appeal on both grounds.
246
 Lord Sumption delivered the 
majority leading judgment (with which Lady Hale, Lord Kerr, and Lord Clarke agreed in 
whole; Lord Neuberger and Lord Dyson agreed only on the procedural grounds, Lord 
Carnwath only on the substantive grounds). As to the substantive issue, it was noted, firstly, 
that ‘by reference to the various statements of Treasury ministers, the justification for the 
measure which was given to Parliament was that there was a particular problem about Bank 
Mellat which did not apply to the generality of Iranian banks’.
247
 And while it could not be 
said, Lord Sumption suggested, ‘that the Schedule 7 direction in this case had no rational 
connection with the objective of frustrating as far as possible Iran’s weapons programmes’, it 
was held that ‘the distinction between Bank Mellat and other Iranian banks which was at the 
heart of the case put to Parliament by ministers was an arbitrary and irrational distinction and 
that the measure as a whole was disproportionate’.
248
 A key reason for this was that ‘once it is 
found that the problem is not specific to Bank Mellat but an inherent risk of banking, the risk 
posed by Bank Mellat’s access to those markets is no different from that posed by the access 




Nothing in the Treasury’s case explains why we should accept that it is necessary to eliminate Bank 
Mellat’s business in London in order to achieve the objective of the statute, if the same objective can be 
sufficiently achieved in the case of comparable banks by requiring them to observe financial sanctions 
and relevant risk warnings.
250 
 
In regards to the procedural ground, the key point raised by the Treasury was that ‘the 
legislative form of a Schedule 7 direction takes it out of the area in which the courts can 
imply a duty of fairness or prior consultation’.
251
 It was emphasised by Lord Sumption, 
however, that ‘[w]here the courts have declined to review the procedural fairness of statutory 
orders on the ground that they have been subject to Parliamentary scrutiny, they have not 
generally done so on the ground that Parliamentary scrutiny excludes the duty of fairness in 
general or the duty of prior consultation in particular’.
252
 Yet, crucially, ‘[w]ith a measure 
such as this one, targeted against “designated persons”’, Lord Sumption found that ‘it is not 
possible to say that procedural fairness is sufficiently guaranteed by Parliamentary scrutiny or 
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The justification for the direction depends on the particular character and conduct of the designated 
person, about which Parliament cannot have the same plenitude of information as it is assumed to have 
about matters of general legislative policy. Many of the essential facts about the particular target will 
be peculiarly within the designated person’s knowledge, and even those known to the Treasury will not 
necessarily be publicly disclosed.
254 
 
In the specific case of Bank Mellat, among other things ‘the Bank was not in a position to 
defend itself against the Treasury’s allegation that they had had dealings with entities 
involved in the Iranian weapons programmes until the Treasury identified the entities that 
they were referring to’.
255
 Notably, this was not done ‘in the course of justifying the order in 
Parliament’, and neither was the Bank made aware of the relevant entities until after the 
relevant parliamentary processes were completed.
256
 The Treasury’s designation was thus 
‘unlawful for want of prior notice to [the Bank] or any procedure enabling them to be heard 
in advance of the order being made’.
257
 
The key point to note here is that Bank Mellat clearly stands as another important 
example, very much in a similar vein to Ahmed, of common law principle(s) and standards of 
review getting in the way of counter-terrorism powers of extraordinary breadth and severity. 
And yet Parliament’s response to the Bank Mellat litigation—indeed, even before judgment 
was eventually handed down in the Supreme Court—was such as to render explicit, once 
again, that any obstacle that the common law might erect to the exercise of such powers can 
very straightforwardly be overcome in practice. Thus, following the expiry of the first 
direction, a second direction was issued in 2011,
258
 followed by a third a year later,
259
 both of 
which extended restrictions on business and transaction in relation to any ‘credit institution 
incorporated in Iran’, as well as the ‘Central Bank of Iran’, and branches or subsidiaries of 
either, ‘wherever located’.
260
 Though, with effectively the same restrictions against Iran 
having been implemented at the EU level in 2012,
261





C. Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018  
 
The UK’s withdrawal from the EU on 31 January 2020 necessitated key changes in the legal 
framework of asset-freezing, not least given that, as has been shown throughout this chapter, 
the EU legal order has for many years operated as a critical layer of governance in the 
intermeshing of domestic and international legal enforcement of asset-freezing measures. In a 
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public consultation document published by the UK Government in 2017, it was noted that 
while ‘[t]he UK has some limited domestic powers to impose some sanctions … these are not 
sufficient to replicate the full range of sanctions currently in force through the UN and EU’; 
new powers would be needed to replace those (at the time) provided for by the ECA 1972, 
and so enable the Government ‘to preserve and update UN sanctions, and to impose 
autonomous UK sanctions in coordination with our allies and partners’.
263
 
The relevant powers were subsequently introduced under the Sanctions and Anti-Money 
Laundering Act 2018. What is striking, however, is that the Act makes available a range of 
powers which are plainly capable of being used for a number of purposes far exceeding 
simply that of ensuring compliance with international obligations and coordination with the 
extant (though now entirely independent) EU asset-freezing regime. For instance, s. 1 permits 
the making of sanctions regulations where a Minister considers that it is ‘appropriate’ to do 
so, though not only for the purposes of ‘compliance with a UN obligation’
264
 or ‘any other 
international obligation’,
265
 but for ‘discretionary purposes’,
266
 including that it would: 
‘further the prevention of terrorism, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere’;
267
 ‘be in the 
interests of national security’
268
 or ‘in the interests of international peace and security’;
269
 
‘further a foreign policy objective of the [UK Government]’;
270
 ‘promote the resolution of 
armed conflicts or the protection of civilians in conflict zones’;
271
 ‘promote accountability for 
or be a deterrent to gross violations of human rights’, or otherwise ‘promote compliance with 
international human rights law’ or (merely) ‘respect for human rights’;
272
 ‘promote 
compliance with international humanitarian law;
273
 ‘contribute to multilateral efforts to 
prevent the spread and use of weapons and materials of mass destruction’;
274
 or ‘promote 
respect for democracy, the rule of law and good governance’.
275
 Indeed, it is difficult to 
imagine a purpose for the imposition of far-reaching financial sanctions which is not covered 
by this extraordinary list. It is equally difficult to imagine the additional requirement that the 
Minister ought to consider ‘whether there are good reasons to pursue’
276
 the relevant purpose, 
and that ‘the imposition of sanctions is a reasonable course of action for that purpose’,
277
 
imposes any particularly exacting procedural burden, whether in principle or in practice. 
Though, in any event, the Minister is also required to report to Parliament as to the reasons 
for introducing sanctions regulations pursuant to such ‘discretionary purposes’.
278
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Several other familiar procedural safeguards and oversight mechanisms feature in the new 
Act, including, for instance, ongoing review and reporting by ministers and an independent 
appointee,
279
 and a right to apply to the courts to have designation decisions set aside (on the 
basis of judicial review principles).
280
 Yet, it suffices to highlight a second key area in which 
the 2018 Act can be seen to have significantly expanded the scope of domestic powers to 
impose asset-freezing measures. That is, not only does the Act confer the power to designate 
named persons,
281
 it confers the power to designate persons ‘by description’,
282
 albeit subject 
to several key conditions, including: that ‘a reasonable person’ would know whether a person 
fell within the description of persons specified in the relevant designation;
283
 that ‘at the time 
the description is specified, it is not practicable for the Minister to identify and designate by 
name all the persons falling within that description at that time;
284
 that there are reasonable 
grounds to suspect that persons falling within the description are so involved (in terrorism-
related activity, etc.);
285
 and that (again) the Minister considers it ‘appropriate’ to make such 
a designation having regard to the many and various purposes outlined above.
286
  
Even from this very brief survey of these powers, one thing is abundantly clear: the very 
real need not only to ensure the continuing domestic legal basis for EU sanctions throughout 
the UK’s ‘transition’ from Member State to third country, but also to ensure the patriation of 
those sanctions at the end of that process, has given way to opportunism. The 2018 Act has 
resulted in the creation of a new, “purely” domestic legal basis for the imposition of asset-
freezing measures which, without doubt, is far broader, involving procedural safeguards (and 
legal thresholds) which are much lower, than anything which came before. The UK 
Government has already begun to make use of the new powers at its disposal, imposing 
sanctions for the first time which cover a range of foreign nationals and organisations 
involved in ‘some of the most notorious human rights violations in recent years’.
287
 Quite 
how the new powers will be used for the purposes of counter-terrorism in the coming months 
and years, and quite how far, if at all, the legal challenges which will inevitably ensue will 




Arguably the defining characteristic of the contemporary constitutional position of asset-
freezing is that of its complexity. This chapter has shown that much of this complexity can be 
seen to derive primarily from the intermeshing of domestic and international governance 
arrangements, not least insofar as these arrangements have led to excessive fragmentation of 
the law in this area. This, in turn, has resulted in the implementation of asset-freezing 
measures whose domestic legal basis is liable to shift, depending, that is, on whether the 
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decision to impose such measures is to be or has been made under the auspices of the UN 
collective security regime, in Brussels, or in HM Treasury. And it serves only to compound 
the complexity which flows from the co-existence of these various legal bases that across 
each of them the potential for (legal and/or political) oversight of or challenge to key 
decision-making varies greatly, indeed inasmuch as, for instance, the relevant procedural 
safeguards to which the exercise of the discrete sets of powers are subject. 
Key tensions in and of the domestic and international law and politics of asset-freezing 
have been shown in this chapter to arise at their point of intersection in the domestic 
constitution in various, significant ways. In particular, the chapter has highlighted a number 
of examples which all point, fundamentally, to the incapacity of the rules, principles and 
standards of review developed in the common law to adequately resolve those tensions. 
Perhaps the clearest example of this is the UK Supreme Court’s decision in Ahmed. Indeed, 
that decision might in fact be taken to represent something of a ‘victory’ for the common law 
constitution. For, of course, it was the common law principle of legality—not, on this 
occasion, the ECHR—in which the Supreme Court grounded an explicit and ultimately 
effective rule-of-law-based resistance to the deprivation of property: only with Parliament’s 
clear and unambiguous approval, in primary legislation, can the executive be taken to have 
been so authorised to deprive such a ‘fundamental’ right. And yet, it very clearly calls into 
question whether Ahmed represents a ‘victory’ in any ordinary sense of the word that 
Parliament responded by retrospectively validating what the Supreme Court considered to 
represent a deficient domestic legislative basis for the enforcement of UN sanctions. Indeed, 
the reversal of a judicial decision by a political institution perhaps signals the ‘end-point’ of 
the common law constitution. Above all, whatever ‘victory’ might be claimed by or for the 
common law, here, the key point is this. Any such ‘victory’ ultimately achieves nothing to 
diminish the basic constitutional reality of the UK’s dualist approach to international law: 
that executive action at the international (UN) level extends to the deprivation of 
















On 21 August 2015, Reyaad Khan, a British citizen, was killed whilst travelling in a vehicle 
in the city of Raqqa, Syria, in what was described by (then) Prime Minister David Cameron, 
in a statement to the House of Commons, as ‘a precision airstrike carried out … by an RAF 
remotely piloted aircraft’.
1
 The House was informed that Khan had been operating as a 
member of the radical Islamist terrorist group ISIL/Da’esh
2
, and was ‘involved in actively 
recruiting ISIL sympathisers and orchestrating specific and barbaric attacks against the west’, 
including directing terrorist atrocities on UK soil.
3
 The operation, said to have been carried 
out after ‘meticulous’ planning, also resulted in the deaths of two of Khan’s ‘ISIL associates’, 
one of whom, Ruhul Amin, was identified as a UK national.
4
  
In authorising the airstrike which killed Khan (and two others), the UK Government had 
engaged in a method of counter-terrorism its predecessors had consistently denounced as 
‘contrary to international law’.
5
 This was, above all, a ‘targeted killing’: ‘the intentional, 
premeditated and deliberate use of lethal force, by [a State or its agents] acting under colour 
of law … against a specific individual who is not in the physical custody of the perpetrator’.
6
 
And then there was the location of the airstrike—Raqqa, Syria—appearing to position Khan, 
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crucially, outside of an area recognised by the UK at the material time as a legitimate theatre 
of armed conflict.
7
 This is without precedent, ‘the first time in modern times that a British 
asset has been used to conduct a strike in a country where [the UK was] not involved in a 
war’;
8
 it signals what has been described as a ‘sea-change’ in the UK’s broader legal position 
on the use of force, that position now appearing to have been closely aligned ‘with several 




Ambiguity surrounds the lawfulness of targeted killing in several international legal 
frameworks which govern the state-sponsored deprivation of life.
10
 It is of note, therefore, 
that the Government subsequently endeavoured to characterise the airstrike as having formed 
part of ongoing hostilities in Iraq (extending into Syrian territory)—that is, despite all the talk 
of this marking a ‘new departure’ for the UK.
11
 Indeed, this is of profound contextual 
significance to the issues explored in this chapter. For this manoeuvre ultimately speaks to a 
key tension in the relationship between the legal and constitutional positions of targeted 
killing: targeted killing may be “constitutional” whilst at the same time patently unlawful, 
and the opposite is seemingly also true. In recasting the legal basis for Khan’s killing as the 
law of armed conflict (‘jus in bello’) instead of the (less permissive) self-defence exception to 
the general prohibition on the use of force (‘jus ad bellum’), the Government can be seen, 
above all, to have attempted to consolidate the legal position of targeted killing. And yet that, 
decisively, entailed undermining the authority of the nascent War Powers Convention as the 
apparent principal mechanism by which accountability arrangements for the exercise of 
domestic war powers are organised in the contemporary constitution.
12
  
In accordance with the Convention, the essence of which, as explored in this chapter, is 
that the House of Commons ought to be given the opportunity to debate proposed military 
action before the fact,
13
 the Government had proposed to honour its defeat in 2013 on a 
motion in support of deploying British armed forces in Syria.
14
 This particular vote was in 
fact taken to signify the new authority of the War Powers Convention; Parliament had voted 
against military action in Syria, and so the Government (initially) obliged, appearing to 
accept that such a course of action was without adequate parliamentary (and thus democratic) 
support.
15
 That the targeted killing of Khan entailed the deployment of a British military asset 
in that very location thus indicated otherwise.  
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Several key questions are given rise by these developments. Not least that of whether, and 
if so to what extent, the constitutional position—that is, the constitutionality—of targeted 
killing is contingent on the operation of the War Powers Convention. Indeed, subsequent 
developments have shone yet more light on these controversial issues, targeted killing and the 
use of ‘drones’ appearing to occupy an increasingly central position in the UK Government’s 
contemporary counter-terrorism strategy. The chapter explores these issues as follows. 
Section II outlines the UK’s domestic arrangements for authorising the use of force, and 
specifically the awkward position of targeted killing and the use of drones within those 
arrangements. That section highlights the key tensions underlying a seemingly tenuous 
distinction between “constitutional” and “unconstitutional” behaviour in the exercise of 
domestic war powers, to the extent that that distinction is now determined principally by 
reference to the scope and operation of the War Powers Convention. Section III then gives an 
overview of the Government’s apparent recent embrace of targeted killing as a response to 
the contemporary terrorist threat, specifically insofar as that threat is primarily characterised 
in international terms. That section considers that this development is situated in a broader 
strategic context, in particular one which involves the increasing legitimisation of targeted 
killing, per se, as a method of counter-terrorism in the global ‘War on Terror’, and the 
nebulousness of the European Court of Human Rights’ approach to the enforcement of the 
Convention rights in military operations abroad. Finally, Section IV considers the 
implications of the Government’s targeted killing policy in the context of the general 
(international) prohibition on the use of armed force. Key issues are raised, it is argued in that 
section, particularly insofar as the Government’s approach to targeted killing clearly 
anticipates (and evidently presumes the lawfulness, in international law, of) the use of force 
against pre-identified individuals even outside active areas of armed conflict. The sorts of 
international legal arguments defended by the UK Government in the circumstances of (and 
crucially since) the targeted killing of Khan serve only to expose the significant, if 
constitutionally dubious role that international law plays in legitimating—that is, 
“constitutionalising”—the exercise of domestic war powers. 
 
II. WAR POWERS IN THE UK CONSTITUTION 
 
A. The Domestic Legal Framework 
 
In the UK constitution, the legal power to deploy armed forces overseas formally derives 
from the royal prerogative,
16
 the ‘residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority, which at any 
given time is legally left in the hands of the Crown’.
17
 As a matter of constitutional practice, 
therefore, the decision to deploy armed forces is reasonably straightforwardly stated: the 
decision is, to all intents and purposes, one for the Government, alone, to make.
18
 Rosara 
Joseph notes that, over four centuries of constitutional development, ‘orthodox theoretical 
and political discourses’ have consistently asserted the executive’s dominance in the exercise 
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 albeit that many varied justifications for this arrangement have been 
advanced over time. Theories of ‘ancient constitutionalism’ and divine right imputed 
legitimacy to the executive in matters of war and foreign policy primarily on the grounds of 
historical precedent, while ‘institutional arguments’ inclined to (the advantages of) 
pragmatism, efficiency and effective governance in the execution of powers in defence of the 
realm were common of the development of parliamentary government in the 18
th
 century, and 
continue to hold sway today.
20
 Throughout the 20
th
 century, executive dominance of war 
powers consistently went unchallenged by the courts,
21
 illustrating a level of deference which 
Joseph attributes to a deep-rooted acquiescence to the Crown’s perceived benevolence in the 
exercise of prerogative powers: 
 
The presumption of good faith in executive motives has an especially entrenched history in the national 
security sphere, and it has conditioned the courts to accept executive assertions as to what was done in 




That such deference is both unambiguously and properly the courts’ constitutional role in 
matters of the war prerogative, and of national security more broadly, was emphasised by the 
(Appellate Committee of the) House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister 
for the Civil Service.
23
 Of this, Lord Fraser said: 
 
[T]he courts will inquire into whether a particular prerogative power exists or not, and, if it does exist, 
into its extent. But once the existence and the extent of a power are established to the satisfaction of the 
court, the court cannot inquire into the propriety of its exercise. That is undoubtedly the position as laid 
down in the authorities to which I have briefly referred and it is plainly reasonable in relation to many 
of the most important prerogative powers which are concerned with control of the armed forces and 




Moreover, Lord Scarman referred to the principle that ‘all matters relating to the disposition 
and armament of the armed forces are left to the unfettered control of the Crown’ as 
‘undoubted’.
25
 And Lord Diplock, in no uncertain terms, reiterated that ‘[n]ational security is 
the responsibility of the executive government’: ‘[i]t is par excellence a non-justiciable 
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B. The War Powers Convention 
 
As Paul Scott notes, ‘[t]he key contemporary implication of the power to go to war being 
found in the prerogative is that it is – as a matter of law – exercisable at the discretion of the 
executive of the day, without any formal safeguards or procedural limitations’.
27
 Indeed, this 
is true of the legal position, per se. Yet, significant changes to the UK’s domestic use-of-force 
arrangements have been effected in recent years, the most important of which is that the 
House of Commons has occupied an increasingly central and important role in scrutinising 
the exercise of the domestic legal power to deploy armed forces. This is notwithstanding that, 
as noted above, the orthodox constitutional position is that the exercise by the executive (that 
is, the Crown) of domestic war powers is in practice conditional upon ministerial ‘advice’. 
The initiative to advise the exercise of legal powers derived from an undemocratic and 
anachronistic source of the constitution is conferred upon those whose democratic credentials 
offset those qualities. On several occasions since the Iraq War in 2003, a further conventional 
arrangement has emerged in which the Government has sought the ‘approval’ or ‘consent’ of 
the House of Commons on the issue of whether to deploy armed forces to conflict situations 
overseas. Indeed, ‘[t]he complexion of the war prerogative therefore, has critically changed 
since 2003’:
28
 it is now widely accepted that the exercise of the war prerogative is subject to a 
separate, distinct ‘War Powers Convention’: that the House of Commons should be given the 
opportunity to debate and thus scrutinise the exercise by the Government of the power to 
deploy armed forces (via the war prerogative) before fact, save in exceptional circumstances, 
such as an emergency.
29
 
While this practice can be seen to have commenced in the context of the events leading up 
to the Iraq War in 2003, during which MPs were, for the first time, asked to vote on a 
substantive motion in support of British military intervention,
30
 it has since operated on a 
number of occasions over the last years, including in relation to UK military intervention in 
Libya, in 2011,
31
 Syria, in 2013,
32
 and Iraq, in 2014.
33
 The most recent example of this 
practice concerned the Government’s proposed extension of the UK’s military campaign 
against Da’esh in Iraq to neighbouring Syria.
34
 So entrenched, it would appear, is this new 
practice that it has been suggested that substantive Commons votes on British military 
intervention has in fact supplanted the war prerogative, establishing, rather, a ‘parliamentary 
prerogative’.
35
 This term is perhaps unhelpful, though, especially given that Parliament’s 
consultative and approval role ‘is not a legal requirement, and the Commons also lack the 
power of initiative over military employment decisions … [and further,] there are no 
standards for the information Parliament would be privy to in such discussions’.
36
 Whatever, 
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that the War Powers Convention now represents an important, if permanent feature of those 
arrangements is confirmed by its codification in the Cabinet Manual: 
 
In 2011, the Government acknowledged that a convention had developed in Parliament that before 
troops were committed the House of Commons should have an opportunity to debate the matter and 
said that it proposed to observe that convention except when there was an emergency and such action 




A key theme of the Convention’s crystallisation over the last years is that it has generally 
been heralded as a positive development, not least given the extent to which it appears to 
enhance the broader ‘democratisation’ of the UK’s domestic use-of-force arrangements.
38
 But 
as a constitutional rule of a non-legally binding nature—qua constitutional conventions—its 
effectiveness depends, above all, on the political will to enforce it; the courts have no 
jurisdiction to preside over the enforcement of constitutional conventions.
39
 Indeed, the 
content of the Convention, its reach, and the increasingly nebulous ‘emergency’ exception 
which provides for its dispensation are all, so to speak, contingent upon the ebb and flow of 
the political will for the time being. The extent to which the War Powers Convention can be 
seen to genuinely enhance accountability, participation and transparency in the domestic use-




For instance, there are a number of examples in which the terms and expectations of the 
Convention appear to have been undermined, though which, in the relevant circumstances, 
were explained (away) as circumstances in which the Convention either did not apply at all, 
or applied only to the extent that its ‘emergency’ exception had been invoked. The 
deployment of British troops in Mali in 2013, ostensibly at the request of the French 
Government for the purposes of providing ‘additional logistical and surveillance support’ to 
French armed forces,
41
 was neither subject to nor authorised by a parliamentary vote. Of this, 
however, the Government said: 
 
[W]e will observe the existing convention that before UK troops are committed to conflict, the House 
of Commons should have an opportunity to debate and vote on the matter, except when there is an 
emergency and such action would not be appropriate. One should also recognise … that the role of 
British troops is clearly not a combat role and it is not our intention to deploy combat troops.
42 
 
It seemingly follows, therefore, that the Convention applies only to the deployment of armed 
forces specifically, and exclusively, to conflict situations overseas. 
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However, of particular and growing significance are the increasing number of instances in 
which the Government has purported to deploy armed forces overseas, indeed in conflict 
situations, though in accordance with the ‘emergency’ exception to Convention. A recent 
example of this is the UK’s military intervention in Syria, in 2018, carried out in response to 
a chemical weapons attack by the Syrian Government on its own people in Douma. The 
intervention was not authorised under the auspices of the UN collective security regime; 
rather, the position of the UK Government was that military intervention was justified so as 
to ‘alleviate the extreme humanitarian suffering of the Syrian people by degrading the Syrian 
regime’s chemical weapons capability and deterring their future use’.
43
 The key point to note 
for present purposes is that a full seven days separated the atrocities in Douma and the UK’s 
military response. In Parliament, after the fact, the then Prime Minister, Theresa May, stated 
that ‘[t]he speed with which we acted was essential in co-operating with our partners to 
alleviate further humanitarian suffering and to maintain the vital security of our operations’.
44
 
Indeed, such factors are without doubt essential considerations as to whether Parliament can 
or should be included in the domestic decision-making process to authorise the deployment 
of armed forces overseas; the deliberative and open nature of parliamentary debate is 
anathema to both speed and confidentiality. Though, perhaps when read in the context of the 
parliamentary vote in 2013, which the then Government lost, it is clear that such arguments 
appear essentially to exploit the ‘emergency’ exception so as to bypass debate in the House of 
Commons.
45
 Thus, as Tanzil Chowdhury writes, ‘despite the incremental development of a 




Thus, despite its now-seemingly central role in the UK’s domestic use-of-force 
arrangements, questions (continue to) surround the precise nature and extent of the War 
Powers Convention. There is a growing sense, perhaps, which is clearly evinced both by 
these various contemporary developments in practice and by increasingly sceptical critiques 
in the academic literature, that the War Powers Convention promises much, yet delivers far 
less. ‘The aim of the War Powers Convention,’ write Fikfak and Hooper, ‘was to provide a 
more democratic process through which military troops are deployed into battle’: ‘[t]he idea 
was to strengthen the position of Parliament vis-à-vis the Government and to give the House 
of Commons an active role in compelling the Government to articulate its motives and 
formulate long-term strategy’.
47
 And so in this sense, fundamentally, it is ‘an inappropriate 
and ineffective tool to deliver on what it promised’.
48
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Indeed, these questions are particularly pertinent in the present context, that of targeted 
killing, not least given that unmanned aerial vehicles—“drones” —appear to have been 
carved out of the War Powers Convention as one of its seemingly numerous and increasingly 
broad exceptions. Drones are capable of being deployed remotely, to situations which may or 
may not constitute active areas of armed conflict in the eyes of international law, and thus 
appear to render unnecessary the exercise of war powers for the purposes of establishing and 
directing a full-scale military campaign. As such, it is unclear whether the use of drones, 
specifically outside of an existing armed conflict situation, falls within the remit of the War 
Powers Convention. As Fikfak and Hooper note: 
 
Whilst the picture is still unclear, it is more than likely that in the future the use of drones for targeted 
killings outside recognised armed conflict will escape parliamentary oversight. This will occur either 
because they are used in an ‘emergency’, providing the Government the flexibility it needs to ‘surprise’ 
the unexpected targets, or because the Government will claim that they do not involve the deployment 




It therefore stands to reason that the use of drones—including, crucially, their use in targeted 
killing operations—occupies an awkward position within the constitutional accountability 
arrangements instituted by the War Powers Convention. 
 
III. THE U.K. GOVERNMENT’S CONTEMPORARY TARGETED KILLING 
‘POLICY’ IN ITS STRATEGIC CONTEXT 
 
No UK Government has ever formally endorsed a ‘policy’ of targeted killing, per se, whether 
or not as part of a broader counter-terrorism strategy. Rather, as Nils Melzer notes: 
 
Traditionally, public debate in the United Kingdom never seriously considered that targeted killing 
could be a legitimate method of law enforcement, even in the face of decades of terrorist activities 




And yet, the circumstances in which Reyaad Khan and Ruhul Amin were killed in August 
2015 (as briefly described in the introduction to this chapter) are symptomatic of a paradigm-
shift in the UK’s response to the contemporary terrorist threat—particularly, that is, in 
relation to threats emanating from sources external to the UK. Above all, those circumstances 
appear to suggest that the UK Government now conceives of targeted killing as a legitimate 
method of counter-terrorism. Indeed, since that episode, the viability—and, so it would seem, 
the desirability—of targeted killing has become an increasingly conspicuous feature of the 
Government’s contemporary counter-terrorism rhetoric; in recent years, there has been a 
significant and marked ramping-up of political rhetoric appearing to (ever) openly endorse 
targeted killing, in spite of its dubious legal and moral legitimacy.
51
 For instance, in 
December 2017, the then Secretary of State for Defence, Gavin Williamson, signalled the 
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Government’s apparent embrace of targeted killing as part of a broader, aggressive military 
response to the threat posed by so-called “foreign terrorist fighters”—namely, ‘individuals 
who have travelled from their home states to other states to participate in or support terrorist 
acts’.
52
 Williamson was reported as having stated in an interview with the Daily Mail that 
British citizens who travel abroad in support of terrorist groups such as Da’esh should, in no 
uncertain terms, be ‘hunted down and killed to ensure they never return to the UK’.
53
 After 
all, Williamson was quoted as saying, ‘[a] dead terrorist can’t cause any harm to Britain’.
54
 
Some two weeks later, then Prime Minister Theresa May also shed light on the Government’s 
increasing amenability to the targeted killing of terrorist suspects operating in foreign 
countries. The Prime Minister expressed her support in Parliament for the deployment of 
lethal force in so-called ‘precision airstrike[s]’ against terrorist suspects abroad, albeit as ‘the 
last resort in a host of counter-terrorism measures to prevent and disrupt plots against the UK 
at every stage in their planning’.
55
 
Public and parliamentary scrutiny of the UK Government’s targeted killing ‘policy’ has 
since intensified, not least given that, crucially and controversially, the availability of the use 
of lethal force for counter-terrorism purposes manifestly transcends the boundaries of lawful 
armed conflict.
56
 That there have been a number of reports of unintended civilian casualties 
as a result of UK involvement in targeted killing operations only serves to compound the 
legal and moral ambiguities surrounding this course of action.
57
 A compelling body of 
evidence also points towards the UK’s broader involvement in targeted killing operations led 
by foreign states, especially the US.
58
 Parliament was informed that Junaid Hussain and 
Mohammed Emwazi (the latter of whom was infamously dubbed “Jihadi John” by the 
mainstream media), both British-born members of Da’esh, were killed in targeted drone 
strikes conducted by the US military in August
59
 and November 2015,
60
 respectively. 
Subsequently, in October 2017, it was reported in the media that Sally Jones, also a British 
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citizen, and the wife of Hussain, was also killed in a joint UK-US drone-strike operation.
61
 
And so, despite consistently publicly rebutting claims that it operates a ‘policy’ of targeted 
killing, including a policy of maintaining a secret ‘kill list’ of high-profile terrorist suspects,
62
 
in evidence subsequently given to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Government all 
but confirmed, from the Committee’s point of view, that it does have a broader policy to use 
lethal force abroad, outside armed conflict, for counter-terrorism purposes: 
 
Despite the sometimes confusing explanations offered by the Government, we are now clear about 
what the Government’s policy is. Although the Government says that it does not have a “targeted 
killing policy”, it is clear that the Government does have a policy to use lethal force abroad outside 
armed conflict for counter-terrorism purposes. We understand why the Government does not want to 
call its policy a “targeted killing policy”. In our view, however, it is important to recognise that the 
Government’s policy on the use of lethal force outside of areas of armed conflict does contemplate the 




Whether or not the Government would ever acknowledge that this is tantamount to 
operating a targeted killing ‘policy’, its apparent embrace of targeted killing as a method of 
counter-terrorism is consistent with what Melzer calls ‘the broader trend towards 
legitimatisation’, a process which has involved, in essence, targeted killing’s ‘escaping the 
shadowy realm of half-legality and non-accountability, and of gradually gaining legitimacy as 
a method of counter-terrorism and ‘surgical’ warfare’.
64
 In the 2011 report of the former UN 
Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary and Arbitrary Executions, it is noted that a 
number of States ‘have adopted policies, either openly or implicitly, of using targeted 
killings, including in the territories of other States’.
65
 Those policies have been justified as a 
‘legitimate’ counter-terrorism response and ‘as a necessary response to the challenges of 
“asymmetric warfare”’,
66
 a type of armed conflict characterised by the ‘radically different 
means and methods of violence and radically divergent levels of brute firepower’ which both 
sides bring to that conflict.
67
 Indeed, the process described by Melzer has accelerated in the 
post-9/11 era, and the normalisation of a range of aggressive, militarised responses under the 
US ‘War on Terror’ counter-terrorism paradigm.
68
 The US targeted killing programme 
emerged as a ‘central strategy’
69
 of President George W. Bush’s counter-terrorism policy, and 
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was thereafter significantly expanded under the subsequent Obama administration. Indeed, it 
was in this context, as Christine Gray notes, ‘that the USA expanded its wide doctrine of self-
defence against non-state actors in third states’.
70
 In other words, the legitimisation of 
targeted killing can be seen to have depended primarily on the redefining of key tenets of the 
general (international) prohibition on the use of armed force, under art. 2(4) of the UN 
Charter. One question to which this has given rise is whether, in principle, the ‘targeted’ use 
of force against individual terrorist suspects can be seen to engage art. 2(4) at all. As Helen 
Duffy writes: 
 
On a perhaps extreme view, it would be unnecessary to invoke self-defence as there would be no use of 
force in prima facie violation of Article 2(4). One question in this vein is whether limited incursions on 
to another state’s territory, for the purposes of a targeted killing, for example (as opposed to the large-
scale military interventions that characterised early resort to force in the ‘war on terror’), should be 
considered to violate territorial integrity or political independence envisioned in Article 2(4) at all. The 





Indeed, the strategic use of language such as ‘precision’ airstrikes ought clearly to be read in 
the context of this potential ambiguity. 
That targeted killing has increasingly been accepted as a legitimate method of counter-
terrorism is symptomatic of the increasingly fluid perception of the contemporary terrorist 
threat—again, not least given that the global response to that threat has itself consistently 
been characterised, since 9/11, as entailing ‘war on terror’. Yet, from the perspective of the 
UK, the issue of targeted killing has historically been viewed in the context of Northern 
Ireland-related terrorism: a domestic matter. There was, in other words, no sense in which it 
could be plausibly argued in these circumstances that the use of lethal force could be 
deployed, consistent with the legal rules of international armed conflict. Rather, the issue of 
the state-sponsored deprivation of life, in that respect, was embroiled in the controversies 
surrounding the “shoot-to-kill” policy which domestic (UK) law enforcement were alleged to 
have been operating against members of Irish-nationalist terrorist organisations.
72
 Notably, 
the view that that policy was ‘clearly illegal’ was widely and strongly held.
73
 Indeed, as much 
was confirmed by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights in McCann 
and Others v United Kingdom,
74
 in which it was held that the killings of three members of the 
Provisional Irish Republican Army during the course of an operation conducted by British 
soldiers in Gibraltar contravened human rights law, specifically the right to life protected 
under art. 2 of the Convention, which states:  
 
1. Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by law. No one shall be deprived of his life intentionally 
save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his conviction of a crime for which this penalty 
is provided by law.  
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2. Deprivation of life shall not be regarded as inflicted in contravention of this article when it results 
from the use of force which is no more than absolutely necessary:  
 
(a) in defence of any person from unlawful violence;  
 
(b) in order to effect a lawful arrest or to prevent the escape of a person lawfully detained;  
 
(c) in action lawfully taken for the purpose of quelling a riot or insurrection. 
 
The Court considered that deprivation of life ought to be subject to  
 
the most careful scrutiny, particularly where deliberate lethal force is used, taking into consideration 
not only the actions of the agents of the State who actually administer the force but also all the 





As such, the violation of art. 2 was, in this case, found to have resulted from various failings 
in the conduct of the operation, including (but not limited to) ‘the failure of the authorities to 
make sufficient allowances for the possibility that their intelligence assessments might, in 
some respects at least, be erroneous’.
76
  
Of particular significance for present purposes, moreover, are the comments of the Court 
in relation to the nature and scope of art. 2. In particular, the Court emphasised that art. 2(2) 
‘does not primarily define the situations where it is permitted to intentionally kill an 
individual, but describes the situations where it is permitted to “use force” which may result, 
as an unintended consequence, in the deprivation of life’.
77
 Yet, of utmost importance, the 
Court noted, is that ‘[t]he use of force … must be no more than “absolutely necessary” for the 
achievement of one of the purposes set out in sub-paragraphs (a), (b) or (c)’,
78
 and that ‘[i]n 
this respect the use of the term “absolutely necessary” … indicates that a stricter and more 
compelling test of necessity must be employed from that normally applicable when 
determining whether State action is “necessary in a democratic society” under paragraph 2 of 
Articles 8 to 11’.
79
 Fundamentally, this can be seen to highlight the particularly elevated 
status of the right to life in a democratic society; the level of scrutiny to be applied under the 
legal framework of the ECHR exceeds even that relating to interference with ‘qualified 
rights’ (namely, arts. 8 to 11) where—as discussed in Chapter 3, for instance—the Court has 
shown itself willing to be particularly interventionist. 
It is against this backdrop that the Government’s attempt to construct a narrative which 
evidently foregrounds the international dimensions of targeted killing action can be seen to 
represent, in turn, an attempt to keep a lid on the human rights implications of that action. It 
ought, firstly, to be noted here that the (latest version of the) Government’s counter-terrorism 
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strategy document, ‘CONTEST’, published in June 2018,
80
 makes clear that the international 
dimension of the contemporary terrorist threat is a prominent—perhaps defining—feature of 
that threat. The document notes that ‘[a] large proportion of terrorist plots that have targeted 
the UK in recent years have had an international link or have begun overseas’.
81
 Specifically, 
Islamist terrorism is said to account for ‘the largest proportion of terrorist attacks globally, 
with most carried out by Daesh, Al Qa’ida and their respective affiliates’.
82
 Whilst it is also 
noted that terrorism related to Northern Ireland ‘remains a serious threat, particularly in 
Northern Ireland itself’, and that ‘extreme right-wing terrorism’ represents a ‘growing 
threat’,
83
 the combination of ‘the rise of Da’esh and the creation of its cult-like “Caliphate”’ 
and the ‘persistent threat of Al Qa’ida’ is identified as the principal cause of the ‘increased 
[terrorist] threat’ to the UK in recent years.
84
 The level of that threat, which is assessed by the 
Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre ‘on the basis of both the intent and capability of an 
individual or group to commit a terrorist act’,
85
 is currently set at ‘SUBSTANTIAL’, 
indicating that the possibility of an attack is ‘likely’.
86
 The threat level relating to 
‘international terrorism’, which includes terrorist groups such as Da’esh and Al Qa’ida, has 
remained primarily at ‘SEVERE’ (meaning an attack is ‘highly likely’) since 29 August 
2014, having actually been elevated to ‘CRITICAL’—the highest grade on the Security 
Services’ ‘Threat Levels’ metric, indicating that a terrorist attack is ‘expected 
imminently’
87
—on two occasions during that period: between 23-27 May 2017 and 15-17 
September 2017,
88
 prompted by the terrorist attacks carried out in Manchester Arena
89
 and on 
the carriage of a District Line train at Parsons Green, west London,
90
 respectively. 
Two key issues ultimately flow from this, relating specifically to the position of the ECHR 
(and the applicability of art. 2 in particular). First, efforts to legitimise targeted killing as a 
means of combatting the contemporary threat of terrorism—again, as an essentially 
international threat—engage, if albeit implicitly, with the tropes of human rights 
argumentation, especially the language of ‘necessity’. For instance, these efforts have been 
made very clearly in the context of the apparent futility of a ‘criminal justice’ model of 
counter-terrorism. Where, in other words, the Government has come closest to publicly 
making the case for targeted killing as a legitimate counter-terrorism response is in the 
context of its having emphasised the practical obstacles created by the global and crucially 
asymmetric character of the contemporary terrorist threat. The Prime Minister’s remarks in 
relation to the targeted killing of Reyaad Khan can be seen to illustrate this point, in which it 
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was repeatedly noted that ‘[w]e took this action because there was no alternative’, that, 
further, ‘there is no Government we can work with [in Syria]’, and that ‘we have no military 
on the ground to detain those [such as Khan] preparing plots’.
91
 The effect of this is that it 
does much, if only by way of shaping the prevailing political narrative, to shift the locus of 
the use of lethal force (and targeted killing practices) increasingly away from the paradigm of 
domestic law enforcement, for it is in that context in which the right to life (under art. 2)—as 
demonstrated in McCann—clearly bites deeply on the lawfulness of state deprivation of life. 
The second key issue raised by this dynamic is perhaps the more consequential from an 
explicitly legal standpoint, speaking more broadly to the tenuous position of the ECHR in the 
context of the use of lethal force abroad—specifically, that is, the Strasbourg Court’s 
developing doctrine on the extra-territoriality of the Convention rights. Space precludes a 
detailed discussion of this issue, which has generated much academic scholarship in recent 
years.
92
 Rather, it suffices for present purposes to note that much hangs, in this respect, on the 
concept of ‘jurisdiction’ within the meaning of art. 1 of the Convention, which states that 
‘[t]he High Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in … this Convention’. Classically, the question of ‘jurisdiction’ has 
been interpreted as relating primarily to territorial boundaries.
93
 And yet, crucially, in recent 
years the Court has endorsed an increasingly expansive view of this issue. For instance, in 
Bankovic v Belgium,
94
 the Court reiterated that territorial limitations indeed remain the 
primary factor in any assessment as to competence of the relevant High Contracting Party to 
‘secure’ the Convention rights to the relevant individual(s),
95
 though went on to accept that 
‘other bases of jurisdiction’ might be applicable, albeit that they are ‘exceptional and 
requir[e] special justification in the particular circumstances of each case’.
96
 Within such 
exceptional circumstances, the key question is whether the respondent State  
 
through the effective control of the relevant territory and its inhabitants abroad as a consequence of 
military occupation or through the consent, invitation or acquiescence of the Government of that 




In particular, the Court explicitly rejected the applicants’ claim, in that case, to the effect that 
‘the positive obligation under Article 1 extends to securing the Convention rights in a manner 
proportionate to the level of control exercises in any given extra-territorial situation’.
98
 Such 
an approach was regarded as ‘tantamount to arguing that anyone adversely affected by an act 
imputable to a Contracting State, wherever in the world that act may have been committed or 
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its consequences felt, is thereby brought within the jurisdiction of that State for the purpose of 
Article 1 of the Convention’.
99
 Moreover, the Court held that  
 
the wording of Article 1 does not provide any support for the … suggestion that the positive obligation 
in Article 1 to secure “the rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of this Convention” can be divided 




Rather, this, it was noted, ‘does not explain the application of the words “within their 
jurisdiction” in Article 1 and even goes so far as to render those words superfluous and 
devoid of any purpose’.
101
 In other words, the capacity of the Contracting State to secure ‘the 
rights and freedoms defined in Section 1 of [the] Convention’ ought to be taken to mean the 
full range of Convention rights. 
Some several years after the ruling in Bankovic, the question of the extra-territorial 
application of the Convention was once again considered—and indeed further expanded—by 
the Court in Al-Skeini v United Kingdom.
102
 The Court once again reiterated that 
‘[j]urisdiction is presumed to be exercised normally throughout the State’s territory’,
103
 
noting, however, with reference to the ruling in Bankovic, that ‘as an exception to the 
principle of territoriality, a Contracting State’s jurisdiction under Article 1 may extend to acts 
of its authorities which produce effects outside of its own territory’.
104
 One of several 
‘defining principles’
105
 of the Convention’s extra-territorial jurisdiction, it was said, is that 
‘the use of force by a State’s agents operating outside its territory may bring the individual 
thereby brought under the control of the State’s authorities into the State’s Article 1 
jurisdiction’.
106
 Whilst, however, that principle had (in the art. 1 case law)
107
 clearly been 
applied ‘where an individual is taken into the custody of State agents abroad’, the Court 
emphasised that it ‘does not consider that jurisdiction … [arises] solely from the control 
exercised by the Contracting State over the buildings, aircraft or ship in which the individuals 
[are] held’; instead, ‘[w]hat is decisive … is the exercise of physical power and control over 
the person in question’.
108
 Notably, the Court appeared to U-turn on the question of the 
indivisibility of the Convention rights, its previous stance, in Bankovic, unequivocally against 
the notion that they may be ‘divided and tailored’ to particular circumstances. Thus, ‘the 
State, [which] through its agents, exercises control and authority over an individual, and thus 
jurisdiction … is under an obligation under Article 1 to secure to that individual the rights 
and freedoms … that are relevant to the situation of that individual’; it is ‘[i]n this sense, 
therefore, [that] the Convention rights can be “divided and tailored”’.
109
 Moreover, the 
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territorial paradigm of ‘jurisdiction’ was also found to admit of two further exceptions: 
firstly, ‘when, as a consequence of lawful or unlawful military action, a Contracting State 
exercises effective control of an area outside that national territory’;
110
 and, secondly, ‘where 
the territory of one Convention State is occupied by the armed forces of another’, in which 
circumstances ‘the occupying State should in principle be held accountable under the 
Convention for breaches of human rights within the occupied territory’.
111
 
The Court’s ruling in Al-Skeini has potentially far-reaching implications for a UK policy 
of targeted killing of terrorist suspects operating overseas. The reason why this ought to be 
framed, however, as only having “potential” implications is that, fundamentally, the link 
between extra-territorial ‘jurisdiction’ and specifically ‘the exercise of physical power and 
control’ is clearly very tenuous in the context of targeted killing. Not least, that is, given that 
many and various fundamental questions are raised as to whether so-called ‘precision 
airstrikes’ and the use of remotely-controlled aerial vehicles can, per se, constitute such an 
exercise of physical power and control. And whilst the ECtHR has yet to elaborate on this 
particular issue, it is notable that, in a legal challenge considered both by the High Court and 
the Court of Appeal, two radically different approaches have so far been offered. That 
challenge related to the use of force by British military against individuals in Iraq when 
neither the individuals in question were in British custody, nor was Britain in occupation at 
the material time. The question, therefore, was whether the principle of ‘jurisdiction’ as 
considered in Al-Skeini extended to these circumstances. In the High Court, Leggatt J noted 
that ‘[w]hether the exercise of physical control over an individual outside a state’s own 
territory should be sufficient to bring that individual within the scope of the Convention is far 
from obvious’.
112
 Yet, the point was emphasised that ‘[u]sing force to kill is indeed the 
ultimate exercise of physical control over another human being’, there being, moreover, no 
clear basis for  
 
a principled system of human rights law [to] draw a distinction between killing an individual after 
arresting him and simply shooting him without arresting him first, such that in the first case there is an 




Thus, in any event: 
 
The essential principle … is that whenever and wherever a state which is a contracting party to the 
Convention purports to exercise legal authority or uses physical force, it must do so in a way that does 
not violate Convention rights.
114 
 
However, this proposition was subsequently, and notably, rejected by the Court of Appeal, in 
which it was held that the intention of the ECtHR in Al-Skeini ought to be read as implying 
that something more than the mere use of lethal force was required to bring the affected 
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individual within the ‘jurisdiction’ of the relevant State.
115
 In particular, ‘the intention of the 
Strasbourg court was to require that there be an element of control of the individual prior to 
the use of lethal force’.
116
 ‘It may well be,’ the Court noted, ‘that it will be difficult to draw 
sensible distinctions between different types or degrees of power and control’; indeed, so 
‘inherently imprecise’ is the test of physical power and control.
117
 Though, whatever 
conclusion ought to be drawn as to those distinctions, it was decided that it ‘must be drawn 
by the Strasbourg court itself and not by a national court’.
118
  
That, for the time being at least, the concept of ‘jurisdiction’ remains deeply contested, is 
crucial: it sustains a critical grey area in the UK’s human rights obligations in which the 
Government can (continue to) ground key political arguments as to the legitimacy of a policy 
of targeted killing of terrorist suspects overseas. The key point to note here, however, is that 
if in some future application the ECtHR were to endorse an expansive approach to the 
question of ‘jurisdiction’ such as that of Leggatt J in Al-Saadoon, a policy of targeted killing 
would unequivocally be vulnerable to legal challenge under the HRA / art. 2 of the ECHR. 
Though, it is not clear quite what the HRA/ECHR remedy may be in this context, nor how 
effective it would be. Given the ECtHR ruling in McCann, outlined above, a declaration that 
targeted killing is unlawful under s. 6 seems unlikely; rather, intervention by the courts would 
perhaps more likely establish a framework within which uses of power in this way might be 
lawful, no doubt subject to the strict requirements of ‘necessity’ and ‘proportionality’.  
 
IV. ‘CONSTITUTIONALISING’ TARGETED KILLING 
 
A key theme for which the human rights implications of targeted killing can be seen, more 
broadly, to evince is that of the ambiguity which surrounds the lawfulness of state-sponsored 
deprivation of life. Indeed, these ambiguities are crucial to establishing the context in which 
the UK Government sought to justify its actions in relation to the targeted killing of Reyaad 
Khan, which, in turn, can be seen to have important implications for the constitutional 
position of those actions. 
 
A. The Targeted Killing of Reyaad Khan: Unlawful, but ‘Constitutional’? 
 
In a statement to the House of Commons, the then Prime Minister, David Cameron, 
acknowledged the unprecedented nature of the targeted killing of Reyaad Khan: 
 
[I]s this the first time in modern times that a British asset has been used to conduct a strike in a country 
where we are not involved in a war? The answer to that is yes. Of course, Britain has used remotely 
piloted aircraft in Iraq and Afghanistan, but this is a new departure, and that is why I thought it was 
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But there was some ambiguity as to what, exactly, was meant by the Prime Minister’s 
reference to ‘a new departure’. This is symptomatic of the fact that there were two 
immediately relevant contexts in which the killing of Khan could have been considered to 
have represented such a ‘new departure’.
120
 
The first relates to the operation of the War Powers Convention. Indeed, from this 
perspective, much turns on the location in which Khan was killed. Two previous instances in 
which the terms and expectations of the Convention had been triggered produced the 
definitive answer that the House of Commons did not support British military intervention 
specifically in Syria: in August 2013, in the context of the Assad regime’s use of chemical 
weapons and the developing humanitarian crisis in Syria;
121
 and in September 2014, in which 
the Commons voted in support of airstrikes against Da’esh in Iraq, subject to the explicit 
caveat that airstrikes do not extend to Syrian territory.
122
 Fikfak and Hooper note that it was 
therefore the Prime Minister’s intention to characterise the action as ‘a new departure’ in an 
attempt to ‘avoid the [Government’s] previous defeat (2013), and the decision of Parliament 
prohibiting action in Syria (2014)’.
123
 
In what has been described as a ‘generous’ interpretation of the Government’s action,
124
 
the JCHR was prepared to accept the operation of the War Powers Convention as an adequate 
explanation for the Prime Minister’s remarks: 
 
We are satisfied that the strike on Reyaad Khan was a new departure in terms of the domestic 
constitutional convention governing the use of military force abroad. It was not, however, a new 
departure in the sense of being a use of lethal force outside of armed conflict, because we accept, as a 
matter of international law, that it was part of the wider armed conflict with ISIL/Da’esh already taking 




The airstrike which killed Khan and two others was therefore unprecedented, a ‘new 
departure’, in that, for the first time since the emergence of the War Powers Convention, the 
Government had invoked the ‘emergency’ exception for which the Convention allows in 
exceptional circumstances. 
Though, the second context in which the killing of Khan could be said to have represented 
a ‘new departure’ is perhaps the more convincing—indeed, perhaps the more consequential. 
From this perspective, talk of a ‘new departure’ is in reference to the apparent shift in the 
Government’s broader legal position on the issue of targeted killing, per se.
126
 Yet, in this 
sense, the operation of the War Powers Convention can be seen to obscure the serious 
ambiguities in this legal position, as articulated—or perhaps not—in the aftermath of Khan’s 
killing. As Christof Heyns et al note, ‘for a particular drone strike to be lawful, it must satisfy 
the legal requirements under all applicable international legal regimes, namely: the law 
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regulating the use of force (ius ad bellum); international humanitarian law and international 
human rights law’.
127
 Further:  
 
[T]he legality of a drone strike under the ius ad bellum does not preclude the wrongfulness of that 
strike under international humanitarian law or international human rights law, and that since those latter 
obligations are owed to individuals, one State cannot consent to their violation by another State. 
 
The Government failed to defend a coherent legal position on the killing of Khan, instead 
resting its actions on multiple, often contradictory, legal bases in international law.
128
 The 
effect of the Government’s oscillating between, in fact, directly contradicting legal positions 
situated the airstrike which killed Khan and two others within the scope of two wholly 
incongruous (international) legal frameworks. On one hand, the Government contended that 
the drone strike had been conducted within the operational remit of the wider coalition 
military action against Da’esh in Iraq, to which the UK was party at the relevant point in 
time.
129
 The applicable legal framework against which the lawfulness of the Government’s 
actions is assessed in these circumstances is thus the jus in bello, or ‘international 
humanitarian law’ (IHL). Yet, the Prime Minister informed the House of Commons that 
Khan was killed by a British military asset outside an area considered by the UK to be an 
active theatre of armed conflict.
130
 And so in these circumstances, the UK’s obligations under 
the jus ad bellum and international human rights law (IHRL) are given rise. 
Ultimately, on account of the dichotomy presented by the Government, there are, as Nehal 
Bhuta notes, ‘two different ways of understanding the targeted killing’.
131
 They are primarily 
distinguished by the balance struck between the distinct legal and constitutional ramifications 
of the Government’s actions. For instance, the legal dimensions of the former scenario are, 
when compared to the latter, largely unproblematic. Insofar as it is accepted that the UK was, 
at the time of the strike, engaged in a ‘non-international armed conflict’ with Da’esh, the 
legality of the killing primarily rests on whether the jus in bello principles of ‘distinction’, 
‘proportionality’, ‘military necessity’ and ‘unnecessary suffering’ have been sufficiently 
adhered to. As Bhuta suggests, this version of events ‘does not require any kind of radical re-
interpretation of international law governing the use of force’; rather, the main controversy 
this creates centres on ‘some difficult constitutional and public law questions for the UK 
government’.
132
 That is, the Government’s sanctioning of the use of force in Syria, albeit as 
part of a wider military engagement against Da’esh in Iraq, has direct implications for the 
authority of the nascent constitutional convention concerning parliamentary assent to the 
Government’s use-of-force-decision-making. Given that, on 26 September 2014, the House 
of Commons supported the Government’s motion on military intervention against Da’esh in 
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Iraq on the explicit condition that it did not extend to Syria,
133
 the killing of Khan plainly 
undermines that authority. 
It is the extent to which the Government was prepared to defend the lawfulness of its 
actions in the latter scenario—that is, where the context situated Khan outside of an active 
area of armed conflict—which prompted an escalation in parliamentary scrutiny as to the 
Government’s policy on targeted killing, as considered in Section III, above.
134
 Bhuta 
suggests that these circumstances in fact bring about a ‘sea-change’ in the Government’s 
broader legal position on the use of force, that position now appearing to have been closely 
aligned ‘with several US legal positions in the ‘war on terror’ which, hitherto, no European 
state has formally embraced’.
135
 The report by the JCHR also highlights the conspicuous 
parallels between what the Government appeared to be attempting to achieve in its legal 
machinations on the killing of Khan and the controversial counter-terrorism paradigms 
espoused by successive US Governments in the post-9/11 era:  
 
The United States has caused controversy in the years since 9/11 by arguing that it is involved in a 
single, global non-international armed conflict with Al Qaida, so that the permissive rules of the Law 
of War, rather than the stricter rules of human rights law, apply to the use of lethal force against 




The legal position defended by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons was entirely at 
odds with that explained, in a letter to the UN Security Council, by the UK Permanent 
Representative to the UN. Whereas the former relied only on the ‘UK’s inherent right to self-
defence’ as the legal basis for the airstrike, giving explicit assurances that the Government’s 
actions were ‘not part of coalition military action against ISIL in Syria’, the latter reneged on 
that assurance, indicating the lawfulness of military action taken against Da’esh/ISIL in Syria 
in ‘the collective self-defence of Iraq’
137
 and thereby offering that as an equally adequate 
legal justification for the airstrike. 
For present purposes, the upshot of these developments is that they expose the deeply 
fraught questions surrounding the lawfulness of such action, and indeed the awkward reality 
for the UK Government seemingly intent on following the trail blazed by the US in its 
aggressive military response to the contemporary terrorist threat. Above all, the UK 
Government’s interpretation of the international legal framework relating to the use of armed 
force—and therefore, by extension, any such ‘policy’ of targeted killing it might be seen to 
have developed—is found wanting. In its inquiry into the Government’s use of drones, the 
JCHR reiterated that 
 
When dealing with an issue of such grave importance, taking a life in order to protect lives, the 
Government should have been crystal clear about the legal basis for this action from the outset. They 
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were not. Between the statements of the Prime Minister, the Permanent Representative to the UN and 




It is of particular significance, however, that the Committee was ultimately willing to ‘accept 
that in extreme circumstances such uses of lethal force abroad may be lawful, even outside of 
armed conflict’: 
 
Indeed, in certain extreme circumstances, human rights law may even impose a duty to use such lethal 
force in order to protect life. How wide the Government’s policy is, however, depends on the 
Government’s understanding of its legal basis. Too wide a view of the circumstances in which it is 
lawful to use lethal force outside areas of armed conflict risks excessively blurring the lines between 
counter-terrorism law enforcement and the waging of war by military means, and may lead to the use 




The problem, fundamentally, is that in reality these issues can be seen to evince the broader 
undermining of the War Powers Convention, seemingly as a matter of policy. In other words, 
accepting that targeted killing could be lawful and thus legitimate albeit in ‘extreme 
circumstances’ would, in any such event, perhaps give a plausible explanation that the 
‘emergency exception’ to Parliament’s ex ante role in scrutinising the deployment of armed 
forces was in play. After all, targeted killing of this kind is inherently ad hoc and reactive, 
and so it is structurally always going to be an ‘emergency’ rather than a large scale action, 
very clearly calling into question whether the War Powers Convention will, of itself, ever be 
able to deal with this. The Committee’s role, here, effectively entrenches the ‘emergency’ 
exception as, in fact, the norm, and thus shifts the otherwise clear expectation(s) of the War 
Powers Convention to one in which Parliament’s role is merely to be consulted after the 
fact—indeed, when the horse has bolted, as it were.  
 
B. ‘Outsourcing’ the Domestic Legal basis for Targeted Killing? 
 
The case of Reyaad Khan thus offers several important insights as to the role of international 
law in “constitutionalising” the Government’s targeted killing endeavours. As outlined above, 
in those circumstances the Government sought to justify its actions by covering as many 
plausible (international) legal bases as possible, to the point that they, in fact, directly 
contradicted one another. It may be, of course, that this simply suggests the Government’s 
recognition of international law’s overriding monopoly on the use of force. Though, that 
would perhaps be too generous a reading. Indeed, the precariousness of that reading is 
particularly exposed when considered, for instance, in the light of the absence since 2015 of 
the explicit commitment previously included in the Ministerial Code, that Ministers ‘comply 
with the law including international law and treaty obligations’.
140
 Rather, the distinct 
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emphasis by the Government on quantifying rather than qualifying the international legal 
basis of its actions is perhaps more convincingly explained, therefore, as an attempt to misuse 
international law for domestic political (constitutional) purposes. Those purposes, again, 
include legitimising by “legalising” the exercise of power—here the royal prerogative power 
to deploy UK armed forces abroad—the relevant constitutional position of which is, in 
practice, deeply ambiguous. 
The Government’s practice suggests that it is only seriously willing to make the case for 
the targeted killing of terrorist suspects (including those of British nationality) in overseas 
locations. The question which presents itself, as the corollary of this, is whether the 
constitutional position of targeted killing is entirely contingent on the international 
dimension of that action—whether, in other words, the international dimension of a targeted 
killing operation is, of itself, ultimately determinative of the extent to which the 
Government’s targeted killing policy may be legitimately implemented as a matter of UK 
constitutional law. If this is the case—and indeed it does appear to be the case—it results in a 
peculiar state of affairs in which the domestic legal basis, plainly an essential factor in 
establishing the constitutionality of the Government’s targeted killing endeavours, has, in 
effect, been “outsourced” to the international legal framework. 
This has a number of significant implications for the nature and extent of the 
Government’s targeted killing policy, particularly where the target of that counter-terrorism 
action is a British national. The potential for the Government to engage exclusively in 
international legal argumentation ultimately obscures questions of fundamental domestic 
legal and constitutional import, not least as to whether the Government is or could be 
empowered within the UK constitution to target and kill British citizens, albeit for the 
purposes of counter-terrorism. In (not so improbable) circumstances involving the absence of 
unequivocal, even persuasive, international legal justification, the key question is: might the 
Government be willing, indeed constitutionally able, to rest its targeted killing counter-
terrorism strategy on an entirely domestic legal basis? This question necessitates 
consideration of the interaction between primary sources of the constitution, that legal basis 
being, again, as a matter of orthodoxy, the royal prerogative; the exercise of that power being 
subject the terms of the War Powers Convention, as a constitutional arrangement of a 
politically binding character; and the broader constitutional commitment to the principle of 
the rule of law.
141
 Notwithstanding the courts’ customary light-touch scrutiny of prerogative 
powers relating to national security,
142
 it stands to reason that a legal power derived from an 
undemocratic source of the constitution, conferred upon the executive, to execute individuals, 
including those of British nationality, cannot readily be squared with a broader constitutional 
commitment to the rule of law. 
The interaction between domestic and international legal frameworks on the use of force 
thus produces an anomalous outcome in the scheme of the UK’s constitutional arrangements 
and, particularly, the position of the Government’s targeted killing policy within those 
arrangements. Namely, the Government is constitutionally empowered to act in a particular 
way outside of the UK’s jurisdiction that it seemingly is not (or, at least, would not appear to 
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seriously contemplate) within that jurisdiction. In other words, the Government’s approach to 
targeted killing has been to imply that it is constitutionally legitimate to target and kill its own 
citizens in foreign jurisdictions, without judicial oversight, whether or not as part of an 
ongoing armed conflict situation, where to do so within the UK would likely be widely 
considered unconstitutional, and give rise to the risk of criminal responsibility on behalf of 
those involved in the targeted killing operation.
143
 
Since the circumstances of the targeted killing of Reyaad Khan, in practice the 
Government now routinely seeks to justify its increasing reliance on the use of (armed) 
drones with reference principally to international law. In 2016, the response of Penny 
Mordaunt, as then Minister for the Armed Forces, to oral questions in the House of Commons 
about the lawfulness of the Government’s policy on targeted killing is paradigmatic of this 
approach: 
 
We have been very clear that this is guided by international law. Where there is an identified, direct 
and immediate threat to the United Kingdom, and where we have no other means of dealing with it, we 




Indeed, that statement is now reflected in the latest version of ‘CONTEST’, which confines to 
one short paragraph the Government’s willingness to resort to lethal force for the purposes of 
counter-terrorism: 
 
We are clear that where we identify an imminent threat to the UK, which could include a terrorist 
threat, we will take lawful action to address it. Lethal force would only be used as a last resort when all 
other options have been exhausted, and we would always do so in accordance with international law 




This statement perhaps speaks to a broadly orthodox account both of the availability, in law, 
of the right to use force and of the relationship between (and priority accorded to) domestic 
and international legal frameworks on the use of force within the UK’s constitutional 
arrangements. It is, after all, a truism that questions concerning the lawfulness of the use of 
force (including targeted killing) in international law are ultimately independent of questions 
as to the propriety or legitimacy of legal and/or constitutional arrangements in accordance 
with which that use of force is authorised on the domestic plane.
146
 Equally, international 
legal questions are customarily treated as non-justiciable by domestic courts in the UK.
147
 
And so in this sense, the Government’s exclusive emphasis on international legal justification 
may signal a broader attempt to evade domestic legal accountability for the implementation 
of its targeted killing policy.  
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That the statement is silent as to the domestic legal arrangements relating to the initiation 
of and accountability for the use of force may, however, be read as perpetuating a more 
consequential state of affairs with important constitutional ramifications. This involves, in 
effect, the “outsourcing” of those arrangements to the international legal framework. The 
Government’s willingness to be ‘guided by international law’ thus potentially serves above 
all as a means to evade domestic constitutional accountability in terms of parliamentary 
oversight, but also questions about the authority structures in which these powers exist. 
Again, the international legal framework is ignorant as to the domestic process on which the 
lawful engagement of that framework ultimately depends. To wave all of this away as simply 
a matter of international law is, consequently, to shift the locus of legal authority for the use 
of force onto the legal framework which governs interstate armed conflict (that is, the ‘jus ad 
bellum’). Indeed, that framework is to be preferred to international human rights law 
(IHRL)—which nevertheless also applies to the state-sponsored deprivation of life outside of 
armed conflict situations—for it allows for a greater degree of latitude in the (lawful) use of 
lethal force; IHRL subjects the deprivation of life to more stringent conditions, imposing 
upon the state the obligation to prove that the use of lethal force falls within a limited scope 
of possible derogations from the protections afforded to the targeted individual.
148
  
The constitutional implications of this are most starkly illustrated in circumstances where 
(as in the case of Reyaad Khan) the targeted individual is a British citizen. For, in fact, the 
individual’s status as a British citizen is ultimately rendered inconsequential within the 
framework relating to interstate armed conflict. The conduct of international relations 
between states is, from a constitutional perspective, a matter for the Government alone, 
exercising political judgment.
149
 And so a seemingly anomalous state of affairs is established 
in which the Government’s actions appear to imply that it is constitutionally legitimate to 
target and kill its own citizens (albeit for the purposes of counter-terrorism), whether or not as 
part of an existing armed conflict situation, without domestic judicial oversight, so long as 
this takes place in a foreign jurisdiction—simply “out there” or “somewhere other” than the 
UK. Ultimately, very dubious assumptions of constitutionality flow from the question of 
legality in this instance. On one hand: better, it seems, to argue that the power to target and 
kill (say, by drone-strike) a British citizen, albeit for the purposes of counter-terrorism, 
derives from and is conditioned by the international legal framework rather than the royal 
prerogative. The former, ostensibly founded on mutual respect for the sovereignty of 
individual nation-states, the principle of reciprocity, and so forth, seemingly confers a level of 
democratic legitimacy upon such an egregious power (and its use) which the latter, an 
ancient, undemocratic source of the constitution, plainly cannot achieve alone. Yet, on the 
other hand, the key point is that domestic political accountability mechanisms are shown to 
have very little, if any, impact on these issues. Rather, the Government’s framing of the 
targeted killing of terrorist suspects as an essentially international legal issue radically 
suppresses very important questions about the authority structures, and mechanisms of 
political accountability, within the domestic constitution.  
                                                          
148 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as 
amended) (ECHR) art 2; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 
23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 171 (ICCPR) art 6. 







This chapter has shown that the UK Government’s targeted killing ‘policy’—indeed, whether 
or not the Government would publicly acknowledge the existence of such a policy—is above 
all contingent on the international dimensions of the contemporary terrorist threat. The 
constitutional implications of this are striking. For this has produced an intensely 
controversial state of affairs, whereby a critical source of the domestic constitutional 
legitimacy of the Government’s targeted killing counter-terrorism policy—that is, its 
domestic legal basis—appears to have, in effect, though perhaps by design, been “colonised” 
by the international legal framework which governs the use of force. 
On one hand, there are clear benefits to exploring these issues from the distinctive 
perspective of political constitutionalism. One important benefit, for instance, is that political 
constitutionalism provides critical resources with which to explore an evident felt need 
amongst institutional actors in the UK—certainly in this context as much as any—to 
legitimise-by-“legalising” the exercise of power. It is from this critical perspective that an 
important dynamic can clearly be seen to emerge: that very dubious assumptions as to the 
constitutionality of targeted killing can be seen to flow from the emphasis on its (purported) 
legality. Thus, when contrasted with ‘legal’ constitutionalism, from which perspective 
international law—inasmuch as domestic law—would perhaps readily accept the former as a 
discrete source of legal authority for the actions of domestic institutional actors, a political 
constitutionalist approach gives cause to distrust the democratic credentials of that ostensible 
source of authority. 
Yet, equally, these issues ultimately raise a number of important questions concerning a 
potential weakness of political constitutionalism as an explanatory tool. For what has been 
described in this chapter as the effective “outsourcing” of the domestic legal basis for 
targeted killing leads also, and equally, to the writing-out of the constitutional ‘picture’ in this 
context the domestic political accountability and authority structures within which these 
powers exist. That, in other words, all of this increasingly takes place outside of a democratic 
framework very clearly creates problems for an explanatory approach which espouses the 
essential constitutional—and constitutionalising—role of democratic politics. It is perhaps 
also unclear whether a policy of targeted killing of terrorist suspects could be (re-
)accommodated by or within domestic accountability arrangements, and particularly whether, 
and if so to what extent, the ostensible democratic politics of this process are truly of the sort 
embraced in political constitutionalist theory. Indeed, one possible solution is to reinvigorate 
existing arrangements, most obviously those instituted by the War Powers Convention: in 
other words, to do this ‘better’.
150
 Perhaps, alternatively, only an Act of Parliament—a ‘War 
Powers Act’—conferring on the UK Government an explicit legal power to engage in 
targeted killing operations, or alternatively prohibiting such action altogether, is the only 
means to truly democratise the exercise of state power in this context. Whatever the answer, 
it is clear, in the meantime, that the current state of affairs is deeply unsatisfactory from a 
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democratic perspective. The key point to note here, however, is this: it is only with the 
broader set of critical resources which political constitutionalism provides—that is, above and 
beyond a narrow and problematic emphasis on legality and rule-of-law lip service—that these 













Through exploring the various ways in which the insights of political constitutionalism are 
brought to bear on counter-terrorism law and policy in the UK, this thesis makes three key 
contributions to constitutional studies. First, the thesis has shown the utility, and 
contemporary relevance, of political constitutionalism as providing a distinctive perspective 
on the inter-relation of (constitutional) law and politics in the UK. Secondly, the thesis has 
shown that this perspective highlights a number of key themes of the UK’s contemporary 
counter-terrorism response(s) in particular, and as such can be seen to deepen our 
understanding of counter-terrorism law and policy in practice. And thirdly, the thesis has 
shown how various contemporary developments in UK counter-terrorism law and policy in 
turn generate important insights for the potential development of the theory of political 
constitutionalism itself. 
 
1. The Utility of Political Constitutionalism 
 
A key argument developed throughout this thesis is that political constitutionalism has 
particular value as an explanatory lens through which to explore the role(s) and inter-relation 
of law and politics in and of the UK constitution: one which emphasises, fundamentally, and 
thus provides key conceptual resources with which to critique, the contestability and 
contingency of constitutional law and legal norms in particular contexts. Political 
constitutionalism can thus be seen, above all, to provide a vital corrective to legalistic 
analyses which otherwise foreground and (over-)emphasise the practical significance of such 
legal norms within these contexts. Rather, it emphasises the inherently political character of 
constitutional law: that ‘constitutional law does not stand above politics: they are two sides of 
one coin’.
1
 And as such, it entails an approach to the study of the constitution which 
recognises that the exercise of power by the state is sustained by a broader political discourse, 
within which law operates as one—albeit important—form of political interaction, but is 
political nonetheless.
2
 The classic expression of this point is John Griffith’s: ‘politics is what 
happens in the continuance or resolution of … conflicts [within a political community] … 
[a]nd law is one means, one process, by which those conflicts are continued or may be 
                                                          
1 Keith Ewing, ‘The Politics of the British Constitution’ [2000] PL 405, 436. 






 One must be distrustful, Griffith argued, of the capacity of law and 
legal norms, in and of themselves, to resolve the many and various questions and conflicts 
and tensions which provoke political debate: ‘[o]ver-simple, conservative diagnosis of our 
ills—that minority Governments have too much power and need to be restrained by written 
constitutions and a supreme court, and the rest—take us no step nearer the resolution of 
conflicts or at least their voluntary containment’.
4
 Nor, equally, ‘will we find even temporary 
solutions in appeals to reference points like social solidarity, the conscience of mankind or 
justice or fairness or fundamental legal principles’: indeed, these ‘cannot be guidelines for 
legislative or administrative activity, because such principles, in their application to particular 
situations, are the very questions which divide not unify opinion’.
5
 
In many ways this might simply be considered to represent the application of political 
constitutionalism in a conventional sense—that is, as a normative critique of ‘legal’ 
constitutionalism, of ‘law’, of the judicial process, and so on. In Chapter 1, the potential 
limitations of the particular normative dimensions of political constitutionalism were shown 
to have been the focus of growing criticism in the academic literature. It suffices to reiterate 
here that the premise of the so-called ‘normative turn’ in the development of the theory of 





—has been perceived to involve the distortion of Griffith’s core arguments 
in ‘The Political Constitution’, engendering, moreover, an ‘oppositional narrative’ within 
contemporary constitutional scholarship, whereby UK constitution is bifurcated into two 
competing ‘models’ of constitutional accountability: ‘legal’ and ‘political’.
8
 In this rendition, 
political constitutionalism is said to represent a ‘model’ constitutional arrangement which 
posits the parliamentary process as the most normatively desirable means by which 
constitutional actors—including, most obviously, the executive—may be ‘limited’ in the 
exercise of political power. The justifications for this are typically given in terms of 
Parliament’s effectiveness and democratic legitimacy vis-à-vis the (alternative) judicial 
process, both as a means of enhancing the liberty of the individual in a political community, 
and of valorising the republican and/or collectivist potential of political decision-making. 
Yet, in this sense, political constitutionalism’s normative critique of legal constitutionalism is 
thus said to ground an approach to constitutional studies which caricatures both ‘law’ and 
‘politics’, and archetype ‘legal’ and ‘political’ institutions (courts and Parliament, 
respectively): ‘the political constitution’ is distinguished from, and crucially locked in 
opposition with, ‘the legal constitution’, and ultimately presented as a highly stylised view of 
“the good constitution” in which politics trumps law. 
The argument in this thesis engages with, and thus responds to, this (mis)characterisation 
of political constitutionalism. Specifically, this thesis has shown that political 
constitutionalism’s distinctly critical approach to the role (and especially the limits) of law in 
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specific constitutional contexts can be seen to have particular and enduring value, above and 
beyond, that is, the ways in which this approach has been developed in the work of Tomkins 
and Bellamy, for instance. Above all, such an approach need not be seen to espouse the 
necessary exclusion of law and legal argumentation, and by extension the courts or the 
common law more generally, from such contexts. Leaving to one side the question of whether 
or not that were even possible, rather the key point is that in showing the limits of law as a 
means of conditioning the exercise of political power, one can obtain an understanding of 
how the constitution ‘works’ in practice. Political constitutionalism has value, therefore, as a 
critique of the explanatory potential of ‘legal’ constitutionalism, crucially revealing the 
balance of power as it actually exists in specific, real-world (as opposed to hypothetical or 
abstract) contexts. The key benefits of this approach are shown throughout its application in 
this thesis: it explains that, certainly in those counter-terrorism contexts explored here, 
political institutions not only typically overcome any legal obstacles which might prevent the 
exercise of power in certain (often controversial) ways, but also that the legitimating 
structures of law and legal argumentation can be, and are, exploited as a means to justify such 
uses of power. 
Of course, it is important to note the potential pitfalls to this approach, including, perhaps, 
that an essentially descriptive mode of study of the UK constitution might appear to strip the 
constitution of its values. Indeed, it is one thing to accept the ebb and flow of democratic 
political decision-making as a viable explanation for the contestability and contingency of the 
constitution—that, ultimately, ‘the constitution is no more and no less than what happens’.
9
 
And yet, in the context of counter-terrorism as much as any, in which the standard democratic 
justifications for the exercise of power are very often tenuous, there is clearly scope to 
question the extent to which this might ‘threate[n] to cloak irresponsible, unaccountable and 
even authoritarian government power in the reassuringly respectable garb of the British 
constitutional tradition’.
10
 Political constitutionalism thus has a distinct explanatory value, but 
this, of itself, can be seen to reveal key tensions which themselves might not be easily 
resolved by mere description. Though, crucially, once these tensions are revealed, political 
constitutionalism provides a broader set of analytical resources—beyond, that is, legal norms 
such as the rule of law and principle(s) of legality—against which (normative) critique of 
these tensions can be better developed.  
 
2. Key Themes of the UK’s Contemporary Counter-Terrorism Response(s) 
 
A second key contribution of this thesis is that in bringing the critical insights of political 
constitutionalism to bear on various contemporary developments in UK counter-terrorism law 
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(i) Political constitutionalism as a critique of legalism and the ‘language’ of rights 
 
The first theme can be seen very clearly to emerge from the discussion in Chapter 2 
(‘Deprivation of Liberty’). In that chapter, it is argued that there are a number of compelling 
reasons to be sceptical about whether the various stages of the development of a modern era 
of ‘executive detention’ in the UK can be seen to represent a ‘vindication’ of the Human 
Rights Act 1998 per se, and of the contemporary human rights paradigm more generally. 
Rather, the most convincing reading of the role of the HRA (specifically, and human rights 
paradigm more broadly) in that context, it is argued, is that of its having inculcated in the 
process of establishing the constitutional position of (counter-terrorism) deprivation of liberty 
the language and, ultimately, the legalism of the human rights discourse. Thus, drawing on 
the now well-established ‘democratic scepticism’ scholarship which has grown up in this 
particular area of the counter-terrorism literature (especially in Keith Ewing’s work), the 
chapter argues that the HRA/human rights law has had an obscuring rather than consolidating 
effect on the constitutional position of deprivation of liberty: the centrality of rights-discourse 
has seen the increasingly artificial, legalistic distinction between ‘deprivation’ and mere 
‘restriction’ of liberty, under art. 5 of the European Convention on Human Rights, entrenched 
as the guiding principles by which debates surrounding the constitutional position of ‘liberty’ 
are to be settled. 
Indeed, a sceptical approach to human rights is a perennial theme of political 
constitutionalist theory—one which, again, can be seen to resonate with the key insights of 
Griffith’s 1978 Chorley Lecture. The contemporary salience of Griffith’s insights are 
striking, not least in the context of counter-terrorism deprivation of liberty. For as Griffith 
wrote: 
 
In [a] political, social sense there are no over-riding human rights. No right to freedom, to trial before 
conviction, to representation before taxation. No right not to be tortured, not to be summarily executed. 
Instead there are political claims by individuals and by groups. One danger of arguing from rights is 





A key contribution of this thesis, therefore, is that it highlights an area of contemporary 
constitutional practice in which the danger that Griffith describes—crucially from the 
perspective of ‘the political constitution’—has materialised: questions of politics—that is, the 
appropriate constitutional position of ‘liberty’—are, in this area, presented as questions of 
law, with very tangible consequences. Egregious measures involving, for instance, 12-hour 
curfews and forced relocation (up to 200 miles from one’s family and home life), subject only 
to very low procedural thresholds, have in effect been judicially sanctioned under the HRA, 
and thus allowed to take root as a permanent feature of the contemporary counter-terrorism 




                                                          






(ii) The futility of the common law, and the contingency of rights-protection 
 
A second, though related theme (to the aforementioned) is that of the futility of the common 
law, which is shown to emerge, in particular, in Chapters 3 and 4. As discussed in Chapter 3 
(‘Deprivation of Privacy’), the common law’s historic, and indeed ongoing approach to the 
protection of privacy has been to resist the development of a negative right against 
interference by public authorities. The common law’s inadequacy as a source of legal 
protection of privacy in the UK, not least in areas of counter-terrorism law and policy, which 
involve often far-reaching invasions of privacy, therefore means that the constitutional 
position/protection of privacy is above all contingent, in practice, on the operation of the 
HRA/ECHR. In particular, the right to private and family life under art. 8 of the Convention 
has done much—indeed, more than anything else—to leverage a significant level of 
protection of (the right to) privacy in the UK, which, plainly, without it would not exist. 
Though this, consequently, has perpetuated a legal approach to the protection of privacy, 
which is evinced both at the domestic and supranational levels, in overwhelmingly formal or 
procedural terms: key developments in the legal protection of privacy have focused primarily 
on the relevant procedural safeguards, eschewing any real engagement with the substance of 
privacy, and the freedom(s) that they concept ought to be taken to encompass.  
A broader theme for which these issues can be seen to contribute a compelling evidence 
base is that of the (in)compatibility of common law constitutionalism, as a conceptual 
grounding for the constitutional position of privacy, with the ‘legal’ constitutionalism of 
(what might be described as the inherently ‘legal’ order of) the ECHR. Indeed, the common 
law’s abject record in the context of privacy perhaps reflects a fundamental clash between 
‘legal’ and ‘common law’ constitutionalism: that the common law has neither the conceptual 
tools for developing, much less enforcing, a repository of ‘fundamental’ constitutional 
rights—especially any such right which might be brought to bear on the protection of 
privacy. Rather, this is a limitation of the domestic courts’ self-proclaimed ‘broad brush’
12
 
approach to the protection of privacy, which relies primarily on the application of first 
principles of the rule of law, and which very clearly sets itself apart from the ECtHR’s 
otherwise textual and technical approach to the relevant legal safeguards required under art. 
8(2). Quite how, though, if at all, the rule of law comes down on the protection of privacy, 
per se, is entirely unclear. As also discussed in Chapter 3, in cases involving extraordinarily 
wide powers of (suspicionless) stop-and-search, neither the rule of law nor the derivative 
principle of legality were found to have any bearing on the lawfulness of those measures in 
any substantive sense. And while in the Privacy International litigation,
13
 rule-of-law 
principles were used to carve out a key area of substantive protection in the legal framework 
of surveillance powers, it fails to convince that this might properly be regarded as a victory 
for the protection of privacy, per se, whether in principle or, more importantly, in practice. In 
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both contexts, the general truth of the common law’s failure to protect privacy in and of itself 
holds true.  
As noted above, the futility of the common law also links thematically to the discussion in 
Chapter 4 (‘Deprivation of Property’). That chapter has shown that key tensions in and of the 
domestic and international law and politics of asset-freezing arise at their point of intersection 
in the domestic constitution in various, significant ways. And yet, several examples are 
highlighted which all point, fundamentally, to the incapacity of the rules, principles and 
standards of review developed in the common law to adequately resolve those tensions. In 
particular, Parliament’s response to the decision in HM Treasury v Ahmed,
14
 essentially 
involving a reversal of a judicial decision by a political institution, can perhaps be read as a 
stark example of the ‘end-point’ of legal/common law constitutionalism. Indeed, judicial 
demands for clear(er) legislative authority may, in principle, be read as having some 
justificatory value, perhaps even—as is so often reiterated by the courts—as a means of 
buttressing (rather than undermining) the democratic credentials of the parliamentary political 
process.
15
 And yet, given that such demands have not only consistently been met, but that 
Parliament has invariably provided for a domestic legal basis which far exceeds, both in 
nature and scope, that which came before, there is plainly little, if any, role for the common 
law to play beyond this point. 
 
3. Challenges for (the Development of) Political Constitutionalism 
 
There are thus many compelling insights to be gleaned from the theory of political 
constitutionalism, not least when it is applied to particular circumstances as a distinctive 
explanatory lens. Though, equally, and crucially, it is also a key argument of this thesis that 
practice—specifically, in this case, counter-terrorism law and policy—can be seen to throw 
up key challenges for the theory. And so whilst political constitutionalism has value as a 
distinctive lens through which to explore contemporary constitutional developments, when 
tested in hard contexts such as those explored in this thesis, the limitations of an approach 
which typically espouses the virtues of democratic governance, seldom its vices, are very 
clearly exposed. Two key challenges which emerge across a number of chapters necessitate 
particular inquiry: the continuing value of political constitutionalism depends on the extent to 
which it responds to, and thus potentially resolves, these challenges. 
 
(i) The role/status of international law and politics in the domestic constitution 
 
The first challenge for political constitutionalism concerns its approach to key tensions in the 
intersection of international and domestic law and politics, and the implications of those 
tensions for, and within the specific context of, domestic constitutional arrangements. Indeed, 
these tensions feature as a distinctive issue particularly in Chapters 4 and 5. In relation to the 
former, as noted above, it is the incapacity of the rules, principles and standards of review 
developed in the common law to adequately resolve these tensions which emerges as a key 
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issue in and of the complex constitutional position of asset-freezing. A key example is that, 
far from vindicating the UK Supreme Court’s principled stance in Ahmed, it was, in reality, 
international law/politics which forced Parliament to overturn the decision in that case, there 
being a legal obligation (within the UN Charter regime) for the UK to comply with the asset-
freezing mandates under UNSCRs 1267 and 1373. Thus, whatever ‘victory’ might be claimed 
by or for the common law, here—in its forcing a further intervention from Parliament (that is, 
to provide the requisite legal authority)—the key point is that any such ‘victory’ ultimately 
achieved nothing to diminish the basic constitutional reality of the UK’s dualist approach to 
international law: that executive action at the international (UN) level extends to the 
deprivation of ‘fundamental’ rights in ways that are untouched, in practice, by domestic legal 
arrangements. There is in the international arena, after all, an effective inversion of the (legal 
and political) hierarchy between Parliament and the executive which the principle of legality 
is liable to obscure: ultimately, it is the executive which ‘speaks’ for the UK on the 
international stage, not Parliament. 
In Chapter 5 (‘Deprivation of Life’), the international/domestic dynamic plays out in the 
context of the War Powers Convention, and the role that these arrangements appear to have 
carved out for international law as an ostensibly self-standing legitimating factor in uses of 
force where, crucially, domestic legal authority (for such a course of action) is itself 
ambiguous. This theme creates scope for a key critique of political constitutionalism itself—
that is, of how that framework conceives the status of international law in the domestic 
constitution. This is a key area in which the development of the theory of political 
constitutionalism might potentially generate new insights, not least insofar as the theory 
principally frames the inter-relation of law and politics exclusively in domestic terms. 
Moreover, there is a fundamental conceptual point to contend with, here: that of political 
constitutionalism’s distinctive conception of law as denoting politics simply ‘by some other 
means’. Thus, when contrasted with ‘legal’ constitutionalism, which would naturally perceive 
international law—inasmuch as domestic law—as a discrete source of legal authority for the 
actions of domestic institutional actors, a political constitutionalist approach to the role of 
international law, as effectively denoting international politics ‘by some other means’, raises 
a number of questions as to the democratic credentials of those politics, not least where they 
can be seen to penetrate domestic sites of political deliberation. The way in which the UK 
Government frames the issue of targeted killing of terrorist suspects ultimately as an 
international legal issue, as discussed in Chapter 5, thus potentially exposes the weakness of 
political constitutionalism as a lens through which to explore these dynamics. Rather, 
domestic political accountability mechanisms are shown to have very little, if any, impact in 
terms of counteracting the Government’s effective “outsourcing” of the legal basis for 
targeted killing. And so not only does this reveal that very dubious assumptions as to the 
constitutionality of such action are being made on the basis of its (purported) legality; it 
shows that very important questions about the authority structures within which these powers 
exist are being radically suppressed.  
A number of questions are thus raised as to how these issues could be (re-)accommodated 
within the domestic constitution, and how this process would or could be conceptualised from 
a political constitutionalist perspective. For instance, one political constitutionalist response 




ongoing debate as to the capacity of the War Powers Convention to organise domestic use-of-
force-authorisation arrangements presenting as one key example in this respect.
16
 Perhaps 
there is scope to reinvigorate Parliament’s scrutiny role under the Convention, for instance by 
limiting the circumstances in which the seemingly ever-expanding ‘emergency’ exception 
can be used to justify the bypassing of ex ante parliamentary debate on the use of drones. 
Alternatively, perhaps an Act of Parliament—a ‘War Powers Act’—conferring on the UK 
Government an explicit legal power to engage in targeted killing operations, or alternatively 
prohibiting such action altogether, is the only means to truly democratise the exercise of state 
power in this context. Whatever the answer, it is clear that the current state of affairs is 
deeply unsatisfactory from a democratic perspective. If, indeed, it should continue, a radical 
reimagining of the theory of political constitutionalism, recognising the constitutional impact 
of such novel, if increasingly unconventional modes of political contestation, is required. 
 
(ii) The ‘empowering’ dimensions of the constitution 
 
In foregrounding democracy as an empowering/legitimating force in the UK constitution, 
political constitutionalism has been shown to offer a vital corrective to liberal-legalist 
constitutional analyses which unduly focus on the constitution’s capacity to limit or constrain 
the exercise of state power. Yet, the theme of empowerment highlights another, potentially 
important, challenge for political constitutionalism itself. That is, there is scope to critique the 
various ways in which the constitution, or a particular constitutional arrangement, can be seen 
to empower state actors, even, if perhaps especially, in ways which might be considered 
undesirable from a democratic perspective. For instance, it is plainly a matter of fundamental 
democratic import that there exists within the UK constitution a legal power sourced in the 
royal prerogative, which can be, and is, used to target and kill British terrorist suspects, 
without domestic legal or political oversight. The inter-relation between the relevant law and 
politics in these circumstances are such as to empower the state in this way. And yet, there 
are a range of factors in this single example of very dubious (if any) democratic legitimacy: 
the fact that the domestic legal power derives from an anachronistic source of monarchical 
power; the absence of political oversight; the bare fact that it involves the arbitrary 
deprivation of life by the state, contrary to all manner of core international human rights 
standards. Each of these factors raise important questions as to how any of this might (if at 
all) be reconciled by/with political constitutionalism, which typically eulogises the 
constitutional—and constitutionalising—role of democratic politics. 
Indeed, these questions perhaps speak more broadly to a fundamental tension 
underpinning an approach to the study of the constitution which recognises as ‘constitutional’ 
that which simply ‘happens’—and indeed that the same must be true, equally, where ‘nothing 
happens’. Whilst, in other words, this might be a valuable approach to understanding how the 
constitution actually ‘works’, there is perhaps no way of distinguishing, from this 
perspective, between ‘a failed process or mechanism of political accountability and one 
which has operated as it should’.
17
 Political constitutionalism provides a necessary reminder 
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that in a constitutional democracy political power is not only constituted but continuously re-
constituted, and sustained by a broader, ongoing and unpredictable political discourse. A key 
question facing those who would seek to develop the theory, therefore, is whether there is 
very much to be gained from (over-)theorising the ‘politics’ of political constitutionalism in 
increasingly abstract terms. Before any such further stage in the development of the theory is 
explored, there should be a pause to (re-)consider the legitimating role of democratic politics 
within the practice of the political constitution. For as this thesis has shown, there is in fact a 
murky, deeply unedifying side to democratic politics, which is liable to legitimate uses and 
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